USA v. FREDERICKS et al

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
DIVISION OF ST. THOMAS AND ST. JOHN
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) Crim. No. 14-cr-33
)
v. )
)
ALVIN THOMAS, )
)
Defendant. )
_____________________________ )
ATTORNEYS:
Gretchen Shappert, United States Attorney
David White, AUSA
United States Attorney’s Office
St. Thomas, VI
For the United States of America,
Omodare Jupiter, FPD
Gabriel Villegas, AFPD
Office of the Federal Public Defender
For Alvin Thomas.
ORDER
Before the Court is the remand of the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals in this matter.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY
On March 15, 2014, several individuals robbed First
Imperial Jewelers (“Imperial”) on St. Thomas, United States
Virgin Islands. The Virgin Islands Police Department (“VIPD”)
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United States v. Thomas
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was alerted to the robbery by an alarm being activated at
Imperial.
A chase of the suspects ensued. VIPD observed and radioed
the location and direction of the suspects’ flight while in
pursuit. During the pursuit, VIPD apprehended Alvin Thomas
(“Thomas”) and transported him to a police precinct where he
made incriminating statements to the police.
On June 12, 2014, Shaquim Fredericks (“Fredericks”), Warkim
Gabriel (“Gabriel”), Chefton Newton (“Newton”), and Thomas
(collectively “the defendants”) were indicted on various charges
related to the March 15, 2014, robbery of Imperial. Thomas filed
a motion to suppress the incriminating statements he made on
that date.
At a July 14, 2014, omnibus hearing, the Court heard the
testimony of Officers Derick Greaves (“Greaves”) and Dora Theda-
Charles (“Charles”). The testimony of Greaves and Charles
provided the following details. On March 15, 2014, Central
Dispatch, the radio transmission and communication division of
the VIPD, informed VIPD officers that an armed robbery was in
progress. Central Dispatch further informed the officers that
the suspects were fleeing towards Back Street, a road located in
downtown Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas. Greaves proceeded towards
Back Street to provide assistance.
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As Greaves proceeded towards Back Street, Greaves received
another radio transmission. An officer stated “that one of the
suspects had passed her going [to] Vester Gade.” Transcript of
July 14, 2017, Omnibus Hearing: Testimony of Derick Greaves, ECF
No. 96 at 38:3-4. Shortly thereafter, another call over the
radio stated “that suspects were fleeing up Fire Burn Hill
towards the Governor’s residence.” Id at 38:10-12. The suspects
were running. Transcript of July 14, 2017, Omnibus Hearing:
Testimony of Dora Theda-Charles, ECF No. 96 at 49:15-16
(“Because according to Central Dispatch, they -- certain
suspects were seeing [sic] running in that area.”). A final
radio transmission from an officer stated that the suspects were
proceeding through some bushes and that a firearm had been
discharged.
At approximately 10:00 am, Greaves stopped his vehicle in
front of the Governor’s residence. While preparing his
bulletproof vest, Greaves witnessed Thomas exiting the bushes.
Greaves ordered Thomas to lie on the ground. Thomas complied
with Greaves’s order. Greaves testified that while Thomas was
complying, Thomas stated that “some guys were in the bushes with
guns and [I] saw them, got scared and []ran.” Id. at 38:24-25.
While Thomas was complying with Greaves’s order, Charles arrived
on the scene. Charles observed that Thomas “had little bits of
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United States v. Thomas
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brush on him, []was sweaty, and []was shaking.” Id. at 58:25-
59:1. Greaves handcuffed Thomas. After handcuffing Thomas,
Greaves left Thomas with Charles. Greaves left to investigate a
location where police had apprehended another suspect.
At the omnibus hearing, Thomas, in relevant part,
testified:
I was walking on the road close by government
mansion, heading into the Garden Street area.
. . .
Q. What happened when you came in contact with
police?
A. Well, I was walking and then I heard
“Freeze. Don’t move. Get on the ground.”
Q. Did you see who said that?
A. No.
Q. Did you comply?
A. Yes.
Q. What happened next?
A. When I got on the ground, the officer came,
put handcuffs on me, asked me where the
others. I tell him, “I don’t know.” And he
pick me up and carry me over to the police
car.
Transcript of July 14, 2017, Omnibus Hearing: Testimony of Alvin
Thomas, ECF No. 96 at 116:6-117:1.
Charles escorted Thomas back to her squad car. Charles
advised Thomas of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona and placed
Charles in the squad car. Charles held Thomas in her vehicle for
roughly an hour until she was ordered to transport Thomas to
Callwood Command, a VIPD precinct in St. Thomas. Thomas was not
questioned while he was held in the squad car.
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Detective Sehkera Tyson (“Tyson”) also testified at the
omnibus hearing. Tyson explained that at Callwood Command, the
defendants were processed in a location referred to as the
“booking room.” Thomas and another two of the defendants were in
the booking room at the same time. In the booking room, all of
the defendants were able to see each other. VIPD officers
proceeded to provide the three defendants with forms advising
the defendants of their Miranda rights. Thomas informed Tyson
that he wished to make a statement. Tyson advised Thomas of his
Miranda rights. Thomas signed the form indicating that he
understood his rights. Tyson did not take a statement from
Thomas at that time due to concerns about Thomas’s safety.
Tyson’s concerns arose from the fact that two of the other
defendants were in an area where they might be able to see
Thomas as Thomas gave a statement to Tyson. Shortly before 4:30
pm, detectives Sophia Rashid (“Rashid”) and Nigel James
(“James”) took Thomas to an interview room in order to take
Thomas’s statement in private.
James, who also testified at the omnibus hearing, testified
as to what occurred when Thomas was in the interview room. The
interview room is a ten foot by ten foot room that contained a
desk and three chairs. In the interview room, James read Thomas
his Miranda rights. Throughout the course of the conversation,
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Thomas, James, Rashid, and ATF Special Agent Bennie Mims were
all present. James presented Thomas with a fresh form explaining
to Thomas his Miranda rights. Thomas signed the form in two
different locations. The first location indicates that Thomas
understood his rights. The second location indicates that Thomas
wished to waive his rights. James then proceeded to take
Thomas’s statement. Thomas proceeded to describe to James how
the defendants orchestrated the robbery. Notably, James
testified that Thomas described hearing a shot in the bushes
when he went there after the robbery. James also testified that
Thomas stated that he went out into the street heading toward
Garden Street, and while going out in the street, was
apprehended by police. In total, Thomas’s interview lasted
roughly between 90 minutes and two hours. Throughout the
interview, Thomas was calm and forthcoming. The officers asked
their questions in a calm manner.
Thomas’s recollection of events that occurred after his
arrest were significantly different from James’s. Thomas
testified that at Callwood Command he was repeatedly asked if he
wanted to give a statement. Thomas asserts that he repeatedly
stated he did not. Furthermore, he testified that various VIPD
officers promised that if Thomas made a statement, that Thomas
would be able to leave, graduate from school, and even join the
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military if Thomas so chose. Thomas testified that he signed a
form waiving his Miranda rights. Ultimately, Thomas testified
that he only did what VIPD requested in order to return home.
At the end of omnibus hearing, the Court denied Thomas’s
motion to suppress.
After the omnibus hearing, the matter proceeded to trial.
On July 23, 2014, a jury found the defendants guilty of
conspiracy to interfere with commerce by robbery, interference
with commerce by robbery, and conspiracy to possess a firearm in
furtherance of a crime of violence. The defendants appealed
their convictions.
In an April 7, 2017, opinion, the Third Circuit affirmed
all of the proceedings in this Court except for the Court’s
denial of Thomas’s motion to suppress. See United States v.
Fredericks, 684 Fed. Appx. 149, 157, 159-65 (3d Cir. 2017). The
Third Circuit vacated this Court’s order denying the motion to
suppress and remanded for this Court to determine whether there
was probable cause for Thomas’s arrest and, if not, whether his
statement was sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful arrest.
Id. at 157.
DISCUSSION
“The general rule in a criminal proceeding is that
statements and other evidence obtained as a result of an
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unlawful, warrantless arrest are suppressible if the link
between the evidence and the unlawful conduct is not too
attenuated.” INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1040-41
(1984) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)).
An arrest by a law enforcement officer without a warrant “is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment where there is probable
cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being
committed.” Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004).
Absent probable cause, evidence obtained from an arrest cannot
be used at trial to prove the defendant’s guilt. See Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482-89 (1976) (describing development of
the exclusionary rule, which proscribes courts from using
evidence obtained from illegal searches and seizures in criminal
trials); see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655
(1961) (incorporating exclusionary rule to state proceedings).
Probable cause exists where the totality of the
circumstances known to the officers at the time supported a fair
probability that the suspect had committed or was committing a
crime. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696
(1996); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949). Whether probable cause
exists is an objective inquiry. See Whren v. United States, 517
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U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in
ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”).
Even when the officers could have obtained an arrest
warrant, it is not necessary if the officers have probable
cause. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24
(1976) (noting the judicial preference for warrants but
“declin[ing] to transform this judicial preference into a
constitutional rule when the judgment of the Nation and Congress
has for so long been to authorize warrantless public arrests on
probable cause rather than to encumber criminal prosecutions
with endless litigation with respect to the existence of exigent
circumstances, whether it was practicable to get a warrant,
whether the suspect was about to flee, and the like.”).
ANALYSIS
The Court is tasked with determining whether Greaves had
probable cause to arrest Thomas. In making that assessment, the
Court must examine the totality of the circumstances to
determine whether the weight of information before the officer,
when coupled with the officer’s reasonable inferences,
established probable cause. See United States v. Yusuf, 461 F.3d
374, 390 (3d Cir. 2006) (discussing the cumulative weight of the
information in connection with the officer’s reasonable
inferences). In considering the reasonable inferences of the
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officer, the Court is cognizant that “[t]he collective knowledge
of the investigating officers is measured in determining
probable cause.” United States v. Belle, 593 F.2d 487, 597 n.15
(3d Cir. 1979). “Subjective intentions play no role in
ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
Here, an alarm at Imperial alerted VIPD that a robbery was
in progress. VIPD officers were also informed thereafter by
Central Dispatch that suspects were fleeing. VIPD officers
reported the specific location and direction of that flight--up
Fire Burn Hill toward the Governor’s residence through the
bushes. From that observation, VIPD could infer that the
individuals fleeing the scene of the robbery to Back Street,
then Vester Gade, and then through the bushes on Fire Burn Hill
to the Governor’s residence were fleeing to evade capture. See
generally Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000)
(“Headlong flight--wherever it occurs--is the consummate act of
evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it
is certainly suggestive of such”).
Greaves witnessed Thomas exit the bushes on Fire Burn Hill
a short time after VIPD officers had witnessed and reported that
the suspects had run into those bushes. Thomas was sweaty,
shaking, and covered in brush. An officer could reasonably infer
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that a person sweating, shaking, and covered in brush had been
running through the bushes. Given Thomas’s emergence from the
bushes on Fire Burn Hill--the precise location and direction
suspects were reported to be fleeing at the time--and his
physical appearance--consistent with fleeing for a period of
time--it was reasonable for Greaves to conclude that Thomas was
one of the robbery suspects in flight from VIPD.
The circumstances presented here are similar to those in
Mathies v. United States, 374 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1967). In that
case, the DC Circuit found that law enforcement had probable
cause to arrest Appellant George Mathies. The DC Circuit found
that
[a]t the precise moment of arrest, Detective Mitchell,
the arresting officer, knew that a crime had been
committed at Davis Realty Company, had observed the
wrecked getaway car, had learned from Officer O’Brien
that four men had fled the scene, and that two of them
had entered an alley which exited on U Street. During a
house-to-house search which followed immediately, he
learned that a man had been observed running from the
direction of the wreck and entering the premises at 619
U Street. Mitchell, as we have noted, found Appellant
“hiding” in the basement. At that critical point
abundant probable cause existed to believe that
Appellant had fled into the house from the wrecked
getaway car only a short distance away and, therefore,
was probably one of the participants in the crime.
Id. at 316. In Mathies, law enforcement officers did not have a
specific description of the suspect. Rather, they had
information regarding dynamic events involving fleeing suspects
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and the location to which one suspect fled. See id. Here VIPD
knew that a robbery at Imperial had occurred. Additionally, VIPD
had information that suspects had fled the scene. Central
Dispatch radioed the dynamic path of the suspects flight to
officers, the final location and direction up Fire Burn Hill
through the bushes toward the Governor’s residence. In response,
Greaves positioned himself in front of the Governor’s residence.
Immediately thereafter Greaves apprehended Thomas exiting the
bushes on Fire Burn Hill. Given Thomas’s emergence from the
exact location where VIPD reported the suspects to have fled, it
was reasonable for Greaves to infer that Thomas had probably
been involved in the robbery. Additionally, Thomas was sweaty,
shaking, and covered in brush, further supporting an inference
that Thomas was one of the fleeing suspects. Cf. United States
v. Mauk, 927 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding probable cause
where the defendant was found in the precise location reported
by a 911 call only two-three minutes after the robbery had
occurred and was sweating heavily consistent with the robber who
had been seen running down the street).
While Thomas testified that he happened to be walking on
the road close by the Governor’s residence at about the time of
the Imperial robbery, his account suffers for want of
credibility. Indeed, it is hard to conceive how simply walking
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along the road--as Thomas testified he was doing--could produce
a person who was sweaty, shaking, and covered in brush--as
Thomas was when he was arrested. Additionally, Thomas’s
testimony directly contradicts Greaves’s testimony that Thomas
exited the bushes. Thomas’s testimony also contradicts James’s
testimony that Thomas stated that Thomas had been in the bushes.
In assessing the credibility of the testimony of a witness,
a factfinder may consider the witness’s demeanor, potential
motives to be untruthful, interest in the outcome of the case,
and the extent to which his testimony is either supported or
contradicted by other evidence and testimony in the case. United
States v. Boone, 401 F.2d 659, 662 (3d Cir. 1968). The Court has
considered Thomas’s demeanor while testifying, his interest in
the outcome of the suppression hearing, and the substance of
Thomas’s testimony. The Court has also considered all of the
other evidence offered at the July 14, 2014, omnibus hearing,
including the testimony of Greaves and the statement that Thomas
made to James in the police precinct. On balance, the Court does
not find Thomas’s account to be credible. Rather, the Court
finds the government’s version of events more credible. Indeed,
Greaves, Charles, and Thomas were cross examined and testified
consistently with one another. Cf. United States v. Focareta,
283 Fed. Appx. 81-82 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting that the district
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court’s findings of fact were not clearly erroneous as they were
supported by the officers’ consistent testimonies during the
suppression hearing, which the district court determined were
credible).
Taking into consideration the totality of the
circumstances, the Court concludes that Greaves had probable
cause to arrest Thomas. See, e.g., United States v.
Muhammad, 120 F.3d 688, 696 (7th Cir. 1997)(“Probable cause
exists when at the moment an arrest is made officers have ‘facts
and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they
[have] reasonably trustworthy information’ that would
sufficiently ‘warrant a prudent man in believing that the
[suspect] had committed or was committing the offense.’”)
(alterations in original)(quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91
(1964)).
Because the Court has determined that Greaves had probable
cause to arrest Thomas, the Court need not reach the issue of
whether Thomas’s statements were sufficiently attenuated from
his arrest. See United States v. Fredericks, 684 Fed. Appx. 149,
157 (3d Cir. 2017)(“we will . . . remand for the District Court
to determine whether there was probable cause for Thomas’s
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arrest and, if not, whether his statement was sufficiently
attenuated from the unlawful arrest.”).1
The premises considered, it is hereby
ORDERED that Alvin Thomas’s motion to suppress is hereby
DENIED; it is further
ORDERED that Alvin Thomas’s motion to strike exhibits and
excess pages (ECF No. 139) is GRANTED in part; it is further
ORDERED that exhibits 1, 9, and 10 to the Government’s
Notice of Filing and Memorandum (ECF No. 136) are hereby
STRICKEN; it is further
1 Even if the Court had found that there was no probable cause, suppression
would not be appropriate given the attenuation between Thomas’s statement and
arrest. To determine whether a statement is sufficiently attenuated from an
unlawful arrest, a Court examines several factors:
The Miranda warnings are an important factor, to be sure, in
determining whether the confession is obtained by exploitation of
an illegal arrest. But they are not the only factor to be
considered. The temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession,
the presence of intervening circumstances, and, particularly, the
purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct are all relevant.
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975) (internal citations omitted).
Temporally, the arrest and confession occurred approximately six hours apart.
In the intervening period, Thomas was provided with Miranda warnings three
times. Furthermore, Thomas signed two different advice of rights forms.
Additionally, before VIPD had an opportunity to begin interrogating Thomas,
Thomas offered to make a statement to VIPD. Thomas’s desire to make a
statement did not result from VIPD interrogating Thomas, but was an
intervening circumstance arising during what appears to be the normal booking
process. Finally, to the extent the conduct of Greaves and Charles could be
construed as misconduct, a determination the Court finds no basis in the
record to make, their conduct was neither flagrant nor possessed of an
illicit purpose. Thus, the conduct of the officers does not warrant
suppression. See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016) (noting that
the third factor in the attenuation doctrine favors exclusion “only when the
police misconduct is most in need of deterrence—that is, when it is
purposeful or flagrant”).
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ORDERED that the Government’s motion to exceed page limit
(ECF No. 140) is GRANTED; it is further
ORDERED that Alvin Thomas’s motion to expedite ruling on
remand (ECF No. 152) is MOOT; and it is further
ORDERED that Alvin Thomas’s second motion to expedite
ruling on remand (ECF No. 160) is MOOT.
S\__________________
CURTIS V. GÓMEZ
District Judge
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