Nelson v. Long Reef Condominium Homeowners Association

DISTRICT COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
DIVISION OF ST. CROIX
ANNE-MARIE BEDELL and 	)
SANDRA NELSON, 	)
)
Plaintiffs, 	)
)
v. 	)
)
)
LONG REEF CONDOMINIUM 	) 	Civil Action No. 2011-051
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
__________________________________________)
)
LONG REEF CONDOMINIUM 	)
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, 	)
)
Counter-Claimant, 	)
)
v. 	)
)
ANNE-MARIE BEDELL and 	)
SANDRA NELSON, 	)
)
Counter-Defendants. 	)
__________________________________________)
Attorneys:
Daryl Barnes, Esq.,
Sunshine S. Benoit, Esq.,
John J. Merchant, Esq.,
St. Croix, U.S.V.I.
For the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
Douglas L. Capdeville, Esq.,
Mia L. Woodward, Esq.,
Ellen G. Donovan, Esq.,
St. Croix, U.S.V.I.
For the Defendant/Counter-Claimant
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Lewis, Chief Judge
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant Long Reef Condominium Home
Owners Association’s “Motion to Dismiss all of Plaintiff Sarah Nelson’s Claims” (Dkt. No. 29),
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of standing; Nelson’s Opposition to
the Motion (Dkt. No. 30); and Defendant’s Reply (Dkt. No. 31). For the reasons that follow, the
Court will deny Defendant’s Motion.
I. 	B ACKGROUND
A. 	Procedural History
By Complaint filed on May 12, 2011, Plaintiff Anne-Marie Bedell (“Bedell”) initiated the
instant 	action 	against 	Defendant 	Long 	Reef 	Condominium 	Home 	Owner’s 	Association
(“Defendant”) alleging that Defendant violated provisions of the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) (42
U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2)–(3)) in enforcing its pet prohibition against her and refusing to allow her to
keep a dog she claimed to be an emotional support animal in her condominium unit. (Dkt. No.
1). On July, 18, 2011, Bedell and Sarah Nelson (“Nelson”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed a First
Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 6), in which Nelson made allegations against Defendant that were
the same or similar to Bedell’s allegations. The First Amended Complaint sought declarative
relief and damages. (Id. at 14). Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant violated their rights
under the FHA by enforcing its pet prohibition against them (Count I); committed slander of title
by recording liens against, and publishing false allegations about, their property (Count II);
intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon them (Count III); and intentionally harmed
Bedell’s property interest (Count IV). (Id. at ¶¶ 59–76). Defendant filed an Answer on October
12, 2011 (Dkt. No. 12), and a First Amended Answer and Counterclaim on October 2, 2012
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(Dkt. No. 43), in which it sought an injunction prohibiting Plaintiffs from housing any animals in
their respective units as well as costs and attorneys’ fees. Plaintiffs filed their Answer to
Defendant’s Counterclaim on October 22, 2012. (Dkt. No. 47).
In the instant Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Nelson’s claims for lack of standing, Defendant
claims that there is no active case or controversy because Nelson no longer lives in her
condominium unit. (Dkt. No. 29). With the filing of the instant Motion (Dkt. No. 29), Nelson’s
Opposition (Dkt. No. 30), and Defendant’s Reply (Dkt. No. 31), this matter is ripe for resolution.
B. 	Factual Background
In view of the legal standard governing consideration of Rule 12(b)(1) motions, see infra,
Part II, the following facts are accepted as true.
Plaintiff Nelson bought and began occupying her condominium unit in June 2004. (Dkt.
No. 6 at ¶ 37; Dkt. No. 30 at 1). She acquired a small dog in October 2009, which she began to
keep in her condominium. (Dkt. No. 6 at ¶ 38; Dkt. No. 30 at 2). That fall, Nelson had witnessed
the shooting death of a friend and her brother had passed away. (Dkt. No. 30 at 2). Nelson was
diagnosed with depressed and post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”)—starting around that
time—and two mental health professionals advised her that it was “necessary” for her to keep the
dog for emotional support. (Id.) As a result of her PTSD, Nelson worries about her safety, which
in turn affects her ability to live independently and to interact with other people. (Dkt. No. 6 at ¶
37). She is afflicted with nightmares and is unable to leave her home at times. (Id.) The presence
of Nelson’s dog, acting as an emotional support dog, reduces the effects of her PTSD and
depression, thereby improving her quality of life. (Id. at 39). The dog’s support enables Plaintiff
to continue working and living independently. (Id.)
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As the owner of her condominium, Plaintiff Nelson was subject to Defendant’s rules and
regulations, which were recorded in March 1988 and amended in January 2006. (Dkt. No. 30 at
1–2). Both the rules and regulations and the 2006 amendments prohibited keeping pets in the
condominium units. (Id. at 2). However, over the ten year period leading up to Plaintiffs filing of
the First Amended Complaint, several animals were found living with owners on the property
and no legal action was taken. (Dkt. No. 6 at ¶ 40). Additionally, the 2006 amendments
recognized “several cats [that] are presently on Long Reef property as of the date of these revised
rules,” and treated them as an “exception” to the prohibition against pets. (Id. at ¶ 41). Further,
after the rules were amended, two dogs found living on the property were grandfathered in and
no legal action was brought against their owners. (Id. at ¶ 42).
On December 7, 2009, Johanna Renzi (“Renzi”), President of the Long Reef Board of
Directors, sent Plaintiff Nelson a letter advising her that Defendant was aware she had a dog on
the premises; that pets were prohibited; and that Defendant would proceed with fines followed
by legal action if Nelson did not remove the dog from the premises. (Dkt. No. 29-4). Nelson
advised Defendant that her dog was a “necessary companion.” (Dkt. No. 6 at ¶ 43). In February
2010, Defendant issued a fine against Nelson for violating the pet prohibition. (Id. at ¶ 44). The
same month, “[i]n response to such threats [the December 2009 letter], and to avoid a lawsuit,
Nelson was forced to move out of her residence . . . and has resided elsewhere ever since.” (Dkt.
No. 30 at 2). Defendant continued issuing fines against Nelson for several months, and then in
May 2010, Defendant sued her in the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands, seeking to enjoin her
from keeping her dog on the premises. (Dkt. No. 6 at ¶ 45; Dkt. No. 30 at 2–3).
Nelson informed Defendant on July 16, 2010 that her dog was a “service animal,” and
asked what documentation Defendant would require to allow her to keep her dog. (Dkt. No. 6 at
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¶ 46). Defendant never responded to Nelson’s query. (Id.) On December 2, 2010, Defendant
recorded 	a 	lien 	against 	Nelson’s 	condominium 	in 	the 	amount 	of 	$1,308.15 	for 	unpaid
assessments owing against the unit and the costs of Defendant’s lawsuit against Nelson in
Superior Court. (Dkt. No. 30 at 3). Nelson did not discover that the lien existed until she read
about it in the Commercial Reporter in February 2011. (Dkt. No. 6 at ¶ 51). Defendant
subsequently released the lien on June 16, 2011. (Dkt. No. 30 at 3). In the interim, on June 13,
2011, Nelson advised Defendant of her mental condition and formally requested that Defendant
accommodate her by allowing Nelson to keep a pet on the premises as an emotional support
animal, in accordance with the FHA. (Dkt. No. 30 at 3). Nelson joined Bedell in the present
action against Defendant on July 18, 2011. (Dkt. No. 6). On October 10, 2012, Defendant filed a
counterclaim in this action, seeking to enjoin Nelson from living in her condominium unit with
her dog. (Dkt. No. 43 at ¶¶ 90–94).
II. 	APPLICABLE L EGAL PRINCIPLES
A Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenges a court’s subject matter jurisdiction to hear a case.
Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1021 (3d Cir. 1997); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Constitutional
standing is one element of the “case or controversy” requirement of Article III of the
Constitution. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498–99 (1975); Conte Bros. Auto., Inc. v. Quaker
State-Slick 50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221, 224 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101–103 (1998); Bennett v. Spear, 540 U.S. 154, 162 (1997)). If a Court
finds that Constitutional standing does not exist in a case, the court does not have jurisdiction to
hear the case and must dismiss it. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990).
“Constitutional standing requires (1) injury-in-fact, which is an invasion of a legally
protected interest that is (a) concerete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not
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conjectural or hypothetical; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of; and (3) it must be likely as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision.” Danvers Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 432 F.3d 286, 290–
291 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); Khodara
Envtl., Inc. v. Blakey, 376 F.3d 187, 193 (3d Cir. 2004)). The burden of proving standing lies
with the plaintiffs. Danvers Motor Co., 432 F.3d at 291 (citing Storino v. Borough of Point
Pleasant Beach, 322 F.3d 293, 296 (3d Cir. 2003)).
In considering a motion to dismiss for lack of standing pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the
court “‘accept[s] as true all material allegations of the complaint and construe[s] them in favor of
the Plaintiff.’” Danvers Motor Co., 432 F.3d at 288 (quoting Conte Bros. Auto., 165 F.3d at
224).
III. 	DISCUSSION
In its Motion to Dismiss, Defendant argues that because Plaintiff Nelson moved out of
her condominium in February 2010—sixteen months before joining Bedell in the present
action— there is no active controversy between Nelson and Defendant. Accordingly, Defendant
contends that Nelson does not have standing and all of her claims should be dismissed. Further,
Defendant argues that Nelson’s claim for slander of title should be dismissed as moot because
Defendant released the lien. The Court disagrees with both arguments.
A. 	Standing
The facts underlying the instant matter clearly indicate that a live case or controversy
exists here.
Plaintiff Nelson owns a unit in Defendant’s condominium. Defendant has rules under
which Nelson is bound that prevent her from living in the condominium with a dog. Nelson
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acquires a dog in violation of the rules. Defendant fines her and threatens legal action. Feeling
that she is unable to live without her dog, and to avoid a lawsuit and more fines, Nelson moves
elsewhere with her dog. Nelson retains ownership of the condominium unit. Months later,
Defendant files a lawsuit against Nelson in Superior Court seeking to enjoin her from moving
back into the condominium with her dog. Nelson sues Defendant in this Court seeking
declaratory relief and damages. Nelson acknowledges that she is bound by Defendant’s rules, but
argues that they are in violation of federal law as applied to her. Defendant counterclaims, once
again seeking to enjoin Nelson from living in her unit with her dog.
Defendant now argues that there is no case of controversy between them, because Nelson
moved out of her condominium. Defendant contends that Nelson “took matters into her own
hands without the intervention of this Honorable Court when she removed herself from the reach
of the Board’s rule against pets.” (Dkt. No. 29-1 at 9). Defendant further argues that “from the
time Plaintiff first filed this lawsuit, she has been under no restriction imposed by Long Reef
with respect to keeping as her pet the animal she claims to need for emotional support services.”
(Id. at 6).
Contrary to Defendant’s contention, Nelson is clearly under a restriction imposed by
Defendant. As a dog owner, she is unable to live in property that she owns because of
Defendant’s rule that prohibits pets in the condominium. This is her “injury-in-fact.” Danvers
Motor Co., 432 F.3d at 290. Nelson has been made to choose between two rights to which she
would otherwise be entitled—living in property that she owns and keeping her dog. Thus, her
injury is concrete and particularized as well as actual—as opposed to hypothetical. Id. at 291.
There is a causal connection between Defendant’s conduct and her injury because every day that
the no-pet rule exists, and Nelson is unable to live in her condominium with her dog, is a day in
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which Defendant’s actions are causing her injury to continue. Id. Finally, there is redressability
because if the Court rules in favor of Nelson on the merits, she will be able to live in her unit
with her dog, thus remedying her injury. Id.
Accordingly, the Court finds that these facts present a live controversy.1
B. 	Mootness
Plaintiff Nelson alleges that, as a result of Defendant recording a lien against her unit in
violation of its own bylaws, she “has been forced to hire an attorney to defend against Long
Reef’s false allegations” and “the added stress of litigating over this slanderous lien” caused her
to incur more medical expenses. (Dkt. No. 6 at ¶¶ 52–55, 68).
1 The Court notes that Defendant relies on two cases that are inapposite. (Dkt. No. 29-1 at 7–8).
In Simpson v. Wood, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1926, at *5–7 (D.V.I. Jan. 7, 2010), a former owner
of a condominium unit sued a member of the board of directors of the condominium association,
alleging that the director had committed fraud by misrepresenting the qualifications of other
directors on the board, and that the members of the board were therefore improperly elected. The
court in Simpson found that the plaintiff lacked standing to allege that the board members were
not properly elected because he no longer owned his condominium unit and therefore would not
suffer an injury if the members were not properly elected, nor benefit from any remedy ordered.
Id. at *6–7. Simpson is distinguishable from the present case because Nelson is a current—not a
former—owner of her condominium unit, and a holding in her favor on the merits would redress
her injury.
In Gagliardi v. Kratzenberg, 404 F. Supp. 2d 858 (W.D. Pa. 2005), a pro se plaintiff alleged that
various defendants had committed RICO violations against him through their actions to collect
back taxes on property the plaintiff had owned approximately thirty years earlier. The actions for
back taxes were directed at the current owners of the property. Id. at 864–65. The court found
that the “[p]laintiff’s submissions ma[de] [it] clear that he [could] not claim to have [had] actual
deeded ownership of the subject property at anytime during the events in question.” Id. at 864.
Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiff lacked standing. Id. at 868. Like Simpson, Gagliardi
is distinguishable from the present case, in that Nelson is the owner of her condominium unit,
and Defendant’s actions are directly affecting her.
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Defendant counters—without citing any authority and in a two-sentence paragraph that
concludes the “Discussion and Analysis” portion of its Motion—that Nelson’s claim for slander
of title is moot because the lien was released a month before Nelson joined Bedell in this action.
(Dkt. No. 29-1 at 9). This contention is without merit.
“Damages should be denied on the merits, not on the grounds of mootness.” Nat’l Iranian
Oil Co. v. Mapco Int’l, Inc., 983 F.2d 485, 489 (3d. Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Further, damages claims “are retrospective in nature—they compensate for
past harm” and, accordingly, “‘such claims cannot be moot.’” CMR D.N. Corp. & Marina
Towers Ltd. v. City of Phila., 703 F.3d 612, 622 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Lippoldt v. Cole, 468
F.3d 1204, 1204 (10th Cir. 2006)). As long as a party presents a viable claim for damages, a case
is not moot. Khodara Envtl., Inc. v. Beckman, 237 F.3d 186, 196 (3d Cir. 2001) (citation
omitted).
Accepting as true Nelson’s allegations that Defendant improperly filed the lien against
her condominium (Dkt. No. 6 at ¶¶ 52–55), Nelson’s claim for compensatory damages
associated with defending against the lien and any damage it caused her were not rendered moot
by the discharge of the lien. See CMR D.N. Corp., 703 F.3d at 622; Nat’l Iranian Oil, 983 F.2d at
489. Her claims for damages are “retrospective” in nature and survive the lien’s discharge. CMR
D.N. Corp., 703 F.3d at 622.
Accordingly, the Court will not dismiss Plaintiff Nelson’s slander of title claim as moot.
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Plaintiff has standing and that her claim
for slander of title is not moot. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 29) is
denied. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Date: September 30, 2013 	________/s/________
WILMA A. LEWIS
Chief Judge
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