Corea Sanchez v. Mullin et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
JORDY STUARD COREA SANCHEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Secretary, United
States Department of Homeland Security;
TODD BLANCHE, Attorney General of the
United States, Executive Office for
Immigration Review; TODD LYONS, Acting
Director, United States Enforcement and
Removal Operations; EVAN TJADEN, Salt
Lake City Field Office Director, Enforcement
and Removal Operations, United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE); MIKE SMITH, in his official capacity
as the County Sheriff of Utah County and
warden of the Utah County Jail,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
GRANTING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS
Case No. 2:26-cv-00904-JNP
Chief District Judge Jill N. Parrish
Before this court are petitioner Jordy Stuard Corea Sanchez’s petition for a writ of habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary
injunction. Dkt. Nos. 1, 4. For the following reasons, the court GRANTS the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus and DENIES the motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary
injunction.
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BACKGROUND
Mr. Corea Sanchez is a citizen and national of Honduras. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 19. In 2003, when
he was approximately two years old, he entered the United States without inspection, and he
resided in Utah until his initial detention by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in 2025.
Id. ¶¶ 46–47; Dkt. No. 4, at 4. Mr. Corea Sanchez’s initial encounter with ICE occurred on June
12, 2025, immediately following a state conviction related to driving under the influence of
alcohol. Dkt. No. 14, at 3. An ICE officer determined that Mr. Corea Sanchez was a removable
noncitizen, but on August 8, 2025, an immigration judge in Las Vegas granted Mr. Corea Sanchez
bond pending his removal. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 47. After Mr. Corea Sanchez posted bond and was released
from custody, his pending immigration proceedings were transferred to Salt Lake City immigration
court. Id.
On May 5, 2026, the Board of Immigration Appeals reversed the immigration judge’s grant
of bond to Mr. Corea Sanchez, reasoning that he was subject to mandatory detention under
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Id. ¶ 1. But on June 30, 2026, the Tenth Circuit in Santillan Quiroz v.
Mullin rejected the reasoning relied upon by the Board of Immigration Appeals. 180 F.4th 1226,
1240 (10th Cir. 2026) (“Based on the statutory text and context, we conclude that § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s
application is limited to the border.”). Mr. Corea Sanchez was not immediately re-detained
following the Board’s decision.
Mr. Corea Sanchez’s present immigration detention—which is challenged in this action—
began on September 29, 2026. Dkt. No. 14, at 3. This detention stems from his September 5 arrest
for driving under the influence of alcohol and other associated charges. Dkt. No. 14, at 3. Mr.
Corea Sanchez has not been convicted of these charges. Dkt. No. 1, at 2. On September 29, 2026,
after he posted bail in his state case, Mr. Corea Sanchez was brought from state custody and taken
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into ICE custody pursuant to the immigration warrant issued on September 5, 2026. Id. at 4.
Although Mr. Corea Sanchez alleges that he was transferred to federal custody pursuant to an
immigration detainer, this court has not received any information on when, or on what basis, this
detainer was issued.
Mr. Corea Sanchez filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and a motion for a temporary
restraining order and a preliminary injunction on September 29, 2026. Dkt. Nos. 1, 4. That same
day, the court ordered respondents to show cause why Mr. Corea Sanchez’s petition for writ of
habeas corpus should not be granted. Dkt. No. 7. On October 6, 2026, respondents filed a response
and petitioner filed a reply. Dkt. Nos. 14, 15. On October 7, 2026, the court held a hearing on the
petition; Mr. Corea Sanchez was present at the hearing. Dkt. No. 16.
LEGAL STANDARD
“Preliminary injunctive relief—whether a temporary restraining order or a preliminary
injunction—‘is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.’” Schiermeyer ex rel.
Blockchain Game Partners, Inc. v. Thurston, 697 F. Supp. 3d 1265, 1269 (D. Utah Oct. 9, 2023)
(quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008)). To obtain preliminary relief,
a party must show that (1) it “is substantially likely to succeed on the merits”; (2) it “will suffer
irreparable injury if the injunction is denied”; (3) its “threatened injury outweighs the injury the
opposing party will suffer under the injunction”; and (4) “the injunction would not be adverse to
the public interest.” Fish v. Kobach, 840 F.3d 710, 723 (10th Cir. 2016).
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United States.”
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2). “[T]he essence
of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the
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traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 475, 484 (1973).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a district court has the authority to grant a writ of habeas corpus
when the petitioner “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that his custody
is in violation of the law. See Espinoza v. Sabol, 558 F.3d 83, 89 (1st Cir. 2009) (“The burden of
proof of showing deprivation of rights leading to unlawful detention [under § 2241] is on the
petitioner.”).
DISCUSSION
I. 	Mr. Corea Sanchez’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus is Granted.
In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Mr. Corea Sanchez identifies four “causes of
action.” First, he argues that the ICE detainer represents an ultra vires agency action that should
be set aside under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Dkt. No. ¶¶ 126–32.
Second, he argues that the ICE detainer led to his prolonged state confinement, which resulted in
a violation of his Fifth Amendment Due Process rights. Id. ¶¶ 133–40. Third, Mr. Corea Sanchez
argues that he is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus granting him immediate release from custody.
Id. ¶¶ 141–46. Fourth, he argues that if the court chooses to grant him a bond hearing instead of
immediate release, the government should bear the burden of justifying continued detention. Id.
¶¶ 147–53. Because the court grants Mr. Corea Sanchez’s habeas petition, the court declines to
address his Administrative Procedure Act and due process claims related to the immigration
detainer. Cf. Scott v. Mullin, 303 F.3d 1222, 1224 (10th Cir. 2002) (declining to address remaining
claims in a habeas petition after granting relief on one).
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Mr. Corea Sanchez argues that the appropriate remedy is immediate release or a bond
hearing at which the government must bear the burden of establishing that continued detention is
necessary. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 117. His argument for immediate release hinges on the concern that merely
providing him with “another hearing . . . leaves unanswered how an Immigration Judge would
provide effective relief from the Board’s outstanding disposition.” Dkt. No. 15, at 4. In response
to Mr. Corea Sanchez’s petition, respondents argue that Mr. Corea Sanchez was offered a bond
hearing before an immigration judge, but that he has not yet been given such a hearing because
“the box to select a bond redetermination hearing is not marked.” Dkt. No. 14, at 4. Respondents
maintain that Mr. Corea Sanchez “can still request a bond redetermination either orally when he
appears in Court or in writing.” Id. at 6.
A. 	Mr. Corea Sanchez’s August 2025 Bond Remains Active.
The May 2026 Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision to vacate Mr. Corea Sanchez’s
August 2025 bond was premised on the erroneous holding that he “remains subject to detention
under INA § 235(b)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), and the Immigration Judge lacked
jurisdiction to redetermine his custody.” Dkt. No. 15-1, at 5. The Tenth Circuit has since held that
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) is inapplicable to individuals in Mr. Corea Sanchez’s position, which effectively
reversed the BIA’s decision. See Santillan Quiroz, 180 F.4th at 1240 (10th Cir. 2026). Indeed,
respondents appear to agree that Mr. Corea Sanchez remained on bond until at least September
2026. See Dkt. No. 14, at 5 (admitting that “Petitioner’s bond remained unchanged until his present
criminal conduct”).
Respondents maintain, however, that Mr. Corea Sanchez’s bond was somehow revoked
when an ICE officer issued an arrest warrant following his September 2026 arrest for state offenses
related to driving under the influence. Id. But if, as the parties agree, Mr. Corea Sanchez’s bond
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was active when he was arrested on September 5, 2026, it remains active now. ICE could not
unilaterally revoke Mr. Corea Sanchez’s bond by issuing an arrest warrant signed by an
immigration officer. See, e.g., Ebu v. Tindall, No. 3:25-CV-779-RGJ, 2026 WL 252899, at *4
(W.D. Ky. Jan. 30, 2026) (concluding that an arrest warrant issued by a Supervisory Detention and
Deportation Officer does not serve a valid method of revoking bond). And respondents have
identified no other basis upon which Mr. Corea Sanchez’s bond may have been revoked. See Dkt.
No. 14, at 4 (“Records provided by Respondents to the undersigned counsel thus far do not support
Petitioner’s assertion that his bond was revoked on May 5, 2026.”).
B. 	Mr. Corea Sanchez is Entitled to a Pre-Deprivation Hearing.
Where a noncitizen has been released on bond pursuant to § 1226(a), this court has
repeatedly ruled that the noncitizen is “protected by the Due Process Rights created by § 1226(a).”
Martinez Laguna v. Leyva, No. 2:26-CV-00607-JNP, 2026 WL 1998746, at *4 (D. Utah July 10,
2026); Peña Becerra v. Sparks, 2:26-cv-00212-JNP-DBP, 2026 WL 915439, at *4 (D. Utah April
3, 2026). Because Mr. Corea Sanchez’s bond remains active, he too is protected by the due process
rights created by § 1226(a).
This court has previously analyzed the process owed to noncitizens whose bond the
government seeks to revoke. In Peña Becerra v. Sparks, Mr. Peña Becerra was released on his own
recognizance under § 1226, but he was arrested several years later on state charges for possession
of marijuana and for operating a vehicle without a license or valid insurance. 2026 WL 915439, at
*3–7. ICE officers detained him after he was released from state custody, and he filed a habeas
action seeking immediate release. This court undertook a due process inquiry under Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), and concluded that “[a] pre-deprivation hearing is warranted.”
Peña Becerra, 2026 WL 915439, at *6. In Martinez Laguna v. Leyva, this court reached the same
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result and ordered immediate release for a noncitizen who had previously been released on his own
recognizance but was subsequently re-detained by ICE after a state arrest for domestic violence.
2026 WL 1998746. Reasoning that “[t]he court’s Mathews v. Eldridge due process inquiry in Peña
Becerra remains largely the same,” this court ordered Mr. Martinez’s release because ICE had
failed to provide him with a pre-deprivation hearing. Id. at *4–6.
Here too, the court finds that the Mathews v. Eldridge due process inquiry commands the
same result reached by this court in Peña Becerra and Martinez Laguna. Mr. Corea Sanchez has a
substantial private interest in remaining out of detention on bond, which he has been on for over a
year. There is also a significant risk of erroneous deprivation of that liberty interest here because
Mr. Corea Sanchez’s prior bond grant in 2025 indicates that ICE “necessarily determined” that he
“would not pose a danger and was likely to appear for future proceedings.” Ledesma Gonzalez v.
Bostock, 808 F. Supp. 3d 1189, 1198 (W.D. Wash. 2025). Although Mr. Corea Sanchez has recently
been arrested on state charges related to driving under the influence, the fact of arrest does not
determine his guilt. Finally, as was also the case in Peña Becerra and Martinez Laguna, a pre-
deprivation hearing would not impose a costly burden on the government or unduly interfere with
the government’s interests in enforcing immigration law and protecting the public. At bottom, “[i]f
the government wishes to re-arrest [Mr. Corea Sanchez] at any point, it has the power to take steps
toward doing so; but its interest in doing so without a hearing is low.” Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F.
Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2019). A pre-deprivation hearing is thus warranted.
Mr. Corea Sanchez has therefore met his burden of demonstrating that his custody is in
violation of the law. See Espinoza v. Sabol, 558 F.3d 83, 89 (1st Cir. 2009). The court orders that
respondents release Mr. Corea Sanchez.
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C. 	At any Future Bond Hearings, Respondents Bear the Burden of Establishing That
Petitioner is a Flight Risk or Danger to the Community.
Mr. Corea Sanchez is entitled to immediate release, and if respondents seek to re-detain
him in the future, they must provide him with notice and a pre-deprivation hearing. Mr. Corea
Sanchez argues that at such bond hearings, the government should bear the burden of establishing
his dangerousness and risk of flight. Dkt. No. 1, at 39. Respondents do not address this argument
in their response. Dkt. No. 14.
The Supreme Court has reserved ruling on which party bears the burden of proof at
§ 1226(a) bond hearings, and the Tenth Circuit has not yet had occasion to opine on the issue. See
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 312 (2018) (declining to reach burden-of-proof arguments
because they were not considered by the lower court); see also Black v. Almodovar, 156 F.4th 171,
173–74 (2d Cir. 2025) (Nardini, J., dissenting) (detailing the “circuit splat” of “all-over-the-map
holdings” regarding the burden of proof in § 1226(a) bond hearings). Circuits are not only split on
which party bears the burden; they are also split on the extent of the burden as well. Compare
Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 41 (1st Cir. 2021) (placing the burden on the government
to justify continued detention by “a preponderance of the evidence” for flight risk but “clear and
convincing evidence” for dangerousness), with Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 855–56 (2d
Cir. 2020) (requiring the government to provide “clear and convincing evidence” for both flight
risk and dangerousness).
Other district courts in this circuit applied the tripartite Mathews v. Eldridge framework to
this determination and have held almost unanimously that the government must bear the burden
of proof at § 1226(a) bond hearings. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See, e.g., Abanil v. Baltazar, 817
F. Supp. 3d 1148, 1159 (D. Colo. 2026) (concluding that “it is the Government’s burden to ‘justify
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a noncitizen’s continued detention at a bond hearing’” (citations omitted)); Velasquez Salazar v.
Dedos, 806 F. Supp. 3d 1231, 1245 (D.N.M. 2025) (applying the Mathews and civil detention
frameworks to conclude that the burden of proof must be shifted “to the Government to prove, by
clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner is at risk of flight and/or a danger to the community
such that continued detention is necessary”); Arias v. Levya, 2:26-cv-00812-RJS, 2026 WL
2957987, at *7–8 (D. Utah Oct. 1, 2026) (applying the Mathews framework and concluding that
the balance of factors weighed in favor of shifting the burden to the government).
As to the extent of the burden the government must bear, “clear and convincing evidence”
is the most appropriate standard. “[T]he Supreme Court has long held that the clear and convincing
evidence standard applies to civil detention where an individual’s liberty interest is at stake.”
Arostegui-Maldonado v. Baltazar, 794 F. Supp. 3d 926 (D. Colo. 2025) (citing United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987)). The First Circuit held in Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons that a
preponderance of the evidence standard was appropriate for flight risk in part because “there is
less risk of error from a preponderance standard on this issue because, as noted, detained citizens
possess knowledge of many of the most relevant factors.” 10 F.4th at 40. This court, however, is
conscious that the rapidly changing landscape of immigration detention has made it increasingly
difficult for detained noncitizens to effectively access counsel and make arguments at bond
hearings. See, e.g., Andrade v. Mullin, 2:26-cv-00805-JNP, 2026 WL 2641853, at *2 (D. Utah Sept.
8, 2026) (“During [oral argument], Ms. Andrade’s counsel represented that he had been unable to
locate or communicate with Ms. Andrade since her transfer to ICE custody.”); Chiriboga v. Mullin,
No. 2:26-cv-00760-JNP, 2026 WL 2797328, at *1–2 (D. Utah Sept. 18, 2026) (detailing the
government’s inability to locate the individual detained by ICE). In the absence of further direction
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from the Tenth Circuit, clear and convincing evidence is the appropriate standard for both risk of
flight and danger to community.
If they seek to re-detain Mr. Corea Sanchez, respondents therefore bear the burden of
proving by clear and convincing evidence that he is a flight risk or a danger to the community.
II. 	Mr. Corea Sanchez’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and a Preliminary
Injunction is Moot.
Mr. Corea Sanchez also moves for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary
injunction (1) ordering his immediate release from custody; (2) enjoining respondents from relying
on the challenged ICE detainer, the detention it caused, or the resulting ICE arrest as a basis for
his continued detention or re-detention; (3) enjoining respondents from transferring him outside
the District of Utah or removing him from the United States while this action is pending; (4)
ordering respondents to preserve all relevant documents. Dkt. No. 4, at 12–13.
Mr. Corea Sanchez’s first request duplicates his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. His
second request is moot because he is no longer being held in state custody pursuant to an ICE
detainer. This court’s order to show cause already addressed petitioner’s third request for a
limitation on transfer and a prohibition against removal while this action is pending. Dkt. No. 7, at
4–5 (imposing a prohibition against removal from the United States and a prohibition against
transfer beyond a 100-mile radius of the Orrin G. Hatch United States Courthouse). And the fourth
request would be duplicative of the obligations already imposed on parties appearing before this
court. See Chiriboga, 2026 WL 2797328, at *3 (D. Utah Sept. 18, 2026) (explaining that the
obligation to preserve documents relevant to future litigation “applies with equal force to
electronically stored information and to evidence relevant to habeas petitions”).
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Mr. Corea Sanchez’s motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction
is therefore DENIED AS MOOT.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, the court ORDERS that:
1. 	Petitioner Jordy Stuard Corea Sanchez’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED.
Dkt. No. 1.
2. 	Petitioner’s motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction is
DENIED AS MOOT. Dkt. No. 4.
3. 	Respondents are ORDERED to either immediately release Mr. Corea Sanchez or to release
Mr. Corea Sanchez in Salt Lake City as soon as practical and without undue delay, based
on Mr. Corea Sanchez’s preference. If applicable, respondents must provide a status report
within 48 hours detailing the release plan and any associated timeline. Respondents must
also provide a status report informing the court of Mr. Corea Sanchez’s release within 24
hours of the release.
4. 	Respondents are ORDERED, at the time of release, to provide him any personal effects
and identification documents that were confiscated from him.
5. 	Respondents are ENJOINED from imposing further restraints on liberty (e.g., electronic
monitoring) that were not imposed on Mr. Martinez prior to his 2026 arrest, unless those
restraints are determined to be necessary at a future pre-deprivation or custody hearing. Mr.
Martinez must be released to the same legal status and conditions he enjoyed prior to the
2026 arrest.
6. 	If Respondents seek to re-detain Mr. Corea Sanchez, absent exigent circumstances, they
must provide Mr. Corea Sanchez notice of at least seven days before a pre-deprivation
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hearing before an immigration judge in which the government bears the burden of
establishing by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Corea Sanchez is a flight risk or
danger to the community.
7. 	Respondents are ENJOINED from denying petitioner bond on the basis that he is subject
to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
DATED October 13, 2026.
BY THE COURT
______________________________
Jill N. Parrish
Chief United States District Court Judge
District of Utah
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