Valenzuela v. Knight et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
ALMA DELIA VALENZUELA,
Petitioner,
v.
JASON KNIGHT, Field Office Director, Salt
Lake City Enforcement and Removal
Operations, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE/ERO); PAUL WIMMER,
Tooele County Sheriff; DAVID
VENTURELLA, Acting Director of ICE;
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Secretary, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security; TODD
BLANCHE, U.S. Attorney General,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS
Case No. 2:26-cv-00886-JNP-CMR
Chief District Judge Jill N. Parrish
Chief Magistrate Judge Cecilia M. Romero
Before this court is Petitioner Alma Delia Valenzuela’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Dkt. No. 1. For the following reasons, the court GRANTS the petition.
The court also GRANTS Respondent’s motion for leave to file additional exhibits (Dkt. No. 26).
BACKGROUND1
Ms. Valenzuela is a citizen of Mexico but has resided in the United States for at least 20
years. Dkt. No. 1, p. 2. She entered the United States “without inspection” at the age of fourteen,
Id; Dkt. No. 19-3, p. 2. Ms. Valenzuela has three United States citizen children, all under 18 years
1 The facts recited here are those alleged in Ms. Valenzuela’s petition. As discussed during oral
argument, an evidentiary hearing may be necessary to resolve certain factual disputes in this case.
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of age. Dkt. No. 1, p. 3. Her wife has a pending asylum application, a work permit, and a social
security number, and intended to add Ms. Valenzuela as a beneficiary of her asylum claim, though
she has not been able to do so because of resource constraints.2 Id.
Ms. Valenzuela was arrested on August 6, 2026, and was detained at the Salt Lake County
Jail. Id. at 4. After seven weeks of detention, Ms. Valenzuela’s attorney presented her with a plea
offer. Id. Ms. Valenzuela pled guilty to misdemeanor assault and was sentenced to 45 days with
credit for time served, which meant that she was ordered to be released. Id. But the next morning,
instead of being released, Ms. Valenzuela was picked up by ICE agents and taken to an ICE office
in Orem, Utah. Id. The agents asked “a lot of questions about her personal situation” and ultimately
told her that she could “either sign for voluntary departure or wait 5–6 weeks for a judge to hear
her case[;]” the first option would result in her release in Mexico within a week, while the second
would require her to “stay in custody for months and possibly more than a year before her case
would be resolved.” Id. The agents also informed Ms. Valenzuela that “they would be moving her
to a detention facility in another state[;]” they “did not tell they had authority to release her, and
they also did not tell her she had a right to a prompt bond hearing with an immigration judge.” Id.
Ms. Valenzuela was given only a “few minutes” to consider these options. Id. She reports “feeling
intense pressure to sign for voluntary departure” and agreeing to do so. Id. at 5. She also reports
that, despite understanding English, she is not literate and did not know the content of the paper
she signed. Id. After signing, she was taken to Tooele County Jail. Id.
2 Respondents report that Ms. Valenzuela indicated that she was single when questioned by ICE;
that she called a friend, rather than her wife, while in custody; and that her wife appears to be the
complaining witness in the state criminal proceedings discussed below. Dkt. No. 19, pp. 5–6. Ms.
Valenzuela has since explained that the “friend” she called while in custody is her wife. Dkt.
No. 25, p. 3.
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Ms. Valenzuela filed her petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this court on September 24,
2026, accompanied by an emergency motion to stay her transfer out of Utah. See Dkt. Nos. 1, 3.
Her petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleges that she “faced undue pressure to sign the form for
voluntary departure” and challenges both the legality of her present detention without bond and
the validity of the deportation order she signed. Id. at 5, 9. The court granted in part Ms.
Valenzuela’s motion to stay transfer, ordering that she not be transferred outside a 100-mile radius
of the Orrin G. Hatch United States Courthouse. Dkt. No. 5. After this court delayed briefing on
this petition so that Ms. Valenzuela’s counsel could visit her in order to discuss this case, Ms.
Valenzuela was “unexpected[ly] transfer[red] over the weekend,” complicating her counsel’s
efforts to reach her. Dkt. No. 25, p. 1.
This court held a hearing on Ms. Valenzuela’s petition on October 7, 2026, at which Ms.
Valenzuela was present. Just before that hearing, Respondents filed a status report indicating that
a bond hearing had been scheduled for Ms. Valenzuela on October 13, 2026, in the West Valley
Immigration court in Utah. Dkt. No. 27. They purported to attach as an exhibit the notice for this
hearing. Dkt. No. 27-1. As the court noted during oral argument, the notice exhibited by
Respondents did not mention bond and did not appear to be a notice for a bond hearing, as it
warned Ms. Valenzuela that she could be ordered removed from the United States if she failed to
appear, which was inconsistent with a bond hearing being held while Ms. Valenzuela was already
in detention. Dkt. No. 27-1, p. 1. After the hearing, Respondents filed an additional status report
representing that the “immigration court ha[d] since issued a corrected copy of the hearing notice”
and exhibiting that “corrected” notice. Dkt Nos. 28, 28-1. Respondents did not explain how the
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erroneous notice was issued, nor did they indicate whether the corrected notice was issued by the
immigration court on its own initiative or as a result of this court’s inquiries.3
Just before the hearing, Respondents also moved to admit additional documents: a notice
to appear against Ms. Valenzuela, in which she was informed of a removal hearing scheduled for
October 21 and requested a bond hearing; and a declaration by Officer Shields, describing his
interview with Ms. Valenzuela. Dkt. Nos. 26, 26-1, 26-2.
Following the hearing, Respondents filed two additional briefs, in which they argued that
the court should not grant Ms. Valenzuela’s requests that the court shift the burden of proof in her
bond hearing and order Respondents to produce documents related to her detention. Dkt. Nos. 29,
30. In their brief addressing the issue of the burden of proof, Respondents acknowledged that they
incorrectly represented to the court that the Form I-213 for Ms. Valenzuela had already been filed
in 	the 	bond 	proceedings. 	Dkt. 	No. 29. 	Respondents 	indicated 	that 	counsel’s 	inaccurate
representation to the court during the hearing “was based on a miscommunication with ICE
counsel” and that the Form I-213 and FBI rap sheet have not been filed in the bond proceedings,
though Respondents represented that the government “ha[d] every intent to file” them. Dkt.
No. 29, p. 4. Respondents indicated that they would not object to an order requiring those
documents to be filed, or to an order requiring that Ms. Valenzuela have “reasonable access to
phone calls and visits” while she is detained. Id. at 5. Respondents did not indicate whether Ms.
Valenzuela could expect “reasonable access to phone calls and visits” without a court order.
3 During oral argument, the parties referred to Ms. Valenzuela’s bond hearing as taking place on
the Wednesday following this court’s hearing. Respondents’ submission of the corrected notice of
the bond hearing indicated that the “date and time of the custody redetermination hearing remain
unchanged[.]” Dkt. No. 28, p. 1. However, the bond hearing was scheduled for October 13, 2026,
the following Tuesday.
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LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United States.”
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2). “[T]he essence
of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the
traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 475, 484 (1973).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a district court has the authority to grant a writ of habeas corpus
when the petitioner “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The Petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that her custody
is in violation of the law. See Espinoza v. Sabol, 558 F.3d 83, 89 (1st Cir. 2009) (“The burden of
proof of showing deprivation of rights leading to unlawful detention [under § 2241] is on the
petitioner.”).
DISCUSSION
I. 	Deportation Order & Right to a Bond Hearing
Respondents, while disputing Ms. Valenzuela’s factual account and arguing that her
signature on the voluntary departure form was not coerced, indicate that they “will vacate the
request for voluntary departure.” Dkt. No. 19, p. 3; see also Dkt. No. 26-2. They further indicate
that a bond hearing has been scheduled for October 13, 2026, in the West Valley Immigration Court
in Utah. Dkt. Nos. 27, 27-1, 28, 28-1.
Ms. Valenzuela maintains her factual account of her interview with Officer Shields,
including the allegations that she was not told of her right to a bond hearing; that she was not given
adequate time to consider her decision; and that she didn’t know what she was signing. Dkt.
No. 25, pp. 2–4. Ms. Valenzuela acknowledges that she signed more than one paper but argues that
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the papers exhibited by Respondents, which she allegedly signed, offer little support for
Respondents’ factual account, noting that the forms’ existence does not prove that she was given
adequate information about their content. Id. at 3, 7. Because Respondents agree that Ms.
Valenzuela’s signed departure form will be voided and that she is eligible for a bond hearing under
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), the court need not determine the voluntariness of Ms. Valenzuela’s signature
on the deportation order at this time.
II. 	Document Production
The parties continue to dispute Ms. Valenzuela’s request that the court order Respondents
to produce documents relevant to her detention. Respondents insist that Ms. Valenzuela was given
copies of certain documents and can simply “ask the staff at the jail” for her copies; that it is the
policy of “local attorneys representing” ICE to “be reasonable in releasing non-confidential
documents[;]” and that there is “no legal authority authorizing the Court to demand Respondents
produce any additional documents.” Dkt. No. 30, pp. 1–3.
Ms. Valenzuela identifies extensive legal authority authorizing such a production order,
including Supreme Court precedent and federal statutes. First, Ms. Valenzuela highlights Harris v.
Nelson, in which the Supreme Court emphasized that “[t]here is no higher duty of a court, under
our constitutional system, than the careful processing and adjudication of petitions for writs of
habeas corpus” and concluded that
in appropriate circumstances, a district court, confronted by a
petition for habeas corpus which establishes a prima facie case for
relief, may use or authorize the use of suitable discovery procedures,
including 	interrogatories, 	reasonably 	fashioned 	to 	elicit 	facts
necessary to help the court to ‘dispose of the matter as law and
justice require.’ 28 U.S.C. § 2243.
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Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 292 & 290 (1969). The Tenth Circuit has reaffirmed that holding.
United States v. Velarde, 485 F.3d 553, 560 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Discovery is authorized in habeas
corpus cases[.]”).
Ms. Valenzuela also draws the court’s attention to the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases,
which provide that a district court may apply them to a habeas petition. R ULES GOVERNING
S ECTION 2254 C ASES IN THE UNITED S TATES DISTRICT C OURTS , R. 1(b). Those Rules provide that
a “judge may, for good cause, authorize a party to conduct discovery under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and may limit the extent of discovery.” Id. at R. 6.
Finally, Ms. Valenzuela identifies several recent cases in which district courts have ordered
the production of documents in habeas proceedings. See Dkt. No. 33, p. 3. In those cases, district
courts have repeatedly concluded that discovery can be authorized in the habeas context. Romero
Marentes v. Warden of the Golden State Annex ICE Detention Facility, No. 1:26-cv-00247, 2026
WL 1130395, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2026) (granting petitioner’s request for the production of
documents); Aguilar Olarte v. ICE, 2:25-cv-01662, p. 2 (D. Ariz. Aug. 14, 2025) (grating
petitioner’s motion for limited discovery); E.D.Q.C. v. Dickerson, No. 4:25-cv-00050 (M.D. Ga.
June 3, 2025) (granting petitioner’s motion for expedited jurisdictional discovery); Jeremie B. v.
Chestnut, No. 1:26-cv-2779, 2026 WL 1022947, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 15 2026) (ordering
respondents to file “Petitioner’s full Form I-213, any orders of release or detention, any custody
warrants or notices, and any other portions of Petitioner’s A-File relevant to the determination of
the issues presented in the Petition” alongside their response to the habeas petition).
Respondents, having informed the court that there is “no legal authority authorizing the
Court to demand Respondents produce any additional documents,” have not explained whether
they could not find these authorities or merely considered them distinguishable. Dkt. No. 30, p. 3.
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Regardless, multiple authorities, including Supreme Court precedent, clearly authorize this court
to order the production of documents in habeas proceedings where petitioner shows good cause
for such an order. Ms. Valenzuela has made that showing here; as her counsel explained during
oral argument, the requested documents are not realistically accessible to Ms. Valenzuela and go
directly to the basis for her detention. The court therefore grants Ms. Valenzuela’s requests for the
production of documents.
III. 	Burden of Proof at Ms. Valenzuela’s Bond Hearing
The parties continue to dispute who should bear the burden of proof at Ms. Valenzuela’s
bond hearing—either Ms. Valenzuela must prove that she is not a flight risk or danger to the
community, or Respondents must prove that she is. Respondents’ briefing discusses the Ninth
Circuit’s ruling in Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189 (9th Cir. 2022), in which it concluded
that the Due Process Clause did not require the government to bear the burden of proof at the
petitioner’s bond hearing. See Dkt. No. 29, pp. 1–2. Respondents also seek to distinguish this case
from that of Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19 (1st Cir. 2021), in which the First Circuit found
that the government should bear the burden of proof.
Though the facts in this case are not identical to those in Hernandez-Lara, Ms. Valenzuela
persuasively argues that relevant details are consistent between the two cases. Ms. Valenzuela
notes that Respondents suggest that she will have the assistance of counsel in her bond hearing,
but she has not yet obtained counsel to represent her in her bond hearing and will not be entitled
to appointed counsel. Dkt. No. 32, p. 4. Furthermore, Ms. Valenzuela highlights the overwhelming
practical obstacles she will encounter in trying to assemble passports, birth certificates, pay stubs,
and other relevant documentary evidence while she is in Respondents’ custody. Id. at 4–5. Ms.
Valenzuela also notes that, while she does not currently have a pending asylum application, she
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does have a path to citizenship through her children and spouse. Id. at 3–4. Thus, Ms. Valenzuela’s
case is similar to the facts in Hernandez-Lara, even if it is not identical.
The Supreme Court has reserved ruling on which party bears the burden of proof at
§ 1226(a) bond hearings, and the Tenth Circuit has not yet had occasion to opine on the issue. See
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 312 (2018) (declining to reach burden-of-proof arguments
because they were not considered by the lower court); see also Black v. Almodovar, 156 F.4th 171,
173–74 (2d Cir. 2025) (Nardini, J., dissenting) (detailing the “circuit splat” of “all-over-the-map
holdings” regarding the burden of proof in § 1226(a) bond hearings). Circuits are not only split on
which party bears the burden; they are also split on the extent of the burden. Compare Hernandez-
Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 41 (1st Cir. 2021) (placing the burden on the government to justify
continued detention by “a preponderance of the evidence” for flight risk but “clear and convincing
evidence” for dangerousness), with Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 855–56 (2d Cir. 2020)
(requiring the government to provide “clear and convincing evidence” for both flight risk and
dangerousness).
Other district courts in this circuit applied the tripartite Mathews v. Eldridge framework to
this determination and have held almost unanimously that the government must bear the burden
of proof at § 1226(a) bond hearings. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See, e.g., Abanil v. Baltazar, 817
F. Supp. 3d 1148, 1159 (D. Colo. 2026) (concluding that “it is the Government’s burden to ‘justify
a noncitizen’s continued detention at a bond hearing’” (citations omitted)); Velasquez Salazar v.
Dedos, 806 F. Supp. 3d 1231, 1245 (D.N.M. 2025) (applying the Mathews and civil detention
frameworks to conclude that the burden of proof must be shifted “to the Government to prove, by
clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner is at risk of flight and/or a danger to the community
such that continued detention is necessary”); Arias v. Levya, 2:26-cv-00812-RJS, 2026 WL
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2957987, at *7–8 (D. Utah Oct. 1, 2026) (applying the Mathews framework and concluding that
the balance of factors weighed in favor of shifting the burden to the government).
As to the extent of the burden the government must bear, “clear and convincing evidence”
is the most appropriate standard. “[T]he Supreme Court has long held that the clear and convincing
evidence standard applies to civil detention where an individual’s liberty interest is at stake.”
Arostegui-Maldonado v. Baltazar, 794 F. Supp. 3d 926 (D. Colo. 2025) (citing United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987)). The First Circuit held in Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons that a
preponderance of the evidence standard was appropriate for flight risk in part because “there is
less risk of error from a preponderance standard on this issue because, as noted, detained citizens
possess knowledge of many of the most relevant factors.” 10 F.4th at 40. This court, however, is
conscious that the rapidly changing landscape of immigration detention has made it increasingly
difficult for detained noncitizens to effectively access counsel and make arguments at bond
hearings. See, e.g., Andrade v. Mullin, 2:26-cv-00805-JNP, 2026 WL 2641853, at *2 (D. Utah Sept.
8, 2026) (“During [oral argument], Ms. Andrade’s counsel represented that he had been unable to
locate or communicate with Ms. Andrade since her transfer to ICE custody.”); Chiriboga v. Mullin,
No. 2:26-cv-00760-JNP, 2026 WL 2797328, at *1–2 (D. Utah Sept. 18, 2026) (detailing the
government’s inability to locate the individual detained by ICE). In the absence of further direction
from the Tenth Circuit, clear and convincing evidence is the appropriate standard for both risk of
flight and danger to community. The court therefore concludes that Respondents should bear the
burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Valenzuela is a flight risk or poses a
danger to the community.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, the court ORDERS as follows:
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1. 	Ms. Valenzuela’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED. Dkt. No. 1.
2. 	Respondent’s motion for leave to file additional exhibits is GRANTED. Dkt. No. 26.
3. 	Respondents are ORDERED to vacate the request for Ms. Valenzuela’s voluntary
departure.
4. 	Respondents are ENJOINED from detaining Ms. Valenzuela, denying her bond or
conditional parole, or seeking her deportation on the basis of the voluntary departure
form. That form is declared to be void.
5. 	Respondents are ORDERED to produce the following categories of documents, or
sworn declarations that such documents do not exist, by October 16, 2026:
a. 	Any records requested in Ms. Valenzuela’s petition (Dkt. No. 1) that have not
already been provided;
b. 	Any “agency records” that Officer Shields relied on to make his custody
determination (Dkt. No. 26-2, p. 1);
c. 	Any internal policies, whether communicated in writing or verbally, that
Officers Shields considered while making his custody determination;
d. 	Any notes taken by Officer Shields or others in connection with the processing
of Ms. Valenzuela;
e. 	Any forms or paperwork that Ms. Valenzuela filled out during processing.
6. 	Because of the confusion regarding the date of Ms. Valenzuela’s bond hearing, this
order issues after the scheduled hearing. The parties are therefore ORDERED to file by
October 16, 2026, status reports indicating:
a. 	Whether Respondents provided Ms. Valenzuela with a bond hearing on October
13, 2026, in the West Valley Immigration Court in Utah;
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b. 	Whether Respondents bore the burden of establishing by clear and convincing
evidence that Ms. Valenzuela is a flight risk or danger to the community under
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) at that hearing;
c. 	Whether, prior to that hearing, Respondents produced the documents requested
by Ms. Valenzuela and ordered to be produced by this court in this order and, if
so, when those documents were produced;
d. 	Whether Ms. Valenzuela was represented by counsel at that hearing;
e. 	The outcome of that hearing; and
f. 	Ms. Valenzuela’s detention status following that hearing.
7. 	If Ms. Valenzuela is released on bond or conditional parole, Respondents are
ORDERED, at the time of release, to provide her any personal effects and identification
documents that were confiscated from her.
DATED October 13, 2026.
BY THE COURT
______________________________
Jill N. Parrish
Chief United States District Court Judge
District of Utah
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