Seabrook v. Hegseth

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IN THE UNITED STATE DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH
GINA K. SEABROOK, f/k/a GINA K.
COVINGTON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
PETE HEGSETH, Secretary of
Department of War,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM DECISION & ORDER
TO AMEND COMPLAINT
Case No. 2:25-cv-01133
Magistrate Judge Dustin B. Pead
Before the court is pro se Plaintiff Gina K. Seabrook (“Ms. Seabrook”) complaint.1 Ms.
Seabrook was granted leave to temporarily proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C § 1915
(“IFP Statute”) while the court screens her pleading.2 Accordingly, the court now reviews the
sufficiency of Ms. Seabrook’s complaint under the authority of the IFP Statute. Based upon the
analysis set forth below, the court orders Mr. Seabrook to file an amended complaint no later
than January 19, 2026.
1 ECF No. 1, Complaint.
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BACKGROUND
Ms. Seabrook names Pete Hegseth as the Defendant (“Mr. Hegseth”) in this action.3
Plaintiff’s complaint contains the following allegation in support of her claim:
Acting General Manager Christina Griffin presented [Ms. Seabrook] with Advance
Notice of 4 day Suspension without pay AWOL accusation while on approved leave.
New General Manager Melanie White presented [Ms. Seabrook] with [a] Final
Suspension Notice in April 2019[, and] a Written Reprimand in Aug 2019. At a later
date 12 June 2020 [Melanie White] [p]resented [Ms. Seabrook] with an Advance
Notice of Separation for Cause for Western Union accusation which was reduced to a
5 day Suspension without pay. New General Manager Tammy Hairston presented
[Ms. Seabrook] with a Written Counseling stating [Ms. Seabrook] was 261 days
passed [sic] an initial Western Union suspense. On or around 27 July 2022 Ms[.]
Hariston sent emails to [Ms. Seabrook] while on leave stating the condition of [Ms.
Seabrokk’s] facility and that the Supervisors who [Ms. Seabrook] had left in charge
did not know how to run a facility. The following listed below have witnessed
actions of Sr. Leadership, Shift Supervisory Merceydece Quinney, Shift Supervisor
Angenette Johnson, Shift Supervisor Sheena Lamphere, Camp Manager Shaun
Parrisor[, and] Laborer Amber Kubat[.]
Based on these allegations, Ms. Seabrook alleges a Bivens claim and seeks punitive damages
and fees for medical bills, legal bills and back pay.4
LEGAL STANDARDS
To review Ms. Seabrooks’s complaint under the authority of the IFP Statute, the court
must consider the standard under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) regarding the failure to state a claim on
which relief can be granted.5 This legal standard is addressed below.
2 ECF No. 5, Order Temporarily Granting Motion to Proceed IFP; 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
3 See generally, ECF No. 1.
4 ECF No. 1 at 3, 6. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 29 L. Ed. 2d
619 (1971).
5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
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1. 	Failure to State a Claim
Whenever the court authorizes a party to proceed without payment of fees under the IFP
Statute, the court is required to “dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the
action . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.”6 In determining whether a
complaint fails to state a claim for relief under the IFP Statute, the court employs the same
standard used for analyzing motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).7 Under that standard, the court “look[s] for plausibility in th[e]
complaint.”8 More specifically, the court “look[s] to the specific allegations in the complaint to
determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief. Rather than adjudging whether
a claim is ‘improbable’ ‘[f]actual allegations [in a complaint] must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level.’”9
Additionally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 is incorporated in the court’s Rule
12(b)(6) analysis.10 Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”11 “A pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ Nor does
6 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217-18 (10 th Cir. 2007).
8 Id. at 1218 (quotations and citations omitted) (second alteration in original).
9 Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929
(2007)) (other quotations and citation omitted) (second and third alterations in original).
10 U.S. ex. rel. Lemmon v. Envirocare of Utah, Inc., 614 F.3d 1163, 1171 (10 th Cir. 2010); Fed. R. Civ. P.
8.
11 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
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a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”12
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice.”13 Rule 8 requires, at least, that the allegations of a complaint put the
defendant on fair notice of the claims raised.14 The twin purposes of a complaint are to give the
opposing party fair notice of the basis for the claims so defendant may respond and to allow the
court to conclude that the allegations, if proven, show that the plaintiff is entitled to relief.15
In analyzing Ms. Seabrook’s complaint, the court is mindful that she is proceeding pro se
and that “[a] pro se litigant’s pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”16 However, it is not “the proper function of
the district court to assume the role of advocate for the pro se litigant,”17 and the court “will not
supply additional facts, nor will [it] construct a legal theory for [a pro se] plaintiff that assumes
facts that have not been pleaded.”18 Indeed, as the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated,
[t]he broad reading of [a pro se] plaintiff’s complaint does not relieve the plaintiff
of the burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could
be based. . . . [C]onclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are
insufficient to state a claim on which relief can be based. This is so because a pro
se plaintiff requires no special legal training to recount the facts surrounding his
12 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 557) (alteration in original).
13 Id.
14 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
15 Monument Builders of Greater Kan. City, Inc. v. Am. Cemetery Ass’n. of Kan., 891 F.2d 1471, 1480
(10 th Cir. 1989).
16 Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10 th Cir. 1991); see e.g., Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, Kan., 318
F.3d 1183, 1187 (10 th Cir. 2003).
17 Id. at 1110 (citation omitted).
18 Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10 th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
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alleged injury, and he must provide such facts if the court is to determine whether
he makes out a claim on which relief can be granted. Moreover, in analyzing the
sufficiency of the plaintiff’s complaint, the court need accept as true only the
plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual contentions, not his conclusory allegations.19
After reviewing a pro se plaintiff’s complaint under the IFP Statute, the court may
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim “only where it is obvious that the plaintiff
cannot prevail on the facts he has alleged[,] and it would be futile to give [him] an opportunity to
amend.”20
ANALYSIS
Ms. Seabrook’s complaint is subject to dismissal because she fails to state a plausible
claim for relief under Bivens. However, because Ms. Seabrook may be able to cure this
deficiency with adequate allegations in an amended pleading, the court provides Plaintiff with
the opportunity to do so.
1. 	Ms. Seabrook’s Complaint Fails to State a Plausible Claim for Relief Under Bivens.
After reviewing Ms. Seabrook’s complaint, the court concludes that the factual
allegations are conclusory in nature and fail to state a claim or satisfy the minimum pleading
standards under Federal Rule 8(a)(2) and Federal Rule 12(b)(6).21
First, Ms. Seabrook fails to state a claim under Bivens because she has not identified the
violation of any federal constitutional right. A Bivens action “seeks to impose personal liability
and damages on a federal official for the violation of a federal constitutional right.”22 Here, other
than indicating that the basis for federal jurisdiction is her Bivens claim, Ms. Seabrook has not
19 Bellmon, 935 F.2d at 1110 (citations omitted).
20 Kay, 500 F.3d at 1217 (quotations and citation omitted).
21 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
22 Chapoose v. Hodel, 831 F.2d 931, 935 (10 th Cir. 1987).
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alleged any constitutional rights that were violated.23 Second, a Bivens claim “can be brought
only against federal officials in their individual capacities.”24 Yet, Ms. Seabrook’s complaint
does not indicate in what capacity she sues Mr. Hegseth. Finally, Ms. Seabrook fails to make any
specific or intelligible allegations about Mr. Hegseth’s alleged actions, when they occurred or
how they harmed her. Indeed, “to state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what
each defendant did to him or her; when the defendant did it; how the defendant’s action harmed
him or her; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated.”25 Other
than naming Mr. Hegseth as Defendant, Ms. Seabrook’s complaint is completely devoid of any
factual allegations against him.. As a result, Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed for failure to
satisfy Rule 8’s requirements and failure to state a plausible claim.26 However, as discussed
below, the court permits Mr. Seabrook to amend her complaint.
2. 	The Court Permits Ms. Seabrook to Amend Her Complaint.
Based upon the foregoing analysis, Ms. Seabrook’s complaint fails to state a plausible
claim for relief. Yet dismissal is proper only “if it is obvious that [she] cannot prevail on the facts
[s]he has alleged and it would be futile to give [her] an opportunity to amend.”27 Accordingly,
the court affords Ms. Seabrook an opportunity to amend her complaint. Consistent therewith, the
23 ECF No. 1 at 3.
24 Smith, 561 F.3d at 1099 (“Bivens claims cannot be asserted directly against the United States, federal
officials in their official capacity or federal agencies.”) (internal citations omitted).
25 Allison v. Boulder County Bcso, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 19270, at *4 (10 th Cir. July 31, 2025) (citing
Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10 th Cir. July 3, 2007)).
26 Allison, at *7 (“But failure to satisfy Rule 8’s requirements essentially results in a failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.”).
27 Kay, 500 F.3d at 1217 (quotations and citation omitted).
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court orders Mr. Seabrook to submit an amended complaint no later than January 19, 2026. Once
received, the court will address whether Ms. Seabrook’s amended complaint states a claim for
relief. If it fails to do so, it will be subject to dismissal with prejudice.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
The court ORDERS as follows:
1. 	Ms. Seabrook is ordered to file an amended complaint by January 19, 2026. The words
“Amended Complaint” should appear in the caption of the documents.
2. 	Once filed, the court will screen the proposed amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. §1915
and DUCivR 3-2(b).
3. 	Ms. Seabrook’s failure to file an amended complaint may result in dismissal of this
action.
4. 	Ms. Seabrook’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is TEMPORARILY GRANTED.28
IT IS SO ORDERED
DATED this 30th day of December, 2025.
BY THE COURT
________________________________
DUSTIN B. PEAD
Magistrate Judge
United States District Court
28 ECF No. 2.
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