Jeanpierre v. Trump

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
BRANDON MICHAEL JEANPIERRE,
Plaintiff,
v.
DONALD J. TRUMP,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
WAIVE FILING FEE (DOC. NO. 8)
AND DISMISSING ACTION
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915
Case No. 2:25-cv-00290
Magistrate Judge Daphne A. Oberg
Plaintiff Brandon Jeanpierre filed this action without an attorney and without
paying a filing fee.1 The court temporarily granted Mr. Jeanpierre’s motion to waive the
filing fee and stayed the case for screening.2 After screening Mr. Jeanpierre’s complaint
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and identifying deficiencies, the court invited Mr.
Jeanpierre to file an amended complaint,3 noting that failure to do so could result in
dismissal of this action.4
1 (See Compl., Doc. No. 1; Mot. to Waive Filing Fee, Doc. No. 8.)
2 (See Order Temp. Granting Mot. to Waive Filing Fee and Notice of Screening Under
28 U.S.C. § 1915, Doc. No. 9.)
3 (See Mem. Decision and Order Permitting Am. Compl., Doc. No. 11.)
4 (Id. at 15.)
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Mr. Jeanpierre did not file an amended complaint by the deadline in the court’s
order5 or anytime thereafter. Accordingly, Mr. Jeanpierre’s motion to waive the filing
fee6 is granted. But because Mr. Jeanpierre’s complaint fails to state a plausible claim
for relief, and further opportunities to amend would be futile, this action is dismissed with
prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
LEGAL STANDARDS
When a court authorizes a party to proceed without paying a filing fee, the court
must dismiss the case if it determines the complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted.”7 In making this determination, the court uses the standard for
analyzing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.8 To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint
must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”9 The
court accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true and views them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.10 But
5 Mr. Jeanpierre consents to proceed before a magistrate judge in accordance with 28
U.S.C. § 636(c), Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the District of
Utah’s General Order 20-034. (See Doc. No. 5.)
6 (Doc. No. 2.)
7 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
8 Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007).
9 Hogan v. Winder, 762 F.3d 1096, 1104 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007)).
10 Wilson v. Montano, 715 F.3d 847, 852 (10th Cir. 2013).
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the court need not accept the plaintiff’s conclusory allegations as true.11 “[A] plaintiff
must offer specific factual allegations to support each claim.”12
Because Mr. Jeanpierre proceeds without an attorney (pro se), his filings are
liberally construed and held “to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers.”13 Still, pro se plaintiffs must “follow the same rules of procedure that
govern other litigants.”14 For instance, a pro se plaintiff “still has the burden of alleging
sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based.”15 While courts must
make some allowances for a pro se plaintiff’s “failure to cite proper legal authority, his
confusion of various legal theories, his poor syntax and sentence construction, or his
unfamiliarity with pleading requirements,”16 a court “will not supply additional factual
allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s
behalf.”17
11 Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
12 Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 2011).
13 Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.
14 Garrett v. Selby, Connor, Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005)
(citation omitted).
15 Jenkins v. Currier, 514 F.3d 1030, 1032 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
16 Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.
17 Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1096 (10th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
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THE COMPLAINT
Mr. Jeanpierre is the founder of a religious organization called the Black Flag.18
He sues Donald J. Trump in his official and individual capacities under Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics19 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.20 He
claims President Trump’s Executive Order 14253 violates his religious freedoms under
the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),21 as well as
Article 18 of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights.22
The Black Flag is a tax-exempt religious organization with various tenets.23 The
central tenet: Mr. Jeanpierre can do whatever he “feel[s] like doing.”24 A “Principle of
Autonomy” grants him “autonomy of mind, body, spirit, emotion, and execution of will
regardless of opinion of any and all other individual(s), entity, or entities.”25 The Black
Flag prohibits prejudice and discrimination “against any member, guest, or affiliated
party based on race, color, gender, sexual orientation, national origin, age, disability, or
18 (Compl., Doc. No. 1 at 8.) As Mr. Jeanpierre’s complaint uses the standard civil rights
form and a long form complaint, each of which have different page numbering, all
citations in this order refer to the complaint’s CM/ECF pagination.
19 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
20 (Compl., Doc. No. 1 at 2–3, 8, 16.)
21 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.
22 (Compl., Doc. No. 1 at 12–15.)
23 (Id. at 8.)
24 (Id. at 9.)
25 (Id. at 10.)
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socioeconomic status.”26 The religion “mandates recognition of systemic racism,
inequity, and historical injustice,” imposes “a religious duty to actively engage in
dismantling systems of oppression,” and requires “active engagement in outreach
programs and protective measures” for marginalized or vulnerable groups.27
On March 27, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14253, titled
“Restoring Truth and Sanity to American History.”28 As characterized in the complaint,
the executive order “directs federal agencies to remove . . . ‘divisive race-centered
ideology’ from the Smithsonian Institution and to restore monuments that have been
‘removed or changed to perpetuate a false reconstruction of American history.’”29 The
order refers to a historical revisionist movement which “seeks to undermine the
remarkable achievements of the United States by casting its founding principles and
historical milestones in a negative light.”30 Mr. Jeanpierre claims the order “opposes
narratives that present American history as ‘inherently racist, sexist, oppressive, or
otherwise irredeemably flawed.’”31 It “prohibits ‘exhibits or programs that degrade
26 (Id. at 9.)
27 (Id. at 9, 10.)
28 (Id. at 9 (referencing and quoting Exec. Order No. 14253 (“Exec. Order”), 90 Fed.
Reg. 63, 14563 (Apr. 3, 2025),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/04/03/2025-05838/restoring-truth-and-
sanity-to-american-history [https://perma.cc/6VBH-BCWB]).)
29 (Id. (quoting Exec. Order).)
30 (Id. (quoting Exec. Order).)
31 (Id. (quoting Exec. Order).)
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shared American values, divide Americans by race, or promote ideologies inconsistent
with Federal law,’ and targets changes made to historical presentations since
January 1, 2020.”32 And it “directs the Department of the Interior to ensure that
monuments and memorials do not contain content that ‘inappropriately disparage
Americans past or living (including persons living in colonial times).’”33
According to Mr. Jeanpierre, this executive order “effectively establishes a state-
sponsored religious doctrine of American historical exceptionalism” and, as a result, is
“a direct attack on the foundational tenets of [his] sincerely held religious beliefs.”34 He
alleges the order prevents Mr. Jeanpierre “from exercising his religious autonomy to
perceive and interpret history according to his religious conscience.”35 He alleges the
order’s “prohibition against depicting American history as ‘inherently racist, sexist,
oppressive, or otherwise irredeemably flawed’” impedes his “religious mandate to
identify and confront . . . historical realities” and interferes with his “religious practice of
acknowledging and addressing systemic racism” by “imposing a sanitized historical
narrative that contradicts [his] religious understanding of reality.”36 The “restrictions on
historical presentations,” according to Mr. Jeanpierre, force “compliance with a historical
narrative that [he] religiously believes causes harm to marginalized communities” and
32 (Id. (quoting Exec. Order).)
33 (Id. (quoting Exec. Order).)
34 (Id. at 7, 11.)
35 (Id. at 10.)
36 (Id. (quoting Exec. Order).)
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“spiritual suffocation and respiratory distress to [his] religion by restricting the free
breath of historical truth.”37 Finally, Mr. Jeanpierre alleges the executive order’s
imposed historical doctrine compels him “to violate his religious tenants regarding
autonomy, truth-telling, and confrontation of systemic inequity,” forcing him “to choose
between adherence to his religious principles and compliance with federal law.”38
Mr. Jeanpierre seeks injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief, as well as
“specific performance.”39 In particular, he requests an order permanently enjoining
Executive Order 14253 and declaring it violative of the First Amendment and RFRA—
and a finding that it constitutes religious violence under international law.40 He requests
$666 in “compensatory damages” and “attorney’s fees and costs.”41 And he seeks an
order requiring President Trump “to surrender one (1) lung” to him as specific
performance “for the spiritual suffocation caused by the Executive Order”—or, in the
alternative, a specifically orchestrated apology delivered by President Trump before
international news media.42
37 (Id. at 11.)
38 (Id.)
39 (Id. at 5, 20–21.)
40 (Id. at 20.)
41 (Id. at 21.)
42 (Id.)
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ANALYSIS
Mr. Jeanpierre’s complaint is deficient. He does not state a claim upon which
relief may be granted under § 1983 or Bivens. He does not state a claim that the
executive order violates RFRA or the First Amendment’s religion clauses. And the
United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not provide for a private
right of action. For these reasons, the complaint must be dismissed.
First, Mr. Jeanpierre fails to state a claim under § 1983 or Bivens. Section 1983
provides a recovery mechanism for violations of federal rights by “a person acting under
color of state law.”43 The statute “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a
method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.”44 “It entitles an injured
person to money damages if a state official violates his or her constitutional rights.”45
Because Mr. Jeanpierre sues President Trump, who is a federal official, not a state
official, he fails to state a claim under § 1983.
43 See Margheim v. Buljko, 855 F.3d 1077, 1084 (10th Cir. 2017) (describing § 1983
generally).
44 Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979). To the extent Mr. Jeanpierre relies
on the Declaratory Judgment Act, that act involves procedural remedies and (like
§ 1983) does not confer any “substantive rights” or create a cause of action. See
Cheyenne & Arapaho Tribes v. First Bank & Tr. Co., 560 F. App’x 699, 708 (10th
Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (citing Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 570 F.2d 1384,
1386 (10th Cir. 1978)).
45 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 130 (2017) (emphasis added).
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Although Bivens created an implied cause of action against federal officials for
constitutional violations,46 Mr. Jeanpierre does not state a Bivens claim. He sues
President Trump in his official and individual capacities, but “a Bivens claim can be
brought only against federal officials in their individual capacities.”47 Further, Bivens
only allows suits for monetary damages. Bivens does not permit the injunctive and
declaratory relief (and specific performance) Mr. Jeanpierre requests.48 Finally,
although Mr. Jeanpierre also seeks monetary damages, Bivens’ implied remedy for
damages only extends to claims brought under the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth
Amendments.49 The Supreme Court has “never held that Bivens applies to First
46 See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 379.
47 Smith, 561 F.3d at 1099 (“Bivens claims cannot be asserted directly against the
United States, federal officials in their official capacities, or federal agencies.” (internal
citations omitted)).
48 See Solida v. McKelvey, 820 F.3d 1090, 1093–94 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[W]e join our sister
circuits in holding that relief under Bivens does not encompass injunctive and
declaratory relief where, as here, the equitable relief sought requires official government
action.”); Higazy v. Templeton, 505 F.3d 161, 169 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The only remedy
available in a Bivens action is an award for monetary damages from defendants in their
individual capacities.”); Simmat v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 413 F.3d 1225, 1231 (10th
Cir. 2005) (explaining “a Bivens claim lies against the federal official in his individual
capacity” and, although some “courts have characterized constitutional claims to enjoin
federal officials as Bivens claims,” the Bivens Court held “plaintiffs may sue federal
officials in their individual capacities for damages for Fourth Amendment violations”);
see also Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 72 (2001) (“For people in Bivens’
shoes, it is damages or nothing.” (citation omitted)).
49 See Silva v. United States, 45 F.4th 1134, 1138–39 (10th Cir. 2022) (explaining
Bivens and its early progeny “fashioned a claim for damages in three constitutional
contexts” under the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments); see also Sargeant v.
Barfield, 87 F.4th 358, 362–64 (7th Cir. 2023) (providing detailed background of Bivens
and its progeny).
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Amendment claims”50 like the religious freedom claims asserted here.51 Accordingly,
the complaint fails to state a claim under Bivens.
Second, Mr. Jeanpierre also fails to state a claim under RFRA. RFRA provides a
remedy to redress violations of the right to free exercise under the First Amendment.52
The statute bars the federal government from “substantially burden[ing] a person’s
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability,” unless
the government shows the burden is “(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.”53 A plaintiff, however, must allege a “substantial” burden on his exercise of
religion.54 The government substantially burdens religious exercise if it: (1) “requires
50 Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 498 (2022) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S.
658, 663 (2012)).
51 Extending Bivens to a new constitutional context requires assessing “whether there is
any rational reason (even one) to think that Congress is better suited to weigh the costs
and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.” Id. at 496. By passing RFRA,
which broadly protects religious freedoms, Congress has shown it is better suited to do
so. Accordingly, Mr. Jeanpierre cannot show Bivens should extend to his First
Amendment claims. See Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286, 305 (3d Cir. 2016)
(“[N]either the Supreme Court nor this Court has ever extended Bivens to Free Exercise
claims. In view of RFRA’s broad protections for religious liberty, we decline to do so
here.”); see also Tanzin v. Tanvir, 592 U.S. 43, 48–52 (2020) (holding “RFRA’s express
remedies provision permits litigants, when appropriate, to obtain money damages
against federal officials in their individual capacities”).
52 Tanzin, 592 U.S. at 45.
53 United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1126 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb-1(a)–(b)).
54 Iglesia Pentecostal Casa De Dios Para Las Naciones, Inc. v. Duke, 718 F. App’x 646,
650–51 (10th Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (explaining the elements of a RFRA claim).
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participation in an activity prohibited by a sincerely held religious belief,” (2) “prevents
participation in conduct motivated by a sincerely held religious belief,” or (3) “places
substantial pressure on an adherent . . . to engage in conduct contrary to a sincerely
held religious belief.”55
Mr. Jeanpierre fails to assert facts showing the executive order substantially
burdens his exercise of religion. He alleges the order “imposes a sanitized historical
narrative” that prohibits “depicting American history as ‘inherently racist, sexist,
oppressive, or otherwise irredeemably flawed.’”56 And he broadly alleges this prevents
him “from exercising his religious autonomy to perceive and interpret history,” impedes
his religious practice of identifying and confronting “historical realities” and
“acknowledging and addressing systemic racism,” forces him to comply with an
incorrect historical narrative, compels him “to violate his religious tenants regarding
autonomy, truth-telling, and confrontation of systemic inequity,” and forces him “to
choose between adherence to his religious principles and compliance with federal
law.”57
55 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1138 (10th Cir. 2013) (en banc)
(citations omitted), aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682
(2014).
56 (Compl., Doc. No. 1 at 10.)
57 (Id. at 10–11.)
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But the executive order, as described in the complaint, does not demand any
conduct from Mr. Jeanpierre or impose any consequence for his religious beliefs.58 It
orders federal agencies to remove race-centered ideology from the Smithsonian
Institution and to restore public monuments, according to President Trump’s historical
narrative that the country’s achievements, principles, and milestones are being
undermined and cast in a negative light.59 Mr. Jeanpierre does not assert he was made
to alter his religious behavior in some way because of this order. He does not even
allege he visited the Smithsonian or any other monument affected by the order. And,
even if he has, the order demands nothing from him. It includes no provision requiring
or coercing him to accept the executive order’s narrative as truth. Mr. Jeanpierre is free
to disagree without any consequence.60 Accordingly, the complaint fails to state a claim
under RFRA.
Third, Mr. Jeanpierre also fails to state a claim that the executive order violates
his religious freedoms under the First Amendment. Among other things, the First
58 Cf. Burwell, 573 U.S. at 720 (holding the federal government substantially burdened
the plaintiffs’ exercise of religion where regulations “demand[ed] that they engage in
conduct that seriously violates their religious beliefs” and, if they “d[id] not yield to this
demand, the economic consequences w[ould] be severe”).
59 (Compl., Doc. No. 1 at 9.)
60 Cf. Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Indiana Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717–18 (1981)
(explaining where the government “conditions receipt of an important benefit upon
conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of
conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an
adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion
exists”).
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Amendment contains an Establishment Clause and a Free Exercise Clause: “Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof . . . .”61 Mr. Jeanpierre does not state a claim under either clause.
The Establishment Clause prohibits the government from “mak[ing] a religious
observance compulsory,” “coerc[ing] anyone to attend church,” or forcing individuals “to
engage in a formal religious exercise.”62 The executive order does none of that—it is
entirely secular. Mr. Jeanpierre does not allege he has been forced to attend or engage
in any religious observance—or even that he has been forced to visit the Smithsonian or
any other monument affected by the order.
The Free Exercise Clause prohibits the government from burdening “sincere
religious practice pursuant to a policy that is not neutral or generally applicable.”63 But
Mr. Jeanpierre does not allege the executive order burdens his religious practice—that it
prevents him from holding his own beliefs or compels him to alter his personal religious
behavior. Moreover, the executive order is neutral and generally applicable. It has no
61 U.S. Const. amend. I.
62 Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 597 U.S. 507, 536–37 (2022) (citing Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) and Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589 (1992)).
63 Chiles v. Salazar, 116 F.4th 1178, 1221 (10th Cir. 2024) (citing Kennedy, 597 U.S. at
525).
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religious objectives.64 It does not target religion.65 On its face, it has nothing to do with
religion. In effect, Mr. Jeanpierre’s free-exercise claim demands that President Trump
refrain from implementing a religiously neutral, historical narrative at the Smithsonian
and other monuments that is contrary to the Black Flag’s religious understanding of
history. The First Amendment has never been interpreted to “require the Government
itself to behave in ways that the individual believes will further his or her spiritual
development.”66 For these reasons, the complaint fails to state a claim under either the
Establishment Clause or the Free Exercise Clause.
64 Id. at 1222 (“Government fails to act neutrally when it proceeds in a manner intolerant
of religious beliefs or restricts practices because of their religious nature. If the object of
a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the
law is not neutral.” (citation modified)).
65 Id. at 1224 (explaining a law is not generally applicable “if it invites the government to
consider the particular reasons for a person’s conduct by providing a mechanism for
individualized exemptions from the law’s requirements” or “if it prohibits religious
conduct while permitting secular conduct that undermines the government’s asserted
interests in a similar way” (citation modified)).
66 Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986). In Bowen, the Supreme Court rejected a
father’s religious objection that the government’s use of social security numbers for
government benefit programs may harm his daughter’s spirit. Id. at 696, 699. Holding
this could not support a free exercise challenge, the Court explained:
The Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require the
Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the
religious beliefs of particular citizens. 	Just as the Government may not
insist that [citizens] engage in any set form of religious observance,
[citizens] may not demand that the Government join in their chosen religious
practices . . . . 	The Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the
government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual
can extract from the government.
Id. at 699–700 (citation omitted).
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Finally, Mr. Jeanpierre fails to state a claim that the executive order violates
Article 18 of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights.67 The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a non-binding declaration that provides no
private rights of action.68
For these reasons, this action must be dismissed.69 “Dismissal of a pro se
complaint for failure to state a claim is proper only where it is obvious that the plaintiff
cannot prevail on the facts he has alleged and it would be futile to give him an
opportunity to amend.”70 The court previously identified the deficiencies described
above and permitted Mr. Jeanpierre to amend his complaint to correct them,71 but he
failed to do so. Therefore, further opportunities to amend would be futile, and dismissal
is necessary.
67 (Compl., Doc. No. 1 at 15.)
68 See Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734 (2004) (explaining that the
Universal Declaration is simply a statement of principles and not a treaty or international
agreement imposing legal obligations); Chen v. Ashcroft, 85 F. App’x 700, 705 (10th Cir.
2004) (unpublished) (explaining “the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is merely a
resolution of the United Nations” that is not “binding on the United States” or the Tenth
Circuit).
69 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
70 Kay, 500 F.3d at 1217 (citation omitted).
71 (See Mem. Decision and Order Permitting Am. Compl., Doc. No. 11.)
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Jeanpierre’s motion to proceed without paying the filing fee72 is GRANTED.
Because Mr. Jeanpierre’s complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief, and further
opportunities to amend would be futile, this action is DISMISSED with prejudice
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
DATED this 18th day of November, 2025.
BY THE COURT:
_____________________________
Daphne A. Oberg
United States Magistrate Judge
72 (Doc. No. 8.)
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