Ammerman et al v. Fisher et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
PATRICIA AMMERMAN; and HARRIS S.
AMMERMAN,
Plaintiffs,
v.
DAVID LLOYD FISHER, et al.,
Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
TO GRANT DEFENDANT’S MOTION
TO DISMISS (DOC. NO. 106)
Case No. 2:24-cv-00790
Chief District Judge Jill N. Parrish
Magistrate Judge Daphne A. Oberg
Patricia and Harris Ammerman, proceeding pro se,1 filed this action alleging
“fraud in the course of Defendants’ operation of a Racketeering Enterprise engaged in a
pattern of committing wire fraud.”2 Defendant Nola Conrad, LLC, has moved to dismiss
the claims against it for lack of personal jurisdiction.3 Because the Ammermans fail to
establish personal jurisdiction over Nola Conrad through any of their jurisdictional
theories—specific jurisdiction, conspiracy jurisdiction, or jurisdiction through the
1 Mr. Ammerman states he is an attorney, but he is not licensed to practice in Utah.
(See Pls.’ Resp. to Show Cause Orders 3, Doc. No. 59.)
2 (See Compl. ¶ 1, Doc. No. 1.)
3 (Mot. to Dismiss (Mot.), Doc. No. 106.) Nola Conrad also moved to dismiss for failure
to state a claim and on grounds the complaint violates the pleading standards of
Rules 8 and 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Id. at 1.) Where the court
lacks personal jurisdiction over Nola Conrad, the court need not address these
arguments.
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Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act4 (RICO)—the undersigned
recommends5 the district judge grant the motion to dismiss and dismiss the
Ammermans’ claims against Nola Conrad.
BACKGROUND
The Ammermans assert claims against eighteen defendants6 for substantive
RICO violations, conspiracy to violate RICO, common law fraud, breach of contract,
unjust enrichment, quasi contract, “implied in fact” contract, civil conspiracy, breach of
fiduciary duty, negligence, gross negligence, and “promissory estoppel/detrimental
reliance.”7 They allege Defendants fraudulently obtained $1.126 million from them
through the operation of a racketeering enterprise.8
According to the complaint, defendants “Ken Phillips, Andre Ester, and Darrell
Rideaux are the architects of this enterprise and wire fraud ring.”9 They registered
4 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq.
5 This case is referred to the undersigned magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(B). (See Doc. No. 33.)
6 (Compl. 1–5, Doc. No. 1.) The Ammermans initially named twenty-seven defendants
but have since voluntarily dismissed nine of them—John M. Burkman, Burkman &
Associates, LLC, Jacob Alexander Wohl, Kenneth C. Rudy, Michael Perog, Ken Phillips,
Gaunlet Holdings Asset Management (UK) LTD, Gauntlet Holdings, LLC, and Antonio
Marino. (See Doc. Nos. 39, 59, 70, 84 & 90.) And the court recently dismissed eight
more for lack of personal jurisdiction—Keisha Perry Walker, the Perry Law Group, LLC,
Todd Jackson, Todd Jackson Law, PC, Erik Paul Weingold, Weingold Law PLLC, and
Paul and Kirsten Nykamp. (Order Adopting R. & R., Doc. No. 110.)
7 (Compl. ¶¶ 215–352, Doc. No. 1.)
8 (Id. ¶ 1.)
9 (Id. ¶ 39.)
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“numerous LLC’s over the years that falsely purported to be investment companies to
use in their fraudulent contracts with victims to provide them a false sense of security.”10
They “induced victims to send them millions of dollars through ‘escrow’ attorneys that
they recruited, including David Fisher” and others, “with false assurances that their
money was being invested in securities and private placement, and falsely guaranteeing
immense returns, with the intent to deceive and defraud.”11
The Ammermans claim they fell victim to this fraud scheme. They allege the
defendants induced them to send Mr. Fisher $1.126 million to be reinvested, promising
them “ten times return on any money they sent.”12 The Ammermans wired the money
to Mr. Fisher, but it was never invested.13 Instead, Mr. Fisher and the other escrow
attorneys allegedly pocketed a portion of the money for themselves before disbursing
the rest to their other co-conspirators.14
Nola Conrad is a limited liability company registered by Paul and Kirsten
Nykamp—two of the alleged co-conspirators domiciled in Florida.15 The Ammermans
10 (Id.)
11 (Id. ¶ 44.)
12 (Id. ¶ 2.)
13 (Id. ¶¶ 121, 183, 195–96.)
14 (Id. ¶¶ 65, 125.)
15 (Id. ¶¶ 23–24, 26.) Although the Ammermans do not identify in their complaint where
Nola Conrad is based, they do not dispute that the company is (or was) based in
Florida. (See Mot. to Set Aside Default, Decl. of Paul Nykamp ¶¶ 1–3, Doc. No. 58-1
(attesting that Nola Conrad is a now dissolved limited liability company organized under
the laws of Florida and managed primarily by Paul Nykamp); Ex. 2 to Pls.’ Mot. for Entry
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allege the Nykamps “shared the same conspiratorial knowledge and objective of
facilitating the transfer of money knowingly obtained from Plaintiffs through fraud, to
[Mr.] Rideaux and [Mr.] Fisher, in exchange for receiving a kickback themselves.”16 And
the Nykamps used their company, Nola Conrad, “to receive money from [Mr.] Fisher
that was stolen” from the Ammermans.17 In particular, the Ammermans identify three
wire transfers Mr. Fisher allegedly made to the Nykamps through Nola Conrad.18 Those
are the extent of the allegations specific to Nola Conrad.
Notably, Paul and Kirsten Nykamp have been dismissed from this case. The
undersigned previously issued a Report and Recommendation to dismiss the claims
against them for lack of personal jurisdiction.19 The court subsequently adopted the
Report and Recommendation, overruling the Ammermans’ objections.20 Before the
court issued this order, Nola Conrad filed the present motion, incorporating the
of Default, Doc. No. 44-2 (providing affidavit of service indicating Nola Conrad’s
registered agent was served in Florida).) These materials do not contradict allegations
in the complaint and may be considered in assessing the present motion to dismiss.
See Behagen v. Amateur Basketball Asso., 744 F.2d 731, 733 (10th Cir. 1984) (“[W]hen
a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is decided [based on] affidavits and other
written materials, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing. The allegations in
the complaint must be taken as true to the extent they are uncontroverted by the
defendant’s affidavits.” (internal citations omitted)).
16 (Compl. ¶ 87, Doc. No. 1.)
17 (Id.)
18 (Id. ¶¶ 193(19), 198(16), 198(32).)
19 (R. & R. to Grant Mots. to Dismiss (R. & R.), Doc. No. 104.)
20 (Order Adopting R. & R., Doc. No. 110.)
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arguments from the Nykamps’ motion to dismiss.21 Nola Conrad contends the court
lacks personal jurisdiction for the same reasons it did for the Nykamps—given that the
allegations as to these defendants are the same, and they are conclusory under any
theory of jurisdiction.22 The Ammermans argue personal jurisdiction is proper under
RICO because the “ends of justice” require nationwide jurisdiction, and under
“conspiracy-based” jurisdiction because they allege the Nykamps used Nola Conrad to
receive “scheme proceeds” and they identify three wire transfers from Utah.23
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits dismissal for lack of
personal jurisdiction.24 “The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.”25 When a defendant moves for dismissal under
Rule 12(b)(2), “the allegations in the complaint must be taken as true to the extent they
21 (Mot. 3, Doc. No. 106 (incorporating the Nykamps’ motion to dismiss arguments
under Rule 7-1(a)(8) of the Local Civil Rules of Procedure).) See DUCivR 7-1(a)(8)
(providing that “[a] party may incorporate by reference another party’s arguments in the
party’s own motion”). The NyKamps moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction
under Rule 12(b)(2), failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), and failure to satisfy
the pleading standards under Rules 8 and 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
(Mot. to Dismiss by Defs. Paul & Kirsten Nykamp 7–10, Doc. No. 80.) Because there is
a lack of personal jurisdiction over Nola Conrad, as explained below, this order does not
address the latter two grounds.
22 (Mot. 3, Doc. No. 106.)
23 (Pls.’ Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. (Opp’n) 2–3, Doc. No. 107.)
24 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2).
25 Behagen, 744 F.2d at 733.
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are uncontroverted by the defendant’s affidavits.”26 However, “the tenet that a court
must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions.”27 Courts need only accept well-pleaded factual allegations, and
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.”28
DISCUSSION
The Ammermans assert three theories of personal jurisdiction: specific
jurisdiction, conspiracy jurisdiction, and nationwide jurisdiction under RICO’s “ends of
justice” provision.29 Because each theory fails, the Ammermans fail to establish the
court has personal jurisdiction over Nola Conrad.
A. Specific Jurisdiction
First, a court may exercise specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant if
the lawsuit arises out of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state.30 To establish
26 Id. (citation modified).
27 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
28 Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
29 (Opp’n 2–3, Doc. No. 107.) Although the Ammermans did not raise specific
jurisdiction in their opposition, this order analyzes specific jurisdiction given the
allegations that Nola Conrad is the Nykamps’ company and that the Nykamps have
“sufficient contacts to warrant specific personal jurisdiction in this state and this federal
court.” (Compl. ¶¶ 23–24, Doc. No. 1.)
30 See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014). Utah’s long-arm statute
provides for jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the fullest extent permitted by
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
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specific jurisdiction, a plaintiff must show (i) the out-of-state defendant “purposefully
directed its activities at residents of the forum state,” and (ii) the plaintiff’s alleged
injuries arose from “the defendant’s forum-related activities.”31 Purposeful direction
requires “(1) an intentional action; (2) expressly aimed at the forum state; and (3)
knowledge that the brunt of the injury would be felt in the forum state.”32
At minimum, the Ammermans fail to establish the third requirement of the
purposeful direction test.33 This “requirement concentrates on the consequences of the
defendant’s actions—where was the alleged harm actually felt by the plaintiff.”34 The
Ammermans are residents of Maryland.35 While they identify three wire transfers in
Utah, they do not allege they suffered the brunt of their injury here. Where “the brunt of
See Utah Code § 78B-3-201(3); Starways, Inc. v. Curry, 980 P.2d 204, 206
(Utah 1999).
31 Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Cont’l Motors, Inc., 877 F.3d 895, 904 (10th Cir. 2017)
(citation modified).
32 Eighteen Seventy, LP v. Jayson, 32 F.4th 956, 967 (10th Cir. 2022) (citation
modified).
33 As noted above, the Ammermans do not argue for specific jurisdiction in their
opposition and do not allege Nola Conrad has sufficient contacts with Utah. (See
Compl. ¶ 26, Doc. No. 1.) But they allege Paul and Kirsten Nykamp own Nola Conrad
and have “sufficient contacts to warrant specific personal jurisdiction in this state and
this federal court.” (Id. ¶¶ 23–24.) Ultimately, this conclusory allegation is insufficient to
establish personal jurisdiction over the Nykamps or Nola Conrad. See Black & Veatch
Constr., Inc. v. ABB Power Generation, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d 569, 572 (D. Kan. 2000)
(“Conclusory allegations that defendant has minimum contacts are insufficient to
establish personal jurisdiction.”).
34 Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, 514 F.3d 1063, 1075 (10th Cir. 2008).
35 (Compl. ¶ 5, Doc. No. 1.)
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the injury” was not felt in Utah, the Ammermans fail to demonstrate specific jurisdiction
over Nola Conrad.
B. Conspiracy Jurisdiction
Although the Ammermans’ next jurisdictional theory rests on their conspiracy
allegations, they fail to allege Nola Conrad was aware or should have been aware of
substantial steps taken in Utah in furtherance of the conspiracy. “The existence of a
conspiracy and acts of a co-conspirator within the forum may, in some cases, subject
another co-conspirator to the forum’s jurisdiction.”36 “In order for personal jurisdiction
based on a conspiracy theory to exist, the plaintiff must offer more than bare allegations
that a conspiracy existed, and must allege facts that would support a prima facie
showing of a conspiracy.”37 To allege a prima facie case of civil conspiracy, a plaintiff
“must establish the following five elements: (1) a combination of two or more persons,
(2) an object to be accomplished, (3) a meeting of the minds on the object or course of
action, (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts, and (5) damages as a proximate result
thereof.”38
Here, the Ammermans allege that “Defendants have operated a wire fraud ring
[for four years] whereby they fabricated bogus investment opportunities promising
investors immense returns, and proceed[ed] to pocket and steal the money for
36 Melea, Ltd. v. Jawer Sa, 511 F.3d 1060, 1069 (10th Cir. 2007).
37 Id. (citation omitted).
38 World Wide Ass’n of Specialty Programs v. Pure, Inc., 450 F.3d 1132, 1141 (10th Cir.
2006) (citation omitted).
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themselves for their own enrichment without ever actually investing any of the investors’
funds.”39 The Ammermans claim Mr. Philips, Mr. Ester, and Mr. Rideaux orchestrated
this wire fraud ring and recruited attorneys such as Mr. Fisher to participate.40 Mr.
Fisher allegedly induced the Ammermans to wire $1.126 million to his lawyers’ trust
account based on promises the money would be reinvested.41 Instead, the complaint
alleges, Mr. Fisher used the funds for his and his co-conspirators own personal
enrichment.42 And he facilitated this scheme by using his status as an attorney to
entice the Ammermans to invest.43 The complaint also alleges Mr. Fisher facilitated
“wire transfers to the racketeering enterprise of amounts that the non-lawyer members
of the enterprise could not easily have received without risking raising suspicion,
potentially causing incoming wires from victims to be frozen.”44
These allegations meet the elements of a prima facie case of conspiracy. They
indicate the defendants allegedly agreed to steal money from victims by using their
status as attorneys and their trust accounts to accomplish their objective. Mr. Fisher
allegedly induced the Ammermans to wire their life savings to him on the promise that
those savings would be reinvested. He then pocketed some for his own benefit and
39 (Compl. ¶ 38, Doc. No. 1.)
40 (Id. ¶¶ 39, 44.)
41 (Id. ¶ 120.)
42 (Id. ¶ 121.)
43 (Id. ¶ 2.)
44 (Id. ¶ 4.)
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transferred the rest to his co-conspirators’ trust accounts so they could also personally
benefit. And the Ammermans allege damages as a proximate result—the $1.126 million
they wired to Mr. Fisher.
Even though the Ammermans offer allegations to support a prima facie case of
conspiracy, those allegations “do not necessarily establish jurisdiction over a
nonresident co-conspirator.”45 Conspiracy allegations must satisfy the minimum
contacts requirement as to each conspirator.46 Minimum contacts require “more than
the presence of a co-conspirator within the forum state.”47 Rather, to extend personal
jurisdiction to a co-conspirator, (1) the conspiracy must be directed toward the forum48
or (2) substantial steps in furtherance of the conspiracy must be taken in the forum “of
which the out-of-state co-conspirator was or should have been aware.”49
The factual allegations in the complaint do not support an inference that the
conspiracy was directed toward Utah. Although one of the co-conspirators, Mr. Fisher,
is a Utah resident, the conspiracy targeted victims from across the country, including the
Ammermans, who are residents of Maryland. And the complaint does not allege the
45 Weldon v. Ramstad-Hvass, 512 F. App’x 783, 789 (10th Cir. 2013) (unpublished)
(emphasis original).
46 Melea, 511 F.3d at 1070 (“Due process requires that [the defendant] itself have
minimum contacts with [the forum state].”).
47 Am. Land Program, Inc. v. Bonaventura Uitgevers Maatschappij, N.V., 710 F.2d
1449, 1454 (10th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted).
48 Malea, 511 F.3d at 1070.
49 Am. Land Program, 710 F.2d at 1454 (citation omitted).
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“architects” of the scheme had any Utah connection. Accordingly, to show minimum
contacts, the Ammermans must allege that substantial steps were taken in the forum in
furtherance of the conspiracy, “of which the out-of-state co-conspirator was or should
have been aware.”50
They fail to do so. As with the Nykamps, there are no factual allegations (beyond
legal conclusions) to support finding Nola Conrad was or should have been aware of
substantial steps taken in Utah in furtherance of the conspiracy. The Ammermans
vaguely allege the Nykamps knew of the conspiracy51 and used Nola Conrad “to receive
money from [Mr.] Fisher that was stolen” from them.52 They allege Mr. Rideaux texted
Mr. Fisher to send “5k” to the Nykamps.53 And they identify three wire transfers Mr.
Fisher allegedly made to the Nykamps through Nola Conrad.54 But these allegations do
not suggest Nola Conrad (whether through the Nykamps or otherwise) knew of the
conspiracy, let alone that substantial steps in furtherance of the conspiracy took place in
Utah—or that Nola Conrad knew or should have known of these steps. In short, the
only factual allegation relating to Utah is the existence of a few wire transfers to Nola
50 Id.
51 (Compl. ¶ 87, Doc. No. 1 (alleging the Nykamps “shared the same conspiratorial
knowledge and objective of facilitating the transfer of money knowingly obtained from
Plaintiffs through fraud, to [Mr.] Rideaux and [Mr.] Fisher, in exchange for receiving a
kickback themselves”).)
52 (Id.)
53 (Id. ¶ 188.)
54 (Id. ¶¶ 193(19), 198(16), 198(32).)
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Conrad from Utah. This is not enough to establish minimum contacts. Therefore, the
complaint fails to demonstrate personal jurisdiction over Nola Conrad based on a
conspiracy theory.
C. Jurisdiction Under RICO’s “Ends of Justice” Provision
Finally, the Ammermans attempt to establish personal jurisdiction through RICO
§ 1965(b). This section provides for nationwide personal jurisdiction in civil RICO cases
where the court has personal jurisdiction over at least one defendant, if the “ends of
justice” require nationwide jurisdiction.55 The “‘ends of justice’ is a flexible concept
uniquely tailored to the facts of each case,”56 and should be assessed in light of “the
remedial purpose of the RICO statute in eradicating organized crime.”57 However, “the
Fifth Amendment requires the plaintiff’s choice of forum to be fair and reasonable to the
defendant.”58 In this due process inquiry, courts look to the following non-exclusive
factors: “(1) the extent of contact with the forum state, (2) the inconvenience of having to
litigate in a foreign jurisdiction, (3) judicial economy, (4) the probable situs of the
55 See 18 U.S.C. § 1965(b); see also Cory v. Aztec Steel Bldg., Inc., 468 F.3d 1226,
1231 (10th Cir. 2006) (discussing § 1965). Where the Ammermans allege Mr. Fisher is
domiciled in Utah, they sufficiently allege the court has personal jurisdiction over at least
one defendant. (See Compl. ¶ 6, Doc. No. 1.)
56 Cory, 468 F.3d at 1232.
57 San Miguel Hosp. Corp. v. Publix Supermarket, Inc., No. 1:23-cv-00903, 2025 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 51766, at *89 (D.N.M. Mar. 19, 2025) (unpublished) (citing Cory, 468 F.3d
at 1232).
58 Peay v. BellSouth Med. Assistance Plan, 205 F.3d 1206, 1212 (10th Cir. 2000).
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discovery proceedings, and (5) the nature of the defendant’s activities and its impact
beyond his state’s borders.”59
Exercising personal jurisdiction over Nola Conrad does not serve the ends of
justice. As explained above, the allegations as to Nola Conrad are bare, largely
conclusory, and fall well short of demonstrating participation in the racketeering
enterprise Mr. Fisher and “the architects” allegedly ran. Weighing the above factors
leads to the same conclusion. Nola Conrad’s contact with the forum state is extremely
limited—at most, it received three wire transfers from Utah.60 The inconvenience of
litigating here is great, where Nola Conrad is based in Florida.61 As for judicial economy
and probable situs of discovery, it is not clear the alleged conspiracy is centered in Utah
as the Ammermans claim. Mr. Phillips, Mr. Ester, and Mr. Rideaux are allegedly “the
architects of this enterprise and wire fraud ring, registering numerous LLC’s over the
years that falsely purported to be investment companies to use in their fraudulent
contracts with victims to provide them a false sense of security.”62 In the complaint, the
59 Klein v. Cornelius, 786 F.3d 1310, 1318 (10th Cir. 2015).
60 See Dollar Sav. Bank v. First Sec. Bank, N.A., 746 F.2d 208, 213 (3d Cir. 1984)
(concluding mere receipt of wire transfers from the forum state did not subject the
recipient to jurisdiction in that forum).
61 As noted above, it appears to be undisputed that Nola Conrad is based in Florida.
(See Mot. to Set Aside Default, Decl. of Paul Nykamp ¶¶ 1–3, Doc. No. 58-1 (attesting
that Nola Conrad is a now dissolved limited liability company organized under the laws
of Florida and managed primarily by Paul Nykamp); Ex. 2 to Pls.’ Mot. for Entry of
Default, Doc. No. 44-2 (providing affidavit of service indicating Nola Conrad’s registered
agent was served in Florida).)
62 (Compl. ¶ 39, Doc. No. 1.)
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Ammermans do not allege Mr. Fisher, the only defendant with Utah ties, is even at the
center of this conspiracy. And as previously discussed, the factual allegations do not
show Nola Conrad knew of Mr. Fisher’s involvement in the alleged conspiracy. Finally,
to the extent the Ammermans offer factual allegations showing Nola Conrad took any
actions at all, the impact of such activity on Utah is insignificant. Accordingly, exercising
personal jurisdiction over Nola Conrad would not serve the ends of justice within the
meaning of RICO § 1965(b).
RECOMMENDATION
Because the Ammermans fail to establish personal jurisdiction over Nola Conrad
through any of their theories—specific jurisdiction, conspiracy jurisdiction, or RICO
§ 1965(b)—the undersigned recommends the district judge grant the motion to
dismiss63 and dismiss the Ammermans’ claims against Nola Conrad, LLC without
prejudice.64 The parties have the right to object to this Report and Recommendation
within fourteen days, and failure to object may be considered a waiver of objections.65
DATED this 20th day of January, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
_____________________________
Daphne A. Oberg
United States Magistrate Judge
63 (Doc. No. 106.)
64 See Hollander v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 289 F.3d 1193, 1216 (10th Cir. 2002)
(noting dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction should be without prejudice).
65 See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed R. Civ. P. 72(b).
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