Jones v. O'Malley

5:24-cv-01179TxwdDec 3, 2025

Full text

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION
DUSTIN JONES, 	§
§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	SA-24-CV-1179-XR (HJB)
§
FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration,1
Defendant.
§
§
§
§
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
To the Honorable Xavier Rodriguez, United States District Judge:
This 	Report 	and 	Recommendation 	concerns 	Plaintiff’s 	request 	for 	review 	of 	the
administrative denial by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) of his application for Social
Security Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act,
respectively, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 	This matter was automatically referred to the
undersigned for findings and recommendations pursuant to an October 8, 2019, Division-wide
Standing Order. (See Text Entry Dated Oct. 17, 2024).
After considering the parties’ briefs (Docket Entries 9, 12, and 13), the transcript (“Tr.”) of
the SSA proceeding (Docket Entry 6), the applicable case law, the relevant statutory and regulatory
1 Frank Bisignano was sworn in as Commissioner of the Social Security Administration on
May 7, 2025. He is therefore substituted as the Defendant in this case. See F ED. R. C IV. P. 25(d)
(“An action does not abate when a public officer … ceases to hold office while the action is
pending[;] [t]he officer’s successor is automatically substituted as a party [and] [l]ater proceedings
should be in the substituted party’s name.”).
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provisions, and the entire record in this matter, I recommend that the Commissioner’s decision be
AFFIRMED.
I. 	Jurisdiction.
This Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). The undersigned is authorized to issue this Report and Recommendation pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 636(с).
II. 	Background.
Plaintiff filed an application for DIB on February 28, 2023, alleging an onset of his
disability on April 16, 2020. 	(Tr. at 17.) 	At the time, Plaintiff was a 51-year-old high school
graduate, with past work experience as a topographic engineer, hunting guide, and combat marine.
(Tr. at 27, 257.)
After the Commissioner denied his initial claim and his request for reconsideration,
Plaintiff filed a written request for a hearing, which was held before Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) Katherine Brown on July 10, 2024. (Tr. at 17, 57.) On July 25, 2024, the ALJ issued a
decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Tr. at 17–29.) In her decision, the ALJ followed
the five-step sequential evaluation process required under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). (Tr. at 18–19.)
At step one of the evaluation process, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date of April 16, 2020. (Tr. at 19.) At step two,
the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: right legt amputation, just
below the knee; degenerative disc disease in his cervical and lumbar spine; osteoarthritis in his
shoulders, knees, and hips; umbilical hernia with repair; obesity; depression; and post-traumatic
stress disorder (“PTSD”). (Id.) At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had no “impairment or
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combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed
impairments” in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, App. 1 (“the Listings”). (Tr. at 20.)
Before reaching step four in the analysis, the ALJ determined Plaintiff’s residual
functioning capacity (“RFC”). 	(See Tr. at 22–27.) 	In determining Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ
evaluated, inter alia, the opinions in prior administrative findings of two state agency medical
consultants. (Tr. at 26–27.) The first opinion came from Dr. Laurence Ligon, MD, a state agency
medical consultant who evaluated Plaintiff’s RFC on July 10, 2023. (Tr. at 100–01.) Dr. Ligon
found that Plaintiff could perform light work with additional postural limitations, and that he could
stand or walk for about six hours in an eight-hour workday. (Id.) The second RFC examination,
performed by state agency medical consultant Dr. Hope Folarin, MD, found that Plaintiff could
perform less than light work with additional postural limitations. (Tr. at 111–13.) In contrast to
Dr. Ligon, Dr. Folarin determined that Plaintiff could stand or walk for just four hours. (Id.)
The ALJ considered both prior administrative medical findings in assessing the severity of
Plaintiff’s impairments and determining his RFC. (Tr. at 26–27.) She found the two administrative
medical findings to be “partially persuasive” because they were “supported by review of treatment
records” and “generally consistent with evidence of osteoarthritis in the claimant’s hips and knees,
degenerative disc disease [in the] cervical and lumbar spine, and obesity.” (Tr. at 27.) However,
the ALJ ultimately concluded that the Plaintiff’s “right below the knee amputation, degenerative
disc disease [of the] cervical and lumbar spine, osteoarthritis [of the] shoulders, knees, and hips,
muscle spasms, umbilical hernia with repair, obesity, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder
would restrict him to less than the full range of light work.” (Id.)
In accordance with her evaluation of the opinions of Drs. Ligon and Folarin, and her review
of the other evidence in the record, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform “light”
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work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), except that Plaintiff was limited to “occasional
climbing of ramps or stairs; never climbing ladders, ropes, [or] scaffolds; occasional balancing,
stooping, kneeling, crouching[,] and crawling; occasional overhead reaching; no foot controls;
[and] occasional interaction with the public and coworkers.” 	(Tr. at 22.) 	The ALJ’s RFC
determination did not include any limitation on standing or walking—according to the SSA
regulations, “light” work requires “standing or walking, off and on, for a total of approximately 6
hours of an 8-hour workday,” SSR 83-10.
At steps four and five, the ALJ made determinations based on her RFC findings and the
testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”) regarding Plaintiff’s ability to perform past work or other
work. (Tr. at 27–29; see id. at 81–93.) The VE testified that a claimant with Plaintiff’s RFC would
be unable to perform his past relevant work (Tr. 85), and at step four the ALJ agreed with this
testimony (Tr. at 27).
Regarding other work, the ALJ heard testimony from the VE that jobs existed in significant
numbers in the national economy that a person with Plaintiff’s RFC could perform, including
122,465 positions as a routing clerk, Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) 222.687-022,
classified as light, unskilled (SVP-2) work; 12,562 positions as a mail clerk, DOT 209.687-026,
classified as light, unskilled (SVP-2) work; and 190,468 positions as a cleaner or housekeeper,
DOT 323.687-014, classified as light, unskilled (SVP-2) work—a total of approximately 325,495
jobs. (Tr. at 86.) The ALJ asked the VE whether these estimates would change for an individual
who, in addition to the limitations in Plaintiff’s RFC, was limited to four or five hours of standing
and walking in an eight hour workday—an amount less than the full range of light work. (Id.) The
VE answered that the estimates would change: the standing/walking limitation would eliminate
the housekeeping positions altogether, and it would reduce the number of routing and mail clerk
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positions by 75%. (Tr. at 86–87). On cross-examination, Plaintiff’s attorney questioned the basis
of the VE’s job estimates, which the VE responded were based on her observations and experience
in job placement. (Tr. 89–90.)
At step five, the ALJ found that the VE’s testimony was generally consistent with
information in the DOT; where the DOT was silent, the ALJ found that the VE properly relied on
her training and experience in forming her estimates. (Id.) Based on the VE’s testimony, the ALJ
concluded that jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could
have performed, such that he was “not disabled.” (Tr. at 28–29.) In reaching this conclusion, the
ALJ found Plaintiff was capable of performing all three positions that the VE had identified, and
she did not reduce the number of positions to account for a limitation on Plaintiff’s ability to stand
or walk during the workday. (Id.)
Plaintiff sought review by the Appeals Council, which denied the request, finding “no
reason under [its] rules to review the Administrative Law Judge’s decision.” (Tr. at 1.) That denial
made the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. 	(See Tr. at 1–3.) 	The instant
appeal followed. (See Docket Entry 1.)
III. 	Applicable Legal Standards.
A. 	Standard of Review.
In its review, the Court is limited to a determination of whether the Commissioner’s
decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the proper legal standards were applied.
42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see Keel v. Saul, 986 F.3d 551, 555 (5th Cir. 2021). “Substantial evidence is
more than a scintilla, less than a preponderance, and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir.
1990) (quoting Hames v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 162, 164 (5th Cir. 1983)). 	The Court weighs four
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elements of proof in determining whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s
determination: (1) the objective medical facts; (2) the diagnoses and opinions of treating
physicians; (3) the claimant’s subjective evidence of pain and disability; and (4) the claimant’s
age, education, and work experience. 	Martinez v. Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1995).
Substantial evidence will be found lacking only when “there is a conspicuous absence of credible
choices” or “no contrary medical evidence.” Abshire v. Bowen, 848 F.2d 638, 640 (5th Cir. 1988)
(citation omitted). The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Newton
v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2000). Conflicts in the evidence and credibility assessments
are for the Commissioner, not the Court, to resolve. Martinez, 64 F.3d at 174.
While substantial deference is afforded to the Commissioner’s factual findings, the ALJ’s
legal conclusions, and claims of procedural error, are reviewed de novo. 	Brueggemann v.
Barnhart, 348 F.3d 689, 692 (8th Cir. 2003); Gutierrez v. Barnhart, No. 04-11025, 2005 WL
1994289, at *4 (5th Cir. Aug. 19, 2005) (citing Hollis v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1378, 1382–83 (5th Cir.
1988)). Even when an ALJ errs, the Court must further determine whether the error was harmless.
See Keel, 986 F.3d at 556. Error will not warrant reversal unless a party’s substantial rights have
been affected, Audler v. Astrue, 501 F.3d 446, 447–48 (5th Cir. 2007), and procedural errors
“constitute a basis for remand only if such improprieties would cast into doubt the existence of
substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s decision,” Alexander v. Astrue, 412 F. App’x 719, 722
(5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Morris v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 333, 335 (5th Cir. 1988). Put otherwise, an
error is harmless “when it is inconceivable that a different administrative conclusion would have
been reached even if the ALJ [had] not err[ed].” Keel, 986 F.3d at 556.
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B. 	Entitlement to Disability Benefits.
The term “disability” means the inability to “engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment or combination of
impairments which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than [12] months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A claimant
is disabled only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are so severe that he is unable
to do his previous work, and cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience,
participate in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy,
regardless of whether such work is available in the immediate area where he lives, whether a
specific job vacancy actually exists, or whether he would be hired if he applied for such work. Id.
§ 423(d)(2)(A).
C. 	Evaluation Process and Burden of Proof.
SSA regulations require that disability claims be evaluated according to the five-step
process employed by the ALJ in this case, as recounted above. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (2012).
At the first step, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant is currently engaged in
substantial gainful activity. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, then he is not disabled regardless of his
medical conditions, age, education, or work experience. Id. § 404.1520(b). At the second step,
the Commissioner determines whether the claimant’s impairment is sufficiently severe. 	Id.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). Absent a severe impairment, a claimant is not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(c).
At the third step, the Commissioner compares the severe impairment with those in the Listings.
Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii); see 20 C.F.R. § 404 Subpart P, App’x 1. If the severe impairment meets
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or equals an impairment in the Listings, then the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d);
see Stone v. Heckler, 752 F.2d 1099, 1101 (5th Cir. 1985).
If the severe impairment is not in the Listings, then the Commissioner must proceed to the
fourth step: determining the claimant’s RFC and reviewing the demands of his past relevant work.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant is still able to perform his past work, then he is not
disabled. Id. § 404.1520(f). But if the claimant is unable to do so, then the Commissioner must
proceed to the fifth and final step: evaluating the claimant's ability—given his residual capacities,
age, education, and work experience—to perform other work. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). Only if he
cannot perform any other work will the claimant be deemed disabled. Id. § 404.1520(g).
The claimant bears the burden of proof during the first four steps of this process. Salmond
v. Berryhill, 892 F.3d 812, 817 (5th Cir. 2018). But once the claimant has shown that he is unable
to perform his past work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to identify other substantial,
gainful employment available to the claimant that he is physically able to perform and maintain
for a significant period of time, taking into account his exertional and non-exertional limitations.
Watson v. Barnhart, 288 F.3d 212, 217 (5th Cir. 2002). If the Commissioner identifies such work,
then the burden shifts back to the claimant to prove that he is unable to perform that work.
Anderson v. Sullivan, 887 F.2d 630, 632-33 (5th Cir. 1989). 	A finding that a claimant is not
disabled at any step in the five-step sequence is conclusive and terminates the analysis. Lovelace
v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 55, 58 (5th Cir. 1987).
IV. 	Analysis.
Plaintiff argues that remand is required for two reasons: (a) the ALJ failed to explain why
she did not either adopt a recommended limitation on Plaintiff’s standing and walking that was
included in an administrative medical finding, or otherwise resolve the conflict in the medical
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opinion evidence; and (b) the VE’s testimony is unreliable and does not support the ALJ’s finding
that other, appropriate jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy. (Docket Entry
9, at 6–12.) Each of these claims is addressed below.
A. Whether Remand Is Required Because the ALJ Failed to Explain How She Resolved a
Conflict in Prior Administrative Medical Findings Regarding the Time Plaintiff Could
Stand or Walk During the Workday.
As noted above, before reaching step four of the analysis, the ALJ found that Plaintiff
retained the RFC to “perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b)[,] except [that] he is
limited to occasional climbing of ramps or stairs; never climbing ladders, ropes, [or] scaffolds;
occasional 	balancing, 	stooping, 	kneeling, 	crouching[,] 	and 	crawling; 	occasional 	overhead
reaching; no foot controls; occasional interaction with the public and coworkers.” (Tr. at 22.) The
RFC included no express limitation on the hours spent walking or standing. 	(See id.) 	Plaintiff
argues that the ALJ’s RFC determination is not supported by substantial evidence as the ALJ failed
to address the conflicting medical opinion evidence from Drs. Ligon and Folarin as to how many
hours Plaintiff could walk or stand during work. (Docket Entry 9, at 6–8.)
As discussed above, the ALJ did address the medical opinions at issue. (See Tr. at 27.)
Moreover, she did, at least implicitly, resolve the conflict in the opinion evidence as to Plaintiff’s
ability to stand and walk—at step five, she found that Plaintiff could perform a job that the VE
testified required six hours of standing and walking, and she did not reduce the available number
of jobs that the VE opined would be available if the standing and walking hours were reduced.
(Compare Tr. at 28 with Tr. at 87.)
When two prior administrative findings conflict, it is the ALJ who must weigh conflicting
evidence in the record. Martinez, 64 F.3d at 174. The Court may not substitute its own judgment
for that of the Commissioner where substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision. 	Newton,
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209 F.3d at 452. Although the ALJ did not expressly adopt Dr. Folarin’s walking-and-standing
opinion, it cannot be said that the RFC assessment was not based on substantial evidence. 	See
Webster v. Kijazaki, 19 F.4th 715, 719 (5th Cir. 2021) (finding decision was supported by
substantial evidence even when ALJ did not adopt state agency report verbatim, as “the ALJ
incorporated [agency] findings into [the] RFC” and “appropriately used the RFC when questioning
the vocational expert”).
Even if there were some error in the ALJ’s failure to make an explicit finding, however,
Plaintiff cannot show that the error was prejudicial. Not every error warrants reversal or remand.
See Frank v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 618, 622 (5th Cir. 2003). “Procedural perfection in administrative
proceedings is not required.” Mays v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1362, 1364 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)).
Thus, the Court should vacate a judgment only if a party’s substantial rights have been affected.
Anderson, 887 F.2d at 634 (quoting Mays, 837 F.2d at 1364); see also F ED. R. C IV. P. 61 (“[T]he
court must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any party’s substantial rights.”).
Alleged procedural improprieties “constitute a basis for remand only if such improprieties would
cast into doubt the existence of substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s decision.” Morris, 864
F.2d at 335.
In this case, even if the ALJ had expressly resolved the conflict, and even if the Court
assumes that resolving the conflict would have resulted in some reduction of the hours of walking
and standing included in the RFC, the error was harmless; substantial evidence would still support
the ALJ’s ultimate determination of no disability. At step five, the ALJ relied on the VE’s job
estimates based on a full range of light work in concluding that jobs existed in significant numbers
in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. (Tr. at 28, 86.) This number amounted to
approximately 325,495 jobs. (Tr. at 28.) If she had added walking and standing limitations, the
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VE testified that it would have eliminated one position entirely and reduced the remaining
available jobs by 75%, or approximately 33,756 jobs. 	(Tr. at 86–87.) 	Contrary to Plaintiff’s
suggestion (see Docket Entry 9 at 8–9), that estimate would still constitute a significant number.2
While the Fifth Circuit has not established a bright line rule for what constitutes a significant
number of jobs, 25,000 or fewer jobs have been found to be sufficiently significant by many courts,
both from this circuit3 and others.4 Given this consensus, the 33,756 jobs estimated by the VE
would still be a significant number, and thus any potential error in failing to expressly resolve the
conflict in the medical opinion testimony was harmless.
B. Whether the VE’s Testimony is Unreliable and Insufficient to Support a Finding that
Appropriate Jobs Existed in Significant Numbers in the National Economy.
Plaintiff next challenges the ALJ’s determination that appropriate jobs existed in significant
numbers in the national economy, arguing that the VE’s estimate was unreliable and the ALJ never
found that a reduced estimate would still constitute a significant number. (Docket Entry 9 at 8–
11.) As explained above, any failure to make an express finding that the reduced number of jobs
was significant was at worst harmless, as the reduced number—33,756—substantially exceeds the
2 Plaintiff’s separately challenges the reliability of the VE’s estimates—that issue is
addressed in Part IV(B), infra.
3 One court in this circuit has found that 16,566 jobs in the national economy constitutes a
significant number. Ellis v. Astrue, No. 11-2121, 2013 WL 595071, at *4–5 (W.D. La. Jan. 17,
2013), report and recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 596425. Other courts have held 18,760 to
25,000 jobs in the national economy to be significant numbers. See, e.g., McGee v. Astrue, No. 08-
0831, 2009 WL 2841113, at *6 n.14 (W.D. La. Aug. 28, 2009); Warren v. Astrue, No. 6:09-CV-
417, 2011 WL 3444268, at *3 n.2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2011).
4 See Bryant v. Kijakazi, No. 6:22-CV-01098-ADA-JCM, 2023 WL 12008469, at *5 (W.D.
Tex. Sept. 11, 2023) (collecting cases).
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number of jobs that many courts have found sufficiently significant to preclude a finding of
disability. See supra Part IV(A).
Plaintiff’s more general attack on the reliability of the VE’s testimony likewise fails. The
ALJ may rely on VE testimony in assessing whether jobs exist in significant numbers in the
national economy that a claimant could have performed, considering the claimant’s age, education,
work experience, and RFC. 	See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(c)(1), 404.1566(e). 	In offering their
expertise, a VE “may invoke not only publicly available sources but also ‘information obtained
directly from employers’ and data otherwise developed from their own ‘experience in job
placement or career counseling.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 100 (2019) (quoting SSR 00-
4p).
The record here indicates that the ALJ’s reliance on the VE’s testimony was warranted. At
the hearing, the ALJ extensively questioned the VE, including posing a hypothetical question
regarding how changes in Plaintiff’s limitations would affect the number of jobs available to him
in the national economy. (Tr. at 86–88.) The VE provided detailed explanations as to why certain
jobs could or could not be performed, based on the specific hypothetical posed. (Id.) Additionally,
the VE testified that her opinions were consistent with the DOT and her education, training,
experience, and observations in job placement. 	(Tr. at 88–89.) 	This is a sufficient basis for
acceptance of the VE’s testimony. See Biestek, 587 U.S. at 100.
Plaintiff argues that the VE’s testimony is unreliable because the VE did not keep track of
her own data or perform her own studies. (Docket Entry 9, at 10.) However, the Supreme Court
has rejected a categorical rule requiring a VE to disclose his or her underlying data where the
testimony is otherwise reliable. See Biestek, 587 U.S. at 100 (finding that, even without specific
data, VE testimony may have sufficient indicia of reliability to support ALJ’s conclusion regarding
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whether applicant could find work). Additionally, Plaintiff fails to point to any data that either
conflicts with, or otherwise undermines, the VE’s testimony.
Plaintiff also asserts that “cross-examination of the VE shows that her conclusions and
explanation[s] lack reliability markers and are not substantial evidence.” 	(Id. at 10.) 	Such an
argument goes to the credibility of the VE, which is for the ALJ to assess; the Court is not permitted
to substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. 	See Martinez, 64 F.3d at 174; Newton,
209 F.3d at 452.
For all these reasons, the ALJ did not prejudicially err in relying on the VE’s testimony and
finding that there were a significant number of jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff could
perform. As the ALJ correctly concluded, this finding compelled the ultimate determination that
Plaintiff was not disabled.
V. 	Conclusion and Recommendation.
Based on the foregoing, I recommend that the Commissioner’s decision denying Plaintiff’s
application for DIB be AFFIRMED.
VI. 	Instruction for Service and Notice of Right to Object.
The Clerk of Court shall serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation on all parties
by either (1) electronic transmittal to all parties represented by attorneys registered as a “filing
user” with the Clerk of Court, or (2) by mailing a copy to those not registered by certified mail,
return receipt requested. 	Written objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed
within 14 days after being served with a copy of the same, unless this time period is modified by
the District Court. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); F ED. R. C IV. P. 72(b).
The parties shall file any objections with the Clerk of the Court and serve the objections
on all other parties. An objecting party must specifically identify those findings, conclusions, or
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recommendations to which objections are being made and the basis for such objections;
“objections that are frivolous, conclusory, or general in nature needn’t be considered.” Williams
v. Lakeview Loan Serv. LLC, 694 F. Supp. 3d 874, 881 (S.D. Tex. 2023) (citing Battle v. U.S. Parole
Comm’n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987)).
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and
recommendations contained in this Report and Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo
review by the District Court. 	Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149–52 (1985); Acuña v. Brown &
Root, Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 340 (5th Cir. 2000). Additionally, failure to file timely written objections
to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this Report and
Recommendation shall bar the aggrieved party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking
on appeal the unobjected-to, proposed findings and conclusions accepted by the district court.
Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
SIGNED on December 3, 2025.
_________________________
Henry J. Bemporad
United States Magistrate Judge
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