Cano Sida v. Garcia, Field Office Director, ICE El Paso Field Office et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO DIVISION
JESUS EDUARDO CANO-SIDA,
Petitioner,
v.
JOEL GARCIA, FIELD OFFICE
DIRECTOR OF THE ICE EL PASO
FIELD OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT
AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS, U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT; U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY; TODD LYONS, ACTING
DIRECTOR, IMMIGRATION AND
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY; KRISTI NOEM,
SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY; and PAM
BONDI, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
THE UNITED STATES,
Respondents.
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No. 3:25-CV-00726-LS
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER IN PART
Petitioner Jesus Eduardo Cano-Sida filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2241.1 He also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order.2 For the following
reasons, the Court grants Petitioner’s motion for a temporary restraining order in part.
I. LEGAL STANDARD.
The elements required to grant a motion for injunctive relief are:
(1) there is a substantial likelihood that the movant will prevail on the merits; (2)
there is a substantial threat that irreparable harm will result if the injunction is not
1 ECF No. 1.
2 ECF No. 2.
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granted; (3) the threatened injury outweighs the threatened harm to the defendant;
and (4) the granting of the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public
interest. 3
When the government is the opposing party, the third and fourth elements merge.4 The district
court has discretion as to whether to grant or deny injunctive relief.5
II. ANALYSIS.
“The purpose of a preliminary injunction [or temporary restraining order] is not to give the
plaintiff the ultimate relief it seeks.”6 Instead, it “is to preserve the status quo and prevent
irreparable injury until the court renders a decision the merits.”7 Therefore, the Court will preserve
the status quo and will not order Petitioner released from custody at this time. However, the Court
must also take into consideration whether “irreparable harm can result” before a decision on the
merits.8 Therefore, the Court will prevent Petitioner’s transfer outside of the Western District of
Texas and his removal from the United States.
The Court concludes that Petitioner has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits in
his case. Petitioner is a Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) recipient, and his most
recent DACA application was approved by United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
on September 23, 2025.9 In addition to being a DACA recipient, Petitioner also has a pending U-
visa application, which grants him deferred action status.10 He has not received any notice of an
intent to terminate or revoke his protections.11 Petitioner represents that his only criminal arrest,
3 Clark v. Prichard, 812 F.2d 991, 993 (5th Cir. 1987).
4 Texas v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 700 F. Supp. 3d 539, 544 (W.D. Tex. 2023) (quoting Nken v.
Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435–36 (2009)).
5 Apple Barrel Prods., Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 386 (5th Cir. 1984).
6 WarnerVision Ent. Inc. v. Empire of Carolina, Inc., 101 F.3d 259, 261 (2d Cir. 1996).
7 Sambrano v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 21-11159, 2022 WL 486610, at *4 (5th Cir. 2022).
8 Meis v. Sanitas Serv. Corp., 511 F.2d 655, 659 (5th Cir. 1975).
9 ECF No. 1 at 17.
10 Id. at 16.
11 Id. at 17.
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for public affray, was dismissed.12 Other than that, he received a citation for possession of
marijuana and drug paraphernalia, which was dismissed without prejudice.13 As Petitioner has not
been convicted of either of these offenses, his criminal history likely does not disqualify him from
continuing under DACA under 8 C.F.R. § 236.22(b)(6). Regardless, ICE has charged Petitioner
with remaining in the United States for a period longer than permitted.14 However, Petitioner’s
DACA status means that he is considered lawfully present in the United States, and ICE is unlikely
to be able to remove him.15
With respect to the other elements, Petitioner clearly faces the threat of irreparable harm if
he is wrongfully removed from this country. Petitioner’s continued presence in the Western
District of Texas will not cause any threatened injury to the Government. And, lastly, “[t]here is
generally no public interest in the perpetuation of unlawful agency action.”16
III. CONCLUSION.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part Petitioner’s motion
for a temporary restraining order [ECF No. 2].
Petitioner’s request for immediate release is DENIED. However, pending a hearing on the
matter, it is further ordered that Respondents are ENJOINED from (1) removing or deporting Mr.
Cano-Sida from the United States or (2) transferring him to any facility outside of the boundaries
of the Western District of Texas. Unless otherwise ordered, this Temporary Restraining Order
expires at 11:59 p.m. on January 20, 2026. To the extent that a bond may be required under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c), the Court waives this requirement.
12 ECF No. 2 at 3.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 8 C.F.R. § 236.21(c)(3).
16 Louisiana v. Biden, 55 F.4th 1017, 1035 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting State v. Biden, 10 F.4th 538, 560 (5th
Cir. 2021)).
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A hearing on this matter will be scheduled forthwith.
SO ORDERED.
SIGNED and ENTERED on January 7, 2026.
______________________________
LEON SCHYDLOWER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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