Garcia v. City of McAllen et al

CATALINA ANGELICA
GARCIA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CITY OF MCALLEN,
OMAR CABALLERO
Defendants.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MCALLEN DIVISION
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§ 	CIV. NO. 7:25-cv-00364
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MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Catalina Angelica Garcia, proceeding pro se, initiated this action by filing
Plaintiff's Original Complaint on Ju ly 22, 2025, against Defendants, Officer Omar Caballero and
the City of McAllen. (Dkt. No. 2). Plaintiff a ll eged various infractions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (RA),
and violations of Texas state law. 	(See generally id.). 	This Court filed the Memorandum and
Recommendation (Dkt. No. 35) on January 16, 2026, recommending dismissal of Plaintiff's First
Amended Complaint, which was sub sequently adopted by the District Court on February 13 , 2026
(Dkt. No. 38). Plaintiff fi led Plaintiff's Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, or in the
Alte rn ative Rule 60(b) Motion for Rel ief from Judgment, and Request to Reopen Case ("Plaintiff's
Motion") on February 19, 2026. (See Dkt. No. 40). This matter was referred to the undersigned
magistrate judge for memorandum and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and LR
72.
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United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
April 10, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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After careful consideration of the record and applicable law, and for reasons listed herein,
the Court finds that Plaintiff's Motion (Dkt. No. 40) should be DENIED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Factual Background
Plaintiff's allegations stem from an altercation with law enforcement on April 15 , 2025, at
Plaintiff's residence. 	(Dkt. No. 2 at 2). 	On that date, Plaintiff's 14-year-old, minor child, A. O. ,
who is diagnosed with autism, oppositional defiant disorder, explosive emotional disorder,
dyslexia, and other cognitive disorders, experienced a behavioral crisis at home. (Id.). 	Due to a
recent breast surgery, Plaintiff was unable to intervene, and Plaintiff 's husband restrained A.O. to
prevent escalation. (Id.). A.O. ran to the neighbor 's house and called 911 , and Plaintiff called 9 11
as well to inform authorities of A. O. 's condition, hi s di sab il ities, and his nonviolent nature,
specifically requesting officers trained in crisis response and asking for behavioral health
intervention if necessary. 	(Id.). 	Defendant Caballero spoke to neighbors but refused to allow
Plaintiff to speak to or comfort h er son. 	(Id.). 	Defendant Caballero further refused medical and
disability documentation offered by Plaintiff and refused invitation into the home to observe the
environment for investigation and proof of A.O. 's disability and SSI benefits. 	(Id. ). Defendant
Caba ll ero also declined requests fo r behavioral health intervention and transport. (Id.).
Plaintiff alleged she was not permitted to see her son after the 911 call. (Dkt. No. 23 at 4).
Plaintiff asked Defendant Caballero to transport A.O. to the behavioral-health hospital. 	(Id.).
Defendant Ca ba ll ero responded in a hostile tone that the situation did not qualify, and that Plaintiff
would have to go to the Justice of the Peace to do it herself. 	(Id.). 	Plaintiff claimed this was
inaccurate under Texas law and constituted de li berate refusal to accommodate disability. (Id.).
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Next, Defendant Caballero arrested Plaintiff's husband as he was explaining the situation,
then arrested A.O. for throwing a foam cup with com at his stepfather during the outburs t. (Dkt.
No. 2 at 3). A. O. was handcuffed tightly and subsequently showed visible abrasions. (Id.). When
EMS arrived, Plaintiff asked to see A.O. but Defendant Caballero denied the request, and falsely
told Plainti ff that A. O. told EMS "No" to assistance, which Plaintiff characte ri zed as allowing a
disabled minor to make medical decisions without parental consent. (Id.) . At the police station,
Plaintiff was denied access to A.O., who was interrogated without a parent, child advocate, or
accommodations for his disability, and A.O. later reported feel ing scared and pressured. 	(Id.).
Defendant Caba ll ero chose not to include Plaintiff and never asked for her statement until she
insisted. (Id. ).
Plaintiff contacted multiple city officials by phone, email, and text message after the
incident and several responded that they were unable to intervene in police matters, resulting in no
investigation, no review, no assistance, and no ADA guidance. 	(Dkt. No. 23 at 5). 	The city,
Plaintiff contends, li sts a construction employee, who is not trained in A DA compliance, as the
contact person, and Plaintiff was unable to locate the grie vance process through the official ADA
we bpage. (Id.) .
B. 	Procedural Backgro un d
Plaintiff fi led her Original Complaint on July 22, 2025. (Dkt. No. 2). 	Defendants fi led
Defendants City of McA ll en and Officer Omar Caba ll ero's 12(b)(5) Motion to Dismi ss for
Insufficient Service of Process, or Alternatively, to Quash Service on September 29, 2025. (Dkt.
No. 12). 	This Court issued Second Order of Service on October 14 , 2025. 	(Dkt. No. 16).
Defendants fi led Defendant s' Consolidated Rule 12 Motion to Dismiss and, Alternatively, for
More Definite Statement on November 4, 2025. (Dkt. No. 18 ). Plaintiff filed Plaintiff's Response
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in Opposition to Defendants' Consolidated Rule 12 Motion to Di smiss and, in the Alternative,
Motion fo r More Definite Statement on Novemb er 13, 2025. (Dkt. No. 2 1). Pl aintiff then fi led
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint on November 19 , 2025, removing A. O. as a party to the suit.
(Dkt. No. 23). 	In response, Defendants fi led an updated motion, Defendants' Consolidated Rule
12 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Compla in t and, Alternatively, for More Definite
Statement on December 2, 2025. 	(Dk t. No. 24). 	Plaintiff then filed Plaintiff's Response in
Opposition to Defendant s' Consolidated Rule 12 Motion to Di sm iss Plaintiff's First Amended
Complaint on December 9, 2025. (Dkt. No. 28). Defendants fi led Defendant s' Reply to Plaintiff's
Response in Opposition to Defendants' Consolidated Rule 12 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First
Amended Complaint on December 12, 2025. (Dkt. No. 30).
This Court filed the Memorandum and Recommendation ("M&R") on January 16 , 2026,
reco mmending dismissal of Pl aintiff's First Amended Complaint. 	(See Dkt. No. 35). 	Plaintiff
filed her objections to the M&R on January 20, 2026. 	(See Dkt. No. 37). 	The District Court
overruled Plaintiff's objections and adopted the M&R in its entirety on February 13, 2026. (See
Dkt. No . 38). The District Court entered final judgment the same day. (See Dkt. No. 39).
Plaintiff then fi led Plaintiff's Motion on February 19, 2026. (See Dkt. No. 40). Defendants
filed Defendant s' Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend
Judgment, or in the A lternative, Rule 60(b) Motion fo r Relief from Judgment and Request to
Reopen Case ("Defendants' Response") on March 11 , 2026. 	(See Dkt. No. 42). 	Plaintiff
subsequently filed Plaintiff's Reply in Support of Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment,
or in the Alternati ve Rule 60(b) Motion for Re li ef from Judgment, and Request to Reopen Case
("Plaintiff's Reply") on March 18 , 2026. (See Dkt. No. 43).
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II. 	SUMMARY OF THE PLEAD I 	GS
A. 	Plaintiff's Mot ion
Plaintiff filed Plaintiff's Motion on February 19 , 2026, seeking relief under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 59(e) or, in the alterna ti ve, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(l) or
60(b)(6). (See Dkt. 	o. 40). First, Plaintiff argues relief is warranted to prevent manifest injustice
and to permit curative amendment, arguing that the deficiencies id entified in the M&R are the
types of deficiencies typically addressed through amendment at the pleadings stage and, further,
that Plaintiff can file a Second Amended Complaint "t hat proceeds only on Plaintiff 's own injuries,
pleads those injuries with specificity, and a li gns claims with governing legal standards identified
in the M&R." (Id. at 4).
Next, Plaintiff claims amendment is not futile because s he can plead direct injuries that
were identified as missing in the M&R. (Id. at 5). Specificall y, Plaintiff can al le ge: (1) "that when
Plaintiff attempted to approach her chi ld , Officer Caballero called out to another officer who had
been engaged elsewhere; that officer then walked dire ct ly in front of Plaintiff and blocked h er path,
stating words to the effect of 'right now th ey are speaking to him ,' preventing Plaintiff from
proceeding;" (2) "that Plaintiff was kept separated from her child for approximately four to five
hours while officers controlled access to him;" (3) "that EMS personnel asked Officer Caballero
in Plaintiff 's presence whether Plainti ff consented to medical transport; Plaintiff responded that
she wanted to see her child first to assess hi s condition; and Officer Caballero replied that it was
unnecessary and stated the child had already declined, thereby denying Plaintiff access to make an
informed dec ision;" and (4) "that a supervising officer stated words to the effect that the child 's
injuries were ' bad ' and that CPS would 'for sure' be called after Plaintiff requested to see the
injuries and after promising photog raphs that were never provided." (Id. at 5-6).
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Third, Plaintiff argues that amendment is not futile because she can plead concrete facts
estab li shing the required elements under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims. (Dk t. No. 40 at
6). 	Plaintiff identifies the officers' control over parental access, medical decision participation,
and crisis intervention handling during the counter as the relevant service/program/activity
required. (Id.). Plaintiff then notes she requested access to her child's condition, to participate in
medical/transport decisions, and a behavioral-health intervention for her child as the requested
accommodation. (Id.). Next, with regard to the denial, Plaintiff explains that an officer denied her
request, stated the situation "didn' t qualify," prevented access, and refused Plaintiff's participation
in medical decision s. (Id.). Finall y, to show causation, Plaintiff explains the denial occurred after
officers were aware of the child's disability and Plaintiff's need to assist him as his parent. (Id. at
6-7).
Fourth, Plaintiff claims she can plead a municipal po li cy/custom theory consistent with
governing standards or omit any municipal li abi li ty claim that cannot be pleaded in good faith.
(Dkt. No. 40 at 7).
Finally, Plaintiff proposes a Second Amended Complaint to be filed within fourteen (14)
days that: asserts only Plaintiff's own claims and removes claims asserted on behalf of others;
pleads Plaintiff's direct injuries in a discrete section; pleads facts addressing the deficiencies
identified in the M&R; clarifies ADA/RA elements including service, accommodation, denial, and
causation; limits claims to those supported by Plaintiff 's own injuries; and pleads municipal
liability only if supported by non-conclusory facts. (Dkt. No. 40 at 7-8).
In sum, Plaintiff asks the Court to reopen the case and grant leave to file a Second Am ended
Complaint within fourteen (14) days. (Id. at 8).
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B. 	Defendants' Response
Defendants filed Defendants' Response on March 11 , 2026. (See Dkt. No. 42). Defendants
argue that Plaintiff does not identify manifest error under Rule 59(e), specifically suggesting
Plaintiff fails to contend that the Court's legal determinations were lega ll y erroneous, identify
newly discovered evidence, identify an intervening change in controlling law, or identify a
manifest legal or factual etTor in the Court's ruling. 	(Id. at 8). 	Defendants then contend that
Plaintiff's Motion is an improper attempt to replead with previously ava il able facts, which is
procedurally improper and must be denied. (Id. at 10- 11 ). Next, Defendants argue Plainti ff fails
to satisfy Rule 60(b) because she does not identi fy a specific legal error in the Court's ruling;
rather, Plaintiff proposes new factual al legations and narrowed claim s. 	(Id. at 11-1 2). 	Finall y,
Defendants 	claim 	Rule 	60(b)(6) 	is 	inapplicable 	because 	it 	is 	reserved 	for 	extraordinary
circumstances, which Plaintiff does not identify. (Id. at 12).
Thus, Defendants asks the Court to deny Plaintiff's motion in its entirety. (Id.).
C. 	Plaintiff's Reply
Plaintiff fi led Plaintiff's Reply on March 18 , 2026. (See Dkt. No. 43). Plaintiff emphasizes
that the request is narrowly tailored to cure jurisdictional deficiencies, seeking only to alter, amend,
or vacate the j ud gment , reopen the case, and permit the fi ling of Plaintiff's Proposed Second
Amended Compla in t within fourt een (14) days. (Id. at 2). Plaintiff explains that the Motion is n ot
an attempt to replead but simply seeks relief to correct a jurisdiction al pleading deficiency so that
the Court may evaluate the claims on a complete and properly framed record. (Id. at 2-3 ). Plaintiff
claims Proposed Second Amendment cures the standing defect identified by the Court. (Id. at 3).
Plaintiff then responds that Rule 59(e) also exists to prevent manifest injustice, and
"P laintiff does not seek to introduce new claims or theories, but to supply the jurisdictional
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allegations necessary to establish standing based on the same occurrence." 	(Id. at 4). 	Plainti ff
argues that the futility finding in the M&R does not bar rel ief because the defect was one of
articu lation, and "Plaintiff' s claims were dismissed based on how her injuries were pleaded, not
because she lacked a legally cognizable inj ury." (Id. at 5).
Next, Plaintiff explains that manifest injustice would ensue where: the case was dismissed
without reach ing th e merits; the defect identified is jurisdictional and curable; Plaintiff has now
clarified allegations establishing injury-in-fact; and Plaintiff acted promptly within the Rule 59(e)
timeframe. (Dkt. No. 43 at 5-6).
Then, with regard to Rule 60(b)(6), Pl aintiff invokes it only in the alternative and notes
that "the combina ti on of a pro se litigant, a jurisdictional dis mi ssal, and a prompt effort to c ure the
defect pr esents a sufficiently unusual circumstance to warrant limited relief." (Id. at 6).
Plainti ff argues that, unde r Title II of the ADA, she was personally denied meaningful
access to serv ic es. (Id. at 6-7).
Finally, Plaintiff claims that reopening the case for the limi ted purpose of filing the
Proposed Second Amended Complaint promotes efficiency and preserves judicial resource s. (Id.
at 7).
Therefore, Plaintiff asks the Court to grant Plaintiff 's Motion, alter or amend and/or vacate
the fi nal judgment, reopen the case, and grant leave for Plaintiff to file the Proposed Second
Amended Complain t. (Id. at 7-8).
III. 	APPLICABLE LAW/ANALYSIS
A. 	Sta nd a rd of Review
1. 	R ul e 59
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"A motion which attacks a final judgment is treated either as a motion to alter or amend
the judgment under Rule 59(e) or a motion for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure Rule 60(b)." Perry v. Hart, No. 2:21-CV-00281 , 2023 WL 3741643, at *1 (S.D. Tex.
Apr. 	26, 2023) (citing Ford v. 	Elsbury, 	32 	F. 3d 931 , 937 (5th Cir. 	1994)), report and
recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 3740319 (S.D. Tex. May 31, 2023). 	A Rule 59(e) motion
"calls into question the correctness of a judgment." Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 478
(5th Cir. 2004) (quoting in re Transtexas Gas Corp. , 303 F.3d 571,581 (5th Cir. 2002)). Moreover,
a Rule 59(e) motion "serve[ s] the narrow purpose of allowing a party to correct manifest errors of
law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence." 	Id. at 479 (citing Waltman v. Int'/ Paper
Co., 875 F.2d 468, 4 73 (5th Cir. 1989). 	"Reconsideration of a judgment after its entry is an
extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingl y. " Id. (citing Clancy v. Employers Health Ins.
Co. , 101 F.Supp.2d 463,465 (E.D. La. 2000)). And, a Rule 59(e) motion "is not the proper vehjcle
for rehashing evidence, legal theories, or arguments that could have been offered or raised before
the entry of judgment." Id. (citing Simon v. United States, 891 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th C ir. 1990)).
2. 	R ul e 60
Under Rule 60(b), a party may seek reli ef from a final judgment where, among other
reasons, there was: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) new ly discovered
evidence that could not have been discovered in time to file a motion under Rule 59; or (3) fraud,
misrepresentation, or misconduct by the opposing party. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). 	Rule 60(b)(6)
allows for re lief for "any other reason that justifies relief' and is "a catch-all provision, meant to
encompass circumstances not covered by Rule 60(b )'s other enumerated provisions." 	He ss v.
Cockrell, 281 F.3d 2 12 , 216 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Batts v. Tow -Motor Forklift Co., 66 F.3d 743,
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747 (5th Cir. 1995)). 	However, Plaintiff must show extraordinary circumstances for rel ief to be
granted under Rule 60(b)(6). Id.
"The purpose of Rule 60(b) is to balance the principle of finality of a judgment with the
interest of the court in see in g that ju stice is done in light of a ll the facts." Hesling v. CSX Transp.
Inc., 396 F.3d 632,638 (5 th C ir. 2005) (citing Seven Elves, I nc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F. 2d 396, 401 (5 th
C ir. 1981 )). 	However, "it goes without saying that a Rule 60 motion is not a substitute fo r an
appeal from the underlying judgment." Travelers In s. Co. v. Liljeberg Enters., Inc., 38 F.3d 1404,
1408 (5th Cir. 1994). 	Thus, district courts have considerable discretion in determining whether
the movant has met their burden. Id. at 1408 ("Therefore, ' [i]t is not enough that the granting of
re li ef might have been permissible, or even warranted-denial must have been so unwarranted as
to constitute an abuse of discretion ."') (quoting Seven Elves, 635 F.2d at 402) (alteration in
original).
3. 	Leave to Amend
Generally, a request for leave to amend is governed by Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 	However, "when a di strict court has dismissed an ac ti on and entered a final
judgment, 'a plaintiff may request leave to ame nd only by either appealing the j ud gment, or
seeking to alter or reopen the judgment under [Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure]."' Lewis v. Brazoria Cty. Sheriff's Office, No. H-10-5014, 2012 WL 12994979,
at *l (S.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2 01 2) (quot in g Rosenzweig v. Azurix, 332 F.3d 854, 864 (5th Cir. 2003)
(alteration in original)). Similarly, where judgment has been entered on the pl eadings, Plaintiff's
motion under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) should be governed by the same considerations controlling
a motion for leave to amend under Rule l 5(a). I d. Such considerations include: " undue delay, bad
faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated fai lure to cure deficiencies by
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amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of the allowance
of the amendment, [and] futili ty of the amendment. " Id. (alteration in or iginal).
B. 	Plaintiff's Claims
Plaintiff asks the Court to alter or amend the Final Judgment to the extent necessary to
permit amendment, reopen the case, and grant leave to file a Second Amended Complain t. (Dkt.
No. 40 at 8). However, Plainti ff prov id es the Court with no ju stification fo r doing so.
Plaintiff proposes countless factual amendments and legal argwnents in an effort to
ame li orate the deficiencies iden ti fied by the Court in the M&R , most emphaticall y with regard to
those claims dismissed based on lack of standing. But Plaintiff fails to explain why these facts and
arguments were not available during the pend ency of the case before the Court, nor does she make
any attempt to do so. Plaintiff likewise fails to argue that the M&R is tainted with any legal error.
Instead, Plaintiff proffers different iterations of what appear to be the same facts from the original
fil ings, previously reviewed and considered by the Court in drafting the M& R. Similarly, as noted,
the District Court overruled similar objec ti ons made by Plainti ff and adopted th e M&R in i ts
entirety. Thus, re li ef pursuant to Rule 59(e) is not warranted. See Perry, 2023 WL 3741643, at *2
("Plainti ff 's arguments impermissibly seek to rehash ev id ence and present arguments either
previously rejected by the Court or ones that could have been offered before the entry of the Final
Judgment."); Jones v. Driver Pipeline, 	0. 3:25-CV-012 1-B, 2026 WL 608304, at *2 (N.D. Tex.
Mar. 4, 2026) (denying Rule 59(e) motion where the plaintiff presented arguments eith er already
rejected or that could have been offered previously, failing to identify a change in the law, new
evidence, or a manifest error of law or fact).
Plaintiff sim il arly fai ls under Rule 60(b)(l). 	"The movant seeking reli ef under Federal
Rule 60(b)(1) has the burden of establishing mi stake or excusable neglec t. " Alanis v. Wells Fargo
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Bank, NA. , No. SA-2 1-C V-01 261-JKP, 2022 WL 89 1967, at *4 (W. D. Tex. Mar. 25, 2022) (citing
Cartman v. Hunt County, No. 3:15-CV-481-L, 20 15 WL 3794448, at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 18 ,
20 15)). This mistake or excusable neglect does not pertain to any alleged mistake by the Court;
rather, it refers to the movant's or counsel 's error. I d. Pl ai nti ff frames her 60(b)(1) justification as
one of fa il ed arti culation, but this falls well short of demonstrating the "unusual or unique
circumstances justifying such relief." Id. (quoting Pryor v. United States Serv., 769 F.2d 28 1, 286
(5th C ir. 1985)); see Luebano v. Office Depot, LLC, MO:2 1- CV-233-DC, 2022 WL 22906937, at
* 1 (W.D. Te x. Au g. 17, 2022) (denying a Rule 60(b )( 1) motion where Plaintiff did not present any
unusual or unique circumstances, identify any mistake in the judgment, or explain how the
previously identified pleading deficiencies could be cured).
Moreover, Plaintiff has fai le d to identi fy any extraordinary circumstances triggering re li ef
under Rule 60(b)(6). See BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman, 605 U.S. 204, 206 (2025) (holding that
a Rule 60(b)( 6) movant seeking to reopen a case for the purpose of fi ling an amended complaint
must always demonstrate "extraordinary circumstances [.] "); Fackelman v. Bell, 564 F.2d 734, 737
(5 th Cir. 1977) ("[A] 60(b) motion is not a remedy for one who fails to prosecute his rights.").
In any event, even if the Court could grant the relief Plainti ff seeks, Plaintiff has not
proposed any amendment that could overcome the deficiencies identified in the M&R, so
amendment remains fut il e for either lack of standing or failure to state a claim. 	See Thomas v.
Sanchez, NO. 2:22-C V-001 29, 2022 WL 19003363, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 15, 2022) ("Because
Plaintiff's proposed amendments would be futile for failure to state a claim for relief, he cannot
establish entitlement to rel ief from the Court's final j ud gment under Rule 59(e)."), report and
recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 2465791 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2023); Jones, 2026 WL 608304,
at *3 (finding reconsideration inappropriate where the plaintiff pleaded his best case, because he
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"asserts no new facts that suggest he could plausibly allege claims upon which relief could be
granted.").
As such, Plaintiff fai ls to establish she is entitled to re li ef under either R ul e 59 or Rule 60.
IV. 	CO 	CLUSION
Recommended Disposition
Accordingly, the Court recommends Plaintiff's Motion (Dkt. 	o. 40) be DENIED.
Notice to the Parties
Within 14 days after being served a copy of this report, a party may serve and fi le specific,
written objections to the proposed recommendations. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)( l )(C); Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b). The district judge to whom this case is assigned shall make a de nova determination upon
the record, or after additional evidence, of any portion of the magistrate judge's disposition to
which specific written o bj ection has been made. The district judge may accept, reject, or modify
the recommended decision, receive further evidence, or recommit the matter to the magistrate
judge with 	instructions. 	Failure 	to fi le written 	objections to the proposed findings and
recommendations contained in this report within 14 days after service shall bar an aggrieved party
from de nova review by the District Court of the proposed fi ndings and recommendations and
from appellate review of factual findings accepted or adopted by the Dist ri ct Court, except on
grounds of plain error or manifest injustice.
The Clerk shall also provide a copy of this Order to Plaintiff and Counsel for Defendants.
DO 	E at McA ll en, Texas, this 10th day of April 2026.
United States Magistrate Judge
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