Gonzalez v. Ramirez et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MCALLEN DIVISION
LIZELLE GONZALEZ, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § Civil Action No. 7:24-CV-00132
§
GOCHA ALLEN RAMIREZ, §
ALEXANDRIA LYNN BARRERA, §
STARR COUNTY, TEXAS, and §
RENE FUENTES, §
§
Defendants. §
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Lizelle Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”) self-induced an abortion. She was indicted
by a Starr County grand jury for murder and arrested. Defendant Gocha Ramirez, the
District Attorney (“DA”) for Starr County, Texas, dismissed the case after learning that
the Texas Penal Code provides a defense under the murder statute for women that have
an abortion. Gonzalez then sued DA Ramirez, Assistant District Attorney (“ADA”)
Alexandria Barrera, Sheriff Rene Fuentes (collectively, “Defendants”), and Starr County
for alleged Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Pending before the Court is DA Ramirez’s Motion for Summary Judgment, (Dkt.
No. 79), ADA Barrera’s Motion for Summary Judgment, (Dkt. No. 81), Sheriff Fuentes’s
Motion for Summary Judgment, (Dkt. No. 88), and Defendants’ Objections and Motions
to Strike Certain Evidence Submitted in Response to Defendants’ Summary Judgment
Motion, (Dkt. No. 94). For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
April 01, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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DENIES in part Defendants’ Objections and Motions to Strike Certain Evidence
Submitted in Response to Defendants’ Summary Judgment Motion, (Dkt. No. 94);
GRANTS DA Ramirez’s Motion for Summary Judgment, (Dkt. No. 79); GRANTS ADA
Barrera’s Motion for Summary Judgment, (Dkt. No. 81); and GRANTS Sheriff Fuentes’s
Motion for Summary Judgment, (Dkt. No. 88).
I. BACKGROUND1
In early January 2022, with the public fight over the Texas Heartbeat Act raging,2
Gonzalez was treated at Starr County Memorial Hospital after using medication to self-
induce an abortion. (Dkt. No. 91 at 11). Shortly after being discharged, a nurse reported
Gonzalez’s abortion to law enforcement. (Id.). A Rio Grande City officer responded but
the case was quickly transferred to the Starr County Sheriff’s Office. (Id.).
Captain Lenard Fuentes assigned the investigation to Investigator Esmeralda
Muniz. (Id. at 12). Investigator Muniz and Sergeant Rafael Aguirre conducted the
criminal investigation into Gonzalez, which included gathering evidence, interviewing
witnesses, and obtaining grand-jury subpoenas. (Id. at 12–20). The investigation did not
conclude until March 17, 2022. (Dkt. No. 91-4 at 11–13).
1 Except where noted, this Section contains only undisputed facts, and all facts and
reasonable inferences have been construed in favor of the nonmovant. Renfroe v. Parker, 974 F.3d
594, 599 (5th Cir. 2020). The Court has not weighed evidence or made credibility findings. Id.
2 The Texas Heartbeat Act, also known as Senate Bill 8, became effective in 2021. Tex.
Right to Life v. Van Stean, 702 S.W.3d 348, 351 (Tex. 2024) (per curiam). The Act makes it illegal
for an abortion to be induced or performed in Texas by a physician where the physician has
“detected a fetal heartbeat for the unborn child.” Tex. Health & Safety Code § 171.204.
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During the investigation, Sheriff Fuentes was aware that Gonzalez was being
investigated. (Dkt. No. 91-30 at 6). He told his investigators that they needed to
document the facts and submit their investigation to the DA’s Office. (Dkt. No. 91 at 28);
(Dkt. No. 97 at 2); (see also Dkt. No. 91-28 at 37 (“[Sheriff Fuentes] will be like, ‘Okay. Or
just make sure you talk to the DA, okay, or that the DA’s office knows what’s going on.”).
Before the investigation packet was submitted to the DA’s Office, ADA Barrera
spoke with the Sheriff’s Office about the case several times. (Dkt. No. 91 at 13–14, 17, 19);
(Dkt. No. 91-27 at 20); (Dkt. No. 96 at 2). ADA Barrera directed Investigator Muniz to
“take pictures of the ashes,” (Dkt. No. 79-21 at 27–28), and instructed Investigator Aguirre
to interview “that lady that gave her the drugs” before pursuing an arrest warrant, (id. at
24). (See also Dkt. No. 96 at 2). On occasion, ADA Barrera provided legal advice to the
Sheriff’s Office about the investigation. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 91-22 at 40, 79); (Dkt. No. 79-
21 at 26); (Dkt. No. 91-28 at 64–65); (Dkt. No. 91-24 at 41–42).
ADA Barrera also had at least two conversations with DA Ramirez about the case.
(Dkt. No. 95 at 3); (Dkt. No. 91 at 14). In one conversation around February 1, 2022, DA
Ramirez said that the case could go to the grand jury. (Dkt. No. 91 at 20); (Dkt. No. 96 at
2). In a later conversation in “March maybe,” ADA Barrera told DA Ramirez that she
was going to present the case to the grand jury, at which point he said he would be in a
different county during the presentation. (Dkt. No. 91-24 at 65). And ultimately DA
Ramirez did not attend. (Dkt. No. 79 at 10).
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On March 17, 2022, Investigator Muniz finished preparing the packet
summarizing the Sheriff’s Office’s investigation and dropped it off with the DA’s Office.
(Dkt. No. 91-4 at 11–13).
On March 25, 2022, ADA Barrera presented the case to the grand jury. (Dkt. No.
91 at 20). She then drafted the indictment, filed it with the court on March 30, 2022, and
automatically triggered the issuance of an arrest warrant. (Id. at 21).
On April 7, 2022, an investigator with the District Attorney’s Office gave
Investigator Muniz a closed envelope containing the sealed indictment, directed her to
find Gonzalez, bring her back to the Sheriff’s Office, and read to her what was contained
in the envelope. (Id.). Investigator Muniz informed Gonzalez she had been indicted for
murder, and she was booked into the Starr County Jail. (Id. at 22). Shortly thereafter,
Gonzalez “bonded out” after Sheriff Fuentes approved the bond posted by a bail bond
company. (Id. at 24).
On April 11, 2022, DA Ramirez filed a motion to dismiss the criminal case after
determining that Texas Penal Code Section 19.063 applied, and a judge dismissed the
indictment later that morning. (Id. at 25). DA Ramirez apologized to Gonzalez. (Dkt.
No. 95 at 5). DA Ramirez was later investigated by the Texas State Bar Grievance
Committee and entered into an Agreed Judgment of Probated Suspension in connection
with the prosecution of Gonzalez. (Dkt. No. 91 at 27); (see also Dkt. No. 79-21 at 67–71).
3 Section 19.06 provides “[t]his chapter [criminalizing homicide] does not apply to the
death of an unborn child if the conduct charged is . . . conduct committed by the mother of the
unborn child.”
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Gonzalez filed suit against DA Ramirez, ADA Barrera, Sheriff Fuentes, and Starr
County. (Dkt. No. 7). She asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment violations, specifically citing false arrest, malicious prosecution,
and conspiracy. (Id.). Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all claims
asserted against them in an individual capacity. (Dkt. Nos. 79, 81, 88). Gonzalez
responded to the Movants’ Motions jointly. (Dkt. No. 91). Defendants replied. (Dkt.
Nos. 95, 96, 97). Defendants also moved to strike certain evidence from Gonzalez’s
Response. (Dkt. No. 94). Gonzalez responded. (Dkt. No. 98). And finally, Gonzalez
provided supplemental summary-judgment evidence after discovery concluded. (Dkt.
No. 114). Defendants responded. (Dkt. No. 117).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). A fact is material if it could affect the suit’s outcome under governing law. Renwick
v. PNK Lake Charles, LLC, 901 F.3d 605, 611 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). And “[a] dispute about
a material fact is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the non-moving party.” TIG Ins. v. Sedgwick James, 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir.
2002) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510). The moving party “always
bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion”
and identifying the record evidence that “it believes demonstrate[s] the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548,
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2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). “If the moving party fails to meet [its] initial burden, the
motion [for summary judgment] must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant’s
response.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (per
curiam).
If the movant meets this burden, the nonmovant must come forward with specific
facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355–56, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
The nonmovant must “go beyond the pleadings and by [the nonmovant’s] own affidavits,
or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Nola Spice Designs, LLC v.
Haydel Enters., 783 F.3d 527, 536 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting EEOC v. LHC Grp., Inc., 773 F.3d
688, 694 (5th Cir. 2014)). “The nonmovant must ‘identify specific evidence in the record
and . . . articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports his or her claim.’”
Carr v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, 866 F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (quoting
Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998)). If evidence is merely
colorable or not significantly probative, summary judgment is appropriate. Parrish v.
Premier Directional Drilling, L.P., 917 F.3d 369, 378 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 249–50, 106 S.Ct. at 2511).
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the district court views the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Carr, 866 F.3d at 601. This means
that courts must resolve factual controversies in the nonmovant’s favor, “but only
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when . . . both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Little, 37 F.3d at
1075.
III. DISCUSSION
A. EVIDENTIARY RULINGS
In its Motion to Strike, (Dkt. No. 94), Defendants ask the Court to strike five pieces
of Gonzalez’s summary-judgment evidence: (1) the affidavit of Bernice Garza, (Dkt. No.
91-11); (2) the deposition of Rosita Rocha, (Dkt. No. 91-25) (SEALED); (3) the text
messages provided by Rosita Rocha, (Dkt. No. 91-13) (SEALED); (4) the deposition of
Becky Rocha, (Dkt. No. 91-26) (SEALED); and (5) the text messages provided by Becky
Rocha, (Dkt. No. 91-14) (SEALED). These are discussed in turn.
1. Bernice Garza’s Affidavit (Dkt. No. 91-11)
Defendants argue that the affidavit of Garza, the Crime Victim’s Unit Coordinator
in the DA’s Office, should be struck because Gonzalez did not disclose her as a witness
until after the summary-judgment motions were pending and, in any event, Garza’s
statements are inadmissible. (Dkt. No. 94 at 4–6). Gonzalez responds that Defendants
failed to identify the portions of the affidavit that they challenge. (Dkt. No. 98 at 17).
Gonzalez also argues that she properly disclosed the affidavit and that it contains
relevant, admissible testimony based on personal knowledge. (Id. at 18–19).
The Court overrules the objection to Garza’s affidavit. It does not contain hearsay
and is based on personal knowledge. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). Gonzalez also disclosed
Garza before relying on the affidavit as summary-judgment evidence. (Dkt. No. 98 at 18–
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19, 21). Defendants cite no authority supporting their request to strike evidence that a
party disclosed before using it or while discovery remained open.
Even if Gonzalez did not properly disclose Garza, it was harmless. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 37(c) (“If a party fails to . . . identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party
is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a
motion . . . unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.”). To determine
whether a failure to comply is substantially justified or harmless, courts consider: “(1) the
importance of the evidence; (2) the prejudice to the opposing party of including the
evidence; (3) the possibility of curing such prejudice by granting a continuance; and
(4) the explanation for the party’s failure to disclose.” United States v. Grigsby, 86 F.4th
602, 615 (5th Cir. 2023).
Here, the evidence is important. If taken as true, it describes ADA Barrera’s and
DA Ramirez’s role in the investigation of Gonzalez—facts that could defeat absolute-
prosecutorial immunity. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 274, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 2616,
125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993). The prejudice to Defendants is minimal. Defendants were better
positioned to know about Garza because ADA Barrera worked with her. (Dkt. No. 98 at
19–20). Gonzalez supplemented her disclosures to identify Garza as a witness. (Id. at 18).
And Garza was ultimately deposed. (See Dkt. No. 114-1). Defendants’ claimed
prejudice—additional delays and “tabloid drama”—is negligible. (Dkt. No. 94 at 5).
Gonzalez also explained that the delay occurred because Garza’s attorney did not allow
her to speak until early July 2025. (Dkt. No. 98 at 21). On balance, the factors weigh
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against striking Garza’s affidavit. For these reasons, the Court overrules Defendants’
objection to Garza’s affidavit.
2. Rosita and Becky Rocha’s Deposition Testimony (Dkt. Nos. 91-25
and 91-26)
Defendants next object to the depositions of Rosita and Becky Rocha and assert
that they should be excluded for purposes of evaluating the dispositive motions in this
case. Defendants argue that the depositions do not contain a first-hand account of DA
Ramirez’s conduct during the investigation and indictment of Gonzalez—the conduct
relevant to the immunity analysis. (Dkt. No. 94 at 6). Gonzalez responds that Defendants
did not identify the portions of the depositions that are objectionable. (Dkt. No. 98 at 14).
Gonzalez also argues that the testimony is relevant because it shows DA Ramirez’s
involvement in investigating and prosecuting Gonzalez and his knowledge about
whether abortion could be charged as murder. (Id. at 15).
The Court sustains the objection to Becky’s deposition. (Dkt. No. 91-26). Gonzalez
cites the deposition only to argue that DA Ramirez knew abortion wasn’t a crime because
he paid for one in 1996 or 1997. (Dkt. No. 91 at 19, 29, 34). But that happened nearly 30
years ago and has no bearing on DA Ramirez’s conduct during the 2022 investigation and
prosecution of Gonzalez. Further, Section 19.06 did not become law until 2003—well
after DA Ramirez allegedly paid for Becky’s abortion.
The Court also sustains the objection to Rosita’s deposition, (Dkt. No. 91-25)
(SEALED), except for page seven, which describes how (1) Rosita told DA Ramirez that
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“the laws have not changed” since she had an abortion4 and (2) DA Ramirez told Rosita
that ADA Barrera and ADA Villareal were “on top of everything, and they’re advising
everything that’s going on.” The remaining cited pages—6, 124–27,5 136–37, and 144—
describe the relationship between Rosita and DA Ramirez that frequently involved sex;
DA Ramirez calling Rosita to ask about how she felt during her abortion; DA Ramirez
telling Rosita that Gonzalez was in jail; and DA Ramirez asking Rosita’s sister Becky to
obtain an abortion. As with Becky’s testimony, these assertions have no bearing on the
immunity question. The Court therefore strikes Becky’s deposition and Rosita’s
deposition except for page seven.6
3. Rosita and Becky Rocha’s Text Messages (Dkt. No. 91-13 and 91-
14)
Defendants next argue that Rosita and Becky Rocha’s text messages 7 are irrelevant
because they do not show Defendants’ conduct during the Gonzalez investigation or
indictment. (Dkt. No. 94 at 8). Gonzalez argues that Defendants again did not identify
the portions of the text messages that are objectionable. (Dkt. No. 98 at 6, 9). Gonzalez
also argues that the text messages “demonstrate the significance of the longstanding
intimate relationships” DA Ramirez had with Rosita and Becky; “support [Becky’s]
4 The record does not reflect when Rosita had her abortion.
5 Pages 124–27 aren’t included in the deposition excerpts but are nevertheless cited to.
6 The Court’s ruling striking this evidence is limited to the pending summary-judgment
motions. (Dkt. Nos. 79, 81, 88). The Court expresses no opinion on the evidence’s admissibility
for other purposes, and this ruling does not preclude Gonzalez from seeking to introduce the
evidence in future motions or proceedings.
7 However, Defendants concede that a single text message between DA Ramirez and
Becky Rocha is relevant and do not object to it. (Dkt. No. 94 at 8).
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testimony that she had a romantic relationship with DA Ramirez that resulted in an
unwanted pregnancy;” and “demonstrate various instances where DA Ramirez’s
deposition testimony is belied by documentary proof.” (Id. at 17).
The Court sustains Defendants’ objections. At summary judgment, the Court may
not weigh evidence or make credibility determinations. See MAN Roland, Inc. v. Kreitz
Motor Express, Inc., 438 F.3d 476, 478 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2110, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000)). Gonzalez’s
arguments regarding the relevancy of the messages all have to do with credibility—either
of the Rochas or DA Ramirez. The messages do not assist the Court in deciding whether
Defendants are entitled to immunity. The Court therefore strikes the text-message
exhibits.8
B. MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Gonzalez sued each Defendant individually under Section 1983 for false arrest,
malicious prosecution, and conspiracy. (Dkt. No. 7). To establish a claim under
Section 1983, a plaintiff must show (1) the violation of “a right secured by the
Constitution” or federal law, and (2) “a person acting under color of state law” committed
the violation. Perdomo v. City of League City, 765 F.Supp.3d 613, 620 (S.D. Tex. 2025) (citing
Petersen v. Johnson, 57 F.4th 225, 231 (5th Cir. 2023)).
8 Again, the Court’s ruling striking this evidence is limited to the pending summary-
judgment motions. (Dkt. Nos. 79, 81, 88). The Court expresses no opinion on the evidence’s
admissibility for other purposes, and this ruling does not preclude Gonzalez from seeking to
introduce the evidence in future motions or proceedings.
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DA Ramirez and ADA Barrera assert absolute-prosecutorial immunity against
Gonzalez’s false-arrest and malicious-prosecution claims. (Dkt. No. 79 at 20); (Dkt. No.
81 at 20). Prosecutors are absolutely immune from Section 1983 suits in their individual
capacities for conduct within the scope of their prosecutorial duties. Brooks v. George
Cnty., 84 F.3d 157, 168 (5th Cir. 1996). To determine whether prosecutorial immunity
applies, courts ask (1) whether the practical function of the conduct at issue historically
merited absolute immunity at the time Section 1983 was enacted, and (2) whether
granting absolute immunity advances the policy interests that justified the common-law
immunity. Lampton v. Diaz, 639 F.3d 223, 226 (5th Cir. 2011).
At Section 1983’s enactment, common-law prosecutorial immunity extended only
to conduct that was “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal
process.” Id. (quoting Hoog–Watson v. Guadalupe Cnty., 591 F.3d 431, 438 (5th Cir. 2009));
see also Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d 627, 632–33 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430, 96 S.Ct. 984, 995, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). Thus, prosecutorial
immunity protects conduct related to initiating, investigating, and pursuing a criminal
prosecution. Quinn v. Roach, 326 F.App’x 280, 292 (5th Cir. 2009); Oliver v. Collins, 904
F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1990)). Courts apply a functional analysis to determine whether
absolute immunity attaches to a particular activity. Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335,
342, 129 S.Ct. 855, 861, 172 L.Ed.2d 706 (2009). Typical protected activities include, but
are not limited to, initiating prosecutions, appearing in court, and performing actions
taken in the prosecutor’s role as an advocate for the State. Id. at 343, 129 S.Ct. at 861.
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DA Ramirez, ADA Barrera, and Sheriff Fuentes also invoke qualified immunity.
(Dkt. No. 79 at 24); (Dkt. No. 81 at 24); (Dkt. No. 88 at 16). Qualified immunity shields
government officials from civil liability when their conduct is objectively reasonable in
light of clearly established law. Crostley v. Lamar Cnty., 717 F.3d 410, 422 (5th Cir. 2013)
(citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)).
The doctrine “protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate
the law.” Davidson v. City of Stafford, 848 F.3d 384, 391 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting
Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 546, 132 S.Ct. 1235, 1244, 182 L.Ed.2d 47 (2012)).
“A qualified immunity defense alters the usual summary judgment burden of
proof.” Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010). Once an official raises the
defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show a genuine dispute of material fact on
whether the official violated clearly established law. Id.
To overcome qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show that (1) the official
violated a statutory or constitutional right and (2) the right was so “clearly established”
at the time of the challenged conduct that a reasonable officer would be on notice that
their conduct was against the law. Ramirez v. Killian, 113 F.4th 415, 421 (5th Cir. 2024)
(quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2080, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149
(2011)); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 2515, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002)
(“Officers sued in a civil action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 have the same right
to fair notice as do defendants charged with the criminal offense defined in 18 U.S.C.
§ 242.”); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d
523 (1987).
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A plaintiff cannot satisfy these elements at summary judgment “with conclusory
allegations or unsubstantiated assertions of wrongdoing.” Burke v. Masters, No. 4:23-CV-
00361, 2024 WL 1703085, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 14, 2024) (first citing Mitchell v. Mills, 895
F.3d 365, 370 (5th Cir. 2018); and then citing Williams-Boldware v. Denton Cnty., 741 F.3d
635, 643–44 (5th Cir. 2014)). Instead, a plaintiff “must point to specific evidence in the
record demonstrating a material fact issue concerning each element of his claim.”
Mitchell, 895 F.3d at 370. The Court addresses each Defendant and the claims against
them in turn.
1. Sheriff Fuentes
As discussed below, Sheriff Fuentes is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Gonzalez fails to raise a genuine dispute of material fact that Sheriff Fuentes violated her
constitutional right to be free from false arrest, malicious prosecution, or conspiracy.
Further, Gonzalez has failed to show that Sheriff Fuentes is not entitled to qualified
immunity on the false-arrest and malicious-prosecution claims. Because Sheriff Fuentes
is entitled to qualified immunity on those underlying claims, he is likewise entitled to
immunity on the conspiracy claim.
a. False Arrest
Gonzalez alleges that Sheriff Fuentes violated her right to be free from false arrest
by directly participating in the alleged constitutional violation and by enabling it through
his supervisory role. (Dkt. No. 91 at 51–52). The Court finds that Gonzalez has not
established any false-arrest claim against Sheriff Fuentes and even if she had, Sheriff
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Fuentes is entitled to qualified immunity, and the independent-intermediary doctrine
applies.
i. Direct Participation
Gonzalez alleges that Sheriff Fuentes “personally took action that led to” her false
arrest. (Dkt. No. 91 at 51). Specifically, Sheriff Fuentes “directed his staff to involve the
DA’s office in the criminal investigation of Ms. Gonzalez and instructed them to follow
the [DA’s] instructions even though he did not believe that Ms. Gonzalez had committed
a crime.” (Id. at 52). In Gonzalez’s view, Defendants need not personally arrest her to
incur liability because their conduct allowed the investigation to proceed and ultimately
led to her arrest. (Id.). Defendants argue that the evidence shows that Sheriff Fuentes
merely received occasional updates and instructed Captain Fuentes to ensure the case
was reviewed by the DA’s office. (Dkt. No. 88 at 15). The Court agrees with Sheriff
Fuentes.
To establish a direct participation false-arrest claim under Section 1983, an arrestee
must show either that an arresting officer made an arrest while lacking probable cause to
make the arrest, Green v. Thomas, 129 F.4th 877, 886-87 (5th Cir. 2025), or that an
investigative officer “knowingly provided false information to secure the arrest
warrants,” Freeman v. Bexar Cnty., 210 F.3d 550, 553 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Franks v.
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 2684, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978)).
Gonzalez has not presented evidence that Sheriff Fuentes directly participated in
violating her right to be free from false arrest. It is undisputed that Sheriff Fuentes did
not personally arrest Gonzalez, (Dkt. No. 91 at 52), or direct her arrest, (Dkt. No. 88-15 at
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8–9). The record also shows that Sheriff Fuentes did not personally investigate Gonzalez.
(See Dkt. No. 91 at 11–20). Investigator Muniz and Sergeant Aguirre gathered the
evidence, conducted interviews, obtained the grand-jury subpoenas, and submitted the
case to the DA’s Office. (See id.). The evidence establishes that Sheriff Fuentes never
spoke with Investigator Muniz and Sergeant Aguirre about the investigation at all, let
alone told them how to perform the investigation. (See Dkt. No. 88-15 at 16–17); (see Dkt.
No. 88-16 at 6, 7, 8, 10); (see Dkt. No. 88-18 at 4, 6, 22). Indeed, the only guidance Sheriff
Fuentes gave investigators was to document the facts and submit their investigation to
the DA’s office. (See Dkt. No. 88-15 at 16–17); (see Dkt. No. 88-16 at 6, 7, 8, 10); (see Dkt.
No. 88-18 at 4, 6, 22). Therefore, Gonzalez fails to establish a prima facie case for direct-
participation false arrest against Sheriff Fuentes.
Even if she had met her burden, Sheriff Fuentes is entitled to qualified immunity
because Gonzalez has not satisfied the “clearly established” prong. Morris v. Dillard Dep’t
Stores, Inc., 277 F.3d 743, 753 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Chiu v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 260
F.3d 330, 343 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam)). It is obviously beyond debate that the right to
be free from false arrest is clearly established. Mangieri v. Clifton, 29 F.3d 1012, 1016 (5th
Cir. 1994). But “that is not enough.” Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 875 (5th Cir. 2019)
(quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 2156, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001)).
A right is “clearly established” only when existing precedent makes it clear to
every reasonable official that the conduct at issue violates the Constitution or a federal
law. Cope v. Cogdill, 3 F.4th 198, 204 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11,
136 S.Ct. 305, 308, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015) (per curiam)). This standard is met only if “the
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state of the law at the time of the incident provided fair warning to the defendants that
their alleged [conduct] was unconstitutional.” Cass v. City of Abilene, 814 F.3d 721, 728
(5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (alteration in original) (quoting Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650,
656, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 1866, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014) (per curiam)). Consequently, a plaintiff
must identify precedent that “‘squarely govern[s]’ the specific facts at issue.” Joseph ex
rel. Est. of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 337 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Mullenix, 577 U.S. at
15, 136 S.Ct. at 310). Courts must ask “whether the violative nature of particular conduct
is clearly established.” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12, 136 S.Ct. at 308 (emphasis in original)
(quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742, 131 S.Ct. at 2084). This constitutional question must be
framed “‘with specificity and granularity.’” Cunningham v. Castloo, 983 F.3d 185, 193 (5th
Cir. 2020) (quoting Morrow, 917 F.3d at 874–75). In other words, a plaintiff generally must
“‘identify a case in which an officer acting under similar circumstances was held to have
violated the Constitution’ and explain ‘why the case clearly proscribed the conduct of
that individual officer.’” Cope, 3 F.4th at 205 (quoting Bartlett, 981 F.3d at 345 (cleaned
up)). “While an exact case on point is not required,” the specifics of the officers’ violation
must be “‘beyond debate.’” Id. (quoting Baldwin v. Dorsey, 964 F.3d 320, 326 (5th Cir.
2020)). Specifically, “‘the right’s contours [must be] sufficiently definite that any
reasonable official in the officer’s shoes would have understood that he was violating it.’”
Baker v. Coburn, 68 F.4th 240, 245–46 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S.
765, 778–799, 134 S.Ct. 2012, 2023, 188 L.Ed.2d 1056 (2014) (cleaned up)). Broad legal
principles do not suffice. Cope, 3 F.4th at 205; al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742, 131 S.Ct. at 2084
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(“We have repeatedly told courts . . . not to define clearly established law at a high level
of generality.”).
Gonzalez identifies no authority establishing Sheriff Fuentes’s alleged conduct—
i.e., directing his staff to follow the DA office’s instructions, despite not believing that
probable cause existed9—violated clearly established law. (Dkt. No. 91 at 52); see also
Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12, 136 S.Ct. at 308. Nor has Gonzalez shown that Sheriff Fuentes
had a clearly established duty to stop the investigation. (Dkt. No. 91 at 51 (“But for the
conduct of each of the Defendants, Ms. Gonzalez’s investigation would not have
proceeded, and she would not have been arrested.”)). Sheriff Fuentes is therefore entitled
to qualified immunity, and summary judgment is appropriate on Gonzalez’s direct-
participation false-arrest claim against him.
ii. Supervisor Participation
Gonzalez also alleges that Sheriff Fuentes is liable because he supervised the
investigators who pursued the case and, “by both action and inaction, [he] demonstrated
deliberate indifference to [his] employees violating” Gonzalez’s constitutional rights.
(Dkt. No. 91 at 52).
“Under section 1983, ‘supervisory officials are not liable for the actions of
subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability.’” Hicks v. LeBlanc, 81 F.4th 497, 504 (5th
9 It is disputed whether Sheriff Fuentes believed that there was probable cause to arrest
Gonzalez. (Compare Dkt. No. 91-30 at 34, with Dkt. No. 88-18 at 28, 46). However, because the
Court is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, Carr, 866
F.3d at 601, the Court presumes that Sheriff Fuentes did not subjectively believe there was
probable cause to arrest Gonzalez.
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Cir. 2023) (quoting Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1987)). Indeed, “the term
‘supervisory liability’ is a misnomer” because each government official “is only liable for
his or her own misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173
L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). A supervisor who is not personally involved in the alleged
constitutional deprivation may be held liable only if there is a sufficient causal connection
between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Thompkins,
828 F.2d at 303–04. The Fifth Circuit evaluates supervisory-officer claims using the same
standard as municipal-liability claims. Rios v. City of Del Rio, 444 F.3d 417, 426 (5th Cir.
2006); see also Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 453 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (“The
legal elements of an individual’s supervisory liability and a political subdivision’s
liability . . . are similar enough that the same standards of fault and causation should
govern.”).
Generally, a supervisor may be liable under Section 1983 if: (1) the supervisor
instituted or ratified a policy or custom “so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation
of constitutional rights;” or (2) the supervisor failed to supervise his subordinates. Brown,
623 F.3d at 253–54 (quoting Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Par. Council, 279 F.3d 273, 289 (5th Cir.
2002)).
A failure to supervise claim arises when the plaintiff shows that (1) the defendant
failed to supervise the alleged bad actor, (2) there is a causal connection between the
infringement of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights and the lack of supervision, and (3) the
failure to supervise exhibited deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional
rights. Parker v. Blackwell, 23 F.4th 517, 525 (5th Cir. 2022). “The infringement of the
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plaintiff’s constitutional rights must be an ‘obvious’ and ‘highly predictable’ consequence
of the failure to” supervise. Id. (quoting Culbertson v. Lykos, 790 F.3d 608, 625 (5th Cir.
2015)).
“[R]elief will not typically be available absent a showing of a pattern of
constitutional violations, as opposed to a single incident.” Id. That is because
“[d]eliberate indifference is a ‘high standard’ that requires ‘a complete disregard of the
risk that a violation of a particular constitutional right would follow the decision’” not to
adequately train or supervise. Edwards v. City of Balch Springs, 70 F.4th 302, 312 (5th Cir.
2023) (quoting Liggins v. Duncanville, 52 F.4th 953, 955 (5th Cir. 2022)). Thus, to “show
deliberate indifference, a plaintiff normally must allege a pattern of similar constitutional
violations” by the subordinate so as to put his supervisors on notice of the risk he poses.
Id. (quoting Henderson v. Harris Cnty., 51 F.4th 125, 131 (5th Cir. 2022) (per curiam)). “A
pattern requires similarity and specificity; prior indications cannot simply be for any and
all ‘bad’ or unwise acts, but rather must point to the specific violation in question.” Id.
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 851 (5th Cir.
2009)).
Gonzalez failed to demonstrate that Sheriff Fuentes was deliberately indifferent to
the Sheriff’s Office violating her right to be free from false arrest. To be sure, Gonzalez
spends only four sentences attempting to justify why Sheriff Fuentes and DA Ramirez—
officials in separate offices with distinct employees and functions—should be liable in a
supervisory capacity for her arrest. (Dkt. No. 91 at 52). But she never mentions (let alone
provides evidence of) any policy or “pattern of similar constitutional violations” by the
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Sheriff’s Office employees. Edwards, 70 F.4th at 312 (quoting Henderson, 51 F.4th at 131).
The summary-judgment record contains no evidence that Sheriff Fuentes directed
investigators to arrest Gonzalez without probable cause. The evidence instead shows
that he instructed investigators to document the facts and submit the case to the DA’s
Office for review. (See Dkt. No. 88-15 at 16–17); (see Dkt. No. 88-16 at 6, 7, 8, 10); (see Dkt.
No. 88-18 at 4, 6, 22). That instruction does not amount to unconstitutional conduct. Even
if Gonzalez had established a constitutional violation, Sheriff Fuentes is nevertheless
entitled to qualified immunity for the same reasons discussed above. See supra
III(B)(1)(a)(i). Accordingly, the Court finds that summary judgment is appropriate on
Gonzalez’s supervisory false-arrest claim against Sheriff Fuentes.
Because Gonzalez did not meet her burden to show that Sheriff Fuentes, as a
supervisor, violated her constitutional right to be free from false arrest, or that he was not
entitled to qualified immunity, the Court grants summary judgment on Sheriff Fuentes’s
supervisory false-arrest claim.
iii. Independent-Intermediary Doctrine
Even if Gonzalez could establish a false-arrest constitutional violation against
Sheriff Fuentes, the independent-intermediary doctrine would bar her claim. “[I]f facts
supporting an arrest are placed before an independent intermediary such as a magistrate
or grand jury, the intermediary’s decision breaks the chain of causation for false arrest,
insulating the initiating party.” Wilson v. Stroman, 33 F.4th 202, 208 (5th Cir. 2022)
(quoting McLin v. Ard, 866 F.3d 682, 689 (5th Cir. 2017)). “Thus, a properly secured arrest
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warrant or grand jury indictment will shield a defendant who has committed or initiated
a false arrest.” Wilson, 33 F.4th at 208.
Here, the Parties do not dispute that Gonzalez was indicted by the grand jury,
(Dkt. No. 79-1) (SEALED), which Sheriff Fuentes did not participate in, (Dkt. No. 88 at
18–19); (Dkt. No. 91 at 53–55). The Parties dispute, however, whether Sheriff Fuentes’s
actions “tainted the grand jury.” (Dkt. No. 88 at 18–19); (Dkt. No. 91 at 53–55).
Specifically, Gonzalez argues that Sheriff Fuentes “directed his investigators to follow
whatever the DA’s Office told them to do, even though he too did not believe that
Ms. Gonzalez had committed a crime. . . . The investigative reports created by his office
were then integral to securing the faulty indictment.” (Dkt. No. 91 at 55).
The ”taint exception” to the independent-intermediary doctrine arises where the
intermediary’s deliberations “were in some way tainted by the actions of the defendant.”10
Wilson, 33 F.4th at 208 (emphasis in original) (quoting Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156,
170 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam)). Gonzalez cites three pieces of deposition testimony as
evidence that Sheriff Fuentes misled the jury by directing his investigators to “follow
whatever” the DA’s Office told them to do even though he did not believe Gonzalez
committed a crime. (Dkt. No. 91 at 55). But Gonzalez mischaracterizes the evidence.
Captain Fuentes’s testimony indicates that usually Sheriff Fuentes would direct the
10 Gonzalez notes that an officer not in the grand jury room may taint deliberations “for
example, if they ’helped prepare the [presentation] by providing information for use in it’ and
the information provided is false or incomplete.” (Dkt. No. 91 at 53 (quoting Terwilliger v. Reyna,
4 F.4th 270, 283 (5th Cir. 2021))). But that example clearly does not apply, because Gonzalez does
not suggest or provide any evidence that Sheriff Fuentes prepared any grand-jury materials. (See
generally Dkt. No. 91 at 55).
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Sheriff’s Office to talk with the DA and keep the DA informed. (Dkt. No. 91-28 at 37).
But here, Captain Fuentes contends that he never received any guidance from Sheriff
Fuentes about the Gonzalez investigation at all, contradicting Gonzalez’s assertion that
Sheriff Fuentes instructed the investigators to “follow whatever” the DA’s Office told
them. (Id.). And nothing in Sheriff Fuentes’s cited testimony supports that
characterization either. (Dkt. No. 91 at 55 (citing Dkt. No. 91-30 at 34, 36)).
At best, the Court is persuaded that Sheriff Fuentes was aware of the investigation.
Yet simply being an aware of Gonzalez’s investigation is not enough to meet the “taint
exception” to the independent-intermediary doctrine. See Terwilliger v. Reyna, 4 F.4th 270,
284 (5th Cir. 2021). Because the independent-intermediary doctrine applies, the Court
grants summary judgment on Gonzalez’s direct and supervisory false-arrest claims
against Sheriff Fuentes.
b. Malicious Prosecution
Gonzalez alleges that Sheriff Fuentes violated her clearly established right to be
free from malicious prosecution.11 (Dkt. No. 91 at 55–63). The Court finds that Gonzalez
failed to establish a malicious-prosecution claim against Sheriff Fuentes, and even if she
had, Sheriff Fuentes is entitled to qualified immunity.
11 The Court construes Gonzalez’s argument that she was wrongfully framed for murder
as an argument in support of her Section 1983 malicious-prosecution claim. In her Response,
Gonzalez asserts a right to be free from “being unlawfully charged with a crime,” which includes
both a “right to be free from malicious prosecution,” (Dkt. No. 91 at 57), and “a right to be free
from being framed for a crime,” (id. at 61). However, Gonzalez’s First Amended Complaint
contains no claims or factual allegations related to being framed. (See generally Dkt. No. 7). To
the extent Gonzalez is attempting to assert a new claim here, the Court declines to consider it. See
Cutrera v. Bd. of Sup’rs of La. State Univ., 429 F.3d 108, 113 (5th Cir. 2005) (explaining that a plaintiff
cannot raise new claims in a response to a summary-judgment motion).
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To establish a malicious-prosecution claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must
show that the defendant caused a criminal proceeding’s commencement or continuance,
the proceeding ended in the plaintiff’s favor, there was no probable cause, the defendant
acted with malice, the plaintiff suffered damages, and the plaintiff was unlawfully seized.
Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 279 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing first Gordy v. Burns, 294 F.3d
722, 727 (5th Cir. 2002); and then citing Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 43 n.2, 142 S. Ct.
1332, 1337 n.2, 212 L.Ed.2d 382 (2022)).
Sheriff Fuentes argues that Gonzalez does not have any evidence of his malice.
(Dkt No. 88 at 17). Gonzalez argues that because Sheriff Fuentes did not believe there
was probable cause, his conduct “necessarily was motivated by some other purpose than
to bring Ms. Gonzalez to justice.” (Dkt. No. 91 at 59 (citing Armstrong, 60 F.4th at 278)).
The Court is unpersuaded.
The Fifth Circuit recently clarified the malice requirement for malicious-
prosecution claims. As the court explained, the United States Supreme Court has
observed that malice means a suit was instituted “without probable cause and for a
purpose other than bringing the defendant to justice.” Armstrong, 60 F.4th at 278
(discussing Thompson, 596 U.S. at 44, 142 S.Ct. at 1338). However, the Supreme Court
explicitly “declined to decide ‘whether a plaintiff bringing a Fourth Amendment claim
under § 1983 for malicious prosecution must establish malice (or some other mens rea) in
addition to the absence of probable cause.’” Armstrong, 60 F.4th at 278 (discussing
Thompson, 596 U.S. at 44 n.3, 142 S.Ct. at 1338 n.3). The Fifth Circuit then affirmatively
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resolved the ambiguity, definitively separating “the absence of probable cause” and
“malice” into two distinct requirements. Id. at 279.
With this understanding in mind, Gonzalez is inappropriately attempting to
bootstrap the lack of probable cause into the existence of malice. In other words, by
claiming that Sheriff Fuentes’s supposed lack of belief in probable cause automatically
established an improper purpose, Gonzalez is collapsing the two distinct elements into
one. Gonzalez has offered no evidence of Sheriff Fuentes’s actual motive beyond her own
circular reasoning regarding probable cause. (See generally Dkt. No. 91). As such, there
is no genuine dispute of a material fact as to whether Gonzalez was deprived of her right
to be free from malicious prosecution. See Morris, 277 F.3d at 753.
Even if Gonzalez had presented evidence to make out a prima facie case, Sheriff
Fuentes is entitled to qualified immunity. The Fifth Circuit recently faced a similar case.
See Santander v. Salazar, 133 F.4th 471 (5th Cir. 2025). There, in July 2022, a bar-patron was
arrested for public intoxication by an off-duty police officer. Id. at 476. The charges were
later dismissed, and the bar-patron sued the officer for malicious prosecution under
Section 1983 (among other things). Id. at 477. The officer asserted qualified immunity.
Id. The Court held that qualified immunity protected the officer, reasoning:
Before 2022, our court did not recognize a federal claim for
malicious prosecution at all. Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d
939, 942 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding that “‘malicious
prosecution’ standing alone is no violation of the United
States Constitution”) . . . . In April 2022, however, the
Supreme Court expressly recognized a § 1983 malicious
prosecution claim in Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 42, 142
S.Ct. 1332, 212 L.Ed.2d 382 (2022), effectively abrogating
Castellano.
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But Thompson did not “lay out a comprehensive list of the
elements for a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution
claim, and largely left the question of elements to the lower
courts.” Armstrong, 60 F.4th at 278. Only in February 2023
did this court articulate the elements of a post-Thompson
malicious prosecution claim. Id. at 279. The alleged incident
in this case occurred in July 2022, after Thompson, but months
before Armstrong. Therefore, with regard to [plaintiff’s]
§ 1983 malicious prosecution claim, [the officer] could not
have violated clearly established law because, at the time,
there was no clearly established law in this circuit to violate.
[Plaintiff’s] malicious prosecution claim thus fails to
overcome [the officer’s] assertion of qualified immunity.
Santander, 133 F.4th at 482–43. If there was no clearly-established law in July 2022, there
certainly was no clearly-established law before April 11, 2022, when the charges against
Gonzalez were dismissed. (Dkt. No. 79-2) (SEALED). And, as with the plaintiff in
Santander, Gonzalez’s malicious-prosecution claim fails to overcome Sheriff Fuentes’s
assertion of qualified immunity. The Court therefore grants summary judgment on
Gonzalez’s malicious-prosecution claim against Sheriff Fuentes.
c. Conspiracy
Gonzalez alleges that Sheriff Fuentes violated her clearly established right to be
free of a conspiracy to violate her civil rights. (Dkt. No. 91 at 64). The Court disagrees
and finds that Sheriff Fuentes is entitled to qualified immunity on the conspiracy claim.
To establish a conspiracy claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show that the alleged
conspirators agreed to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right and that a deprivation
occurred. Montgomery v. Walton, 759 F.App’x 312, 314 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam).
Gonzalez’s conspiracy claim fails for three reasons. First, Gonzalez failed to cite
any evidence to support her argument that Sheriff Fuentes participated in a conspiracy
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to deprive her of her constitutional rights. (See Dkt. No. 91 at 64). The Court has no duty
“to scour the record in search of evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment; we
rely on the nonmoving party to identify with reasonable particularity the evidence upon
which he relies.” Buehler v. City of Austin, 824 F.3d 548, 555 n.7 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting
Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newsp., Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir. 1996)); see also Carr, 866 F.3d
at 601 (“The nonmovant must ‘identify specific evidence in the record and . . . articulate
the precise manner in which that evidence supports his or her claim.’” (quoting Ragas,
136 F.3d at 458)). Because Gonzalez identifies no evidence supporting a conspiracy and
because the Court has not identified any such evidence, summary judgment is
appropriate.
Second, because Sheriff Fuentes is entitled to qualified immunity from the
underlying Section 1983 claims, see supra III(B)(1)(a), (b), he is entitled to qualified
immunity on the Section 1983 conspiracy claim. See Morales v. Carrillo, 625 F.Supp.3d 587,
607 (W.D. Tex. 2022) (“[W]hen a defendant faces conspiracy claims under § 1983, the
qualified immunity analysis that applies to the underlying § 1983 claims resolves the
qualified immunity analysis for the conspiracy.”) (citing Bevill v. Fletcher, 26 F.4th 270, 283
(5th Cir. 2022)).
Third, the intracorporate-conspiracy doctrine independently defeats Gonzalez’s
claim. Hilliard v. Ferguson, 30 F.3d 649, 653 (5th Cir. 1994) (“[A] ‘corporation cannot
conspire with itself any more than a private individual can, and it is the general rule that
the acts of the agent are the acts of the corporation.’” (quoting Nelson Radio & Supp. Co. v.
Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911, 914 (5th Cir. 1952))) (analyzing in the context of 42 U.S.C.
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§ 1985(3)). Gonzalez alleges that the co-conspirators were Defendants.12 (Dkt. No. 91 at
64 (“[T]he evidence shows that Defendants worked together in furtherance of each
constitutional violation. . . . . The three Defendants thus worked in concert to wrongly
charge and arrest Ms. Gonzalez.”)). Defendants all work for Starr County. Starr County
(and its employees) constitute a single entity that cannot form a conspiracy. Konan v. U.S.
Postal Serv., 96 F.4th 799, 805 (5th Cir. 2024) (recognizing that the intracorporate-
conspiracy doctrine barred Section 1985 claims “against multiple defendants employed
by the same governmental entity”), vacated and remanded on other grounds by U.S. Postal
Serv. v. Konan, 607 U.S. ____, 146 S.Ct. 736, ____ L.Ed.2d ____ (2026); see also Bright v. City
of Killeen, 532 F.Supp.3d 389, 402 (W.D. Tex. 2021) (explaining that the intracorporate-
conspiracy doctrine generally bars a Section 1983 conspiracy claim against multiple
defendants employed by the same governmental entity); Thompson v. City of Galveston,
979 F.Supp. 504, 511 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (collecting cases); see also Jacobs v. Port Neches Police
Dep’t, 915 F.Supp. 842, 844 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (finding that sheriff’s departments and district
attorney’s offices in Texas are not separate legal entities).
For these reasons, the Court therefore grants summary judgment on Gonzalez’s
conspiracy claim against Sheriff Fuentes.
12 Sheriff Fuentes asserts that Gonzalez originally took the position that the conspiracy was
the coordinated effort of the DA’s Office, the Sheriff’s Office, and the Starr County Memorial
Hospital. (Dkt. No. 7 at 5). The Court does not see any allegation that the Starr County Memorial
Hospital was involved in the conspiracy. (Dkt. No. 7 at 15–16). Gonzalez does not argue in her
Response that the Starr County Memorial Hospital was somehow involved in the alleged
conspiracy. (Dkt. No. 91 at 64).
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2. DA Ramirez
As explained below, DA Ramirez is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Gonzalez fails to raise a genuine dispute of material fact that DA Ramirez violated her
constitutional right to be free from false arrest, malicious prosecution, or conspiracy. DA
Ramirez meets his burden to show that he is entitled to absolute-prosecutorial immunity,
barring the false-arrest and malicious-prosecution claims. Gonzalez does not meet her
burden of showing that those claims overcome qualified immunity. Because DA Ramirez
is entitled to immunity on those underlying claims, he is likewise entitled to immunity
on the conspiracy claim.
a. False Arrest
Gonzalez alleges that DA Ramirez violated her right to be free from false arrest by
both directly participating in a constitutional violation and acting in a supervisory
capacity that enabled it. (Dkt. No. 91 at 51–52). The Court finds that Gonzalez has failed
to establish any false-arrest claim against DA Ramirez. Even if she had, DA Ramirez is
entitled to absolute-prosecutorial and qualified immunity, and the independent-
intermediary doctrine applies.
i. Direct Participation
Gonzalez alleges that DA Ramirez “personally took action that led to” her false
arrest. (Dkt. No. 91 at 51). Gonzalez alleges only one direct action: that DA Ramirez
“consulted with ADA Barrera about the criminal investigation and directed her to present
Ms. Gonzalez’s case to the grand jury.” (Id.). In Gonzalez’s view, “[b]ut for the conduct
of each of the Defendants, Ms. Gonzalez’s investigation would not have proceeded, and
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she would not have been arrested.” (Id. at 52). Defendants respond that the evidence
shows that DA Ramirez instructed that the case go to the grand jury. (Dkt. No. 95 at 9).
They contend that DA Ramirez did not direct or participate in the arrest or investigation.
(Id.).
To establish a direct participation false-arrest claim under Section 1983, an arrestee
must show that an arresting officer made an arrest while lacking probable cause to make
the arrest, Green, 129 F.4th at 886-87, or an investigative officer “knowingly provided false
information to secure the arrest warrants or gave false information in reckless disregard
of the truth,” Freeman, 210 F.3d at 553 (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 171, 98 S.Ct. at 2684).
Gonzalez fails to present sufficient evidence that DA Ramirez directly participated
in violating her constitutional right to be free from false arrest. It is undisputed that DA
Ramirez did not personally arrest or investigate Gonzalez. (Dkt. No. 91 at 52); see also
supra III(B)(1)(a)(i). To the extent that Gonzalez argues that DA Ramirez caused
subordinates to investigate or arrest her, that theory concerns supervisory—not direct—
liability. Gonzalez therefore fails to establish a prima facie case of direct-participation
false arrest.
Even if she had carried her burden, DA Ramirez is entitled to absolute-
prosecutorial immunity. Gonzalez asserts that DA Ramirez participated in the
investigation and thus falls outside that protection under Terwilliger. (Dkt. No. 91 at 45).13
13 In her Response, Gonzalez argues that DA Ramirez was not entitled to absolute-
prosecutorial immunity globally and did not articulate, for instance, whether some evidence
related only to some of her claims. (Dkt. No. 91 at 43–47). Accordingly, the Court conducts its
(continue)
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In Terwilliger, the Fifth Circuit denied absolute immunity to a prosecutor. 4 F.4th at 281.
Because he had “investigated the scene within hours of the incident, took photographs of
the scene, reviewed information as it became known,” and been continuously updated
by investigators about the case, the prosecutor had “in all respects inserted himself in the
role of an investigator.” Id. at 280.
DA Ramirez’s conduct bears little resemblance to the prosecutor’s conduct in
Terwilliger. None of Gonzalez’s cited evidence supports the view that DA Ramirez acted
in the role of investigator. DA Ramirez submitted competent evidence that he never
communicated with any investigators about the Gonzalez investigation, and Gonzalez
does not rebut that testimony. (Compare Dkt. No. 79-15 at 2, 23–24, Dkt. No. 79-16 at 6–9,
Dkt. No. 79-17 at 12, Dkt. No. 79-18 at 7–8, Dkt. No. 79-22 at 7, with Dkt. No. 91 at 43–47).
Instead, Gonzalez cites to DA Ramirez’s campaign video promising to work closely with
law enforcement, (Dkt. No. 91-3), and Captain Fuentes’s deposition testimony that if the
Captain needed to speak with the DA’s Office, he would “for the most part” call DA
Ramirez directly, (Dkt. No. 91-28 at 28, 32, 59). (See Dkt. No. 91 at 44–45). Neither item
concerns the Gonzalez investigation; neither sheds light on DA Ramirez’s role in this
matter.
The Court struggles to see how Gonzalez’s other evidence moves the needle under
Terwilliger but will nevertheless address it. First, Gonzalez points to evidence that DA
Ramirez met twice with “ADA Barrera during the investigation to ‘discuss what evidence
absolute-prosecutorial-immunity analysis holistically and finds that it applies to all of Gonzalez’s
false-arrest and malicious-prosecution claims against DA Ramirez.
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had been collected in this investigation’ and ‘to ask ADA Barrera if there was enough
legal basis to prosecute this case.’” (Dkt. No. 91 at 44 (citing Dkt. No. 91-11 at 3)). Nothing
suggests that he was directing or instructing anyone on how to conduct the investigation;
DA Ramirez was merely reviewing the evidence gathered. “[S]upplying legal advice
based on the investigators’ facts . . . fall[s] comfortably within the protection of absolute
immunity.” Terwilliger, 4 F.4th at 280.
Second, Gonzalez points to a text message from ADA Barrera to Investigator
Muniz on February 1, 2022, that said: “So spoke to [DA Ramirez]. Just submit for grand
jury review. No arrest warrant.” (Dkt. No. 91 at 44 (citing Dkt. No. 79-21 at 76, Dkt. No.
79-21 at 32, Dkt. No. 91-24 at 55)). Gonzalez argues that this message shows that DA
Ramirez ordered the case to be presented to a grand jury despite a lack of probable cause.
(Id.). But DA Ramirez testified that “submit for grand jury review” meant that the DA’s
office would evaluate whether the case should be presented to the grand jury after the
Sheriff’s Office completed its investigation. (Dkt. No. 91-24 at 57). What’s more, the
message also predates the grand-jury presentation by nearly two months. (Dkt. No. 79
at 10). Even drawing all inferences in Gonzalez’s favor, the Court is not convinced that
this evidence shows DA Ramirez instructed ADA Barrera to present to the grand jury
without probable cause.
Lastly, Gonzalez submitted evidence about a text message to Rosita Rocha from
DA Ramirez, stating that the ADAs were “advising [him about] everything that’s going
on.” (Dkt. No. 91-25 at 7) (SEALED). Gonzalez argues the text message demonstrates
that DA Ramirez “had been aware of the investigation while it was going on.” (Dkt. No.
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91 at 44 (emphasis added)). Gonzalez is once again taking a comment out of context.
That text message was sent after Gonzalez was already in jail, (Dkt. No. 91-25 at 7)
(SEALED), so no earlier than April 7, 2022, (Dkt. No. 91 at 21–22). Meanwhile, the
Sheriff’s Office’s investigation packet was submitted to the DA’s Office on March 17,
2022. (Dkt. No. 91-4 at 11–13). No evidence has been submitted to show that either the
Sheriff’s Office continued its investigation after March 17, 2022 or that the DA’s Office
conducted its own investigation after that point. See Cousin, 325 F.3d at 636 (“[T]he timing
of events, while not determinative, can be highly relevant to the inquiry into [a
prosecutor’s] function.” (citing Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274, 113 S.Ct. at 2616)). Drawing all
inferences in Gonzalez’s favor, it defies logic to conclude that DA Ramirez was being
informed about the Sheriff Office’s investigation while it was going on if it had been
completed three weeks earlier and when the prosecution of Gonzalez had already
commenced. See id. (“The pendency of a judicial proceeding is logically related to the
determination whether a prosecutor’s ‘activities [are] intimately associated with the
judicial phase of the criminal process, and thus [are] functions to which the reasons for
absolute immunity apply with full force.” (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430, 96 S.Ct. at 995)).
That DA Ramirez later apologized to Gonzalez is of no moment. (Dkt. No. 91 at
46). The relevant question for absolute-prosecutorial immunity is whether the prosecutor
acted within the scope of his prosecutorial duties. Brooks, 84 F.3d at 168. Far from
admitting any direct or supervisory involvement in the investigation, DA Ramirez told
Gonzalez “that it had been a mistake. It had fallen out of his hands, and he didn’t know
what happened.” (Dkt. No. 91-20 at 8). At best, these admissions are either
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“(1) connected to the administrative functioning of the office” or “(2) connected to the
judicial process,” both of which are entitled to absolute-prosecutorial immunity. See
Wooten v. Roach, 964 F.3d 395, 410 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing first Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 344,
129 S.Ct. at 861–62; and then citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431, 96 S.Ct. at 995).
DA Ramirez submitted competent evidence that he was only acting in a
prosecutorial role and not as an investigator. He did not initiate the investigation. (See
Dkt. No. 79-5) (SEALED). He never communicated with any investigators about
Gonzalez’s investigation. (Dkt. No. 79-15 at 2, 23–24); (Dkt. No. 79-16 at 6–9); (Dkt. No.
79-17 at 12); (Dkt. No. 79-18 at 7–8); (Dkt. No. 79-22 at 7). DA Ramirez therefore meets
his burden of showing that he is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. See Wearry
v. Foster, 33 F.4th 260, 269 (5th Cir. 2022). Because Gonzalez fails to show that DA Ramirez
directly violated her constitutional right, she has not carried her burden to overcome DA
Ramirez’s qualified-immunity defense to the direct-participation false-arrest claim.
Brown, 623 F.3d at 253. For these reasons, the Court grants summary judgment on
Gonzalez’s direct-participation false-arrest claim.
ii. Supervisor Participation
Gonzalez also alleges that DA Ramirez is liable as a supervisor because he was
aware of his “subordinates’ conduct and, by both action and inaction, [he] demonstrated
deliberate indifference to [his] employees violating” Gonzalez’s constitutional rights.
(Dkt. No. 91 at 52). Gonzalez further asserts that DA Ramirez knew that ADA Barrera
was pursuing an indictment unsupported by probable cause and failed to intervene. (Id.).
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Gonzalez failed to demonstrate deliberate indifference. Supervisory liability
under Section 1983 requires proof of a pattern of similar constitutional violations. See
Edwards, 70 F.4th at 312; see supra III(B)(1)(ii) (explaining that the standard to establish
supervisory liability under Section 1983 claims requires proving deliberate indifference).
Gonzalez devotes only four sentences to attempting to justify why DA Ramirez and
Sheriff Fuentes—officials in separate offices with distinct employees and functions—
should be liable in a supervisory capacity for her arrest. (Dkt. No. 91 at 52). But she never
mentions (let alone provides evidence of) any “pattern of similar constitutional
violations” by the DA’s Office employees.14 Edwards, 70 F.4th at 312 (quoting Henderson,
51 F.4th at 131). As such, the Court finds that summary judgment is appropriate on
Gonzalez’s supervisory false-arrest claim against DA Ramirez.
Even if Gonzalez had shown a constitutional violation, DA Ramirez is still entitled
to absolute-prosecutorial immunity on Gonzalez’s supervisory false-arrest claim. See
supra III(B)(1)(a)(i). Further, by failing to show that DA Ramirez directly violated her
constitutional right in the first place, Gonzalez does not overcome DA Ramirez’s
qualified-immunity defense to the supervisory false-arrest claim. Brown, 623 F.3d at 253.
14 To be sure, without a pattern, a plaintiff “may proceed [] under the ‘single-incident
exception’—a narrow and rarely successful theory that applies where the specific constitutional
violation at issue was the highly predictable result of complete lack of training.” Thompson ex rel.
Neveah T. v. Martinez, 789 F.Supp.3d 491, 531 (W.D. Tex. 2025) (citing Connick v. Thompson, 563
U.S. 51, 63–64, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1360–61, 179 L.Ed.2d 417 (2011)). However, Gonzalez did not argue
that the single-incident exception applied. (See generally Dkt. No. 91). Therefore, the Court will
not address whether the exception applies here.
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The Court therefore grants summary judgment on Gonzalez’s supervisory false-arrest
claim.
iii. Independent-Intermediary Doctrine
Even if Gonzalez’s direct-participation and supervisory false-arrest claims against
DA Ramirez were otherwise viable, the independent-intermediary doctrine bars those
claims. See supra III(B)(1)(a)(iii) (explaining the independent-intermediary doctrine).
The Parties agree that Gonzalez was indicted by the grand jury. (Dkt. No. 79-1)
(SEALED). The Parties also agree that DA Ramirez neither attended nor participated in
the grand-jury proceeding. (Dkt. No. 91 at 53–55). The Parties disagree, however, over
whether DA Ramirez’s actions “tainted the grand jury.” (Dkt. No. 79 at 27); (Dkt. No. 91
at 53–55). Gonzalez argues that DA Ramirez directed “ADA Barrera to present to the
grand jury, knowing that she would be pursuing a murder charge despite the absence of
probable cause for any crime.” (Dkt. No. 91 at 55). And by “agreeing that he violated
Texas Disciplinary Rules [sic] of Professional Conduct 3.09, DA Ramirez conceded that
the grand jury had been tainted because this rule is not violated unless ‘the prosecutor
believes that material inculpatory information presented to the grand jury was false.’”
(Id. (citing Tex. Disciplinary Rules of Prof. Conduct, cmt. 2 to Rule 3.09)).
But that’s not what happened. In the Agreed Judgment of Probated Suspension,
(Dkt. No. 79-21 at 67–71), DA Ramirez agreed to certain findings of fact, none of which
discussed Rule 3.09. Then, based on those “agreed foregoing findings of fact,” the
investigatory panel found that DA Ramirez violated Rule 3.09. Put differently, DA
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Ramirez never agreed that he violated Rule 3.09. Nor did he concede that the grand jury
had been tainted.
Indeed, Gonzalez has submitted nothing to show that DA Ramirez tainted the
grand jury’s deliberations. She offers no evidence that DA Ramirez “deceived the grand
jury or withheld material information from it.” Curtis v. Sowell, 761 F.App’x 302, 305 (5th
Cir. 2019) (per curiam). She likewise presents no evidence that DA Ramirez encouraged
ADA Barrera to do so. Fifth Circuit precedent confirms that a mere allegation that a
district attorney “persuaded the grand jury to indict . . . even though [the district
attorney] knew there was no factual or legal basis for the charge” does not meet the “taint
exception” to the independent-intermediary doctrine. Id. (affirming dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6)). If a prosecutor who personally presents a case to a grand jury without probable
cause is protected, then surely a prosecutor who merely allows such a case to be
presented without probable cause (assuming there was not probable cause, see infra
III(B)(3)(a), is protected as well. Accordingly, the Court finds that the independent-
intermediary doctrine applies and grants summary judgment on Gonzalez’s direct and
supervisory false-arrest claims against DA Ramirez.
b. Malicious Prosecution
Gonzalez alleges that DA Ramirez violated her clearly established right to be free
from malicious prosecution.15 (Dkt. No. 91 at 55–63). The Court finds that Gonzalez has
15 The Court construes Gonzalez’s argument that she was wrongfully framed for murder
as an argument in support of her Section 1983 malicious-prosecution claim and rejects the
assertion of any new claim based on “being framed.” See supra n.5.
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failed to establish a malicious-prosecution claim. Even if she had, DA Ramirez is entitled
to absolute and qualified immunity.
Similar to Sheriff Fuentes, DA Ramirez argues that Gonzalez does not have any
evidence of his malice. (Dkt No. 79 at 26); see also supra III(B)(1)(b). And similar to the
arguments raised in response to Sheriff Fuentes, Gonzalez asserts that, because DA
Ramirez did not believe there was probable cause, his conduct “necessarily was
motivated by some other purpose than to bring Ms. Gonzalez to justice.” (Dkt. No. 91 at
59 (citing Armstrong, 60 F.4th at 278)). Further, “DA Ramirez did not believe
Ms. Gonzalez could be charged with ‘anything’ but pursued the prosecution anyway
based on his personal opinions16 about the alleged facts.” (Id. at 60).
Context matters. The statement at issue arose when DA Ramirez was asked about
a text message from ADA Barrera to Investigator Muniz on February 1, 2022. (Dkt. No.
91-24 at 55–56). It said: “So spoke to [DA Ramirez]. Just submit for grand jury review.
No arrest warrant.” (Id. at 55). DA Ramirez explained that this meant there were not
16 Gonzalez does not explain what she means by “personal opinions,” and her cited
evidence does not reference DA Ramirez’s “personal opinions” either. (See Dkt. No. 91 (citing
Dkt No. 91-23 at 37, 39, 82, 85); (Dkt. No. 91-24 at 57); (Dkt. No. 91-11 at 4)). Nor does Gonzalez
explain how the evidence supports that DA Ramirez was “motivated to pursue the prosecution
and arrest of Ms. Gonzalez to help ADA Solis in her representation of Ms. Gonzalez’s then-
husband in his divorce proceeding.” (Dkt. No. 91 at 60 (citing (Dkt. No. 91-6 at 2); (Dkt. No. 79-
22 at 59))). As such, the Court declines to consider Gonzalez’s unsubstantiated assertions about
DA Ramirez’s personal opinions or motivations in a separate divorce proceeding in its malice
assessment. See Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005) (explaining that
the non-movant’s summary-judgment burden “will not be satisfied by ‘some metaphysical doubt
as to the material facts, by conclusory allegations, [or] by unsubstantiated assertions’”) (quoting
Little, 37 F.3d at 1075).
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enough facts to charge “anything” under an arrest warrant and to instead “submit for
grand jury review” after the Sheriff’s Office completed its investigation. (Id. at 57).
Drawing all inferences in favor of Gonzalez, the Court struggles to see how this
constitutes malice. If anything, it suggests that DA Ramirez sought to avoid a premature
arrest. DA Ramirez’s instruction—to wait until the Sheriff’s Office completed its
investigation to obtain a “clear picture of what had happened” before “decid[ing]
whether to present it to a grand jury or not,” (id. at 58)—shows a commitment to a full
and fair vetting of the facts. There is no other evidence of DA Ramirez’s malice. As such,
there is no genuine dispute of a material fact as to whether DA Ramirez deprived
Gonzalez of her right to be free from malicious prosecution. See Morris, 277 F.3d at 753.
Even if Gonzalez established her malicious-prosecution claim, DA Ramirez is still
entitled to absolute-prosecutorial immunity. See supra III(B)(1)(a)(i)(a). DA Ramirez is
also entitled to qualified immunity as well. See supra III(B)(1)(a)(b).
Because Gonzalez did not demonstrate that DA Ramirez violated her
constitutional right to be free from malicious prosecution, and because DA Ramirez is
entitled to absolute-prosecutorial and qualified immunity, the Court grants summary
judgment on Gonzalez’s malicious-prosecution claim.
c. Conspiracy
Gonzalez alleges that DA Ramirez violated her clearly established right to be free
of a conspiracy to violate her civil rights. (Dkt. No. 91 at 64). As with Sheriff Fuentes, see
supra III(B)(1)(c), Gonzalez did not cite any evidence to demonstrate that DA Ramirez
participated in a conspiracy to deprive her of her constitutional rights. (See Dkt. No. 91
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at 64). A court is not required to search the record for evidence to prevent summary
judgment. Buehler, 824 F.3d at 555 n.7. The Court instead relies on the nonmovant to
identify with reasonable particularity the evidence supporting the claim. See Carr, 866
F.3d at 601. Gonzalez identifies none, and summary judgment is therefore appropriate.
Second, because DA Ramirez is entitled to absolute immunity from the underlying
Section 1983 claims, see supra III(B)(2)(a), (b), he is entitled to absolute immunity on the
conspiracy claim. See Darden v. Vines, No. 6:22-CV-00404, No. 6:22-CV-01398, 2023 WL
11830304, at *6 (W.D. La. Mar. 10, 2023) (citing Armstrong, 60 F.4th at 280) (holding that
plaintiff’s conspiracy claim was not actionable where defendants were entitled to
absolute immunity for the constitutional claims against them). He is also entitled to
qualified immunity on the underlying claims and, in turn, the conspiracy claim. See
Morales, 625 F.Supp.3d at 607.
And finally, just as with Sheriff Fuentes, see supra III(B)(a)(c), the intracorporate-
conspiracy doctrine defeats Gonzalez’s conspiracy claim, Hilliard, 30 F.3d at 653.
Gonzalez alleges that the co-conspirators were Defendants, (Dkt. No. 91 at 64), but they
all work for Starr County. Starr County (and its employees) cannot conspire with itself
as a matter of law. For these reasons, the Court therefore grants summary judgment on
Gonzalez’s conspiracy claim against DA Ramirez.
3. ADA Barrera
For reasons discussed below, ADA Barrera is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. ADA Barrera is not entitled to absolute-prosecutorial immunity from the false-arrest
and malicious-prosecution claims. Nevertheless, Gonzalez did not satisfy her burden to
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show that ADA Barrera is not entitled to qualified immunity on the false-arrest and
malicious-prosecution claims. Because ADA Barrera is entitled to qualified immunity on
those underlying claims, she is equally entitled to immunity on the conspiracy claim.
a. False Arrest
ADA Barrera does not seem to dispute that she violated Gonzalez’s constitutional
right to be free from false arrest, instead invoking absolute-prosecutorial immunity,
qualified immunity, and the independent-intermediary doctrine. (See Dkt. No. 96 at 7).
The Court finds that she is entitled to qualified immunity on the false-arrest claim.
Turning to the issue of absolute immunity, Gonzalez first argues that ADA Barrera
worked closely with the Sheriff’s Office throughout the investigation and advised them
on what steps they should take to investigate Gonzalez. (Dkt. No. 91 at 38–40). In
support, Gonzalez provides evidence including that ADA Barrera directed Investigator
Muniz to “take pictures of the ashes,” (Dkt. No. 79-21 at 27–28), instructed Investigator
Aguirre to interview “that lady that gave her the drugs” before pursuing an arrest
warrant, (id. at 24), and spoke with a doctor and two other employees at the Starr County
Hospital about the case, (Dkt. No. 91-11 at 2). This evidence raises a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether ADA Barrera acted in an investigative, rather than
prosecutorial, capacity.
To be sure, the Court can see how the above-cited evidence could be construed as
providing legal advice to the investigators, which is different than simply acting as an
investigator. However, that is a distinction without a difference here, because “a
prosecutor’s absolute immunity does not extend to ‘advising the police in the
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investigative phase of a criminal case.’” Terwilliger, 4 F.4th at 280. And Gonzalez
provided additional evidence to show that ADA Barrera provided legal advice to the
Sheriff’s Office in connection with the Gonzalez investigation. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 91-22 at
40, 79); (Dkt. No. 79-21 at 26); (Dkt. No. 91-28 at 64–65).
ADA Barrera argues that Gonzalez “fails to point the Court to a single
case . . . addressing whether a prosecutor with these communications . . . [was] converted
to a pseudo investigator.” (Dkt. No. 96 at 3). While that gap might be fatal in the context
of qualified of immunity, see Cope, 3 F.4th at 205, it is not for absolute-prosecutorial
immunity. That is because the absolute-prosecutorial immunity analysis is functional.
See Wearry, 33 F.4th at 265; see also Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 363–64, 132 S.Ct. 1497,
1503, 182 L.Ed.2d 593 (2012) (listing Supreme Court cases applying the functional
approach). Under this framework, a court should assess the nature of the specific conduct
at issue, regardless of the existence of a prior indistinguishable case. Wearry, 33 F.4th at
265–66. Accordingly, the Court finds that ADA Barrera is not entitled to absolute-
prosecutorial immunity and her “immunity is limited to that of a law enforcement
officer.” See Terwilliger, 4 F.4th at 281.
Turning to whether ADA Barrera is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court finds
that she is. Gonzalez fails to satisfy the “clearly established” prong of qualified
immunity. Morris, 277 F.3d at 753 (quoting Chiu, 260 F.3d at 343); see supra III(B)(1)(a)(i)
(discussing qualified-immunity standard).
Gonzalez argues that the law is clearly established that an officer cannot arrest an
individual without probable cause and the inquiry is “whether an objectively reasonable
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actor would believe there was probable cause of the crime.” (Dkt. No. 91 at 48). She
contends Section 19.06 “‘clearly and plainly’ excepts17 Ms. Gonzalez’s conduct from the
homicide statutes.” (Id. at 49). In support, Gonzalez cobbles together several Texas state-
court cases for the proposition that the “provision prohibits the prosecution of the
pregnant person for her own conduct that causes harm to her fetus,” with a Fifth Circuit
case from 2007 for the proposition that where “a criminal statute excepts a person’s
alleged conduct, no reasonable actor could believe that there is probable cause.” (Dkt.
No. 91 at 49–50).
As an initial matter, Gonzalez’s general claim—that an arrest must be based on
probable cause—“is precisely the type of ‘general proposition’ that the Supreme Court
has rejected. See Gonzalez v. Huerta, 826 F.3d 854, 857–58 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting al-Kidd,
563 U.S. at 742, 131 S.Ct. at 2084). “With the more specific inquiry the Court requires, the
17 Section 19.06 is a defense, not an exception. State v. Hunter, 624 S.W.3d 589, 590 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2021) (Keller, P.J., concurring in denial of review). What may seem like a subtle
distinction between a defense and an exception is, in reality, a critical dividing line with
significant procedural and substantive implications:
[W]hen a penal statute includes an exception as part of the statute
itself, the state must negate the existence of the exception in the
indictment of the offense and prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the . . . defendant’s conduct does not fall within the exception . . . . On
the other hand, the issue of the existence of a defense, including an
affirmative defense, is not submitted to the jury unless evidence is
admitted supporting the defense. The burden of proof with respect to
affirmative defenses rests on the defendant, although proof is not
required beyond a reasonable doubt. While the Government must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which the defendant is charged, proof of the nonexistence
of all affirmative defenses has never been constitutionally required.
24A Tex. Jur. 3d Criminal Procedure: Trial § 533 (internal footnotes omitted).
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question becomes whether there is either ‘directly controlling authority . . . establishing
the illegality of such conduct’ or ‘a consensus of cases of persuasive authority such that a
reasonable officer could not have believed that his actions were lawful.’” Id. (emphasis
omitted) (quoting McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 328–29 (5th Cir. 2002)); see
also Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12, 136 S.Ct. at 308 (noting courts must ask “whether the violative
nature of particular conduct is clearly established”) (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742, 131
S.Ct. at 2084) (emphasis in original).
The Texas state-court cases do not close the distance between the general
proposition and the more particularized showing required here. Only two cited Texas
state-court cases18 create controlling authority in Starr County. See State ex rel. Vance v.
Clawson, 465 S.W.2d 164, 168 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (explaining that the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals is binding on all other courts in Texas); Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.201(e)
(providing that Starr County is under the jurisdiction of the Fourth Court of Appeals in
San Antonio); Kleinman v. State, 703 S.W.3d 813, 822 (Tex. App.—Austin 2024, pet.
withdrawn) (explaining that courts of appeals are not binding authority outside their
jurisdiction) (citing HWY 3 MHP, LLC v. ERCOT, 462 S.W.3d 204, 211 n.4 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2015, no pet.). In Lawrence v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed
a capital-murder conviction of a man who shot and killed a woman and her unborn child.
240 S.W.3d 912, 914–15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The court mentioned that the Texas
murder statute excuses conduct committed by a woman who chooses to terminate her
18 See Lawrence v. State, 240 S.W.3d 912, 915 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Flores v. State, 245
S.W.3d 432, 436 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
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own pregnancy. Id. at 915 n.9. The case, however, did not actually involve an abortion,
so the court’s observation about Section 19.06 was dicta. See Morrow, 917 F.3d at 875–76
(collecting cases to show that dicta cannot be used to show a law is clearly established for
qualified-immunity purposes). The same is true of Flores v. State, which affirmed the
conviction of a man for murdering his pregnant girlfriend’s twin fetuses. 245 S.W.3d 432,
434–36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). In sum, there is no “directly controlling authority”
holding that ADA Barrera could not prosecute Gonzalez. See Gonzalez, 826 F.3d at 858
(quoting McClendon, 305 F.3d at 329).
As for the non-binding Texas appellate-court cases, the same problem arises. See
Eguia v. State, 288 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st. Dist.] 2008, no. pet.) (involving
the conviction of a man who murdered a mother and her unborn child); Brown v. State,
303 S.W.3d 310, 312 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2009, pet. ref’d) (upholding manslaughter
convictions for causing the death of a mother and unborn child); Kiss. v. State, 316 S.W.3d
665, 667 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. ref’d) (involving intoxicated manslaughter for the
death of an unborn child); State v. Hunter, 606 S.W.3d 836, 837 (Tex. App.—Austin 2020,
pet. ref’d) (affirming dismissal of charges against a man for soliciting a mother to cause
the death of her unborn child). Those decisions do not create a “consensus of cases of
persuasive authority” that would have warned ADA Barrera not to prosecute Gonzalez.
Gonzalez, 826 F.3d at 858 (quoting McClendon, 305 F.3d at 329).
The last Texas case—State v. Hunter, 624 S.W.3d 589 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021)—does
Gonzalez more harm than good. There, the intermediate appellate court affirmed the
dismissal of an indictment against a man for soliciting a mother to abort her unborn child,
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and the State sought review before the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Id. at 594. While
the Court of Criminal Appeals refused the petition for discretionary review, that refusal
in itself has no precedential value. See State v. Garcia, 861 S.W.2d 386, 387 n.1 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1993) (“It is well settled that refusal of a petition for discretionary review by this
Court has no precedential value.”).
But more crucially, the fractured opinion—consisting of two concurrences and a
dissent from the court’s refusal to grant review—underscores the lack of clarity over the
interpretation of Section 19.06. A concurrence to the refusal reasoned that “a mother
choosing to abort her unborn child is not a crime.” Hunter, 624 S.W.3d at 589. Thus, the
indictment did not contain an “object crime.” Id. This implies that because no crime
exists, a prosecutor cannot bring charges against a mother who aborts her unborn child.
See id. A dissent to the refusal reasoned that the court below (and by extension, the
majority) inappropriately treated Section 19.06 as an exception rather than a defense. Id.
at 596. In the dissent’s view, it would be permissible for a prosecutor to charge a mother
with murder and require her to raise Section 19.06 in defense. See id. at 599 (“[W]hen
Section 19.06(1) explains that our State’s homicide laws ‘do[] not apply,’ it only means
that they may not be enforced to impose criminal responsibility against the mother of an
unborn child, should she be charged with engaging in conduct that causes the death of
her own unborn child.”) (emphases omitted).
For qualified-immunity purposes, it is immaterial which interpretation of Section
19.06 is ultimately correct; it is, however, material that the interpretation of Section 19.06
is subject to reasonable debate. See Craig v. Martin, 49 F.4th 404, 417 (5th Cir. 2022) (“For
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a right to be clearly established, ‘existing precedent must have placed
the . . . constitutional question beyond debate.’”) (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741, 131
S.Ct. at 2083). Between Hunter, 624 S.W.3d 589, and the other cited Texas state-court
cases, the Court cannot conclude that ADA Barrera’s decision to pursue charges despite
Section 19.06 was “objectively unreasonable.”19 See Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 411 (5th
Cir. 2007).
Gonzalez further argues that Freeman proscribes ADA Barrera’s conduct. (Dkt.
No. 91 at 49 (citing Freeman, 483 F.3d at 415)). In Freeman, officers were attempting to
serve an arrest warrant on a man at his home. 483 F.3d at 408. When officers couldn’t
find him, they asked his mother—who happened to live next door at an address not in
the arrest warrant—whether they could search her home for the man. Id. She refused
“unless they had a search warrant for her address.” Id. The officers then handcuffed the
mother and placed her in a patrol car. Id. at 408–09. The mother later sued the officers
alleging false arrest. Id. at 409. As relevant here, the officers argued that they had
probable cause to arrest the mother under Texas Penal Code § 38.15, which prohibits
interference with public duties. Id. at 413. The court found there was no probable cause
because the conduct fell squarely within a “speech exception” to the statute. Id. at 414.
19 As Gonzalez notes, “the subjective understanding of the particular officer involved”
does not factor into whether the conduct was objectively reasonable. (Dkt. No. 91 at 48 (citing
Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 66, 135 S.Ct. 530, 539, 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014))). Therefore, for
purposes of qualified immunity, the Court will not consider whether ADA Barrera thought that
there was, in fact, probable cause to charge Gonzalez. (See Dkt. No. 91 at 51).
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Freeman is not on point. It involved different conduct, a different statute, a
different defense, and no grand jury or prosecutor. Nor did Freeman involve a prosecutor
allegedly “directing the Sheriff’s [Office] to conduct a criminal investigation,”
“instruct[ing] the Sheriff’s [Office] to classify the crime as murder in their reports,”
“draft[ing] and fil[ing] the indictment, which triggered the issuance of an arrest warrant,”
“pursuing an indictment not supported by probable cause, ” or “knowingly omitting a
material portion of the law, leading directly to a murder charge for conduct that is not a
crime.” (Dkt. No. 91 at 51–52, 55). Thus, Freeman does not meet the “sufficiently high
level of specificity” needed to put ADA Barrera on notice that her conduct was
“definitively unlawful.” Gonzalez, 826 F.3d at 858 (quoting Vincent v. City of Sulphur, 805
F.3d 543, 547 (5th Cir. 2015)).
Recent Fifth Circuit authority also casts doubt on whether Freeman clearly
establishes that a statutory defense negates probable cause. In 2022—over 15 years after
Freeman was decided—the Fifth Circuit noted that it “has repeatedly refused to opine on”
whether the existence of a defense (like Section 19.06) is “relevant to the determination of
probable cause.’” Loftin v. City of Prentiss, 33 F.4th 774, 781 n.2 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting
Piazza v. Mayne, 217 F.3d 239, 246–47 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam)). If one Fifth Circuit
decision says a defense can vitiate probable cause, while another more recent decision
says it is unsettled whether a defense even bears on probable cause, the Court cannot
comfortably say that the law is clearly established.
In short, Gonzalez bears the burden to show that qualified immunity does not
apply, and she has not. Standing alone, the cases cited by Gonzalez simply do not work
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in her favor. And taken together, a collection of non-binding, factually distinct, and
inconclusive authority cannot be aggregated to create clearly established law. Because
the record does not show that her conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly
established law, ADA Barrera is entitled to qualified immunity. The Court therefore
grants summary judgment on the false-arrest claim against her.20
b. Malicious Prosecution
ADA Barrera does not seem to dispute that she violated Gonzalez’s constitutional
right to be free from malicious prosecution, instead arguing that she is entitled to
summary judgment due to absolute-prosecutorial and qualified immunity. (See Dkt. No.
96 at 7–8).
20 Because it is no longer necessary to the resolution of her Motion, the Court declines to
decide whether ADA Barrera is entitled to application of the independent-intermediary doctrine.
(Dkt. No. 96 at 7). Gonzalez argued she was not because ADA Barrera “knowingly omitt[ed] a
material portion of the law, leading directly to a murder charge for conduct that is not a crime.”
(Dkt. No. 91. at 55). Gonzalez has presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate a fact issue as to
whether ADA Barrera knew about Section 19.06 of the Texas Penal Code. (See Dkt. No. 91-23 at
140); (Dkt. No. 91-22 at 68–69, 87–88). Nevertheless, the Court is not persuaded that withholding
this knowledge alone would satisfy the taint exception. Wilson, 33 F.4th at 213 (explaining the
information withheld must be material to whether probable cause existed).
The Fifth Circuit “has repeatedly refused to opine on” whether the existence of a defense is
“relevant to the determination of probable cause.’” Loftin, 33 F.4th at 781 n.2 (quoting Piazza, 217
F.3d 239, 246–47). So, the omission of a defense like Section 19.06 from a grand-jury presentation
is not clearly material to the probable-cause determination. Further, Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure Article 20A.151 reinforces the absence of a proactive disclosure duty by providing that
the “grand jury may send for the attorney representing the state and ask the attorney’s advice on
any matter of law.” By framing the exchange of legal advice as a discretionary request initiated
by the grand jury, the statute supports the conclusion that a prosecutor is not required to
volunteer defenses—like Section 19.06—unless specifically asked. And in any event, under well-
established precedent, the State has no duty to present exculpatory evidence to a grand jury.
United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 52, 112 S.Ct. 1735, 1745, 118 L.Ed.2d 352 (1992); see also Tex.
Att’y Gen. Op. No. GA-0765 (2010) (articulating the principle that the existence of a viable defense
is not a bar to prosecution); see also Tex. Penal Code § 2.03(b) (“The prosecuting attorney is not
required to negate the existence of a defense in the accusation charging commission of the
offense.”).
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As discussed, ADA Barrera is not entitled to absolute-prosecutorial immunity. See
supra III(B)(3)(a). She is, however, entitled to qualified immunity, because there was no
clearly established malicious-prosecution claim in the Fifth Circuit at the time of her
conduct. See supra III(B)(1)(a), (b). The Court therefore grants summary judgment on
Gonzalez’s malicious-prosecution claim against ADA Barrera.
c. Conspiracy
Gonzalez alleges that ADA Barerra violated her clearly established right to be free
of a conspiracy to violate her civil rights. (Dkt. No. 91 at 64). The same reasons that
foreclosed Gonzalez’s conspiracy claims against Sheriff Fuentes, see supra III(B)(1)(c), and
DA Ramirez, see supra III(B)(2)(c), apply with equal force to her claim against ADA
Barrera. Namely, Gonzalez did not cite any evidence demonstrating that ADA Barrera
conspired to deprive her of her constitutional rights, (see Dkt. No. 91 at 64), and the Court
has no duty to search the summary judgment record for that evidence. Buehler, 824 F.3d
at 555 n.7. Additionally, because ADA Barrera is entitled to qualified immunity from the
underlying Section 1983 claims, see supra III(B)(3)(a), (b), she is entitled to qualified
immunity on the conspiracy claim. See Morales, 625 F.Supp.3d at 607 (“[W]hen a
defendant faces conspiracy claims under § 1983, the qualified immunity analysis that
applies to the underlying § 1983 claims resolves the qualified immunity analysis for the
conspiracy.”) (citing Bevill, 26 F.4th at 283). And lastly, the intracorporate-conspiracy
doctrine defeats Gonzalez’s conspiracy claim, because Defendants—all employees of
Starr County—cannot conspire together as a matter of law. Hilliard, 30 F.3d at 653. For
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these reasons, the Court grants summary judgment on Gonzalez’s conspiracy claim
against ADA Barrera.
IV. CONCLUSION
Considering the foregoing analysis, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in
part Defendants’ Objections and Motions to Strike Certain Evidence Submitted in
Response to Defendants’ Summary Judgment Motion, (Dkt. No. 94); GRANTS DA
Ramirez’s Motion for Summary Judgment, (Dkt. No. 79); GRANTS ADA Barrera’s
Motion for Summary Judgment, (Dkt. No. 81); and GRANTS Sheriff Fuentes’s Motion
for Summary Judgment, (Dkt. No. 88).
It is SO ORDERED.
Signed on March 31, 2026.
___________________________________
DREW B. TIPTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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