Hernandez v. Victoria County et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
VICTORIA DIVISION
JOE RICHARD HERNANDEZ, JR.,
Plaintiff,
VS.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:25-CV-00074
VCSO VICTORIA COUNTY SHERIFF
OFFICE, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
TO RETAIN CASE AND DISMISS CERTAIN CLAIMS
Plaintiff Joe Richard Hernandez, Jr., appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, has
filed this prisoner civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s case is subject
to screening pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A.
For purposes of screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1)
and the reasons set forth below, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the district
court RETAIN Plaintiff’s municipal liability claim against Victoria County with respect
to its alleged policy or custom that restricts or denies inmates access to mental health
treatment. The undersigned will order service separately on Victoria County with respect
to this claim retained in this case.
The undersigned respectfully recommends further that the district court:
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
March 19, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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● DISMISS with prejudice Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process
claims (episodic-acts-or-omissions claims) seeking compensatory damages
against Officers Williams and Baylor in their individual capacities as
frivolous or for failure to state a claim for relief;
● DISMISS with prejudice Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment deliberate
indifference claim (conditions-of-confinement claim) seeking compensatory
damages against Sheriff Marr in his individual capacity as frivolous or for
failure to state a claim for relief;
● DISMISS with prejudice Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment deliberate
indifference claims (episodic-acts-or-omissions claims) against Officers
Williams and Baylor in their individual capacities as frivolous or for failure
to state a claim for relief; and
● DISMISS without prejudice Plaintiff’s claims against Sheriff Marr, Officer
Williams, and Officer Baylor in their official capacities.
I. JURISDICTION
The Court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This case
has been referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for case management and making
recommendations on dispositive motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural Background and Allegations
Plaintiff currently is confined as a pretrial detainee at the Victoria County Jail in
Victoria, Texas. In his Amended Complaint,1 Plaintiff sues: (1) the Victoria County
Sheriff’s Office; (2) Sheriff Justin Marr; (3) Guard Officer Williams; and (4) Guard Officer
1 Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is the operative complaint in this case.
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Baylor. (D.E. 5, pp. 1, 3). At the Court’s direction, Plaintiff has filed a More Definite
Statement to further explain his claims. (D.E. 14).
Plaintiff alleges the following in his Amended Complaint and More Definite
Statement. On September 2, 2025, Plaintiff was taken into custody on two charges of
felony possession of a controlled substance. (D.E. 14, p. 1). Plaintiff is not aware of any
trial date set for his Victoria County criminal proceeding. Id.
Sometime between October 8 and 10, 2025, inmate Ethan Perez attempted to hang
himself and commit suicide in Cell 2092. (D.E. 5, p. 4; D.E. 14, p. 2). After he noticed
inmate Perez was hanging, Plaintiff alleges:
● he banged on the window to notify an unidentified guard about what was
happening;
● he woke up an inmate named “David” to inform him about Perez;
● David instructed Plaintiff and another inmate named “Solozano” to help;
● Plaintiff held up Perez while David and Solozano untied inmate Perez;
● guards then came into the cell and told Plaintiff, David, and Solozano to get
away from Perez;
● Plaintiff stepped back away from Perez while David positioned Perez on the
floor;
● Officers Williams and Baylor were two of the Victoria County Jail officials
who entered Cell 2092; and
● Plaintiff, David, and Solozano complied with the Officers Williams’ and
Baylor’s instruction to exit the cell.
(D.E. 5; p. 4; D.E. 14, pp. 2-3).
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Plaintiff alleges that Officers Williams and Baylor removed Plaintiff from Cell 2092
and placed him in a holding cell. (D.E. 14, p. 3). Officer Williams, Plaintiff says, then
took Plaintiff to lockdown/segregation without giving Plaintiff a disciplinary action or
hearing. Id. at 3-4. According to Plaintiff, Officer Williams explained he was taking
Plaintiff to lockdown/segregation because he tried to help Perez. Id. at 3. Plaintiff states
that, on the way to lockdown/segregation, he asked to be taken to medical for mental health
concerns in the wake of the attempted suicide incident. Id. at 4. Officer Williams
responded that Plaintiff needed to “put in a sick call on the kiosk.” Id. Plaintiff put in a
sick call request in October 2025 as instructed. Id. at 5.
Plaintiff alleges that he was in lockdown/segregation for several months—from the
day of Perez’s attempted suicide in October 2025 until January 16, 2026. Id. at 5. Plaintiff
asserts he suffered mental issues and distress as a result of seeing Perez’s attempted suicide,
consisting of being in shock and having nightmares, depression, anxiety, and nausea. Id.
at 3. Plaintiff states he was kept alone in a cell for close to four months without the chance
to be evaluated by or otherwise talk to a mental health professional. (D.E. 5, p. 5; D.E. 14,
pp. 3-4). Plaintiff states further that he has not received any medical attention or been
placed on any medications for mental health issues arising from the traumatic incident
involving Perez’s attempted suicide. (D.E. 5, p. 5).
According to Plaintiff, he did not see either Officer Williams or Officer Baylor
while in lockdown/segregation. (D.E. 14, pp. 4-5). While in lockdown/segregation,
Plaintiff says, Officers Hernandez and Gonzalez told Plaintiff to put in a sick call request
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on the kiosk. Id. at 5. Plaintiff alleges further that he asked Officers Moore and Martinez
to be taken to medical but was told by them to put in a sick call request on the kiosk to
which Plaintiff complied. Id. Plaintiff explains that he was ultimately taken out of
lockdown/segregation on January 16, 2026 and is currently in general population. Id. at 6.
B. Plaintiff’s Construed Legal Claims and Prayor for Relief
Based on his statements in his Amended Complaint and More Definite Statement,
and based also on the Court’s liberal and broad construction of his claims, the undersigned
understands Plaintiff’s claims in this action against each of the named defendants to be the
following:
● Sheriff Marr (sued in both his individual and official capacity) violated
Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights by denying him medical attention and
mental health treatment for his mental trauma suffered following Perez’s
attempted suicide. (D.E. 14, pp. 6-7).
● Officer Williams (sued in both his individual and official capacity) violated
Plaintiff’s: (1) due process rights by not providing Plaintiff with either a
disciplinary hearing or proper reason before taking him down to
lockdown/segregation where he stayed for over three months; and (2) Eighth
Amendment rights by denying him access to mental health care after Plaintiff
made such a request to address his mental trauma suffered following Perez’s
attempted suicide. Id. at 7-8.
● Officer Baylor (sued in both his individual and official capacity) violated
Plaintiff’s: (1) due process rights by not providing Plaintiff with either a
disciplinary hearing or proper reason before taking him down to
lockdown/segregation where he stayed for over three months; and (2) Eighth
Amendment rights by denying him access to mental health care after Plaintiff
made such a request to address his mental trauma suffered following Perez’s
attempted suicide. Id. at 8.
Plaintiff first seeks monetary relief as compensation for his “pain, suffering,
negligence, mental anguish, wrongful punishment, and emotional distress.” (D.E. 5, p. 4;
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D.E. 14, pp. 8-9). Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief in the form of directing the Victoria
County Jail to have mental health providers and assistance on staff due to the high suicide
rate at the jail and for Plaintiff to receive medical attention for his mental health issues.
(D.E. 14, pp. 8-9).
III. GOVERNING LAW
A. Legal Standard for Screening of Plaintiff’s Action
When a prisoner seeks to proceed in forma pauperis the Court shall evaluate the
complaint and dismiss it without service of process if the Court finds the complaint
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (providing that a court shall review an in forma pauperis
complaint as soon as practicable and dismiss it if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from an immune
defendant). A claim is frivolous if it has no arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989). A claim has no arguable basis in law if it is based on an
indisputably meritless legal theory, “such as if the complaint alleges the violation of a legal
interest which clearly does not exist.” Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998).
A claim has no arguable basis in fact if “after providing the plaintiff the opportunity to
present additional facts when necessary, the facts alleged are clearly baseless.” Talib v.
Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 1998).
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“In analyzing the complaint, [the Court] will accept all well-pleaded facts as true,
viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d
322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999). “The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but
whether he is entitled to offer evidence to support his claim. Thus, the Court should not
dismiss the claim unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts
or any possible theory that he could prove consistent with the allegations in the complaint.”
Id. (citations omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported
by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts in support of its legal conclusions that give
rise to a reasonable inference that Defendant is liable. Id.; Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). The factual allegations must raise Plaintiff’s claim for relief
above the level of mere speculation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. As long as the complaint,
taken as a whole, gives rise to a plausible inference of actionable conduct, Plaintiff’s claim
should not be dismissed. Id.
Pleadings filed by pro se litigants like Plaintiff are construed using a less stringent
standard of review. Documents filed by pro se litigants are to be liberally construed, and
pro se complaints, however inartfully drafted they might be, are held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 740
(5th Cir. 2002) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)); see also Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations in the
complaint are to be taken as true for purposes of screening, but such deference does not
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extend to conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.
DeMarco v. Davis, 914 F.3d 383, 386-87 (5th Cir. 2019).
B. Relevant law regarding § 1983
Section 1983 provides a vehicle for redressing the violation of federal law by those
acting under color of state law. Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643 (2004). To prevail
on a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must prove that a person acting under the color of state law
deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). A defendant acts under color of state law
if he misuses or abuses official power and if there is a nexus between the victim, the
improper conduct, and the defendant’s performance of official duties. Townsend v. Moya,
291 F.3d 859, 861 (5th Cir. 2002). “Personal involvement is an essential element of a civil
rights cause of action.” Thompson v. Steele, 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir. 1983).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Individual Capacity Claims
The Fifth Circuit characterizes “§ 1983 violations of a pretrial detainee’s rights as
either episodic-acts-or-omissions claims or conditions-of-confinement claims.” Sanchez
v. Young Cnty., Texas, 956 F.3d 785, 791 (5th Cir. 2020). For a conditions-of-confinement
claim, the relevant question is whether general jail conditions “amount to punishment of
the detainee.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979); Flores v. Cnty. of Hardeman,
Tex., 124 F.3d 736, 738 (5th Cir. 1997). “To state such a claim, a plaintiff must plead facts
that plausibly establish that (1) a condition (2) that is not reasonably related to a legitimate
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government objective (3) caused the constitutional violation.” Rangel v. Wellpath, LLC,
No. 5:23-CV-128-H, 2024 WL 1160913, at *13 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2024). In contrast,
“if the complained-of harm is a particular act or omission of one or more officials, the
action is characterized as an ‘episodic act or omission’ case.” Flores, 124 F.3d at 738.
1. Placement in lockdown/segregation
Plaintiff claims that Officers Williams and Baylor violated Plaintiff’s due process
rights by not providing Plaintiff with either a disciplinary hearing or proper reason before
taking him down to lockdown/segregation where he stayed for over three months. (D.E.
14, pp. 7-8). The undersigned construes this claims as asserting an episodic-acts-or-
omissions claim against Officers Williams and Baylor.
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause prohibits the “punishment” of a
pretrial detainee prior to an adjudication of guilt. Bell, 441 U.S. at 535-36. “A person
lawfully committed to pretrial detention has not been adjudicated guilty of any crime.” Id.
at 536. Pretrial detainees may nevertheless be subjected to “the restriction and conditions
of the detention facility so long as those conditions and restriction do not amount to
punishment, or otherwise violate the Constitution.” Id. at 536-37.
Pretrial detainees are not immune from prison disciplinary actions. See Scott v.
Lemdke, No. A-18-CA-610-LY, 2018 WL 4664138, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2018)
(citing Rapier v. Harris, 172 F.3d 999, 1002 (7th Cir. 1999)). Other circuits have found
that prison officials can impose reasonable punishment to enforce reasonable disciplinary
requirements so long as the punishment is not for prior unproven conduct. E.g., Collazo-
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Leon v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 51 F.3d 315, 318 (1st Cir. 1995). “As unconvicted
citizens, pretrial detainees deserve at least the protections of convicted inmates at a
disciplinary hearing.” Frank v. Larpenter, 234 F.3d 706 (Table), 2000 WL 1598076, at *2
(5th Cir. Oct. 3, 2000) (citing Rapier, 172 F.3d at 1004; Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517,
525 (9th Cir. 1996)).
Here, Plaintiff’s allegations indicate he was subjected to punishment in the absence
of any disciplinary hearing or other process before being placed in lockdown/segregation
for over three months. It is unnecessary to decide whether Officers Williams and Baylor
violated Plaintiff’s due process rights by placing him in lockdown/segregation because
Plaintiff has failed to allege any physical injury resulting directly from their action.
With respect to his due process claim, Plaintiff seeks only monetary relief in the
nature of compensatory damages. (D.E. 14, pp. 8-9).2 Section 1997e(e) of Title 42, United
States Code, provides in pertinent part that no federal civil action may be brought by a
prisoner for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing
of physical injury. The Fifth Circuit has “consistently applied this rule and dismissed the
constitutional claims of prisoners who do not allege any physical injury.” Jackson v. Boone,
2 As discussed above, Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief in the form of directing the Victoria County Jail to have
mental health providers and assistance on staff due to the high suicide rate at the jail and for Plaintiff to receive medical
attention for his mental health issues. (D.E. 14, pp. 8-9). Such injunctive relief relates only to his deliberate
indifference claims in which he alleges that he received no mental health care following the incident of Perez’s
attempted suicide. Even if he did seek injunctive relief with respect to his placement in lockdown/segregation, such
relief has been rendered moot by his transfer from lockdown/segregation at the Victoria County Jail and placement
back into general population. See Garrett v. Lumpkin, No. H-23-2792, 2023 WL 6798120, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 13,
2023) (Lake, J.) (holding that release from solitary confinement and transfer back into general population rendered
his claims seeking injunctive relief moot); Hanson v. O’Daniel, No. A-21-CV-629-RP, 2023 WL 5493607, at * 6
(W.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2023) (finding that inmate’s injunctive request for relief stemming from his confinement in
Administrative Segregation were “mooted by his transfer out of Administrative Segregation”).
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Civ. No. 20-3393, 2022 WL 18276710, at *7 (E.D. La. Dec. 15, 2022), adopted, 2023 WL
172086 (E.D. La. Jan. 12, 2023). Section 1997e(e)’s prohibition also applies to pretrial
detainees. See Coomer v. Doe, No. 5:21-CV-213, 2022 WL 19228834, at *8 (N.D. Tex.
May 25, 2022), adopted, 2023 WL 2604804 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 22, 2023) (citing Kingsley v.
Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 402 (2015) (recognizing that PLRA “applies to both pretrial
detainees and convicted prisoners”)).
In other words, an inmate like Plaintiff seeking to state a claim and requesting
monetary damages must also establish a physical injury resulting from the acts of the jail
officials named. See Johnson v. Kempt, No. 6:21cv426, 2022 WL 983674, at *3 (E.D. Tex.
Feb. 14, 2022), adopted, 2022 WL 965403 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2022). Plaintiff fails to
allege that he suffered any physical injury due to the actions of Officers Williams and
Baylor in placing him in lockdown/segregation where he stayed for over three months.
Indeed, Plaintiff indicates that he only suffered mental and emotional issues during his time
in lockdown/segregation that stemmed from having seen another inmate attempt suicide
and not due to his stay in restrictive custody. (D.E. 14, p. 5).
Because Plaintiff suffered no separate physical injuries resulting from his placement
in lockdown/segregation from October 2025 through January 16, 2026, Plaintiff is barred
from seeking compensatory damages against Officer Williams and Baylor for his alleged
“pain, suffering, negligence, mental anguish, wrongful punishment, and emotional
distress” in connection with this § 1983 claim.3 Johnson, 2022 WL 983674, at *3-4; see
3 In the absence of alleging any physical injuries arising from the actions of Officers Williams and Baylor, the
undersigned construes Plaintiff’s request for monetary damages as seeking compensation for mental and emotional
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also See McKinney v. Painter, No. MO:17-CV-00067-RAJ-DC, 2017 WL 11725575, at *7
(W.D. Tex. Sep. 11, 2017), adopted, 2017 WL 11725587 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 12, 2017)
(holding that inmate could not recover damages on due process claim attacking his
placement in restrictive housing because no physical injury was alleged).
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment
due process claims (episodic-acts-or-omissions claims) against Officers Williams and
Baylor in their individual capacities be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous or for failure
to state a claim for relief.
2. Deliberate Indifference to Mental Health Needs
While housed in a county jail, pretrial detainees have “a constitutional right, under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not to have their serious medical
needs met with deliberate indifference.” Kelson v. Clark, 1 F.4th 411, 417 (5th Cir. 2021)
(quoting Thompson v. Upshur Cnty., Tex., 245 F.3d 447, 457 (5th Cir. 2001)). “[T]here is
no constitutionally significant distinction between the rights of pretrial detainees and
convicted inmates to basic human needs such as medical care.” Reyes v. Tom Green Jail,
No. 6:19-CV-00037-BU, 2022 WL 3588932, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2022), adopted,
2022 WL 3588044 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2022) (citing Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74
injuries only. See Preston v. Smith, No. 23-0324, 2023 WL 5346075, at *7 (W.D. La. Aug. 7, 2023), adopted, 2023
WL 5337430 (W.D. La. Aug. 18, 2023) (construing the inmate’s request for relief as seeking compensatory damages
in that he used the phrase “pain and suffering” as an allegation of “at best, mental or emotional injury unaccompanied
by greater-than-de-minimis physical pain”); Wright v. Waybourn, No. 4:20-cv-1206-O, 2021 WL 5140929, at *5-6
n.1 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2021) (construing inmate’s request for $20 million for “pain and suffering” as a request only
for compensatory damages). The “physical injury” provision of § 1997e(e) does not preclude claims for nominal or
punitive damages. Hutchins v. McDaniels, 512 F.3d 193, 198 (5th Cir. 2007). However, the undersigned does not
construe Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint or More Definite Statement as seeking either nominal or punitive damages.
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F.3d 633, 643 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc)). Courts therefore apply the same deliberate
indifference standard to medical claims brought by both pretrial detainees and convicted
inmates. See Kelson, 1 F.4th at 418.
To establish deliberate indifference regarding denial-of-medical care claims:
The [pretrial detainee] must first prove objective exposure to a substantial
risk of serious harm—in other words, the [pretrial detainee] must prove a
serious medical need. Second, the [pretrial detainee] must prove the officials’
subjective knowledge of this substantial risk. Third, the [pretrial detainee]
must prove that the officials, despite their actual knowledge of the substantial
risk, denied or delayed the [pretrial detainee’s] medical treatment. Finally,
the [pretrial detainee] must prove that the delay in or denial of medical
treatment resulted in substantial harm, such as suffering additional pain.
Importantly, disagreement about the recommended medical treatment is
generally not sufficient to show deliberate indifference.
Petzold v. Rostollan, 946 F.3d 242, 249 (5th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up); see also Estate of
Bonilla v. Orange Cnty., 982 F.3d 298, 305 (5th Cir. 2020) (“To prove deliberate
indifference, the Plaintiffs must show that the defendants were aware of facts from which
the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, that the
defendants actually drew the inference, and that the defendants disregarded that risk by
failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” (cleaned up)).
A serious medical need is “one for which treatment has been recommended or for
which the need is so apparent that even laymen would recognize that care is required.”
Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 345 n.12 (5th Cir. 2006). Furthermore, “a serious
medical need may exist for psychological or psychiatric treatment, just as it may exist for
physical ills.” Partridge v. Two Unknown Police Officers of City of Houston, Tex., 791
F.2d 1182, 1187 (5th Cir. 1986). In the context of medical treatment, the prisoner must
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show “that prison officials refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally
treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a
wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.” Gobert, 463 F.3d at 346 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
“Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet.” Domino v. Tex.
Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 755 (5th Cir. 2001). The Fifth Circuit has
“consistently recognized … that ‘deliberate indifference cannot be inferred merely from a
negligent or even a grossly negligent response to a substantial risk of serious harm.’” Dyer
v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374, 381 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Thompson, 245 F.3d at 458-59);
see also Aguirre v. City of San Antonio, 995 F.3d 395, 420 (5th Cir. 2021) (“Negligence or
even gross negligence is not enough, the officials must have actual knowledge of the
substantial risk.”). The Supreme Court further explains that “an official’s failure to
alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not” falls short of
constituting deliberate indifference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 838 (1994).
i. Sheriff Marr
Plaintiff claims that Sheriff Marr violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights by
denying him medical attention and mental health treatment for his mental trauma suffered
following Perez’s attempted suicide. (D.E. 14, pp. 6-7). Plaintiff asserts that Sheriff Marr
failed to provide any mental health services or otherwise employ on staff, either a medical
provider, nurse, or counselor, to address Plaintiff’s mental health issues in the wake of
Perez’s attempted suicide. (D. E. 1, p. 3; D.E. 16, p. 7). According to Plaintiff, there are
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no available medical personnel capable of treating mental health issues and prescribing
medications at the Victoria County Jail for such issues. Id. Plaintiff further alleges that
the Victoria County Jail is the only county jail that does not have the proper mental health
staff. Id.
Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim against Sheriff Marr is liberally construed
as a conditions-of-confinement claim. A condition—such as the one referenced by Plaintiff
concerning the lack of mental health services at Victoria County Jail—“is usually the
manifestation of an explicit policy or restriction.” Shepherd v. Dallas Cnty., 591 F.3d 445,
452 (5th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff’s allegations, accepted as true, indicate that Sheriff Marr was
responsible for the condition at the Victoria County Jail where inmates like Plaintiff did
not have access to any mental health services. The lack of such access arising from a policy
or custom may not reasonably be related to a legitimate penological objective. See
Albritton v. Henderson Cnty., Texas, No. 3:23-CV-01723-N, 2024 WL 1776380, at *5
(N.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2024) (agreeing that “[t]he system for inmates to access mental health
care at the Henderson County Jail amounted to a condition that left the inmates with no
avenues to access mental health care and the dereliction of care cannot be reasonably
related to any governmental objective”).
With respect to his deliberate indifference claim against Sheriff Marr, Plaintiff’s
allegations must be sufficient to show that Sheriff Marr was “aware of facts from which
the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, that [Sheriff
Marr] actually drew the inference, and that [Sheriff Marr] disregarded that risk by failing
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to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Bonilla, 982 F.3d at 305. A prison official’s
knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm can be inferred if such risk is obvious.
Albritton, 2024 WL 1776380, at *5 (citing Reeves v. Collins, 27 F.3d 174, 176 (5th Cir.
1994)).
Plaintiff does not allege that Sheriff Marr has knowledge of Plaintiff’s specific
requests or need for mental health services. However, his allegations indicate that Sheriff
Marr was well aware of the fact that the Victoria County Jail lacked any mental health
providers or personnel as well any avenue to acquire mental health services or medications.
Such failure to have any mental health services available may be so obvious “that it does
not matter if [Sheriff Marr] had actual knowledge of [Plaintiff] specifically or drew the
inference that a substantial risk of harm existed.” Albritton, 2024 WL 1776380, at *6. The
court in Albritton further explains:
It is obvious that one day an individual would be confined at the jail and that
no one at the jail was qualified to provide mental health care, resulting in that
person’s serious harm. [The official’s] complete abandonment of individuals
like the [inmate] in need of mental health services is an example of an
exceptional circumstance that rises to deliberate indifference even without
[the official’s] direct knowledge of [the inmate’s] risk of harm.
Id.
Plaintiff’s allegations reflect that, in the absence of any access to mental services,
he suffered with depression, anxiety, nightmares, shock, chest pains, head pains, and
nausea. (D.E. 14, p. 3). The undersigned finds that Plaintiff’s allegations, accepted as true,
are sufficient to state a Fourteenth Amendment conditions-of confinement claim against
Sheriff Marr with respect to his deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious mental health
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needs. Partridge, 791 F.2d at 1187; Albritton, 2024 WL 1776380, at *6; cf. Robertson v.
Wyles, No. 24-2024, 2024 WL 5250277, at *3 (W.D. La. Oct. 30, 2024) (concluding that
vague and conclusory descriptions of mental health needs such as “some mental
problems”—which fail to describe mental health symptoms or conditions in detail—fail to
allege a serious medical need and exposure to a substantial risk of serious harm).
While Plaintiff may have stated a plausible claim against Sheriff Marr in his
individual capacity, he is not entitled to his requested relief in the nature of compensatory
damages. (D.E. 14, pp. 8-9). Plaintiff fails to assert that he suffered a sufficient physical
injury with respect to his conditions-of-confinement claim against Sheriff Marr. Rather,
Plaintiff states that he suffered mental and emotional injuries associated with depression,
anxiety, shock and having nightmares. (D.E. 14, p. 3). He further cites suffering generally
from chest and head pains arising in association with his mental condition. Id.
Plaintiff’s general allegations of chest and head pain, along with his related claims
of mental and emotional distress, are insufficient to satisfy the “physical injury”
requirement of § 1997e(e). See Cannon v. Dewberry, No. 6:17cv144, 2019 WL 2465023,
at *12 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2019) (concluding that “[g]eneral allegations of ‘physical health
problems’ [are insufficient to state a physical injury under § 1997e(e)], nor [are] claims of
‘depression, tension in the back, migraine headaches, angry feelings, mood swings, and
pain in the joints and back’”) (citing Herman v. Holiday, 238 F.3d 660, 665 (5th Cir. 2001);
Salter v. Dallas Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 3:08-CV-125-O-ECF, 2008 WL 4393268, at *2 (N.D.
Tex. Sep. 26, 2008)). Thus, with respect to his deliberate indifference claim (conditions-
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of-confinement claim) against Sheriff Marr, Plaintiff is barred from seeking compensatory
damages for his alleged “pain, suffering, negligence, mental anguish, wrongful
punishment, and emotional distress[.]” Johnson, 2022 WL 983674, at *3-4. The
undersigned recommends, therefore, that this conditions-of-confinement claim seeking
compensatory damages be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous or for failure to state a
claim for relief. 4
In addition to seeking compensatory money damages, Plaintiff also seek injunctive
relief in the form of directing the Victoria County Jail to have mental health providers and
assistance on staff due to the high suicide rate at the jail and for Plaintiff to receive medical
attention for his mental health issues. (D.E. 14, pp. 8-9). Section 1997e(e) does not operate
to bar claims for injunctive relief.
Plaintiff, however, cannot seek prospective injunctive relief against an official in
his individual capacity. See Samuels v. Henry, No. 1:23-CV-00132-H, 2025 WL 2697829,
at *4 (N.D. Tex. Sep. 22, 2025) (“Section 1983 does not permit injunctive relief against
state officials sued in their individual capacities[.]”); Richards v. X Corp., No. 3:25-CV-
0916-X, 2025 WL 2244330, at *2 n. 7 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2025) (recognizing that, in a §
1983 case, a plaintiff cannot seek injunctive relief against a defendant sued in his individual
capacity); White v. Texas, No. 4:23-CV-925-P, 2023 WL 8518211, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Oct.
25, 2023), adopted, 2023 WL 8074126 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2023), aff’d, 2024 WL
1826245 (5th Cir. Apr. 26, 2024) (concluding that “section 1983 does not permit injunctive
4 The undersigned does not construe Plaintiff’s Complaint or More Definite Statement as seeking either nominal or
punitive damages against Sheriff Marr.
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relief against state officials sued in their individual capacities). The undersigned, therefore,
will construe Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief as brought against Sheriff Marr in his
official capacity. This issue will be considered below in Section IV(C).
ii. Officers Williams and Baylor
Plaintiff claims that Officers Williams and Baylor violated Plaintiff’s Eighth
Amendment rights by denying him access to medical attention after Plaintiff made such a
request to address his mental trauma suffered following Perez’s attempted suicide. Id. at
7-8. Plaintiff asserts that, rather than escort him to medical, they told Plaintiff to put in a
sick call request on the kiosk. Id. at 8. The undersigned construes this claim as asserting
an episodic-acts-or-omissions claim against Officers Williams and Baylor.
Even assuming that Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm with respect to
his mental trauma, Plaintiff fails to allege that Officers Williams and Baylor acted with the
requisite deliberate indifference to his serious mental health needs. Plaintiff’s allegations
reflect that he only interacted with Officers Williams and Baylor on one occasion, when he
was initially taken to lockdown/segregation. (D.E. 14, pp. 4, 8). Further, Plaintiff’s
allegations indicate that, rather than dismiss Plaintiff’s request altogether, they instructed
him to file a sick call request on the kiosk. Id. Plaintiff does not allege that these officers
took any active measures to deny Plaintiff from submitting a sick call request or otherwise
accessing medical during his time in lockdown/segregation. Moreover, Plaintiff alleges no
facts to suggest that his mental health condition at the time he was taken to
lockdown/security was readily apparent as a medical emergency to Officers Williams or
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Baylor, who work as security officers at the Victoria County Jail without formal medical
training.5 See Trevino v. Hinz, 751 F. App’x 551, 555 (5th Cir. 2018) (“[A]n officer’s
failure to immediately recognize ambiguous symptoms as a medical emergency does not
amount to deliberate indifference.”); Rundles v. Arowosafe, No. 6:19-CV-00014, 2020 WL
7054239, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 2020), adopted, 2020 WL 5939051 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 7,
2020) (rejecting inmate’s deliberate indifference claim because he did not allege that
officer “had the medical training necessary to subjectively recognize inmate's symptoms -
- feeling very ill, having a fast heartbeat, being overheated, and chest hurting – as a medical
emergency).
Plaintiff’s allegations, accepted as true, fail to indicate that either Officer Williams
or Officer Baylor was aware of facts that a substantial risk of serious harm existed for
Plaintiff with regard to his mental health and then disregarded that risk by failing to take
any reasonable measures to abate it. See Bonilla, 982 F.3d at 305; see also Allen v. Valdez,
No. 3:19-cv-00535-S (BT), 2019 WL 3096090, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2019) (dismissing
inmate’s deliberate indifference claim based on his failure to allege defendants knew he
needed immediate medical attention), adopted, 2019 WL 3081664 (N.D. Tex. Jul. 15,
2019). At best, Plaintiff’s allegations indicate that Officers Williams and Baylor’s decision
not to immediately take Plaintiff to medical for mental health treatment amounted to a
5 Plaintiff’s allegations reflect that, during his stay in lockdown/segregation, several other officers refused his request
to be taken immediately to medical for mental health treatment and instead instructed Plaintiff to submit a sick call
request on the kiosk. (D.E. 14, p. 5). Plaintiff does not name these officers as defendants in this case. Moreover, his
allegations do not suggest that these officials acted with the requisite deliberate indifference as they each instructed
Plaintiff of the necessity to submit a sick call request on the kiosk. Plaintiff offers no facts to suggest that these
officials were aware of Plaintiff having a medical emergency requiring immediate medical attention.
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negligent or grossly negligent response to a substantial risk of serious harm. See Farmer,
511 U.S. at 838 (explaining that the “failure to alleviate a significant risk that [the official]
should have perceived, but did not” is insufficient to show deliberate indifference);
Thompson, 245 F.3d at 459 (“Deliberate indifference cannot be inferred from a negligent
or grossly negligent response to a substantial risk of harm.”).
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference
claims (episodic-acts-or-omissions claims) against Officers Williams and Baylor in their
individual capacities be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous or for failure to state a claim
for relief.
B. Victoria County Sheriff’s Office
The Victoria County Sheriff’s Office has been listed as a defendant in this case.
This entity, however, is not capable of being sued. Rogers v. Nueces County Jail, No. C-
07-410, 2007 WL 4367814, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 2007) (Jack, J.) (citing Darby v.
Pasadena Police Dep’t, 939 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1991)). Instead, the proper party would be
Victoria County. See Rogers, 2007 WL 4367814, at *4. In a separate Order, the
undersigned will substitute Victoria County in place of the Victoria County Sheriff’s Office
as a party defendant in this case.
C. Claims Against the Individual Defendants in their Official Capacities and
Victoria County
Plaintiff sues Sheriff Marr, Officer Williams, and Officer Baylor in their official
capacities. Suits against individuals in their official capacities “generally represent only
another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.”
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Goodman v. Harris Cnty., 571 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations and
citation omitted); see also Martin v. Burgess, No. 4:23-cv-03228, 2024 WL 4520131, at
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2024) (Edison, J.) (“When a plaintiff sues a county judge in her official
capacity, the suit is treated as a suit against the county itself.”). Thus, Plaintiff’s suit against
the individual defendants in their official capacities is effectively a suit against the official’s
office, Victoria County. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s claims against Sheriff Marr,
Officer Williams, and Officer Baylor in their official capacities be dismissed without
prejudice.
Under § 1983, a municipality or local government entity such as Victoria County
may be held liable for acts for which it is actually responsible. See Doe on Behalf of Doe
v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211, 215 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986)). The governmental body must either itself subject a
person to a deprivation of rights or cause a person to be subjected to such deprivation.
Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 59 (2011). A municipality is liable for the
constitutional violations of its employees only if the alleged constitutional deprivations
resulted from municipal policy or custom. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); see also Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, Tex., 614 F.3d 161,
166 (5th Cir. 2010) (noting that a municipality may not be subject to liability merely for
employing a tortfeasor; liability requires deliberate action attributable to the municipality
that is the direct cause of the alleged constitutional violation).
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“To support a claim based upon the existence of an official custom or policy, the
Plaintiff must plead facts which show that: 1) a policy or custom existed; 2) the
governmental policy makers actually or constructively knew of its existence; 3) a
constitutional violation occurred; and 4) the custom or policy served as the moving force
behind the violation.” Meadowbriar Home for Child., Inc. v. Gunn, 81 F.3d 521, 532–33
(5th Cir. 1996). “For section 1983 purposes, an official policy may be either a written
policy or a persistent widespread practice of municipal officials and employees which,
although not an authorized or officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common
and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.” Morris
v. Dallas Cnty., 960 F. Supp. 2d 665, 683–84 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (citing Lawson v. Dallas
Cnty., 286 F.3d 257, 263 (5th Cir. 2002); Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841
(5th Cir. 1984)). “The description of a policy or custom and its relationship to the
underlying constitutional violation … cannot be conclusory; it must contain specific facts.”
Spiller v. City of Texas City, Police Dep’t, 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1997).
Courts should be mindful that a plaintiff cannot plead facts “peculiarly within the
knowledge of defendants.” Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1434 (5th Cir. 1995). “[I]n
the context of municipal liability, like that of qualified immunity, it is ‘exceedingly rare
that a plaintiff will have access to (or personal knowledge of) specific details regarding the
existence or absence of internal policies or training procedures prior to discovery.’” Bright
v. City of Killeen, Texas, No. 6:20-CV-431, 2021 WL 1226560, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 31,
2021) (citing Thomas v. City of Galveston, 800 F. Supp. 2d 826, 842 (S.D. Tex. 2011)
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(Ellison, J.)). “Accordingly, only minimal factual allegations should be required at the
motion to dismiss stage,” and “those allegations need not specifically state what the policy
is, as the plaintiff will generally not have access to it, but may be more general.” Thomas,
800 F. Supp. 2d at 842-43. However, the plaintiff’s allegations must still give fair notice
to the defendant and cannot merely restate the generic elements of municipal liability. Id.
at 843. “Allegations that provide such notice could include, but are not limited to, past
incidents of misconduct to others, multiple harms that occurred to the plaintiff himself,
misconduct that occurred in the open, the involvement of multiple officials in the
misconduct, or the specific topic of the challenged policy or training inadequacy.” Id. at
843-44.
The Fifth Circuit has recognized that the legal standards under Monell for municipal
liability and for a conditions-of-confinement claim have no meaningful difference and that
the failure of one is fatal to the other. Bonilla, 982 F.3d at 308. For both claims, therefore,
Plaintiff must adequately allege a municipal policy or custom that was the moving force of
the constitutional violation. Sanchez, 956 F.3d 785, 791 (5th Cir. 2020).
As discussed above, Plaintiff initially stated a conditions-of-confinement claim
against Sheriff Marr.6 Plaintiff’s allegations, accepted as true and liberally construed,
indicate that Victoria County has a policy or custom to restrict or deny mental health care
6 As the undersigned explains, however, Plaintiff’s failure to allege a sufficient “physical injury” under § 1997e(e) is
fatal to his conditions-of-confinement claim against Sheriff Marr in his individual capacity for compensatory money
damages.
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to its inmates and that Sheriff Marr was the policymaker7 at the Victoria County Jail having
actual knowledge of the existence of this policy or custom. Plaintiff alleges a sufficient
factual background to give Victoria County notice as to the specific conditions of
confinement and acts of its employees caused by the policy or custom. Specifically,
Plaintiff alleges that: (1) Sheriff Marr failed to provide any mental health services to him
while confined at the Victoria County Jail despite repeatedly asking for mental health
treatment for several months; (2) Sheriff Marr has failed to employ on staff, either a
medical provider, nurse, or counselor, to address Plaintiff’s mental health issues in the
wake of Perez’s attempted suicide; (3) there is no available medical personnel capable of
treating mental health conditions or prescribing appropriate medications at the Victoria
County Jail; and (4) the Victoria County Jail is the only county jail that does not have the
proper mental health staff. (D. E. 5, p. 3; D.E. 14, pp. 5-7).
The undersigned finds that Plaintiff’s allegations of a Victoria County policy or
custom restricting or outright denying inmate access to mental health treatment are not
conclusory or limited to the generic elements of municipal liability, but rather are sufficient
in detail as can be expected before discovery and given that Victoria County policies are
peculiarly within the knowledge of the County. Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1434; Bright, 2021
7 Courts construe the identity of the final policymaker as “a question of law—specifically a question of state law—
and not a question of fact.” Groden v. City of Dallas, Tex., 826 F.3d 280, 284 (5th Cir. 2016). In Texas, “the county
Sheriff is the county’s final policymaker in the area of law enforcement, not by virtue of the delegation by the county’s
governing body but, rather, by virtue of the office to which the sheriff has been elected.” Turner v. Upton Cnty., Tex.,
915 F.2d 133, 136 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391, 404 (5th Cir. 1980)). Where the
care of inmates is concerned, state law specifically provides that “[t]he sheriff of each county is the keeper of the
county jail.” Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 351.041(a). As such, a county sheriff is required to “safely keep all prisoners
committed to the jail by a lawful authority, subject to an order of the proper court.” Id.
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WL 1226560, at *4. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the district court
retain Plaintiff’s municipal liability claim against Victoria County with respect to its
alleged policy or custom that restricts or denies inmates access to mental health treatment.
D. Claims not specifically addressed in this Memorandum and
Recommendation
To ensure justice and access to the courts, courts interpret pleadings of pro se
litigants liberally. See United States v. Robinson, 78 F.3d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing
United States v. Santora, 711 F.2d 41, 42 (5th Cir. 1983)). Pro se actions will not be
dismissed based on technical pleading defects and should be construed to ensure such
claims are given fair and meaningful consideration despite the unrepresented litigant’s
unfamiliarity with the law. See Haines, 404 U.S. at 520-21; see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at
106 (pro se parties are normally accorded more leniency in the construction of their
pleadings).
The undersigned has liberally construed Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (D.E. 5)
and his More Definite Statement (D.E. 14) to give his claims fair and meaningful
consideration. The undersigned has attempted to articulate and analyze Plaintiff’s claims
in an impartial manner consistent with providing appropriate leniency to pro se litigants
while at the same time requiring compliance with applicable pleading and screening
standards. To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to raise any other claim not specifically
addressed by the undersigned in this memorandum and recommendation, the undersigned
has concluded that Plaintiff has failed to state such claim with sufficient factual detail or
clarity to allow the claim to be identified or analyzed by the Court.
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As stated previously, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Plaintiff, therefore, must allege sufficient facts in support of its legal conclusions that give
rise to a reasonable inference that any defendant is liable. Id.; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
Further, the factual allegations must raise Plaintiff’s claim for relief above the level of mere
speculation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Therefore, Plaintiff is advised that any claim not
addressed in this memorandum and recommendation is not currently before this Court
because Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts or state such claims clearly.
E. Leave to Amend
The undersigned is recommending dismissal of some of Plaintiff’s claims. “When
the dismissal of a pro se complaint is appropriate, it should generally be done without
prejudice in order to allow the plaintiff an opportunity to file an amended complaint.”
Rodriguez v. United States, 66 F.3d 95, 97 (5th Cir. 1995). Leave to amend need not be
granted if the amendment would be futile – for example, if an amended complaint would
still fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S.
178, 182 (1962) (futility of amendment is adequate justification to refuse to grant leave to
amend).
“If the prisoner has filed his complaint and submitted questionnaire responses, then
the court may conclude that he has pleaded his best case such that granting him further
leave to amend would be futile or cause unnecessary delay.” Clark v. Waddell, No. 7:22-
cv-00059-MBP, 2023 WL 8605313, at *18 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 15, 2023) (citing Witherspoon
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v. Waybourn, No. 4:20-cv-1150-P, 2021 WL 2635917, at *10 (N.D. Tex. June 25, 2021)
and McLean v. King, No. 3:20-cv-1244-C-BK, 2020 WL 6049297, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Sept.
15, 2020)); see also Mejia v. Monroe, No. H-18-3036, 2021 WL 765726, at *2 (S.D. Tex.
Feb. 26, 2021) (Miller, J.) (finding that inmate had pleaded his best case where he was
afforded an opportunity to plead facts supporting his claim through a more definite
statement).
Here, Plaintiff has had the opportunity to plead his best case against Defendants
with respect to his claims in that: he has filed an Amended Complaint (D.E. 5) and a More
Definite Statement (D.E. 14) at the Court’s direction in which he has responded to
numerous directives and questions. Where the undersigned has recommended dismissal of
a claim with prejudice, therefore, that dismissal should be without leave to amend because
Plaintiff has already pleaded his best case.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
For purposes of screening and for the reasons discussed above, the undersigned
respectfully recommends that the district court RETAIN Plaintiff’s municipal liability
claim against Victoria County with respect to its alleged policy or custom that restricts or
denies inmates access to mental health treatment. The undersigned will order service
separately on Victoria County with respect to this retained claim.
The undersigned respectfully recommends further that the district court:
● DISMISS with prejudice Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process
claims (episodic-acts-or-omissions claims) seeking compensatory damages
against Officers Williams and Baylor in their individual capacities as
frivolous or for failure to state a claim for relief;
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● DISMISS with prejudice Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment deliberate
indifference claim (conditions-of-confinement claim) seeking compensatory
damages against Sheriff Marr in his individual capacity as frivolous or for
failure to state a claim for relief;
● DISMISS with prejudice Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment deliberate
indifference claims (episodic-acts-or-omissions claims) against Officers
Williams and Baylor in their individual capacities as frivolous or for failure
to state a claim for relief;
● DISMISS without prejudice Plaintiff’s claims against Sheriff Marr, Officer
Williams, and Officer Baylor in their official capacities; and
● DENY Plaintiff leave to amend with respect to his claims dismissed with
prejudice.
Respectfully submitted on March 19, 2026.
____________________________
Julie K. Hampton
United States Magistrate Judge
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NOTICE TO PARTIES
The Clerk will file this Memorandum and Recommendation and transmit a copy to
each party or counsel. Within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of
the Memorandum and Recommendation, a party may file with the Clerk and serve on the
United States Magistrate Judge and all parties, written objections, pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b), 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), General Order No. 2002-13, United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas.
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions,
and recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon
grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual
findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court. Douglass v. United Servs.
Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996)(en banc).
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