Dickerson v. Victoria County City Police Officers, Victoria, Tx et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
VICTORIA DIVISION
RUDY DICKERSON,
Plaintiff,
VS.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:25-CV-00049
VICTORIA COUNTY CITY POLICE
OFFICERS, VICTORIA, TX, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
TO DISMISS CASE
Plaintiff Rudy Dickerson is a Texas inmate appearing pro se and in forma pauperis.
He filed this prisoner civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s case is
subject to screening pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(c); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A.
For purposes of screening and the reasons set forth below, the undersigned
respectfully recommends Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants be DISMISSED with
prejudice as barred by limitations, frivolous and/or for failure to state a claim pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1). The undersigned further respectfully
recommends that the dismissal of this case counts as a “strike” for purposes of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g).1
1 Plaintiff is WARNED that if he accumulates three strikes, he will not be allowed to proceed in forma pauperis in
any civil action or appeal filed while he is incarcerated or detained in any facility unless he is under imminent danger
of serious injury. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
February 17, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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I. JURISDICTION
The Court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This case
has been referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for case management and making
recommendations on dispositive motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636.
II. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is an inmate in the Victoria County Jail in Victoria, Texas. Plaintiff is in
custody based on a felony theft conviction. However, the theft case is not related to the
instant civil action. On August 14, 2025, the Clerk of Court in the Corpus Christi Division
of the Southern District of Texas received Plaintiff’s Prisoner’s Civil Rights Complaint
form. (D.E. 1). Plaintiff’s case was transferred to the Victoria Division of the Southern
District of Texas on the same day. (D.E. 6). On November 4, 2025, after correcting certain
deficiencies, the undersigned granted Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis
(“ifp”). (D.E. 19).
On November 25, 2025, the undersigned held an evidentiary hearing to allow
Plaintiff the opportunity to explain his claims.2 Plaintiff’s civil action arises out of his arrest
in February 2022 in connection with the seizure of approximately 400 grams of controlled
substances from the vehicle Plaintiff was driving. Plaintiff and a passenger were both
arrested at the scene. During the evidentiary hearing, Plaintiff testified he was giving the
2 Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985). The evidentiary hearing is “in the nature of a motion for more
definite statement.” Id. The court ascertains at this procedural stage whether the complaint is adequate to permit the
prisoner to litigate his claims pursuant to § 1915(d). Id. at 182.
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passenger a ride and knew nothing about the controlled substances in the vehicle. (D.E. 24,
pp. 12-13).
Plaintiff testified unidentified U.S. Marshals and City of Victoria police officers and
narcotics officers were involved in his apprehension and arrest. While not entirely clear, it
appears the passenger claimed responsibility for the drugs which resulted in the charges
against Plaintiff being dismissed. Plaintiff believes the officers had no lawful reason to pull
him over and that even after the drugs were found, the officers did not have probable cause
to arrest Plaintiff because the passenger claimed responsibility for the drugs.
Plaintiff was on parole at the time of his arrest in February 2022, and he believes
his parole officer, Defendant Kimberly Niel, was involved in his arrest, although Plaintiff
does not articulate facts in support of this belief. Plaintiff testified he believes his parole
officer is good friends with the U.S. Marshals and “they’re trying to sabotage me.” (D.E.
24, p. 15). He further testified his parole officer scheduled Plaintiff for a parole meeting on
the same date he had to appear in state court for the controlled substances case. Plaintiff
appeared for his parole meeting, but he did not remember the court setting and he missed
his court date. (D.E. 24, p. 16). Plaintiff’s parole was later revoked for other reasons.
Plaintiff believes his parole was revoked for his not reporting to his parole officer, or more
specifically because his parole officer “was saying I wasn’t reporting.” (D.E. 24, p. 16).
Plaintiff brings his claims against his parole officer because Plaintiff believes she was not
treating him fairly. (D.E. 24, pp. 16-17).
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At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the undersigned explained to Plaintiff
that all of his claims were subject to being dismissed for a variety of reasons. (D.E. 24, pp.
14-20). However, the undersigned advised Plaintiff he would be given one opportunity to
file an amended complaint to plead his best case. (D.E. 24, p. 20). In addition to the oral
admonishments during the evidentiary hearing, the undersigned entered a written order
admonishing Plaintiff his claims were subject to dismissal for a variety of reasons,
including but not limited to:
1. Failure to allege facts to raise a plausible claim that his rights were violated or
that any law was violated in connection with his arrest;
2. Failure to allege sufficient facts to indicate any defendant is liable or responsible
to Plaintiff;
3. Making conclusory allegations not supported by facts;
4. Plaintiff’s claims may be barred by limitations; and
5. His claims may be frivolous.
(D.E. 22). The Order further instructed Plaintiff to make a short plain statement of each
claim which includes a short factual statement for each defendant explaining what that
defendant did to violate his rights. (D.E. 22). The order further advised Plaintiff the
amended complaint would take the place of the original complaint, the amended complaint
would be the operative pleading in the case and the Court would not consider any claim
not listed in his amended complaint. (D.E. 22).
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On January 12, 2026, after granting Plaintiff an extension, the Court received
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.3 (D.E. 28). In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges:
Plaintiff was arrested during February 2022. Plaintiff did not violate any
traffic law. In fact, Plaintiff was never issued any citation or warnings and I
was never told why I was pulled over. A U.S. Marshal pulled me out of my
vehicle with his weapon drawn & hand-cuffed me. I would need the arrest
report to identify the U.S. Marshals and police officers. This traffic stop was
unconstitutional.
(D.E. 28, cleaned up). Attached to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is his Exhibit A, which
is a document entitled “States Punishment Recommendation” in State v. Rudy Dickerson,
Cause No. 25-02-35726-D. (D.E. 28-1). The document is date-stamped November 10,
2025, by the District Clerk for Victoria County, Texas, but does not include the court to
which the case was assigned. This document appears to be the plea agreement in the
unrelated state felony theft case in which Plaintiff agreed to plead guilty and waive his right
to appeal in exchange for a sentence of 180 days in custody. The document is signed by
the prosecutor, Plaintiff (as the defendant) and Plaintiff’s criminal defense attorney. (D.E.
28-1, Page 1).
Plaintiff attaches this document as proof of his damages and the intent of the
defendants to cause him harm because he was kept in custody beyond the date on which
he should have been released from custody. When Plaintiff inquired about his release date,
an employee of the Victoria District Clerk’s office told Plaintiff a mistake was made in
3 Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is two-pages in length, however, at the bottom of each page he writes “page 1 of 4”
and “page 2 of 4,” respectively. (D.E. 28). Attached to the amended complaint is “Exhibit A” which includes the
continuation of Plaintiff’s pagination “page 3 of 4” and so forth. (D.E. 28-1). Thus, the Court has received and
docketed Plaintiff’s entire complaint. (D.E. 28 & D.E. 28-1).
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processing his paperwork. Plaintiff does not provide further details about why he believes
the named defendants were involved in the delay of his release from custody. In the
remainder of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff explains the difficulties he has endured
while being in custody.
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard for Screening of Plaintiff’s Action
When a prisoner seeks to proceed in forma pauperis the Court shall evaluate the
complaint and dismiss it without service of process if the Court finds the complaint
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (providing that a court shall review an in forma pauperis
complaint as soon as practicable and dismiss it if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from an immune
defendant). A claim is frivolous if it has no arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989). A claim has no arguable basis in law if it is based on an
indisputably meritless legal theory, “such as if the complaint alleges the violation of a legal
interest which clearly does not exist.” Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998).
A claim has no arguable basis in fact if “after providing the plaintiff the opportunity to
present additional facts when necessary, the facts alleged are clearly baseless.” Talib v.
Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 1998).
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“In analyzing the complaint, [the Court] will accept all well-pleaded facts as true,
viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d
322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts in support of its legal conclusions that
give rise to a reasonable inference that Defendants are liable. Id.; Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). The factual allegations must raise Plaintiff’s claim
for relief above the level of mere speculation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. As long as the
complaint, taken as a whole, gives rise to a plausible inference of actionable conduct,
Plaintiff’s claim should not be dismissed. Id.
Section 1983 provides a vehicle for redressing the violation of federal law by those
acting under color of state law. Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643 (2004). To prevail
on a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must prove that a person acting under the color of state law
deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
While Plaintiff has not stated the exact nature of his claim against the unidentified
U.S. Marshals, these persons are federal law enforcement officers and thus the undersigned
construes these claims as being brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 398 (1971). “A Bivens action is the counterpart to a §
1983 civil rights action and extends to parties injured by federal actors the protections
afforded under § 1983 to parties injured by state actors.” Grainger v. Fed. Bureau of
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Prisons, No. C-08-387, 2009 WL 47127, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2009) (citing Carlson v.
Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980)).
B. All of Plaintiff’s Claims are Barred by Limitations
In determining whether to retain or dismiss Plaintiff’s claims, it is necessary to
consider whether they are barred by the running of the applicable statute of limitations. A
district court may dismiss claims sua sponte under § 1915 where it is clear from a review
of the complaint that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by limitations. Harris v. Hegmann, 198
F.3d 153, 156 (5th Cir. 1999); Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1994).
Federal civil rights actions instituted in Texas, such as those brought pursuant to §
1983, are deemed analogous to personal injury claims, and, therefore, the applicable
limitations period is two years fixed by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.003(a).
Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 2001). Accrual of a § 1983
claim is governed by federal law. Hitt v. Connell, 301 F.3d 240, 246 (5th Cir. 2002). A
cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which
is the basis of the action. Gonzales v. Wyatt, 157 F.3d 1016, 1020 (5th Cir. 1998). “A
section 1983 claim to redress a medical injury arising from deliberate indifference to a
prisoner’s serious medical needs accrues when the plaintiff knows of his physical injury
and its cause. The statute of limitations starts to run when the plaintiff discovers his injury
and its cause even if the full extent or severity of the injury is not yet known.” Devbrow v.
Kalu, 705 F.3d 765, 768 (7th Cir. 2013). Dismissal is appropriate if it is clear from the
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face of the complaint that the claims asserted are barred by the applicable statute of
limitations. Harris, 198 F.3d at 156.
The incident in question occurred in February 2022. (D.E. 28). The Court received
Plaintiff’s complaint on August 14, 2025, although he signed his complaint on August 8,
2025. Under the mailbox rule, a prisoner’s complaint is deemed to be filed the moment it
is delivered to prison officials for mailing to the district court clerk. Medley v. Thaler, 660
F.3d 833, 840 (5th Cir. 2011). Pursuant to the inmate mailbox rule, the undersigned
considers Plaintiff’s complaint to have been filed on August 8, 2025, the day he likely
placed it in the mail. Therefore, Plaintiff’s complaint in the instant case was filed
approximately 18 months beyond the limitation period and is barred by limitations. The
undersigned cautioned Plaintiff at the Spears hearing that his claims were likely barred by
limitations and again in the written order to amend. (D.E. 22). Plaintiff did not address any
reason why his claims were not barred by limitations during the Spears hearing or in his
Amended Complaint and there is no reason to believe the period should be considered to
have been tolled for any period. Therefore, the undersigned recommends all of Plaintiff’s
claims be dismissed as barred by limitations and the Court enter final judgment against
Plaintiff.
However, the undersigned also alternatively addresses the merits of Plaintiff’s
claims below as additional reasons why Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed.
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C. Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment Claims
Plaintiff’s claims against the unidentified Victoria police and narcotics officers and
the unidentified deputy U.S. Marshals are claims that the traffic stop of Plaintiff was
unconstitutional. (D.E. 28, p. 1). Plaintiff maintains he was not violating any traffic law
and there was no lawful basis to execute a traffic stop. For the limited purpose of this
screening Memorandum and Recommendation, the undersigned accepts Plaintiff’s
allegation that he was not committing a traffic violation when he was pulled over.
However, Plaintiff’s conclusion that the initial seizure of the vehicle was a traffic stop is
conclusory and is not supported by the facts and circumstances alleged by Plaintiff. The
facts alleged by Plaintiff indicate this was not a situation which commenced with a routine
traffic stop that developed into a drug trafficking investigation after officers subsequently
had reasonable grounds to believe criminal activity was underfoot. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1 (1968). The facts alleged by Plaintiff indicate the seizure of the vehicle was pursuant to
a purposeful, lawful law enforcement operation based on probable cause a drug trafficking
crime was being committed. While the Court does not have all of the facts, the Court has
sufficient facts to draw this deduction.
The U.S. Marshals are responsible for arresting fugitives and assisting local law
enforcement agencies in arresting violent felons. 28 U.SC. § 566(e)(1)(B). The U.S.
Marshals do not investigate or enforce state traffic laws. Plaintiff alleges U.S. Marshals
were on the scene at the time of the stop and immediately approached the vehicle with their
weapons drawn. Plaintiff and the passenger were immediately handcuffed and taken into
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custody. This is a clear indication the stop of the vehicle was a coordinated law enforcement
operation. The vehicle was searched incident to the arrest of the suspects and over 400
grams of a controlled substance were recovered. This was not a routine traffic stop. While
the passenger may have claimed responsibility for the drugs at some point, he did not do
so immediately. Plaintiff testified while he did not see it happen, he guesses the passenger
threw the drugs in the vehicle. (D.E. 24, p. 12). Plaintiff testified the drugs were “mostly”
on the passenger’s side of the vehicle, which indicates some of the illegal drugs were found
on Plaintiff’s side of the vehicle and in his proximity. (D.E. 24, p. 12). Plaintiff’s allegation
that he was following the rules of the road and had not committed a traffic violation misses
the point because the circumstances indicate this was an arrest based on probable cause a
drug trafficking offense was being committed. See United States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562,
568 (5th Cir. 2008) (Law enforcement officers may conduct an investigative stop based on
reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking activity); United States v. Coleman, 969 F.2d 126,
130 (5th Cir. 1992) (Narcotics officer’s request to marked units stop vehicle was lawful
where it was based on reasonable suspicion that the car’s occupants were involved in illicit
activities); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (Contraband goods
concealed and illegally transported in an automobile or other vehicle may be searched for
without a warrant where probable cause exists).
Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to raise a reasonable inference that
Defendants are liable for making an unlawful traffic stop. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). The factual allegations do not raise Plaintiff’s claim for relief above the level
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of mere speculation. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Therefore,
the undersigned recommends all of Plaintiff’s claims against the law enforcement officers
be dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff’s claims against the unidentified U.S. Marshals should also be dismissed
for additional reasons. While Bivens actions have been recognized in the context of alleged
Fourth Amendment violations and a few other limited situations, the Supreme Court has
consistently refused to recognize a similar cause of action in other contexts. Egbert v.
Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 486 (2022). In Logsdon v. United States Marshal Serv., 91 F.4th
1352, 1358 (10th Cir. 2024), the Court found the Plaintiff’s claim against a U.S. Marshal
deputy was not a cognizable Bivens claim because the Supreme Court has not recognized
a Bivens claim against a deputy U.S. Marshal. The Court found that expanding a Bivens
action to the U.S. Marshals would extend Bivens actions to a new category of defendants
and thus would constitute an unauthorized extension of such actions. Id. at 1358 (citing
Cain v. Rinehart, No. 22-1893, 2023 WL 6439438, at *4 (6th Cir. July 25, 2023)). The
Court included policy considerations weighing against expanding Bivens claims to the
Marshals Service, including not wanting to chill the Marshals Service from assisting local
law enforcement authorities apprehend fugitives, which is a statutory requirement of the
Marshals Service. Id. Additionally, the Supreme Court has cautioned lower Courts that
recognizing a new Bivens action is “a disfavored judicial activity” Egbert, 596 U.S. at 491
(citing Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1856-1857 (2017)). Thus, in addition to not
stating a factual basis to support a claim against the unidentified Marshals, dismissal is
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appropriate because Plaintiff’s Bivens claim against the Marshals would be a disfavored
expansion of Bivens claims.
D. Plaintiff’s Claims Against His Parole Officer
Plaintiff does not name Parole Officer Kimberly Niel in his Amended Complaint.
The Court should consider those claims abandoned because the undersigned cautioned
Plaintiff his amended complaint will take the place of his original complaint and claims
not raised in the amended complaint will not be considered by the Court. (D.E. 22). Even
if the Court were to consider Plaintiff’s original complaint and his Spears hearing
testimony, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to raise a plausible claim against his parole
officer. These claims can be summarized as Plaintiff’s conclusory, subjective belief that
his parole officer was out to get him. However, Plaintiff has not alleged a single fact to
indicate his parole officer did anything to violate his rights. The undersigned recommends
Plaintiff’s claims against parole officer Kimberly Niel be dismissed.
E. Other Claims Not Specifically Addressed in this Memorandum
To ensure justice and access to the courts, courts interpret pleadings of pro se
litigants liberally. See United States v. Robinson, 78 F.3d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing
United States v. Santora, 711 F.2d 41, 42 (5th Cir. 1983)). Pro se actions will not be
dismissed based on technical pleading defects and should be construed to ensure such
claims are given fair and meaningful consideration despite the unrepresented litigant’s
unfamiliarity with the law. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); See also
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Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (Pro se parties are normally accorded more
leniency in the construction of their pleadings).
The undersigned has attempted to articulate and analyze Plaintiff’s claims in an
impartial manner consistent with providing appropriate leniency to pro se litigants while
at the same time requiring compliance with applicable pleading and screening standards.
To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to raise a claim not specifically addressed by the
undersigned in this Memorandum and Recommendation, Plaintiff has failed to state such
claim with sufficient factual detail or clarity to allow the claim to be identified, understood,
or analyzed by the Court.
As stated previously, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Again,
Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts in support of its legal conclusions that give rise to a
reasonable inference that Defendant is liable. Id.; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Further, the
factual allegations must raise Plaintiff’s claim for relief above the level of mere
speculation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Therefore, Plaintiff is advised that any claim not addressed in this Memorandum
and Recommendation is not currently before this Court because Plaintiff has failed to allege
sufficient facts or state such claims clearly. The undersigned recommends Plaintiff not be
granted further leave to amend because all of his claims are barred by limitations and any
attempt to add new or additional claims or defendants would be futile. Additionally,
Plaintiff testified at a Spears hearing, has been advised of his pleading deficiencies, and
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thereafter was granted leave to amend with admonishments he may not be granted further
leave to amend.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and
1915A(b)(1), it is respectfully recommended that all Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants
be DISMISSED with prejudice as barred by limitations, frivolous and/or for failure to
state a claim for relief. It is further respectfully recommended that this dismissal count as
a “strike” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and that the Clerk of Court be
INSTRUCTED to send notice of this dismissal to the Manager of the Three Strikes List
for the Southern District of Texas at Three_Strikes@txs.uscourts.gov.
Respectfully submitted on February 17, 2026.
_______________________________
Jason B. Libby
United States Magistrate Judge
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NOTICE TO PARTIES
The Clerk will file this Memorandum and Recommendation and transmit a copy to
each party or counsel. Within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of
the Memorandum and Recommendation, a party may file with the Clerk and serve on the
United States Magistrate Judge and all parties, written objections, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b), 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), General Order No. 2002-13, United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas.
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and
recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within FOURTEEN
(14) DAYS after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of
plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal
conclusions accepted by the District Court. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d
1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
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