Cardosa Linares v. Noem et al

1 / 5
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
LAREDO DIVISION
HENRRY CARDOSA LINARES,
Petitioner,
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
v. 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:26-CV-00423
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, ET AL.,1
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner is currently detained in federal custody at the Rio Grande Processing
Center in Texas. Before the Court is Petitioner’s Original Verified Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and Request for Declaratory Injunctive
Relief, (Dkt. No. 1), and Respondents’ Response to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
and Motion for Summary Judgment, (Dkt. No. 6).
The Court finds that Petitioner’s deprivation of liberty without constitutionally
adequate procedures is a violation of his due process rights, and the failure to provide
due process warrants his release. For the reasons stated below, Petitioner’s Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus is granted in part. Respondents are ordered to release Petitioner
by July 2, 2026, at 5:00 p.m. The parties are ordered to notify the Court of the status
of Petitioner’s release by July 3, 2026, at 5:00 p.m.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Petitioner, a citizen of Cuba, challenges his ongoing detention without a bond
hearing. Petitioner entered the United States without inspection in July 2022 and has
remained continuously present in the country since then. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 5; Dkt. No. 6
1 Markwayne Mullin is automatically substituted for Kristi Noem in this case under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 25(d). Todd Blanche is automatically substituted for Pamela Bondi in this case under the
same rule. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to substitute these parties on the docket sheet.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
July 01, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
Case 5:26-cv-00423 Document 9 Filed 07/01/26 in TXSD Page 1 of 5

2 / 5
at 2).2 Shortly after entering the United States, Petitioner was apprehended by
immigration officials. (See Dkt. No. 6 at 2). He was subsequently released on an order of
recognizance and served a Notice to Appear. (Dkt. No. 1 at 2; Dkt. No. 1-3 at 1–3; Dkt.
No. 6 at 2). Respondents have not alleged that Petitioner has any criminal history. (See
Dkt. No. 6 at 2).
On October 29, 2022, Petitioner filed a Form I-589 Application for Asylum and
Withholding of Removal before the Immigration Court. (Dkt. No. 1-8 at 1). Petitioner was
re-detained by ICE in November 2025. (Dkt. No. 6 at 2). An Immigration Judge ordered
Petitioner removed on January 23, 2026, and Petitioner filed a timely appeal on February
9, 2026, which remains pending. (Dkt. No. 1-5 at 1).
B. Legal Background
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Justice (DOJ)
released interim guidance in July 2025, announcing a new legal position on detention
authorities for noncitizens. The guidance interpreted the mandatory detention provision
of Section 235 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), or 8 U.S.C. § 1225, as
applying to the detention of all “applicants for admission,” including all noncitizens who
have not been admitted, whether they arrive at a port of entry or enter without
inspection. This position was adopted by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in
September 2025. Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).
In the months following the shift in policy, federal district courts across the
country found the Government’s interpretation at odds with the text of the statute and
ordered bond hearings, or release, for noncitizens subject to mandatory detention under
the policy. See, e.g., Barco Mercado v. Francis, No. 25-CV-6582, 2025 WL 3295903, at *4,
n.22 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (collecting cases). In February 2026, the Fifth Circuit held
that Section 1225(b)(2) applies to all applicants for admission, regardless of whether they
are actively “seeking admission” when they are detained. Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi,
166 F.4th 494, 502 (5th Cir. 2026). However, Buenrostro did not address the validity of
due process claims such as those raised by Petitioner in this case. See, e.g., Bonilla Chicas
2 When citing to the page numbers of any document in the record, the Court will cite to the page
numbering of the Court’s internal CM/ECF docket system, and not to the page numbers in the underlying
documents.
Case 5:26-cv-00423 Document 9 Filed 07/01/26 in TXSD Page 2 of 5

3 / 5
v. Warden, No. 5:26-CV-131, 2026 WL 539475, at *4–5 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2026); see also
Padron Covarrubias v. Vergara, No. 5:25-CV-112, 2025 WL 2950097 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 8,
2025), overruled by Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th 494 (explaining the Court’s prior
statutory interpretation of Section 1225).
C. Procedural Background
Petitioner raises the following claims for relief: Violation of INA § 236(a), Fifth
Amendment Due Process Violation, Unlawful Agency Action under the Administrative
Procedure Act, and Violation of Bond Regulations. (Dkt. No 1 at 13, 15–16, 19). Petitioner
argues that he has a strong liberty interest because he has resided in the United States
for nearly four years and has established a life and robust community ties in the United
States. Petitioner lives in Amarillo, Texas, where he is employed and supports his family.
(Dkt. No. 1 at 6–7). Petitioner requests, among other things, that this Court issue a
declaration that the plain language of INA § 236(a) permits immigration judges to
consider bond requests of noncitizens present without admission and are not classified
as aliens, issue a declaration that DHS may not initiate or pursue expedited removal
against Petitioner while his Section 240 removal proceedings remains non-final and
while he seeks relief from removal before an Immigration judge, issue a Writ of Habeas
Corpus ordering Respondents to Release Petitioner, grant injunctive relief, and award
attorney fees. (Dkt. No. 1 at 23).
II. DISCUSSION
Respondents move for summary judgment, asserting that Petitioner is subject to
mandatory detention pursuant to Buenrostro and that his detention does not violate due
process. The Court principally addresses Petitioner’s due process claim and finds that his
detention violates due process. The Court incorporates the legal standards and analysis
applied in its prior order granting a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under similar
facts. Lopez Moncebais v. Bondi, No. 5:26-CV-268, slip op. (S.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2026).
There, this Court found that Buenrostro does not foreclose due process challenges
to mandatory detention, a noncitizen subject to mandatory detention may bring an as-
applied due process challenge to 8 U.S.C. Section 1225(b)(2), Supreme Court precedent
does not foreclose that type of challenge, and liberty interests in freedom from detention
must be protected by due process of law, including individualized justification for civil
Case 5:26-cv-00423 Document 9 Filed 07/01/26 in TXSD Page 3 of 5

4 / 5
detention. See id. The Court then applied the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge
and found that the petitioner’s procedural due process rights had been violated. Id. at 13
(citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)). The Court ordered immediate
release for the due process violation. Id. at 17.
The Court finds that the same reasoning applies to these facts, though Petitioner’s
length of presence in the United States is factually distinct from Lopez Moncebais.
Petitioner has resided in the United States since 2022. The Court’s reasoning in Lopez
Moncebais relied on the petitioner’s length of residence in the United States in evaluating
his liberty interest. Here, the Court finds that Petitioner’s residence in the United States
since 2022 still creates a sufficient liberty interest to require that his detention is
safeguarded with constitutionally adequate procedures, including an individualized
determination of whether he should be detained.
Additionally, the Court has previously found that a prior release like Petitioner’s
strengthens the liberty interest of a noncitizen because their release created an
expectation that they would be free from detention during the pendency of their removal
proceedings. Bonilla Barrios v. Noem, No. 5:26-cv-172, slip op. at 4 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 2,
2026). As the Court explained there, liberty interests “may arise from an expectation or
interest created by state laws of policies.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005).
In this case, Petitioner had an expectation, in addition to his residence since 2022, that
he would be free from detention or at least entitled to seek bond while his removal
proceedings were pending. He was released from detention in July 2022 and spent nearly
four years out of custody working and building strong community ties in Amarillo before
he was re-detained in November 2025. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5–6). Respondents do not assert
that 	Petitioner 	violated 	any 	conditions 	of 	his 	release. 	That 	expectation 	interest
strengthens his liberty interest. The Court also notes that several cases analyzed for their
persuasive authority in Lopez Moncebais similarly considered prior release as a factor
strengthening the liberty interest of noncitizens detained under Section 1225(b)(2)
without a bond hearing. See Lopez Moncebais, No. 5:26-CV-268, slip op. at 7 n.6
(collecting cases).
For these reasons and the reasons discussed in the Court’s analysis in Lopez
Moncebais, the Court finds that Petitioner’s detention violates his rights under the Due
Case 5:26-cv-00423 Document 9 Filed 07/01/26 in TXSD Page 4 of 5

5 / 5
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, he is entitled to relief, and the appropriate
remedy is to order Petitioner’s immediate release from custody.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s First Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus
and Temporary Restraining Order, (Dkt. No. 1) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in
part. Respondents’ Response to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Motion for
Summary Judgment, (Dkt. No. 6) is DENIED.
Respondents are ORDERED to RELEASE Petitioner from custody by July 2,
2026, at 5:00 p.m., under his prior conditions of release, and to submit a status report to
the Court confirming Petitioner's release by July 3, 2026, at 5:00 p.m. Respondents
must notify Petitioner’s counsel of the exact time and location of Petitioner's release no
less than two hours prior to Petitioner’s release from custody. Respondents are ordered
to return Petitioner’s identity documents and personal effects upon his release.
All other relief requested by Petitioner, including attorney fees, is DENIED.
If Petitioner is re-detained, Petitioner must be afforded procedural due process as
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
A final judgment will follow.
It is so ORDERED.
SIGNED on July 1, 2026.
______________________________
John A. Kazen
United States District Judge
Case 5:26-cv-00423 Document 9 Filed 07/01/26 in TXSD Page 5 of 5