Rad v. Rio Grande Processing Center et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
LAREDO DIVISION
SEYDPOURIYA SALEHI RAD 	§
§
§
§
§
VS.
KRISTI NOEM1 et al.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:26-cv-67
ORDER MODIFYING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The Court referred Petitioner’s Writ of Habeas Corpus and its associated motions
to United States Magistrate Judge Brian C. Bajew (Dkt. Nos. 14, 26). After holding a
hearing, Judge Bajew concluded 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) served as Petitioner’s
detention authority and recommended his conditional release (Dkt. No. 29 at 10, 15). The
fourteen-day objection period lapsed, and no party objected. For the following reasons,
the Court ADOPTS IN PART, REJECTS IN PART, and MODIFIES IN PART the
Report and Recommendation (see Dkt. No. 29).
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Petitioner, an Iranian citizen, entered the United States on January 27, 2025
(Dkt. Nos. 6 at 1, ¶¶ 1, 3; 29 at 1; Hr’g, May 18, 2026, at 1:04:08–20). At that time,
Presidential Proclamation No. 10888 suspended entry at the southern border and
prohibited Petitioner from seeking asylum or withholding of removal (Dkt. Nos. 28-1 at
5; 29 at 2). Proclamation 10888, Guaranteeing the States Protection Against Invasion,
90 Fed. Reg. 8333, 8334–35 (Jan. 20, 2025) (the “Proclamation”). Rather, Petitioner was
1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Todd Blanche is automatically substituted
for Respondent Pamela Bondi in this case. Markwayne Mullin is automatically substituted for
Respondent Kristi Noem and David Venturella is substituted for Respondent Todd Lyons under this
same rule. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to substitute these parties on the docket sheet.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
July 16, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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referred to USCIS for Convention Against Torture screening (Dkt. Nos. 28 at 3; 28-1 at
13–14; 29 at 2). The record suggests Petitioner never filed the appropriate documents
with USCIS (Dkt. No. 25-1 at 5 (“After reviewing the Record of Proceeding, the
immigration court finds that Respondent did not file any applications within the time
limit.”)). On May 9, 2025, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) ordered Petitioner removed to Iran
(Dkt. Nos. 25-1 at 5; 29 at 2).
On July 2, 2025, relevant provisions of the Proclamation were declared unlawful.
See Refugee & Immigrant Ctr. for Educ. & Legal Servs. v. Noem, 793 F. Supp. 3d 19, 94,
95 (D.D.C. 2025), aff’d sub nom. Refugee & Immigrant Ctr. for Educ. & Legal Servs. v.
Mullin, 174 F.4th 81 (D.C. Cir. 2026). USCIS interviewed Petitioner and determined he
did not overcome his presumption of inadmissibility or establish a credible fear (Dkt. No.
24-2 at 1–2). Petitioner requested that an IJ conduct a de novo review of the negative
credible fear finding (Dkt. No. 24-2 at 2). See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.42(d).
On September 29, 2025, an IJ affirmed the negative credible fear determination
(Dkt. No. 24-3 at 2). Therefore, Petitioner’s order of removal became final on that date
(Hr’g, May 18, 2026, at 1:04:52–54; 1:05:13–19). As of the date of this Order, Petitioner
has been detained for 290 days post-removal order.
B. Procedural Background
Petitioner filed this habeas proceeding, seeking his immediate release (Dkt. Nos.
1, 6). Initially, Respondents moved to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, or alternatively for failure to state a claim (Dkt. No. 10). The Court referred
the Petition and that motion to United States Magistrate Judge Brian C. Bajew (Dkt. No.
14).
Judge Bajew conducted a motions hearing on May 18, 2026. During the hearing,
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the parties’ arguments were cabined to Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001)
framework. Respondents conceded Petitioner was subject to a final order of removal,
dated September 29, 2025 (Hr’g, May 18, 2026, at 1:05:13–19). According to Petitioner’s
counsel, Respondents failed multiple times to effectuate Petitioner’s removal (Hr’g,
May 18, 2026, at 1:05:43–55). The breakdown in diplomatic relations between the United
States and Iran, and regional instability, functioned as additional hurdles to Petitioner’s
removal (Hr’g, May 18, 2026, at 1:07:05–11, 1:07:39–40). Indeed, Respondents admitted
they are presently unaware of any third country willing to accept an Iranian citizen, and
Petitioner’s removal to Iran was unfeasible at this time (Hr’g, May 18, 2026, at 1:07:44–
08:10, 1:08:24–35, 1:10:10–14).
Days later, Respondents abruptly pivoted and argued Petitioner was detained
under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV)2 (Dkt. Nos. 21, 23; Min. Ent. May 29, 2026).
Therefore, according to Respondents, Zadvydas is not the bedrock for the Court’s analysis
(Dkt. No. 24 at 10). Respondents claimed § IV authorizes Petitioner’s detention until he
is removed unless he is granted discretionary parole (Dkt. No. 24 at 10). Naturally,
Petitioner opposed that characterization, resting on Respondents’ prior concessions and
persuasive case law (Dkt. No. 28 at 4, 6–7).
In his Report, Judge Bajew principally agreed with Respondents on the detention
authority issue (Dkt. No. 29 at 10). He deviated from them on the length of detention,
deciding it violated due process,3 and recommended Petitioner’s conditional release (Dkt.
No. 29 at 14–15). No party objected to these recommendations; nevertheless, the Court
2 For ease of reference, the Court refers to this mandatory detention provision simply as § IV.
3 The Court notes that Judge Bajew’s Report and Recommendation is ambiguous as to whether
he found a procedural or substantive due process violation (see Dkt. No. 29).
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has carefully reviewed the Report, the record, and all relevant case law.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
Typically, to obtain de novo review by the district court, a party must file specific,
written objections to a magistrate judge’s proposed findings and recommendations.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). However, the district court may conduct
de novo review “despite any lack of objection.” U.S. Bank Tr. Nat’l Ass’n v. Walden, 124
F.4th 314, 320 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting Guillory v. PPG Indus., Inc., 434 F.3d 303, 308
(5th Cir. 2005)); see also Jasso v. Barnhart, 102 F. App’x 877 (5th Cir. 2004) (unpublished
table decision) (“[B]ecause the district court undertook an independent examination of
the record despite the lack of objections in the instant case, the plain-error standard does
not apply.”). “When conducting a de novo review, the district court independently
[analyzes] the applicable facts and legal standards without deference to the magistrate
judge’s findings.” Rodriguez-Zubia v. GEO Del Rio, TX, No. DR-20-CV-0067-AM-VRG,
2021 WL 11680459, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 13, 2021) (citing United States v. Raddatz, 447
U.S. 667, 690 (1980)).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. Petitioner is Detained Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)
Judge Bajew found that Petitioner is detained under § IV rather than the statute
governing post-removal orders (Dkt. No. 29 at 10). In doing so, he favored language in
the Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018) dissent over the controlling opinion (Dkt.
No. 29 at 8–9). The Court disagrees that § IV serves as Respondents’ detention authority
and holds Petitioner is detained under § 1231(a)(1)(A), (a)(2).
In Jennings, the majority emphasized that “[r]ead most naturally, § 1225(b)(1)
. . . mandates detention of applicants for admission until certain proceedings have
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concluded.” 583 U.S. at 297 (citation modified) (emphasis added). True, Jennings did not
specifically examine § IV (Dkt. No. 29 at 8–9 & n.6). But the Court sees no reason to read
Jennings in such a granular fashion. Rather, it is persuaded that once the proceedings
mandating an alien’s detention end, “detention under § 1225(b) must end as well.” Id.
The Supreme Court once more considered the interplay of mandatory detention
statutes in Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523 (2021). There, several aliens who
were previously removed, and later reentered without authorization, sought asylum. Id.
at 532. Asylum officers made positive, reasonable-fear recommendations, and the aliens
pursued bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1226. Id. In stark contrast to the argument advanced by
Respondents in the present case, the Government relied on § 1231 as its statutory basis
for detention. Id. Agreeing with the Government, the Johnson Court reasoned the aliens
had “been ordered removed,” their removal orders were administratively final, and
“§ 1231’s detention provisions [were] a natural fit.” Id. at 534.
The same rings true here, and other district courts confronted with Respondents’
novel approach to § IV have reached the same conclusion. In Jamshidiparvar v.
Thompson, No. 5:25-CV-1326-JKP, 2026 WL 301070 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2026), United
States District Judge Jason Pulliam elucidated:
Even if § 1225(b) provided the detention basis at one time, it gave way to
§ 1231 and its provisions concerning removal periods once the order of
removal became administratively final. Although the provisions of § 1231
might 	have 	been 	inapplicable 	while 	Petitioner 	awaited 	the 	final
determination on his credible fear assertion, once that determination
occurred, there is no reason to not apply the provisions of § 1231. After all,
§ 1231 governs the detention, release, and removal of noncitizens who are
subject to a final order of removal. Indeed, the issue addressed in
Zadvydas, “whether aliens that the Government finds itself unable
to 	remove 	are 	to 	be 	condemned 	to 	an 	indefinite 	term 	of
imprisonment 	within 	the 	United 	States,” 	see 	533 	U.S. 	at 	695,
appears to be the precise issue in this case.
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2026 WL 301070, at *3 (emphasis added).4 Correspondingly, Bhandari v. Bondi, No. C25-
2747-KKE, 2026 WL 369403 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 10, 2026) underscored that once a negative
credible fear determination is final, the alien is no longer subject to ongoing removal
proceedings, and § 1231 controls. 2026 WL 369403, at *3–4. The Court adopts the well-
reasoned conclusions of its sister district courts, finding them persuasive and consistent
with the issues presented here.
Accordingly, the Court REJECTS the Report’s conclusion Petitioner is detained
pursuant to § IV (Dkt. No. 29 at 10). Alnajjar v. GEO Grp., Inc., No. 5:25-CV-0822-JKP,
2025 WL 3853217, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2025) (Ҥ 1231 governs the detention,
release, and removal of noncitizens who are subject to a final order of removal.”). Because
it is an inapplicable provision, the Court offers no opinion as to whether § IV is
unconstitutional as applied to Petitioner.
B. Zadvydas Warrants Petitioner’s Release
Pursuant to the INA, the Government ordinarily secures the removal of an alien
during 	the 	statutory 	90-day 	period 	following 	an 	order 	of 	removal. 	8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(1)(A). As relevant here, the removal period commenced when the IJ affirmed
Petitioner’s negative credible fear determination (Dkt. No. 24-3 at 2 (“This is a final order.
There is no appeal from this decision.”)). See Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523,
534 (2021) (administrative finality turns on an agency’s review proceedings); see also
§ 1231(a)(1)(B)(i). 	Aliens 	are 	generally 	detained 	during 	the 	removal 	period.
§ 1231(a)(2)(A).
4 The Western District of Texas, again, rejected Respondents’ reading roughly three months
later. See Yousaf v. Thompson, No. SA-26-CV-2190-FB (HJB), 2026 WL 1507835, at *3 (W.D. Tex. May
18, 2026) (Bemporad, J.), report and recommendation adopted, No. SA-26-CV-2190-FB, 2026 WL
1513235 (W.D. Tex. May 29, 2026) (Biery, J.). Petitioner notes both decisions in his briefing (Dkt. No.
28 at 7).
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If the alien is not removed during this statutory 90-day period, the Government
may continue to detain them for “a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s
removal from the United States.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689. Reasonableness should be
measured “in terms of the statute’s basic purpose, namely, assuring the alien’s presence
at the moment of removal.” Id. at 699. To aid in this determination, the Supreme Court
set a presumptively reasonable six-month period of post-removal detention. Id. at 701.
“After this 6–month period, once the alien provides good reason to believe
that 	there is 	no 	significant 	likelihood 	of 	removal in 	the 	reasonably
foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient
to rebut that showing. And for detention to remain reasonable, as the period
of prior post-removal confinement grows, what counts as the reasonably
foreseeable future conversely would have to shrink.”
Id. (citations modified). It is axiomatic, however, that the Constitution forbids an alien’s
indefinite or permanent post-removal detention. Id. at 689.
1. 	Presumptively Reasonable Period of Detention
Petitioner’s order of removal became final on September 29, 2025 (Hr’g, May 18,
2026, at 1:05:13–19; Hr’g, May 29, 2026, at 9:11:37–47). Therefore, Petitioner’s post-
removal detention commenced on that date. Respondents concede that over six months
have passed since this date (Hr’g, May 18, 2026, at 1:05:21–32). As of the date of this
Order, over nine months have elapsed since Petitioner’s order of removal
became final, and Petitioner remains detained.
2. 	Petitioner’s Burden
At this point, Petitioner need only demonstrate “good reason to believe that there
is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Zadvydas,
533 U.S. at 701. “‘Good reason’ is not an onerous standard.” Mogos v. Thompson, No. 5:26-
CV-0740-JKP, 2026 WL 475079, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2026) (Pulliam, J.). “It does not
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require Petitioner to rule out any prospect of removal—no matter how unlikely or
unforeseeable.” Yousaf, 2026 WL 1507835, at *4 (citation modified) (quoting Mogos, 2026
WL 475079, at *4). Although the Fifth Circuit instructed that an alien’s onus extends
beyond “conclusory statements,” there is no further binding guidance. Andrade v.
Gonzales, 459 F.3d 538, 543–44 (5th Cir. 2006).
First, the strained diplomatic relations and active conflict between the United
States and Iran have rendered removal to Iran virtually impossible. See Rahimzadeh v.
Noem, 5:26-cv-154, slip. op. at 7–9 (S.D. Tex. June 20, 2026) (Song Quiroga, J.), report
and recommendation adopted, 5:26-cv-154, 2026 WL 1990775 (S.D. Tex. July 9, 2026)
(Garcia Marmolejo, J.); Anjomshoa v. Oldham Cnty. Jail, No. 3:26-CV-020-CHB, 2026
WL 1034403, at *3–4 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 16, 2026); Samiei v. Blanche, No. 2:26CV458, 2026
WL 1971266, at *2 (E.D. Va. July 8, 2026); Vijdani v. Mattos, No. 2:25-CV-02438-JAD-
NJK, 2026 WL 1623138, at *2 (D. Nev. June 5, 2026). Although there was a brief, earlier
ceasefire, President Trump officially notified Congress the Iranian conflict reinitiated on
July 7, 2026.5 This intervening act undoubtedly thwarts Petitioner’s removal, even in
light 	of 	the 	arguments 	presented 	at 	the 	May 	18, 	2026 	hearing 	(Hr’g, May 18,
2026, at 1:07:05–11, 1:07:39–40). Indeed, this alone may carry Petitioner’s burden.
But, here, the Court is further presented with a scenario where Respondents
declared—in no uncertain terms—Petitioner could not be removed at this juncture (Hr’g,
May 18, 2026, at 1:10:10–14). Nor is third-country removal on the table, as Petitioner’s
removal order designates his deportation to Iran, and no country is currently accepting
5 On its own, the Court takes judicial notice of this fact. Fed. R. Evid. 201(c)–(d). See Patricia
Zengerle, Trump Sends Congress Formal Notice that Iran Conflict Has Resumed, R EUTERS
(July 13, 2026), 	https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-sends-congress-formal-notice-that-iran-
conflict-has-resumed-2026-07-13/.
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Iranian 	citizens 	(Hr’g, 	May 18, 	2026, 	at 1:07:44–08:10, 	1:08:24–52). 	Under 	these
circumstances, Petitioner’s removal is not reasonably foreseeable.6
3. 	Whether Respondents’ Rebutted Petitioner’s Showing
In short, Respondents have no clue when Petitioner can be removed. Rather, they
contend they can detain Petitioner until his removal, regardless of whether it occurs
tomorrow, the next day, when the Iranian conflict ends, or ten years from now (Dkt. No.
24 at 2, 10). This argument cannot mount their rebuttal efforts. See Rodriguez Romero v.
Ladwig, 827 F. Supp. 3d 779, 808 (M.D. La. 2026) (finding a failure to provide a
reasonable timeframe for removal to be insufficient to satisfy the Government’s burden).
This Court declines to speculate about the likelihood or possibility of Petitioner’s removal
when Respondents themselves do not assert that such removal is anticipated.
Finally, the Court emphasizes that Petitioner has already been detained for over
nine months post-removal order, and over a year and six months in total. Gonzalez v.
Warden ICE Processing Ctr., No. 2:26-CV-00667-DGE, 2026 WL 1017586, at *4 (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 15, 2026) (finding an alien’s nine-month detention to be unreasonable).
Respondents cannot constitutionally subject Petitioner to a prolonged detention while
they perpetually wait to deport him to Iran. See Rajnish v. Jennings, No. 3:20-CV-07819-
WHO, 2020 WL 7626414, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2020); see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S.
at 690 (because deportation proceedings “are civil, not criminal . . . they are nonpunitive
in purpose and effect”). Thus, the Court finds that Petitioner’s removal is not reasonably
foreseeable, and his continued confinement amounts to an unconstitutional, indefinite
6 The Zadvydas Court recognized that “if removal is reasonably foreseeable, the habeas court
should consider the risk of the alien’s committing further crimes as a factor potentially justifying
confinement within that reasonable removal period.” 533 U.S. at 700. Notwithstanding the
unlikelihood of Petitioner’s removal, Respondents acknowledged he had no known criminal history.
(Hr’g, May 18, 2026, at 1:11:40–47).
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detention. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696, 699 (finding that neither the INA nor the
Constitution authorizes indefinite detention); Vargas v. Noem, No. 25-3155-JWL, 2025
WL 2770679, at *2 (D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2025) (“[P]etitioner has now been detained for
nearly nine months since his removal order became final . . . , well beyond the six-month
period sanctioned by the Supreme Court in Zadvydas, and officials have still not been
able to remove him or even to schedule his removal.”).
C. Third-Country Removal
Petitioner broadly challenges third-country removal as applied to him (see Dkt.
No. 6 at 9–10). He asserts that the statutory framework demands he be afforded notice
and an opportunity to be heard before he can be removed to a third country (Dkt. No. 6
at 9). “The Court will not resolve this issue, as it is separate and distinct from
Petitioner’s prolonged detention.” Khatchapuridze v. Noem, No. 5:25-CV-169, 2025
WL 4762013, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 31, 2025) (Garcia Marmolejo, J.).
D. Equal Access to Justice Act Fees
Petitioner seeks an award of fees and costs (Dkt. No. 6 at 12). The Fifth Circuit
expressly rejects EAJA fees for successful § 2241 petitions. See Barco v. Witte, 65 F.4th
782, 785 (5th Cir. 2023); see Bobomirzaev v. Bondi, No. 5:25-CV-00297, 2026 WL 972331,
at *4 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2026) (Kazen, J.). Because this relief is not authorized by statute,
Petitioner’s request is DENIED.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, ADOPTS IN PART, REJECTS IN PART, and MODIFIES IN
PART the Report (see Dkt. No. 29).
Petitioner’s Habeas Petition (Dkt. No. 6) is GRANTED IN PART. Respondents’
Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 10) is DENIED AS MOOT and Motion for Summary
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Judgment (Dkt. No. 24) is DENIED. Petitioner’s request for EAJA fees and costs is
DENIED.
Petitioner’s Motion to Withdraw (Dkt. No. 13) is GRANTED and the Court
STRIKES Petitioner’s Motion to Stay Deadlines (Dkt. No. 11).
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to update the nature of this suit to 8:1105(a)
Aliens: Habeas Corpus to Release INS Det.
Respondents are ORDERED to RELEASE Petitioner from custody to a public
place no later than 5:00 p.m. on July 20, 2026. Petitioner’s release is subject to
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3) and 8 C.F.R. § 241.5.
Respondents are ORDERED to NOTIFY Petitioner’s counsel of the exact location
and exact time of his release as soon as practicable and no less than two hours before
his release.
The parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report no later than 5:00 p.m.
on July 22, 2026, confirming that Petitioner has been released and advising the Court
of his conditions of release.
The Court’s prior ORDER, that Respondents NOTIFY Petitioner’s counsel and
the Court of any planned removal of him from the United States, at least five (5) days
before any such removal, REMAINS IN PLACE.
It is so ORDERED.
SIGNED July 16, 2026.
___________________________________
Marina Garcia Marmolejo
United States District Judge
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