Cruzata Rojas v. Frink

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
ROSARIO CRUZATA ROJAS,
Petitioner,
versus
MARTIN FRINK,
Respondent.
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CIVIL ACTION NUMBER
4:26-cv-04316
JUDGE CHARLES ESKRIDGE
OPINION AND ORDER ON DISMISSAL
Pending are an amended petition for writ of habeas
corpus by Petitioner Rosario Cruzata Rojas and the
Government’s response. Dkts 8 & 9.
Petitioner filed an initial petition under 28 USC §2241
through a next friend on May 28, 2026. Dkt 1. That petition
was stricken for lack of jurisdiction. Dkt 6. The order
striking the petition noted the Fifth Circuit’s decision in
Buenrostro-Mendez v Bondi, 166 F4th 494, 502–08 (5th Cir
2026), which holds that 8 USC §1225(b)(2)(A) subjects
anyone present in the United States without legal
admission to mandatory detention as an “applicant for
admission” deemed to be “seeking admission.” Id at 4. The
order also conveyed a number of previous decisions by the
undersigned resolving several closely related issues. Id
at 4–7.
Initial screening of the next-friend petition determined
that the arguments presented raised only issues resolved
in those decisions. But Petitioner was granted an
opportunity to file an amended petition, either pro se or
through counsel, specifying individual circumstances or
additional arguments supporting a different result. Id at 7.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
July 16, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Petitioner filed an amended petition on July 10. Dkt 8.
She now proceeds pro se. She acknowledges illegal entry
into the United States on a prior date. Id at 3. She
recognizes the prior decision in Buenrostro-Mendez, but
she nevertheless contends it doesn’t apply to her because
(i) she was previously released on supervision, (ii) she
complied with all immigration orders before her detention,
(iii) she has no criminal history and isn’t a danger to the
community, (iv) her immigration proceedings under the
Cuban Adjustment Act are pending, and (v) detention is
causing her significant physical and emotional harm. See
id at 4–6.
As to any statutory claim, Petitioner expresses her
disagreement with the Fifth Circuit’s determination in
Buenrostro-Mendez that individuals like herself, present in
the United States without legal admission, are subject to
detention under §1225(b)(2)(A). But the undersigned
previously reached the same conclusion based on the plain
language of the statute. See Montoya Cabanas v Bondi,
2025 WL 3171331 (SD Tex); Herrera Naranjo v Uhls,
2025 WL 3771447 (SD Tex). And even if inclined to
reconsider, the undersigned couldn’t grant Petitioner relief
contrary to Buenrostro-Mendez because a district court “is
bound by a circuit decision unless or until it is overturned
by an en banc decision of the circuit court or a decision of
the Supreme Court.” La Unión del Pueblo Entero v Abbott,
614 F Supp 3d 509, 525 (WD Tex 2022), quoting Perez v
Abbott, 250 F Supp 3d 123, 139 (WD Tex 2017). Petitioner’s
disagreement with prior decisions and binding Fifth
Circuit precedent isn’t a basis for habeas corpus relief.
As to the claim based on prior release, Petitioner
essentially seeks to bind the current Administration to
decisions made previously regarding the enforcement of a
statute clearly applicable to her. The Fifth Circuit notes
that courts are “exceedingly reluctant to grant equitable
estoppel against the government.” Robertson-Dewar v
Holder, 646 F3d 226, 229 (5th Cir 2011). As the Supreme
Court observes, “When the Government is unable to
enforce the law because the conduct of its agents has given
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rise to an estoppel, the interest of the citizenry as a whole
in obedience to the rule of law is undermined.” Heckler v
Community Health Services of Crawford County, Inc,
467 US 51, 60 (1984). “In addition, the government should
not be unduly hindered from changing its position if that
shift is the result of a change in public policy.” United
States v Owens, 54 F3d 271, 275 (6th Cir 1995).
Such concerns are certainly present here. The Supreme
Court has recognized that “the Government may
constitutionally detain deportable aliens during the
limited period necessary for their removal proceedings.”
Maceda Jimenez v Thompson, 2025 WL 3265493, *1
(SD Tex), quoting Demore v Kim, 538 US 510, 526 (2003).
The decision of prior Administrations to decline to enforce
§1225(b)(2)(A) against individuals like Petitioner neither
changes the plain statutory text nor otherwise abrogates
the Government’s authority to lawfully detain her pending
her removal. As recently explained by Judge Fernando
Rodriguez:
Petitioner enjoyed liberty within the
United States for some years when past
administrations exercised their discretion
to forgo applying [§]1225 to him. But no
statutory or regulatory provision, and no
Constitutional principle, requires Respond-
ents to follow specific procedural steps
before exercising their authority to the
fullest under [§]1225.
Makhmudov v Lyons, 2026 WL 879392, *1 (SD Tex).
As to the due process claims, due process arguments
similar to those raised by Petitioner were rejected by the
undersigned in Penafiel Clavijo v Thompson, 2026 WL
923310 (SD Tex), which held that procedural due process
doesn’t require an individualized custody determination
beyond the mandate of 8 USC §1225(b)(2)(A). The
undersigned later found that pre-removal-order detention
authorized by 8 USC §1225(b)(2)(A) doesn’t violate
substantive due process while deportation proceedings are
pending even when it exceeds the six-month period set out
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in Zadvydas v Davis, 533 US 678 (2001), as to post-
removal-order detention. See Herrera Estrada v
Thompson, 4:26-cv-01238 (SD Tex, April 27, 2026). And the
petition and its attachments make clear that Petitioner’s
removal order is not yet final, so the presumptively
constitutional six-month post-final-order detention period
provided by Zadvydas hasn’t yet begun.
The Government was ordered to address the effect, if
any, of the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Sosnava Rodriguez v
Ortega, 2026 WL 1906557 (5th Cir), on Petitioner’s
detention. Dkt 7. With reference to limitations imposed by
the Due Process Clause, the panel decision held that the
Government may detain individuals under the subject
statute “for ninety days but no longer without a bond
hearing,” and that “at the hearing, the Government must
articulate an individualized justification for further
detention without bond.” Id at *16. But as the Government
points out in its response, that decision was vacated, on
July 10, 2026, pending rehearing en banc. See Sosnava
Rodriguez, 26-50183 (5th Cir, July 10, 2026). Dkt 9. This
means that the panel decision is currently “of no
precedential value.” Comer v Murphy Oil USA, Inc, 718
F3d 460, 468 (5th Cir 2013).
Petitioner’s contentions concerning her lack of criminal
history, pending immigration proceedings, and compliance
with earlier immigration orders may bear on the question
of whether she should ultimately be removed. But they
don’t bear on the question of whether she may be detained
during the pendency of such removal proceedings. As such,
she hasn’t shown that her current detention violates her
rights under the Due Process Clause.
As to claims of physical and emotional injury, while
sympathetic, they aren’t properly raised in this habeas
corpus action. Solano-Hurtado v Garcia, 2026 WL 916966,
*3 (SD Tex): “Conditions-of-confinement claims improperly
raised in a habeas corpus petition must be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction.” Any such claims must instead be
raised in a civil rights action. See Melot v Bergami, 970 F3d
596, 599 (5th Cir 2020).
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* * *
Because Petitioner hasn’t established that her
detention violates either the Constitution or federal law,
she isn’t entitled to relief on habeas corpus in this action.
The amended petition for writ of habeas corpus by
Petitioner Rosario Cruzata Rojas is DENIED. Dkt 8.
This action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
All pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT.
A certificate of appealability is DENIED as unnecessary.
Final judgment will enter separately.
The Clerk will mail this Order to Petitioner and email
this Order to USATXS.CivilNotice@usdoj.gov to provide
notice of this disposition to Respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Signed on ______________ , at Houston, Texas.
__________________________
Honorable Charles Eskridge
United States District Judge
July 16, 2026
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