Avila Romero v. Thompson

U NITED S TATES D ISTRICT C OURT
SOUTHERN D ISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON D IVISION
O RLANDO ENRIQUE A VILA
ROMERO ,
Petitioner,
versus
RAYMOND THOMPSON ,
Respondent.
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CIVIL ACTION NUMBER
4:26-cv-04225
JUDGE CHARLES ESKRIDGE
O PINION AND O RDER ON D ISMISSAL
Pending is the amended petition for writ of habeas
corpus under 28 USC §2241 filed by Petitioner Orlando
Enrique Avila Romero. Dkt 7.
An initial petition was filed on behalf of Petitioner
through a next friend, on May 27, 2026. Dkt 1. That petition
was stricken because the putative next friend failed to
allege facts sufficient to establish standing. Dkt 5. That
order also noted the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Buenrostro-
Mendez v Bondi, 166 F4th 494, 502–08 (5th Cir 2026),
which held that 8 USC §1225(b)(2)(A) subjects anyone
present in the United States without legal admission to
mandatory 	detention 	as 	an 	“applicant 	for 	admission”
deemed to be “seeking admission.” Id at 4. It further
conveyed 	a 	number 	of 	previous 	decisions 	by 	the
undersigned resolving several closely related issues. Id
at 4–7.
Initial screening of the initial petition determined that
the arguments presented by the next friend raised only
issues resolved in those decisions. Even so, Petitioner was
granted an opportunity to file an amended petition, either
pro 	se 	or 	through 	counsel, 	to 	specify 	individual
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
June 19, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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circumstances 	or 	additional 	arguments 	supporting 	a
different result. Id at 7–8.
Petitioner has now filed his amended petition and
proceeds here pro se. Dkt 7. He acknowledges illegal entry
into the United States on a prior date but nonetheless
asserts that his present detention under 8 USC §1225(b) is
unlawful as a violation of his due process rights under the
Fifth Amendment. Id at 1–3. In this respect, he argues that
(i) he has complied with all immigration requirements
since his arrival, (ii) he has no criminal history and isn’t a
danger to the community, (iii) the appeal of his removal
order 	is 	pending, 	and 	(vi) 	he 	has 	significant 	family
responsibilities. Ibid.
As 	to 	any 	statutory 	claim, 	Petitioner 	appears 	to
disagree 	with 	the 	holding 	of 	the 	Fifth 	Circuit 	in
Buenrostro-Mendez that individuals like himself who are
present in the United States without legal admission are
subject 	to 	detention 	under 	§1225(b)(2)(A). 	But 	the
undersigned previously reached the same conclusion based
on the plain language of the statute. See Montoya Cabanas
v Bondi, 2025 WL 3171331 (SD Tex); Herrera Naranjo v
Uhls, 2025 WL 3771447 (SD Tex). And even if inclined to
reconsider, the undersigned couldn’t grant Petitioner relief
contrary to Buenrostro-Mendez because a district court “is
bound by a circuit decision unless or until it is overturned
by an en banc decision of the circuit court or a decision of
the Supreme Court.” La Unión del Pueblo Entero v Abbott,
614 F Supp 3d 509, 525 (WD Tex 2022), quoting Perez v
Abbott, 250 F Supp 3d 123, 139 (WD Tex 2017). Petitioner’s
disagreement 	with 	prior 	decisions 	and 	binding 	Fifth
Circuit precedent isn’t a basis for habeas corpus relief.
As to any due process claim, arguments similar to those
raised by Petitioner were rejected by the undersigned in
Penafiel Clavijo v Thompson, 2026 WL 923310 (SD Tex),
which held that procedural due process doesn’t require an
individualized custody determination beyond the mandate
of 8 USC §1225(b)(2)(A). The undersigned later found that
pre-removal-order 	detention 	authorized 	by 	8 	USC
§1225(b)(2)(A) 	doesn’t 	violate 	substantive 	due 	process
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while deportation proceedings are pending even when it
exceeds the six-month period set out in Zadvydas v Davis,
533 US 678 (2001), as to post-removal-order detention. See
Herrera Estrada v Thompson, 4:26-cv-01238 (SD Tex, April
27, 2026). Finally, the petition and its attachments make
clear that Petitioner’s removal order is not yet final, so the
presumptively 	constitutional 	six-month 	post-final-order
detention period provided by Zadvydas hasn’t yet begun.
Petitioner’s 	contentions 	concerning 	his 	compliance
with earlier immigration orders, lack of criminal history,
pending appeal, and family responsibilities may bear on
the question of whether he should ultimately be removed.
But they don’t bear on the question of whether he may be
detained during the pendency of such removal proceedings.
As 	such, 	he 	hasn’t 	shown 	that 	his 	current 	detention
violates his rights under the Due Process Clause.
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Because 	Petitioner 	hasn’t 	established 	that 	his
detention violates either the Constitution or federal law, he
isn’t entitled to relief on habeas corpus in this action.
The amended petition for writ of habeas corpus by
Petitioner Orlando Enrique Avila Romero is DENIED . Dkt 7.
This action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The motion by Petitioner to prevent his transfer or
deportation is DENIED . Dkt 6.
All other pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT.
A certificate of appealability is DENIED as unnecessary.
Final judgment will enter separately.
The Clerk will mail this Order to Petitioner and email
this Order to USATXS.CivilNotice@usdoj.gov to provide
notice of this disposition to Respondents.
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SO ORDERED .
Signed on ______________ , at Houston, Texas.
__________________________
Honorable Charles Eskridge
United States District Judge
June 19, 2026
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