De Moya-Rodriguez v. Frink et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
YANISLEY DEMOYA RODRIGUEZ, §
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Petitioner,
VS. CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:26-2090
WARDEN, HOUSTON CONTRACT
DETENTION FACILITY, et al.
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Petitioner Yanisley DeMoya Rodriguez is detained in the custody of officials with
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Through counsel, the petitioner filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Dkt. 1). She brings a claim
under the Due Process Clause, among others, and seeks release from detention.
The federal respondents filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment (Dkt.
5) arguing that the petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)
and her habeas claims lack merit. The petitioner responded (Dkt. 6).
The parties agree that the petitioner is a national and citizen of Cuba; that she entered
the United States on or about November 22, 2021; that officials released her on her own
recognizance shortly after her entry; that officials detained her on or about December 17,
2025; that she has applied for relief from removal; that an immigration judge ordered her
removed to Cuba on March 20, 2026; and that her appeal from the removal order is pending
before the Board of Immigration Appeals. The petitioner further states that she has
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
July 21, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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relatives who are citizens and legal permanent residents of the United States and that she
has no criminal record. The respondents do not contest these facts.1
On February 6, 2026, the Fifth Circuit held in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166
F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), that two petitioners who has been present in the United States
for many years, and who had not been apprehended by immigration officials before the
detention at issue in the case, were subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2). The Court does not base this opinion on the statutory text but instead turns
to the petitioner’s claim that her current detention violates her rights under the Due Process
Clause.
The Court previously addressed due-process claims in the context of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. See, e.g., Vilar Ruiz v. Warden, Montgomery Proc. Ctr., No. 4:26-cv-1307, 2026
WL 1707199 (S.D. Tex. June 12, 2026); Valdes Soria v. Warden, Houston Cont. Det.
Facility, No. 4:26-cv-1272, 2026 WL 1658536 (S.D. Tex. June 8, 2026); Chowdhury v.
Warden, No. 26-cv-1126 (Dkt. 18) (S.D. Tex. June 4, 2026); Avila Perez v. Warden, Civil
Action No. 4:26-957 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2026); Gonzalez Monrreal v. Warden, Civil
Action No. 4:26-925 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2026); Barrera Leon v. Warden, Civil Action No.
4:26-1341 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 2, 2026); Gallegos Perez v. Noem, Civil Action No. 4:26-351
(S.D. Tex. Apr. 2, 2026); Cruz Osorio v. Noem, Civil Action No. 4:25-6390 (S.D. Tex.
Apr. 2, 2026); Rozo-Teran v. Bondi, Civil Action No. 4:26-243 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2026);
1 Despite acknowledging that the petitioner’s appeal is pending before the Board of
Immigration Appeals, the respondents state that the government of Cuba denied repatriation on
April 21, 2026, and that immigration officials have nominated her for third country removal to
Mexico (Dkt. 5, at 3).
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Navarette-Garcia v. Bradford, Civil Action No. 4:26-1503 (S.D. Tex. Mar, 16, 2026);
Delgado-Rodriguez v. Tate, Civil Action No. 4:26-650 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2026). All of
these opinions applied the three-part test from Mathews v. Eldridge, weighing and
balancing the following factors: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and, (3)
the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
For the reasons stated in the Court’s opinions cited above, and based on all
authorities cited in those opinions, the Court determines that the petitioner in this case is
detained without due process of law. She has been present in the country for over four
years, was previously released on her own recognizance, has family ties in the country, has
no criminal history, and is pursuing relief from removal. She has a protected liberty interest
under the Due Process Clause, and the respondents do not argue that flight risk, danger to
the community, or other weighty government interest justifies her detention. Additionally,
the respondents identify no procedures available to the petitioner to provide notice, an
opportunity to be heard, or any individualized determination regarding the reason for her
current detention. Therefore, all three Mathews factors weigh in the petitioner’s favor.
The Court concludes, in accordance with numerous other courts considering the
question, that detention under § 1225(b)(2) as applied to this petitioner, without an
individualized assessment or any notice or opportunity to be heard, violates the petitioner’s
right to procedural due process. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus will be granted. 28
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U.S.C. § 2241; 28 U.S.C. § 2243; see Brown v. Davenport, 596 U.S. 118, 128 (2022)
(“federal courts may grant habeas relief as law and justice require”) (cleaned up).
“Habeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful executive detention.” Munaf v. Geren,
553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008). The remedy for unlawful detention “is, of course, release.” Id.;
see Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973) (based on statutory language of 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) and the common-law history of the writ, “the essence of habeas corpus
is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and that the traditional
function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody”). Because the respondents do
not acknowledge any process available to the petitioner, “there is no process to await.” See
Aroca v. Mason, 819 F. Supp. 3d 517, 548 (S.D.W. Va. 2026) (cleaned up) (collecting
cases).2 After reviewing the authorities and all matters of record, the Court determines that
release is the appropriate habeas relief for the unlawful detention in this case.
The Court therefore ORDERS as follows:
1. The respondents’ motion to dismiss or for summary judgment (Dkt. 5) is
DENIED.
2. The petitioner’s petition for habeas relief (Dkt. 1) is GRANTED in part.
3. The respondents are ORDERED to RELEASE the petitioner from custody to a
public location, under conditions of release no more restrictive than those in
place prior to the detention at issue in this case, within 48 hours of this order.
2 In light of the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Buenrostro-Mendez, and because the respondents
do not argue that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) applies, the Court does not order a bond hearing under
§ 1226(a). See Ahmed M. v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-4711 (ECT/SGE), 2026 WL 25627, at *3 (D.
Minn. Jan. 5, 2026) (collecting cases).
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4. The respondents are further ORDERED to inform the petitioner and petitioner’s
counsel of the time and location of release at least three hours before the
release.
5. The respondents are further ORDERED to return to the petitioner, at the time
of release from custody, any and all identification documents taken from the
petitioner at the time of or during detention.
6. Any possible or anticipated removal or transfer of the petitioner under this
present detention is PROHIBITED and ENJOINED.
7. The respondents may not re-detain the petitioner during the pendency of the
petitioner’s removal proceedings absent a pre-detention hearing before an
immigration judge at which the government demonstrates, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the petitioner is a flight risk or a danger to the
community. See Giri v. Lyons, No. 5:26-CV-00149, ___ F. Supp. 3d _____,
2026 WL 1361557, at *13 (S.D. Tex. May 12, 2026) (collecting authorities).
8. The respondents are further ORDERED to file a status report updating the Court
within 72 hours of this order.
9. All other pending motions, if any, are DENIED as moot.
The Clerk will provide a copy of this order to the parties.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on , 2026.
__________________________________
GEORGE C. HANKS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
July 21
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