Alexander v. Doolittle

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
MARGARET ALEXANDRA
ALEXANDER,
Petitioner,
vs.
WESLEY DOOLITTLE, et al., 1
Respondents.
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§ 	CIVIL ACTION NO. H-26-1799
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner 	Margaret 	Alexandra 	Alexander 	is 	currently 	detained 	in 	the
Montgomery County Jail on a charge of violating her probation. Proceedingpro se,
she filed a petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 asking
this Court to intervene in her state-court criminal proceedings to protect her rights
under federal law. (Dkt. 1). The respondents answered with a motion for summary
judgment, supported by numerous exhibits. (Dkt. 4). Alexander did not respond to
1
Alexander originally filed a civil-rights action against numerous Montgomery
County government agencies and employees. 	See Alexander v. Montgomery Cnty Cmty.
Supervision & Corr. Dep 't, et al., Civil No. 25-cv-4209 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 2026). She filed
her petition for writ of habeas corpus in that pending case. 	Id. at Dkt. 96. 	That petition
was then transferred and opened as a new action in this case. The only proper respondent
to a petition for writ of habeas corpus is the person having custody of the petitioner. 	See
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004) (holding that in a habeas case, the only
"proper respondent is the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held").
Therefore, Warden Doolittle has been substituted as the named respondent in this habeas
action. 	,
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United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
April 24, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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the motion, and her time to do so has now expired. 	After considering Alexander's
petition, the motion for summary judgment and its exhibits; and all matters of record,
the Court grants summary judgment and dismisses the petition for writ of habeas
corpus for the reasons explained below.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Publicly available records show that Alexander was sentenced in 2024 to four
years of deferred-adjudication probation after she entered a guilty plea to one count
of abandoning or endangering a child, elderly individual, or disabled individual in
Montgomery County Cause Number 23-04-05724. 	See 	Search Our Records,
https://odyssey.mctx.org (visited Mar. 9, 2026). 	When she filed her petition, she
was being detained under an order of arrest based on a motion to revoke probation
and adjudicate guilt filed by the State. 	Id. 	In her petition to this Court, Alexander
alleges that her detention violates the Due Process Clause of the United States·
Constitution and the Americans with Disabilities Act. (Dkt. 1). She admits that she
has not exhausted her available state-court remedies. 	(Id. at 8). 	Nevertheless, she
asks this Court to order her immediate release from detention. 	(Id.).
The respondents answered the petition with a motion for summary judgment,
contending that the petition should be denied because ( 1) Alexander failed to exhaust
her state-court remedies before filing the petition; (2) her claims challenging the
original order of deferred adjudication are barred by the statute oflimitations; (3) her
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claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; (4) her claims are barred by Heck
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); (5) she has identified the incorrect respondents;
and (6) 	Younger 	v. 	Harris, 	401 	U.S. 	37, 	54 (1971), precludes federal 	court
involvement 	in Alexander's 	state-court criminal 	case. 	(Dkt. 	4, 	p. 	2). 	The
respondents attach various documents from the state criminal proceedings in support
of the motion. (Dkts. 4-1 through 4-8).
Alexander did not respond to the motion, and her time to do so has now
expired.
II. 	DISCUSSION
Under Southern District of Texas Local Rule 7.4, Alexander's failure to
respond to the motion is taken as a representation of no opposition. 	See S.D. Tex.
L.R. 7.4. Nevertheless, the Court will address the two grounds raised in the motion
for summary judgment that are dispositive of this petition and require its dismissal.
A. 	Exhaustion
Because of considerations of federal and state comity, a person detained under
state process may not use a federal habeas petition to interfere with the "the normal
functioning of a state's crimin~l processes." See Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. ofKy.,
410 U.S. 484, 493 (1973); Di(:kerson v. State of La., 816 F.2d 220, 224 (5th Cir.
1987). Therefore, before a state detainee may pursue federal habeas relief, she must
show that she has exhausted the state remedies available to her. 	See Braden, 410
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U.S. at 489; Dickerson, 816 F.2d at 224. 	This exhaustion requirement prohibits
federal courts from exercising jurisdiction if the claims raised in a state detainee's
petition may be resolved either by a state-court trial on the merits or by other
available state procedures. 	See Dickerson, 816 F .2d at 225; Brown v. Estelle, 530
F.2d 1280, 1284 (5th Cir. 1976). 	To properly exhaust state-court remedies, the
petitioner must have 	presented her claims to the 	state's 	highest court "in a
procedurally proper manner" according to the rules of the state courts. See Baldwin
v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29-32 (2004); Mercadel v. Cain, 179 F.3d 271, 275 (5th Cir.
1999) (per curiam). 	State remedies are not exhausted so long as the petitioner has
the opportunity to present her claims to the state courts by a currently available and
adequate procedure. See Braden, 410 U.S. at 489.
Under Texas law, a detainee held on a probation revocation warrant may seek
release by filing an application for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court in which
the proceedings are pending. See Nix v. State, 65 S.W.3d 664,669 (Tex. Crim. App.
2001) (en bane), abrogated on other grounds by Wright v. State, 506 S.W.3d 478
(Tex. Crim. App. 2016). 	If the trial court denies the application,the detainee may
take a direct appeal to the intermediate appellate court, followed by a petition for
discretionary review in the Court of Criminal Appeals if necessary. 	Id. 	Only after
a detainee has pursued her claims through each of these steps will she be found to
have exhausted her state-court remedies.
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Alexander admits in her petition that she has not pursued her state-court
remedies. 	She contends, without elaboration, that those remedies are ineffective to
protect her from imminent harm to her federal rights. 	But to be considered
ineffective, 	the 	state-court 	remedies 	must 	be 	either 	"unavailable," 	"wholly
inappropriate to the relief sought" or "the attempt to exhaust such remedies would
itself be a patently futile course of action." 	Montano v. Texas, 867 F.3d 540, 542-
43 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Fuller v. Rich, 11 F.3d 61, 62 (5th Cir. 1994)). Alexander
offers no facts to support her conclusory allegation that the available state-court
remedies are ineffective under this standard.
Because Alexander has not presented her claims to the Texas state courts in a
procedurally proper manner, she has not exhausted her state-court remedies and is
not entitled to federal habeas relief. The respondents' motion for summary judgment
on the basis of a failure to exhaust state remedies is granted. 	Alexander's petition
for federal habeas corpus relief will be dismissed on this basis.
B. 	Younger Abstention
Even 	if Alexander 	could 	show 	that 	she 	had 	satisfied 	the 	exhaustion
requirement, the Court would decline to exercise jurisdiction over her petition under
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971). 	Younger requires federal courts to
abstain from exercising jurisdiction when: (1) the federal proceeding would interfere
with an "ongoing state judicial proceeding"; (2) the State has an important interest
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in regulating the subject matter of the claim; and (3) the petitioner has "an adequate
opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges." 	Bice v. La.
Pub. Defender Bd., 677 F.3d 712, 716 (5th Cir. 2012); see also Kolski v. Watkins,
544 F.2d 762, 766 (5th Cir. 	1977) ("a [p]etitioner must satisfy the 	Younger
abstention hurdles before [a court] may give habeas relief'). 2
Alexander's claims meet all three requirements for abstention under Younger.
Any decision by this Court on Alexander's claims would interfere with the ongoing
state-court revocation proceedings. See Younger, 401 U.S. at41; Tex. Ass'n ofBus.
v. Earle, 388 F.3d 515, 518 (5th Cir. 2004) ("Under the rule set out by [Younger],
federal courts must refrain from considering requests for injunctive relief based upon
constitutional challenges to state criminal proceedings pending at the time the
federal action is instituted."). 	The State of Texas has an important interest in
enforcing its criminal laws and procedures. See DeSpain v. Johnston, 731 F .2d 1171,
1176 (5th Cir. 	1984). 	And Alexander can raise her claims in the revocation
proceedings and again on appeal if necessary. 	See, e.g., Friemel v. Sheriff, Gregg
Cnty, Civil No. 6:20cv609, 2021 WL 2372213, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2021)
2
Exceptions to the Younger doctrine exist when "(1) the state court proceeding was
brought in bad faith or with the purpose of harassing the federal plaintiff, (2) the state
statute is 'flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every
clause, sentence, and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort
might be made to apply it,' or (3) application of the doctrine was waived." Texas Ass'n of
Bus. v. Earle, 388 F.3d 515, 519 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 49).
Alexander's petition does not allege facts showing that these exceptions apply in her case.
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(Younger abstention is proper when the "petitioner has.the opportunity to challenge
the evidence against him at trial and to appeal any potential conviction in state court
on direct appeal and in collateral proceedings, as well as through federal habeas
corpus proceedings.").
Alexander's claims meet the requirements for 	Younger abstention. 	The
respondents' motion for summary judgment on the basis of Younger abstention is
granted. Alexander's petition is dismissed with prejudice on this basis.
III. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1. The motion for summary judgment by the Montgomery County respondents,
(Dkt. 4), is GRANTED.
2. Alexander's petition for writ of habeas corpus, (Dkt. 1), is DISMISSED with
prejudice.
3. Any pending motions are DENIED as moot.
4. A certificate of appealability is DENIED as unnecessary.
The Clerk will provide a copy of this Order to the petitioner.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas on ____01"'-	_______	~_'3	____., 2026.
'1)~1~DAVID HITTNER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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