Ramirez v. Noem et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
ANETH MARGARITA RAMIREZ, §
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
Petitioner,
VS. CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:26-1480
WARDEN, HOUSTON CONTRACT
DETENTION FACILITY, et al.
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Petitioner Aneth Margarita Ramirez is detained in the custody of officials with
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Through counsel, the petitioner filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Dkt. 1).
The petition and supporting documents state that the petitioner is a native and citizen
of Venezuela; that she entered the United States on or about December 4, 2021; that
immigration officials issued a Notice to Appear on December 8, 2021, and released the
petitioner to parole on December 14, 2021; that she previously was granted Temporary
Protected Status; that officials detained her in January 2026 when she appeared for a
scheduled supervision appointment; and that her detention could last months or years
without habeas relief from this Court. She brings claims under the Due Process Clause and
the INA, among others, and seeks release from custody.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
July 02, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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The federal respondents filed a motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 6) arguing that
the petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) and her due-
process and other claims lack merit. They submit documents showing that officials initially
charged the petitioner with removability in 2022 and placed in her in removal proceedings;
that an immigration judge terminated her proceedings without prejudice on January 31,
2024, based on a joint motion from the parties; and that officials initiated new removal
proceedings on January 29, 2026 (Dkt. 6-1; Dkt. 6-2; Dkt. 6-3).1 They do not contest the
material facts recited by the petitioner.
On February 6, 2026, the Fifth Circuit held in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166
F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), that two petitioners who has been present in the United States
for many years, and who had not been apprehended by immigration officials before the
detention at issue in the case, were subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2). The Court does not base this opinion on the statutory text but instead turns
to the petitioner’s claim that her current detention violates her rights under the Due Process
Clause. The Court has previously addressed due-process claims in the context of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. See, e.g., Avila Perez v. Warden, Civil Action No. 4:26-957 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 28,
2026); Gonzalez Monrreal v. Warden, Civil Action No. 4:26-925 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 27,
2026); Barrera Leon v. Warden, Civil Action No. 4:26-1341 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 2, 2026);
Gallegos Perez v. Noem, Civil Action No. 4:26-351 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 2, 2026); Cruz Osorio
v. Noem, Civil Action No. 4:25-6390 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 2, 2026); Rozo-Teran v. Bondi, Civil
1 The respondents’ exhibits include two Notices to Appear, dated May 20, 2022, and Jan.
29, 2026. Another Notice to Appear submitted by the petitioner is dated Dec. 8, 2021 (Dkt. 1-3).
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Action No. 4:26-243 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2026); Navarette-Garcia v. Bradford, Civil
Action No. 4:26-1503 (S.D. Tex. Mar, 16, 2026); Delgado-Rodriguez v. Tate, Civil Action
No. 4:26-650, 2026 WL 517983 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2026).
The Constitution guarantees due process of law to every person in the United States,
regardless of the person’s immigration status. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001)
(the Due Process Clause “applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens,
whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent”); see A.A.R.P. v
Trump, 605 U.S. 91, 94 (2025) (procedural due process protections apply to removal
proceedings for persons detained under the Alien Enemies Act).
The Court notes at the outset that the petitioner in this case challenges only her
detention, and not her right to relief from deportation or removal. Courts across the country
have recognized that as-applied due process challenges to detention without an
individualized hearing are not foreclosed by Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591
U.S. 103 (2020), or other Supreme Court precedent.2 Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 175
F.4th 713, 732-34 (6th Cir. 2026); Bonilla Chicas v. Warden, 821 F. Supp. 3d 782, 796-97
(S.D. Tex. 2026); Vieira v. De Anda-Ybarra, 806 F. Supp. 3d 690, 697-700 (W.D. Tex.
2 In Thuraissigiam, the Supreme Court held that a noncitizen seeking “initial entry” to the
United States enjoys only the rights provided by statute because the “power to admit or exclude
aliens is a sovereign prerogative” over which the political branches have plenary authority.
Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 139-40 (cleaned up) (considering case regarding noncitizen detained
25 yards from the border and for whom immigration officials rejected his “credible fear” claim for
purposes of political asylum). However, a challenge to detention, rather than to immigration
proceedings, does not implicate the “sovereign prerogative” on which Thuraissigiam relies. See
Rincon v. Hyde, 810 F. Supp. 3d 101, 111-13 (D. Mass. 2025) (discussing “entry fiction” doctrine
and its purposes).
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2025); Lopez-Arevelo v. Ripa, 801 F. Supp. 3d 668, 681-85 (W.D. Tex. 2025); Rincon, 810
F. Supp. 3d at 111-13; Castro Coneo v. Almodovar, No. 25-CV-09850 (NSR), 2025 WL
3754079, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2025); Destino v. FCI Berlin, Warden, No. 1:25-CV-
374-SE-AJ, 2025 WL 4010424, at *4 n.6 (D.N.H. Dec. 24, 2025) (noting a “growing
consensus” among district courts and collecting cases). Many cases cited above also
distinguish Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), and Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510
(2003), from the detention challenge at issue in this case. See, e.g., Lopez-Campos, 175
F.4th at 734; Rodriguez v. Frink, 823 F. Supp. 3d 678, 682-84 (S.D. Tex. 2026); Bonilla
Chicas, 821 F. Supp. 3d. at 792, 794-96; Rincon, 810 F. Supp. 3d at 110-14; Destino, 2025
WL 4010424, at *3-*8.3 The Court agrees with this consensus and thus proceeds to review
the petitioner’s constitutional claim.4
3 In Demore, the Supreme Court considered a facial challenge to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), a
statutory provision that provides for mandatory detention of non-citizens who have been convicted
of certain crimes, and held that the facial challenge failed. In so holding, the Court discussed
extensively the fact that Congress enacted § 1226(c) based on evidence of increasing criminal
activity by criminal aliens, as well as high rates of recidivism and flight. Demore, 538 U.S. at 518-
19. The Court also relied on the fact that a detainee under § 1226(c) was a “criminal alien” who
was detained for “the limited period of his removal proceedings.” Id. at 531; see id. at 529-31
(citing facts in the record showing that detention under § 1226(c) lasted for an average of 47 days,
and that 100% of the detentions lasted five months or less). Finally, the Court noted that the
detainee in Demore had been afforded procedural protections, including “the full procedural
protections our criminal justice system offers” for his prior convictions and the opportunity for a
“Joseph hearing” at which he would have been entitled to raise any non-frivolous argument to
demonstrate that he was not properly included in the mandatory detention category. Id. at 513-14
& n.3.
4 See also I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 304–05 (2001) (“a serious Suspension Clause issue
would be presented” if a statute deprived federal courts of habeas jurisdiction to review “pure
questions of law”).
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When adjudicating a procedural due-process claim from a civil detainee, courts
apply the three-part test from Mathews v. Eldridge, weighing and balancing the following
factors: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and, (3) the Government’s interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1976).
Regarding the first Mathews factor, the petitioner has a liberty interest that the Due
Process Clause protects. Freedom from physical detention is “the most elemental of liberty
interests.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004); see Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.
A noncitizen who has lived for years in the interior of the United States and established
connections in the country acquires a protectible liberty interest. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S.
at 107 (“aliens who have established connections in this country have due process rights in
deportation proceedings”); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990)
(“aliens receive constitutional protections when they have come within the territory of the
United States and developed substantial connections with this country”); Landon v.
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982) (noncitizen has a “weighty” interest in his or her right
“to stay and live and work in this land of freedom” and to “rejoin . . . immediate family”).
As stated above, the petitioner has lived in the United States for over four years and
is pursuing relief from removal. Moreover, the respondents previously released her to
parole, and removal proceedings against her were terminated based on a joint motion from
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the parties. Her current detention began in January 2026, when she appeared as instructed
for a check-in appointment at ICE, and the respondents do not point to any condition of
release she violated or other changed circumstance justifying her re-detention. Therefore,
the petitioner acquired a protected liberty interest before the detention challenged in this
case. See Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 107; Vieira, 806 F. Supp. 3d at 700; Gunaydin v.
Trump, 784 F.Supp.3d 1175, 1187 (D. Minn. 2025); Lopez-Arevelo, 801 F. Supp. 3d. at
685-86; Destino, 2025 WL 4010424, at *12; Barros v. Noem, No. EP-25-CV-488-KC,
2025 WL 3154059, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2025). The first factor weighs heavily in
the petitioner’s favor.
The second Mathews factor is the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the petitioner’s
liberty interest by the procedures used for her current detention, as well as the probable
value of additional safeguards. “Once it is determined that due process applies, the
question remains what process is due.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
Due process requires adequate procedural protections to weigh the governmental interest
against that of the individual. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (“[G]overnment detention
violates [the Due Process] Clause unless the detention is ordered in a criminal proceeding
with adequate procedural protections or, in certain special and narrow[,] nonpunitive
circumstances where a special justification, such as harm-threatening mental illness,
outweighs the individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical
restraint”) (cleaned up). “Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections
as the particular situation demands.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 (cleaned up). Immigrant
detainees “are entitled to notice and opportunity to be heard appropriate to the nature of the
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case.” Trump v. J. G. G., 604 U.S. 670, 673 (2025) (cleaned up); see Lopez-Campos, 174
F.4th at 732 (“The hallmark of procedural due process is notice and an opportunity to be
heard”) (cleaned up).
The respondents argue that the petitioner’s claim should be denied based on
Demore, 538 U.S. 510, which rejected a facial due-process challenge to a different statute,
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). However, the Court does not consider in this case whether
§ 1225(b)(2) is facially unconstitutional, that is, “unconstitutional in all of its applications.”
See United States v. Morgan, 147 F.4th 522, 526 (5th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, No. 25-6677,
2026 WL 568341 (U.S. Mar. 2, 2026) (cleaned up); Bonilla Chicas, 821 F. Supp. 3d at
792. Instead, the Court considers whether § 1225(b)(2), “though constitutional in some
circumstances,” has been unconstitutionally applied to the petitioner. See Morgan, 147
F.4th at 526.5
5 Apart from the fact that it decided a facial challenge, Demore is distinguishable for
additional reasons. First, the statute at issue in Demore applied to a specific subset of non-citizens
convicted of certain crimes. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). In contrast, § 1225(b)(2) is a broad, “catch-
all” provision. Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th at 499 (citing Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287); see id. at
505 (holding that, although “[i]t is true that § 1226 applies to aliens in the United States,” the
application of § 1226 “does not preclude § 1225 from also applying to such aliens” because “the
two provisions overlap”). Moreover, as stated above, the Demore petitioners had received criminal
procedural protections, as well as the opportunity for a Joseph hearing, and were detained for an
average of 47 days. In the case at bar, however, the petitioner has received no procedures to protect
the liberty interest impacted by her current detention, and nothing in the record suggests that the
length of detention will be limited. Finally, unlike in Demore, nothing in the record in this case
suggests that the petitioner’s detention under § 1225(b)(2) is justified by evidence of danger to the
community. For all of these reasons, Demore does not foreclose the petitioner’s as-applied
challenge. See Bonilla Chicas, 821 F. Supp. 3d at 794-96 (distinguishing Demore); Rincon, 810
F. Supp. 3d at 113-14 (distinguishing Demore); Destino, 2025 WL 4010424, at *8-*9
(distinguishing Demore).
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Civil detention can be permissible based on the government’s showing that the
person is a danger to the community. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,
746, 748-49 (1987) (the government’s regulatory interest in community safety can
outweigh an individual’s liberty interest in avoiding pre-trial detention if the person poses
a danger) (collecting cases). In such cases, the civil detention must be “limited” and
“subject to strong procedural protections.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 691; see Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357(1997) (“We have consistently upheld [forcible civil
detainment of persons who pose a danger to public health and safety] provided the
confinement takes place pursuant to proper procedures and evidentiary standards”);
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750 (upholding bail reform statute which required the government,
“[i]n a full-blown adversary hearing,” to “convince a neutral decisionmaker by clear and
convincing evidence that no conditions of release can reasonably assure the safety of the
community or any person”).
Here, the petitioner has been detained for approximately six months and the
respondents provide no information about when the detention will end. Moreover, the
respondents have made no showing that the petitioner’s current civil detention is justified
by danger to the community, flight risk, or any other weighty government interest. Rather,
they argue that danger and flight risk are irrelevant under the plain language of §
1225(b)(2), thus ending the inquiry (Dkt. 6, at 4-6 (citing Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v.
Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003)). However, the question of whether procedural safeguards for the
petitioner’s liberty interest are adequate is a constitutional question, not a statutory one,
and a statute may not deprive a person of rights that are constitutionally guaranteed.
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Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985); Palm Valley Health Care,
Inc. v. Azar, 947 F.3d 321, 326 (5th Cir. 2020) (“the Constitution, not statutes, determine
the minimum procedures that due process requires”).6 They identify no procedures
afforded to the petitioner to provide notice, an opportunity to be heard, or any
individualized determination regarding her current detention. To the extent the respondents
rely on the Notice to Appear dated January 29, 2026, the document does not adequately
address the petitioner’s presence in the United States for over four years and the liberty
interest she acquired during that time based on established connections in the country. See
Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 107; Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271; Landon, 459 U.S. at
6 Moreover, Doe is distinguishable on several grounds. The plaintiff in Doe challenged a
Connecticut statute that mandated registry of sex offenders based only on the person’s past
conviction for a sex offense, arguing that the registry requirement without a hearing to show he
was currently dangerous violated his procedural due process rights. The Supreme Court held that,
because current dangerousness was irrelevant under the statute, the plaintiff had no procedural due
process right to a hearing. The Court joins other courts in holding that Doe is distinguishable from
the facts and issues in this case. See, e.g., Betancourth v. Tate, 822 F. Supp. 3d 762, 766–67 &
n.4 (S.D. Tex. 2026); Noyola v. Bondi, 822 F. Supp. 3d 729, 733–34 (W.D. Tex. 2026); Aliaga
Zamora v. Bondi, No. SA-26-CA-00447-XR, 2026 WL 693054, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2026);
Diaz Yanez v. Bondi, No. EP-26-CV-00486-DB, 2026 WL 690005, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 4,
2026); Villegas Angel v. Noem, No. 1:26-CV-00384-DAE, 2026 WL 594368, at *3-4 (W.D. Tex.
Mar. 3, 2026). First, the petitioner in this case does not challenge a registry requirement, which
the Doe Court assumed arguendo implicated a liberty interest, but rather freedom from physical
detention, “the most elemental of liberty interests.” Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529. Second, civil
immigration detention is constitutional only when it is justified by a sufficient, non-punitive
purpose. Foucha v. La., 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992); Betancourth, 822 F. Supp. 3d at 7676-67 & n.4;
Diaz Yanez, 2026 WL 690005, at *2. Once a protected interest is implicated, “the right to some
kind of prior hearing is paramount.” Aliaga Zamora, 2026 WL 693054, at *5 (citing, inter alia,
Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569–70 (1972)); Villegas Angel, 2026 WL 594368, at *3.
Third, the statutory language indicates that flight risk and danger are not irrelevant to detention
under § 1225(b), given that “noncitizens who are detained under § 1225(b) may be released on
parole for humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit, so long as they present neither a
security risk nor a risk of absconding.” Noyola, 822 F. Supp. 3d at 734; (cleaned up) (citing 8
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b)); Aguilar v. Bondi, 811 F. Supp. 3d 815, 820 n.1
(W.D. Tex. 2025)
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34. It also does not show that the petitioner was afforded notice and an opportunity to be
heard as to the justification for her current detention. See J.G.G., 604 U.S. at 673
(immigrant detainees “are entitled to notice and opportunity to be heard appropriate to the
nature of the case”) (cleaned up); Lopez-Campos, 175 F.4th at 732.
In the absence of any available procedure to require the respondents to demonstrate
danger or another adequate justification for detention, the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of the petitioner’s liberty interest is high. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 569–70 & n.7 (“When
protected interests are implicated, the right to some kind of prior hearing is paramount”)
(citing, inter alia, Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971); Bell v. Burson, 402
U.S. 535, 542 (1971)). When “the only mechanism Petitioner has to test the propriety of
his detention is DHS’s discretionary authority,” that is “no real test at all.” Tenemasa-
Lema v. Hyde, 810 F. Supp. 3d 244, 258 (D. Mass. 2025); see Destino, 2025 WL 4010424,
at *13 (noting that the risk is heightened by the likelihood of lengthy delays in removal
proceedings). This risk of deprivation could be addressed through an individualized
assessment such as the bond hearings that respondents, until late 2025, routinely provided
to assess a petitioner’s danger to community and flight risk. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335
(courts should assess whether “additional or substitute procedural safeguards” would have
“probable value”); Lopez-Arevelo, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 686 (an individualized hearing would
provide an opportunity to be heard and a meaningful assessment of the petitioner’s
dangerousness and flight risk, and thus would “greatly reduce the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of his liberty”); Barros, 2025 WL 3154059, at *4 (risk of erroneous deprivation
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“can be easily ameliorated through a bond hearing”). The Court concludes that the second
Mathews factor weighs in the petitioner’s favor.
The third Mathews factor is the respondents’ interest in the petitioner’s mandatory,
unreviewable detention at issue here. The respondents have not addressed this factor and
do not argue their interest in detaining the petitioner under § 1225(b). To the extent the
respondents rely on their general interest in enforcing the statute, their interest is
insufficient to extinguish the petitioner’s right to due process. See Loudermill, 470 U.S.
at 541; Rincon, 810 F. Supp. 3d at 112 (“legislation cannot detract from the privilege
afforded by the constitution”) (cleaned up) (quoting Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S.
547, 565 (1892), overruled on other grounds by Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441
(1972)). Although courts have recognized a legitimate governmental interest in preventing
a detainee’s flight and in protecting the community from any danger posed by the detainee,
see, e.g., Gunaydin, 784 F. Supp. 3d at 1189, these interests could be addressed by
providing individualized hearings, as discussed above.7 Moreover, to the extent the purpose
7 Courts “generally have found that the cost of providing a bond hearing is relatively
minimal.” Hilario M.R. v. Warden, Mesa Verde Det. Ctr., 2025 WL 1158841, at *9 (E.D. Cal.
Apr. 21, 2025); see Tenemasa-Lema, 810 F. Supp. 3d at 258-59. Additionally, courts have
recognized that detention itself imposes significant costs and burdens. See Hernandez-Lara v.
Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 33 (1st Cir. 2021) (noting the “substantial social costs” of detention that
separates families and removes breadwinners, caregivers, parents, siblings, and employees from
the community); Rodriguez, 823 F. Supp. 3d at 690 (“Indeed, given the high costs of detention and
the potential for removal proceedings to last multiple years, the Government would reduce its
overall fiscal and administrative burden by detaining only those people who have been determined
to pose a danger or flight risk”) (citing Black v. Decker, 103 F.4th 133, 154 (2d Cir. 2024);
Sampiao v. Hyde, 799 F. Supp. 3d 14, 34 (D. Mass. 2025) (noting that detention of those who have
been denied release on bond or the opportunity to seek release “requires the government to
continue funding and overseeing [the petitioner’s] detention”).
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of the detention is punitive, the purpose is impermissible in the context of civil immigration
proceedings. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80. The respondents have not contested the
petitioner’s material facts, which include her previous release based on the respondents’
determination that she did not pose a flight risk or danger to the community and that she is
pursuing relief from removal. The third factor therefore weighs in the petitioner’s favor.
Because all three Mathews factors weigh in the petitioner’s favor, she is detained
without due process of law. The Court concludes, in accordance with numerous other
courts considering the question, that detention under § 1225(b)(2) as applied to this
petitioner, without an individualized assessment or any notice or opportunity to be heard,
violates the petitioner’s right to procedural due process. The petition for a writ of habeas
corpus will be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 2241; 28 U.S.C. § 2243; see Brown v. Davenport, 596
U.S. 118, 128 (2022) (“federal courts may grant habeas relief as law and justice require”)
(cleaned up).
“Habeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful executive detention.” Munaf v. Geren,
553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008). The remedy for unlawful detention “is, of course, release.” Id.;
see Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973) (based on statutory language of 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) and the common-law history of the writ, “the essence of habeas corpus
is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and that the traditional
function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody”). Because the respondents do
not acknowledge any process available to the petitioner, “there is no process to await.” See
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Aroca v. Mason, 819 F. Supp. 3d 517, 548 (S.D.W. Va. 2026) (cleaned up) (collecting
cases).8 After reviewing the authorities and all matters of record, the Court determines that
release is the appropriate habeas relief for the unlawful detention in this case.
The Court therefore ORDERS as follows:
1. The respondents’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 6) is DENIED.
2. The petitioner’s petition for habeas relief (Dkt. 1) is GRANTED in part.
3. The respondents are ORDERED to RELEASE the petitioner from custody to a
public location, under conditions of release no more restrictive than those in
place prior to the detention at issue in this case, within 48 hours of this order.
4. The respondents are further ORDERED to inform the petitioner and petitioner’s
counsel of the time and location of release at least three hours before the
release.
5. The respondents are further ORDERED to return to the petitioner, at the time
of her release from custody, any and all identification documents taken from her
at the time of or during her detention.
6. Any possible or anticipated removal or transfer of the petitioner under this
present detention is PROHIBITED and ENJOINED.
7. The respondents may not re-detain the petitioner during the pendency of her
removal proceedings absent a pre-detention hearing before an immigration judge
8 In light of the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Buenrostro-Mendez, and because the respondents
do not argue that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) applies, the Court does not order a bond hearing under
§ 1226(a). See Ahmed M. v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-4711 (ECT/SGE), 2026 WL 25627, at *3 (D.
Minn. Jan. 5, 2026) (collecting cases).
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at which the government demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, that
she is a flight risk or a danger to the community. See Giri v. Lyons, No. 5:26-
CV-00149, ___ F. Supp. 3d _____, 2026 WL 1361557, at *13 (S.D. Tex. May
12, 2026) (collecting authorities).
8. The respondents are further ORDERED to file a status report updating the Court
within 72 hours of this order.
9. All other pending motions, if any, are DENIED as moot.
The Clerk will provide a copy of this order to the parties.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on , 2026.
__________________________________
GEORGE C. HANKS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
July 2
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