Marcelo-Aguila v. Noem et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
MISAEL MARCELO-
AGUILA,
Petitioner,
versus
KRISTI NOEM, et al,
Respondents.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
CIVIL ACTION NUMBER
4:26-cv-01376
JUDGE CHARLES ESKRIDGE
OPINION AND ORDER ON DISMISSAL
Petitioner Misael Marcelo-Aguila filed a petition for
writ of habeas corpus under 28 USC §2241 on February 20,
2026. Dkt 1. He proceeds here pro se. He acknowledges
illegal entry into the United States at a prior date but
nonetheless asserts that his present detention violates the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id at 6, 13.
A prior order noted the Fifth Circuit’s decision in
Buenrostro-Mendez v Bondi, 166 F4th 494, 502–08 (5th Cir
2026), which held 8 USC §1225(b)(2)(A) to subject anyone
present in the United States without legal admission to
mandatory detention as an “applicant for admission”
deemed to be “seeking admission.” See Dkt 5 at 1–2; see
also Herrera Avila v Bondi, 2026 WL 819258 (8th Cir)
(holding to same effect as Buenrostro-Mendez). That order
also conveyed a number of previous decisions by the
undersigned resolving several closely related issues. See
Dkt 5 at 2–5.
Initial screening of the petition determined that the
arguments presented raised only issues resolved in those
decisions. But Petitioner was granted an opportunity to
specify individual circumstances or additional arguments
supporting a different result. Id at 4–5.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
April 07, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
Case 4:26-cv-01376 Document 8 Filed 04/07/26 in TXSD Page 1 of 3

2
Petitioner responded to that order. Dkt 7. He
recognizes the decision in Buenrostro-Mendez, and he
doesn’t dispute that it authorizes the Government to detain
him under §1225(b)(2)(A). But he contends that the
Buenrostro-Mendez decision didn’t address the specific due
process claim he raises, being whether the Government
may constitutionally revoke his previously granted release
on supervision without first providing an individualized
process.
In essence, then, Petitioner seeks to bind the current
Administration to decisions made previously regarding the
enforcement of a statute clearly applicable to him. The
Fifth Circuit notes that courts are “exceedingly reluctant
to grant equitable estoppel against the government.”
Robertson-Dewar v Holder, 646 F3d 226, 229 (5th Cir
2011). As the Supreme Court observes, “When the
Government is unable to enforce the law because the
conduct of its agents has given rise to an estoppel, the
interest of the citizenry as a whole in obedience to the rule
of law is undermined.” Heckler v Community Health
Services of Crawford County, 467 US 51, 60 (1984). “In
addition, the government should not be unduly hindered
from changing its position if that shift is the result of a
change in public policy.” United States v Owens, 54 F3d
271, 275 (6th Cir 1995).
Such concerns are certainly present here. The Supreme
Court has recognized that “the Government may
constitutionally detain deportable aliens during the
limited period necessary for their removal proceedings.”
Maceda Jimenez v Thompson, 2025 WL 3265493, *1
(SD Tex), quoting Demore v Kim, 538 US 510, 526 (2003).
The decision of prior Administrations to decline to enforce
§1225(b)(2)(A) against individuals like Petitioner in no way
changes the plain statutory text nor otherwise abrogates
the Government’s authority to lawfully detain Petitioner
pending his removal. As recently explained by Judge
Fernando Rodriguez:
Petitioner enjoyed liberty within the
United States for some years when past
Case 4:26-cv-01376 Document 8 Filed 04/07/26 in TXSD Page 2 of 3

3
administrations exercised their discretion
to forgo applying [§]1225 to him. But no
statutory or regulatory provision, and no
Constitutional principle, requires Respond-
ents to follow specific procedural steps
before exercising their authority to the
fullest under [§]1225.
Makhmudov v Lyons, 2026 WL 879392, *1 (SD Tex).
Petitioner thus hasn’t established that his current
detention violates either the Constitution or federal law.
As such, he isn’t entitled to relief in this action.
The petition for writ of habeas corpus by Petitioner
Misael Marcelo-Aguila is DENIED. Dkt 1.
This action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Any pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT.
A certificate of appealability is DENIED as unnecessary.
Final judgment will enter separately.
The Clerk will mail this Order to Petitioner and email
this Order to USATXS.CivilNotice@usdoj.gov to provide
notice of this disposition to Respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Signed on April 7, 2026, at Houston, Texas.
__________________________
Honorable Charles Eskridge
United States District Judge
Case 4:26-cv-01376 Document 8 Filed 04/07/26 in TXSD Page 3 of 3