Robinson et al v. Brazos Valley Council of Governments et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
Anthony 	Robinson 	and 	Latoya
Robinson,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Brazos 	Valley 	Council 	of
Governments, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 4:26-cv-00016
ORDER ON REQUEST FOR COURT-APPOINTED LAWYER
This is a housing dispute. 	Plaintiffs Anthony Robinson and Latoya
Robinson 	filed 	this 	suit 	against 	Defendants 	Brazos 	Valley 	Council 	of
Governments 	(“BVCOG”), 	BVCOG 	employees 	Roger 	Sheridan, 	Harold
Womble, Leanne Ray, Lilly Moncivais, Audrey De La Rosa, and Yasmin
Coleman, 	Heritage 	Apartments 	employees 	Linette 	Bounds 	and 	Jackie
Hampton, and their former neighbor, Cassandra Karow. 	Dkt. 1-7 at 2.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated their due process rights, U.S. Const.
Amend. XIV, Tex. Const. Art. I § 19, the Violence Against Women Act,
34 U.S.C. § 12491, the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 	3604(f), 3617, and the
Texas Penal Code § 42.092, and that the termination of Plaintiffs’ Section 8
housing voucher was arbitrary and capricious, 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(e)(6).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
March 12, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Dkt. 1-7 at 2-8. Now pending are Plaintiffs’ two separate motions1 requesting
a court-appointed attorney under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Dkts. 13, 14.
Section 	1915(e)(1) 	provides 	that 	for 	litigants 	proceeding 	in 	forma
pauperis (IFP), a court “may request an attorney to represent any person
unable to afford counsel.” 	28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). 	Under this statute, a court
should 	appoint 	an 	attorney 	only 	when 	the 	case 	presents 	exceptional
circumstances. 	See Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 212 (5th Cir. 1982).
This is because “the appointment of counsel in a civil case is a privilege and
not a constitutional right.” 	Lopez v. Reyes, 692 F.2d 15, 17 (5th Cir. 1982).
Thus, 	a 	complainant, 	even 	if 	indigent, 	“has 	no 	right 	to 	the 	automatic
appointment of counsel.” See Ulmer, 691 F.2d at 212 (citations omitted).
When evaluating whether exceptional circumstances exist, courts have
considered several non-exclusive factors: “1. the type and complexity of the
case; 2. the litigant’s ability to investigate and present his case; 3. the presence
of evidence which largely consists of conflicting testimony so as to require skill
in presentation of evidence and in cross-examination; and 4. the likelihood that
appointment will benefit the petitioner, the court, and the defendants by
shortening 	the 	trial 	and 	assisting 	in 	just 	determination.” 	Naranjo 	v.
Thompson, 809 F.3d 793, 799 (5th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted). Courts may
1 Plaintiffs’ second motion (Dkt. 14) repeats and expands upon the contentions in their
first request for a Court-appointed attorney (Dkt. 13).
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also consider the extent of a plaintiff’s attempts to secure private counsel
independently. See id.
Although Plaintiffs’ motions invoke Section 1915, they have neither
sought nor been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this Court. That
omission alone merits denying their request to appoint counsel.
Moreover, Plaintiffs have not shown that theirs is an exceptional case
warranting appointment of counsel. 	As to the first two factors, Plaintiffs
maintain that this case involves “complex federal and administrative law
issues” that “exceed the typical capacity of a pro se litigant to litigate effectively
without counsel.” Dkt. 14 at 2. They note that this case will require a review
of the complete administrative record exclusively controlled by the Defendants,
and that their lack of PACER access prevents them from being able to verify
Defendants’ representations. Id.
Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertions, there is nothing unusual about this
case. Plaintiffs’ claims are not factually or legally complex, and “do not appear
to involve complex evidence, testimony, or circumstances that would require
assistance of counsel ….” See Thomas v. Enriched Schs., 2024 WL 3496543, at
*2-3 (E.D. La. July 19, 2024) (denying request for counsel in a suit that was
not “unusual or exceptional”). 	At this early stage, nothing indicates that the
process of gathering proof, including obtaining relevant documents during
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discovery, will be inordinately complicated. 	Access to PACER has no bearing
on that process.
In 	addition, 	Plaintiffs 	have 	already 	prepared 	and 	submitted
comprehensible filings even without an attorney’s assistance. See, e.g., Dkt. 1-
7 (complaint, including cogent summary of the factual allegations); Dkt. 14
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1)). 	And Plaintiffs have not shown that they have
attempted to secure counsel, including counsel who would be willing to take
the case on a contingency fee. No exceptional circumstances justify appointing
counsel.
Conclusion
For the reasons above, it is ORDERED that Plaintiffs Anthony and
Latoya Robinson’s motions for appointment of counsel (Dkts. 13, 14) are
DENIED.
Signed on March 12, 2026, at Houston, Texas.
__________________________________
Yvonne Y. Ho
United States Magistrate Judge
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