Belmont v. Redondo et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
IN THE ESTATE OF 	§
WILLIAM MICHAEL REDONDO, 	§ 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:25-6168
DECEASED 	§
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Securian Life Insurance Company removed this case from Probate Court No.
1, Montgomery County, Texas citing federal question subject matter jurisdiction and
representing that Wesley Wade Redondo’s Second Amended Will Contest and
Objection to Application to Probate Will seeks ERISA benefits.1 ECF 1. The Notice
of Removal quotes 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c)(2), which states: “Upon removal of an
action described in paragraph (1), the Court shall sever from the action all claims
described in paragraph 1(B)2 and shall remand the severed claims to the State court
from which the action was removed.” ECF 1 at 3. Before the Court is Redondo’s
Motion to Remand, which is ripe for determination. ECF 8; ECF 9; ECF 12. Having
considered the parties’ submissions and the law, the Court recommends that
Redondo’s Motion be granted in part; Redondo’s ERISA claims against Securian
asserted in the Second Amended Will Contest be severed from the probate claims;
1 The District Judge referred this case to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B), the Cost and Delay Reduction Plan under the Civil Justice Reform Act,
and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. ECF 14.
2 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c)(1) provides that an entire action may be removed if it contains both a claim
arising under federal law (§ 1441(c)(1)(A) and a claim not within the jurisdiction of the federal
court (§ 1441(c)(1)(B)).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
July 09, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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and the probate claims over which this Court lacks jurisdiction be remanded to state
court.
I. 	Background
On September 20, 2024, Lauren LaFoy, identifying herself as an interested
party, initiated Probate Case No. 24-47273-P in Montgomery County Probate Court
1 by filing an Application for Independent Administration and Letters of
Administration Pursuant to Section 401.0032 of the Texas Estates Code. ECF 1-2
at 11-13. The Foy Application represents that William Michael Redondo (Decedent)
died intestate in Montgomery County, Texas on July 31, 2024, leaving one child,
35-year-old Wesley Wade Redondo. Id. On October 16, 2024, Michelle Ann
Belmont, Decedent’s sister, filed an Application to Probate Will and For Issuance of
Letters Testamentary in Probate Case No. 24-47273-P. ECF 1-3 at 2-4. Belmont
filed a copy of what she represents to be a true and correct copy of Decedent’s Will.
ECF 1-3 at 6-9.
On October 28, 2024, Redondo filed a Will Contest and Objection to
Application to Probate Will. ECF 1-4 at 1-6. After discovering over a year later
that Securian paid Decedent’s life insurance benefits to Belmont, Redondo filed a
Second Amended Will Contest and Objection to Application to Probate Will on
November 14, 2025. ECF 1-43 at 6-16. The Second Amended Will Contest again
raises objections to the validity of Decedent’s Will (lack of testamentary capacity,
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forgery, fraud) and adds a new claim challenging Securian’s payment of non-probate
assets to Belmont. Id. Securian was served on November 20, 2025, and on
December 19, 2025, filed a Notice of Removal for the entire Probate Case No. 24-
47273-P. ECF 1. Securian attests via Declaration that Decedent was insured at the
time of his death under Group Policy No. 70201, effective January 1, 2022, and
issued to United Airlines as part of an ERISA-governed employee welfare benefit
plan. ECF 1-1.
II. 	Removal Standards
A defendant may remove a case to federal court if the federal court has
jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). However, federal jurisdiction is limited. Howery
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). The party
invoking this Court’s removal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing the
existence of federal jurisdiction. See Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.,
276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court recently
succinctly summarized the removal process as follows:
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1), a party sued in state court who prefers
to proceed in federal court generally has 30 days after receiving notice
of the state-court action to remove the lawsuit to federal court (if there
are grounds for doing so). . . .
The right to remove a lawsuit from state to federal court “is entirely a
creature of statute[,] and ‘a suit commenced in a state court must remain
there until cause is shown for its transfer under some act of Congress.’”
Congress provided one such basis for removal in § 1441(a), which
authorizes removal if a civil action “brought in a State court” is one
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over “which the district courts of the United States have original
jurisdiction.” . . .
For defendants seeking to remove under § 1441(a), the procedures for
doing so are largely set forth in § 1446. Key here as to timing, the
“notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within
30 days after the receipt” of the “initial pleading” in that action, “or
within 30 days after the service of summons upon the defendant[,] ...
whichever period is shorter.” § 1446(b). This 30-day default rule is
subject to several exceptions in § 1446 and elsewhere. Section
1446(b)(3), for instance, extends the 30-day deadline if an initial
pleading did not provide a basis for removal but it is later “ascertained
that the case is one which is or has become removable.” . . .
After a case is removed, any motion to remand the case to state court
must be filed within 30 days of the notice of removal. § 1447(c). An
order remanding a case generally “is not reviewable on appeal or
otherwise.” § 1447(d).
Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel on behalf of Michigan, 146 S. Ct. 1074, 1079–80
(2026) (internal citations omitted).
III. Analysis
Redondo argues that this case must be remanded to state probate court because
(1) removal was untimely; and (2) no federal jurisdiction exists pursuant to the
“probate exception” recognized by the Supreme Court in Marshall v. Marshall, 547
U.S. 293, 308 (2006) (stating “Decisions of this Court have recognized a ‘probate
exception,’ kin to the domestic relations exception, to otherwise proper federal
jurisdiction.”). The Court addresses each of Redondo’s arguments in turn.
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A. Removal was timely.
The parties agree that Probate Case No. 24-47273-P, including Redondo’s
original Will Contest, was not removable to federal court. Section 1446(b)(3)
governs the timing for removal when an initial pleading is not removable:
[A] notice of removal may be filed within 30 days after receipt by the
defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended
pleading, motion, order, or other paper from which it may be first
ascertained that the case is one which is or had become removable.
Redondo argues that the clock on Securian’s 30-day removal window began ticking
on November 14, 2025, the date he filed the Second Amended Will Contest and
provided Securian’s counsel with a copy of the filing by email. ECF 6 at 3. Under
Redondo’s theory, Securian’s December 19, 2025 Notice of Removal was 4 days
late.
Securian was not a party to the initial Will Contest. Even though Redondo
emailed a copy of the Second Amended Will Contest to Securian’s counsel on
November 14, 2025, Securian was not served until November 20, 2025. Section
1446(b)(3) refers to removal by “the defendant” 30 days after “receipt by the
defendant” of a pleading making the case removable. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3)
(emphasis added). Securian was not a “defendant’ prior to service of the Second
Amended Will Contest. Supreme Court precedent establishes that it is a “bedrock
principle” that a party is not required to appear in an action or file a notice of removal
“unless notified of the action, and brought under a court's authority, by formal
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process.” Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999)
(emphasis added). Notice of an action is not service of process. Ellibee v. Leonard,
226 F. App'x 351, 357 (5th Cir. 2007) (explaining “[a]lthough all of the defendants
may have received notice of the civil action, actual notice is not sufficient service of
process.” (citing Way v. Mueller Brass Co., 840 F.2d 303, 306 (5th Cir.1988)).
Therefore, the 30-day removal period expired on Saturday, December 20, 2025 and
Securian’s December 19, 2025 Notice of Removal was timely.
B. The probate exception does not preclude removal.
Securian acknowledges that a federal court “has no jurisdiction to probate a
will or administer and estate[.]” ECF 9 at 7 (citing Curtis v. Brunsting, 704 F.3d
406, 408 (5th Cir. 2013)). However, the probate exception to federal jurisdiction is
narrow and “does not bar a federal court from exercising jurisdiction over all claims
related to such a proceeding.” Curtis, 704 F.3d at 408. Under Marshall, “the probate
exception bars a federal district court only from (1) probating or annulling a will or
(2) ‘seek[ing] to reach a res in custody of a state court’ by ‘endeavoring to dispose
of [such] property.’” Id. (alternations in original). Redondo’s Second Amended
Will Contest concedes that the life insurance proceeds Securian disbursed to
Belmont are non-probate assets, and the funds are in the custody of Belmont, not the
state court. ECF 1-43 at 8. Therefore, this case was removable to federal court based
on federal question jurisdiction based on Redondo’s asserted ERISA claim against
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Securian. However, the probate matter must be severed and remanded to state
probate court. Redondo acknowledges as much in his Reply, by stating: “it appears
that there is no dispute to remanding at least the Probate Matter.” ECF 12 at 1.
IV. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the reasons discussed above, the Court RECOMMENDS that Redondo’s
Motion to Remand (ECF 6) be GRANTED in part; ERISA claims against Securian
be severed from Probate Case No. 24-47273-P; and the remaining claims in
Redondo’s Second Amended Will Contest and Objection to Application to Probate
Will be REMANDED to Probate Court No. 1 in Montgomery County, Texas under
Probate Case No. 24-47273-P.
The Clerk of the Court shall send copies of the memorandum and
recommendation to the respective parties, who will then have fourteen days to file
written objections, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file written
objections within the time period provided will bar an aggrieved party from attacking
the factual findings and legal conclusions on appeal. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto.
Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on
other grounds.
Christina A. Bryan
United States Magistrate Judge
Signed on July 09, 2026, at Houston, Texas.
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