Cruz et al v. City of Rosenberg et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
Stephine Nelson Cruz and Hansel
Rodriguez,
Plaintiffs,
v.
City of Rosenberg, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 4:25-cv-06097
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
On June 5, 2026, Plaintiff filed a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) to
alter or amend the final judgment dismissing with prejudice her claims under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act,
and for negligence. 1 	Dkt. 11. 	This Court’s order adopted the undersigned’s
conclusions that the foregoing claims accrued during the challenged June 7,
2022 traffic stop—when Cruz allegedly suffered emotional distress—and are
barred by the two-year statute of limitations. 	See Dkt. 9 (adopting Dkt. 7);
Dkt. 7 at 9-16. Cruz’s latest filing does not merit revisiting that conclusion.
1 Cruz does not challenge the dismissal without prejudice of her other claim under
the Texas Public Information Act. See Dkt. 11 at 5.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
June 18, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Relief under Rule 59(e) is an “extraordinary remedy that should be used
sparingly.” 	Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 396 (5th Cir. 2021)
(quoting Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 2004)). 	The
Rule 59(e) standard “favor[s] denial of motions to alter or amend a judgment.”
S. Constructors Grp., Inc. v. Dynalectric Co., 2 F.3d 606, 611 (5th Cir. 1993).
To obtain relief, the movant “must clearly establish either a manifest
error of law or fact or must present newly discovered evidence.” 	Simon v.
United States, 891 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1990) (quotations omitted).
“[S]uch a motion is not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal
theories, or arguments that could have been offered or raised before the entry
of judgment.” Templet, 367 F.3d at 479.
Cruz’s contentions falter under that strict standard. She merely reprises
prior contentions that this Court already considered and rejected. 	Like her
earlier objections, Cruz repeats her argument that the discovery rule tolls the
limitations period because the psychological distress she experienced during
the traffic stop did not develop into other mental health conditions until later.
Compare Dkt. 8 at 6-7, with Dkt. 11 at 2-3. And like her prior objections, Cruz
asserts 	again 	that 	her 	diligence 	and 	the 	availability 	of 	tolling 	were
prematurely resolved at this stage. 	Compare Dkt. 8 at 8-9, with Dkt. 11 at 3-
4. Rehashing those arguments provides no basis for relief.
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More fundamentally, it does not matter whether Cruz’s distress at the
time of events worsened into other conditions later, nor whether she was
subjectively aware of what incident was to blame. 	Either way, settled law
holds that she sustained a legally actionable injury that accrued during the
traffic stop itself. See, e.g., Doe v. St. Stephen’s Episcopal Sc., 382 F. App’x 386,
388-89 (5th Cir 2010) (applying Texas’s discovery rule when concluding that a
plaintiff need not connect the wrongful act “to any subsequent psychological
injuries or understand the full extent” of those injuries for the claim to accrue);
Regency Field Servs., LLC v. Swift Energy Operating, LLC, 622 S.W.3d 807,
815 (Tex. 2021) (negligence claim accrues upon occurrence of injury “even if the
claimant does not yet know that a legal injury has occurred, has not yet
experienced the full extent of the injury, or cannot yet ascertain the resulting
damages”). There is no basis to extend the limitations under the discovery rule
or any other tolling doctrine. 	And because her claims are time-barred as a
matter of law, the deficiency cannot be rectified by amendment. Cruz’s motion
under Rule 59(e) should be denied.
Recommendation
For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	it 	is 	RECOMMENDED 	that 	Plaintiff
Stephine Nelson Cruz’s motion to alter or amend the final judgment (Dkt. 11)
be DENIED.
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The parties have fourteen days from service of this Report and
Recommendation to file written objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.
R. 	Civ. 	P. 	72(b). 	Failure 	to 	file 	timely 	objections 	will 	preclude
appellate review of factual findings and legal conclusions, except for
plain error. 	Ortiz v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep’t, 806 F.3d 822, 825
(5th Cir. 2015).
Signed on June 18, 2026, at Houston, Texas.
______________________________
Yvonne Y. Ho
United States Magistrate Judge
_____________________________________
vonn	n	n	neeee Y	Y	Y. Ho
nited States Magistrate Judge
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