Ayala Ayala v. Frink et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
Juan Miguel Ayala Ayala
(A # 221-277-385),
Petitioner,
v.
Martin L. Frink, Warden of the
Houston Contract Detention
Facility, et al.,
Respondents.
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Civil Action H-25-5832
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
This case has been referred to the undersigned magistrate
judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). ECF No. 4. Pending before
the court is Juan Miguel Ayala Ayala’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus, 	ECF 	No. 	1, 	and 	Respondents’ 	Motion 	for 	Summary
Judgment, 	ECF 	No. 	10. 	The 	court 	recommends 	that 	Ayala’s
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, ECF No. 1, be GRANTED,
and 	that 	Respondents’ 	Motion 	for 	Summary 	Judgment,
ECF No. 10, be DENIED.
Juan Miguel Ayala Ayala was born in El Salvador. ECF
No. 1-2 at 2. It is undisputed that Ayala entered the United States
without inspection in 2008, when he was approximately 16 years
old, and that he has remained in this country since that time. Id.
Ayala has three children, who are United States citizens. Id. He
has no prior arrests or criminal convictions. Id. He also has no
prior contacts with the immigration authorities.
On November 6, 2025, Ayala was arrested during a traffic
stop and taken into ICE custody. ECF No. 1-2 at 2. Ayala has been
charged with entering the United States without being admitted
or 	inspected. 	He 	is 	thus 	“inadmissible” 	under 	8 	U.S.C.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
January 20, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) 	as 	“[a]n 	alien 	present 	in 	the 	United 	States
without being admitted or paroled, who arrives in the United
States at any time or place other than as designated by the
Attorney General . . . .” Ayala is now being held in custody at the
Houston Contract Detention Facility. Id. at 3. He has been denied
the opportunity for a bond hearing, which is the basis for his
instant petition for writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 2.
Ayala 	filed 	his 	Petition 	for 	Writ 	of 	Habeas 	Corpus 	on
December 	5, 	2025. 	ECF 	No. 	1. 	The 	court 	held 	a 	hearing 	on
December 15, 2025, and entered an expedited briefing schedule.
ECF No. 8. This Memorandum and Recommendation is being
issued in an expedited manner as well.
Ayala argues that he is entitled to a bond hearing, which has
been denied on the basis of a recent Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) policy, as well as a recent decision by the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) upholding the policy change. ECF
No. 1 at 2. Ayala “seeks a writ of habeas corpus requiring that he
be released [from custody] unless Respondents provide a bond
hearing under [8 U.S.C.] § 1226(a) within seven days.” Id. at 3.
The question in this case is which of two statutes applies to
Ayala. 	Respondent 	argues 	that 	Ayala 	is 	an 	“applicant 	for
admission” who is also “seeking admission” into the United States
and thus, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), is not entitled to a
bond hearing. Ayala argues that he is entitled to a bond hearing
under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which generally allows release of any
alien who has been arrested on a warrant and is detained pending
a decision on removal. Ayala points out that, for many years before
DHS’s new policy was enacted, DHS would have considered him to
be entitled to a bond hearing under section 1226(a) and would
not 	have 	considered 	him 	to 	be 	within 	the 	ambit 	of
section 1225(b)(2)(A).
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Under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) “in the case of an alien who
is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer
determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained
for a proceeding under . . . this title.” (emphasis added) Ayala
admits, as he must, that he is an applicant for admission. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(a)(1) defines that phrase to include any “alien present in
the United States who has not been admitted.” Ayala meets that
definition. 	Ayala 	argues 	that 	he 	is 	not 	“seeking 	admission,”
however, because he has been in this country for decades and was
taking no steps toward admission when he was apprehended.
Before last year, DHS would have agreed with Ayala. For
decades, the government has relied on section 1226(a) to detain
“aliens already in the country,” while relying on section 1225(b) to
detain “aliens seeking admission into the country.” See Acosta de
Perez v. Frink, No. 25-5357, 2025 WL 3626347, at *2 (S.D. Tex.
Dec. 12, 2025) (citing Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 300
(2018)). However, on July 8, 2025, DHS issued “Interim Guidance,”
which states that “§ 1225 of the INA, rather than § 1226, is the
applicable immigration detention authority for all applicants for
admission.” Id. (citing ICE Memo: Interim Guidance Regarding
Detention Authority for Applications for Admission, available at
https://perma.cc/4Q6X-GAZC (last visited Jan. 20, 2026)). This
guidance, 	if 	followed, 	would 	greatly 	broaden 	the 	reach 	of
section 1225(b)(2)(A) to include all aliens who entered without
inspection, regardless of how long they have been in the United
States, 	or 	what 	they 	were 	doing 	when 	contacted 	by 	federal
authorities. On September 5, 2025, the BIA affirmed DHS’s new
policy in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).
The BIA held that individuals who are deemed inadmissible under
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) are “applicants for admission” and, therefore,
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subject to mandatory detention. Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec.
at 228–29.1
In his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Ayala argues that
the 	government’s 	designation 	of 	Ayala 	as 	an 	“applicant 	for
admission,” and its refusal to grant him a bond hearing on that
basis, “violates the plain language of the [INA].” ECF No. 1 at 2.
Ayala 	argues 	that 	“[s]ection 	1225(b)(2)(A) 	does 	not 	apply 	to
individuals like [him] who previously entered and are now residing
in the United States.” Id. Instead, he argues, he should be subject
to section 1226, which “allows for release on conditional parole or
bond.” 	Id. 	Ayala’s 	basic 	argument 	is 	that 	an 	alien 	who 	is
statutorily 	defined 	as 	an 	“applicant 	for 	admission” 	is 	not
necessarily also an alien “seeking admission.” That is, Congress
used both phrases in section 1225(b)(2)(A) and to collapse them
into one would be to excise the second phrase from the statute.
Respondents argue that their current interpretation of the
statutes is supported by the plain statutory text and various
canons of statutory construction. ECF No. 10. They assert that, in
the context of section 1225(b)(2), “there is no difference between
‘an applicant for admission’ and ‘an alien seeking admission[.]’” Id.
at 14. Respondents argue that section 1225(b)(2)(A), applies to all
“applicant[s] for admission,” and that, “as an alien ‘present in the
United States who has not been admitted,’ [Ayala] is by definition
‘an applicant for admission.’” Id. at 13.
This is not the first time that these arguments have been
raised in the courts of this district. There are many decisions that
1 Of course, federal district courts are not bound by agency interpretations of statutes.
Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 392 (2024) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706); see
also, e.g., Acosta de Perez, 2025 WL 3626347, at *2 (citing Loper Bright to reject the
government’s assertion that the court should defer to the BIA’s decision in Yajure
Hurtado); Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, No. 25-3726, 2025 WL 2886346, at *3 n.3
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2025) (same).
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have come out on both sides of the very arguments made here. The
court has considered all of the authority the government has
submitted (ECF Nos. 9, 10 at 3–4, 13 at 2–8), has done its own
independent research, and has carefully considered all of the
parties’ briefing. The court concludes, largely for the reasons set
forth in Judge Hittner’s well-reasoned opinion in Acosta de Perez
v. Frink, No. 25-5357, 2025 WL 3626347 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2025),
that Ayala should be granted a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a). The court concludes that Congress purposefully used
two separate phrases in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and thus intended
them to have independent meaning. Judge Hittner’s statutory
construction analysis is particularly persuasive. Acosta de Perez,
2025 WL 3626347, at *3–4. The undersigned does not believe it is
necessary, given the urgency with which this petition has been
brought before the court, to repeat Judge Hittner’s analysis here.
The court does address specifically one of the government’s
arguments. Respondents cite 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3) and argue that
the statute either equates an “applicant for admission” with an
alien who is “seeking admission,” or indicates that the former
phrase is a subset of the latter. The government’s argument is
based on the following excerpt from subsection 1225(a)(3):
All 	aliens . . . who 	are 	applicants 	for 	admission 	or
otherwise seeking admission . . . to the United States
shall be inspected . . . .
(emphasis added). The government argues that underlined “or
otherwise” 	indicates 	that 	the 	preceding 	italicized 	phrase 	is 	a
subset of the subsequent italicized phrase. If the quoted text were
the only words in the statute, the court would see the government’s
point. But that is not what the statute says. There is more to it.
Subsection 1225(a)(3) says:
All 	aliens . . . who 	are 	applicants 	for 	admission 	or
otherwise 	seeking 	admission 	or 	readmission 	to 	or
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transit 	through 	the 	United 	States 	shall 	be
inspected . . . .
Breaking the statute down, it should be read as follows:
All aliens who are applicants for admission shall be
inspected.
All aliens who are otherwise
seeking admission to the United States, or
seeking readmission to the United States, or
seeking transit through the United States
shall be inspected.
If, as the government suggests, the phrase preceding “or
otherwise” is a subset of the phrase following it, then “applicants
for admission” are a subset not only of aliens seeking admission,
but also those who are seeking “transit through” the United States.
Such a reading makes no grammatical or logical sense.
Moreover, it is notable that “applicant for admission” is a
statutorily defined phrase. Subsection 1225(a)(1) “deems” an alien
“who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States”
to be “an applicant for admission,” regardless of any action the
alien may have taken. “Applicant for admission” would appear to
apply not only to people showing up at the border, but also to
people brought here by their parents when they were children.
Subsection 1225(a)(3) requires inspection of two classes of aliens—
those who are “deemed” to fall within the statutory definition of
“applicant for admission,” as well as those aliens who take the
affirmative act of “seeking” admission to, readmission to, or transit
through the United States.
It is clear to the court that Congress intended “applicants for
admission” to be considered a separate, albeit in many cases
overlapping, category of aliens from those “seeking” admission.
Because there is no evidence that Ayala was “seeking” admission
when he was apprehended, he does not fit the definition of those
not entitled to a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). He
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falls instead under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and is entitled to a bond
hearing.
For 	these 	reasons, 	the 	court 	recommends 	that 	Ayala’s
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, ECF No. 1, be GRANTED,
and that the government’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF
No. 10, be DENIED. The court’s decision is limited to a finding
that Ayala is entitled to a bond hearing under the applicable
statute. The court does not find that Ayala should be released on
bond. That determination is left to the executive branch. Nor does
the court conclude that a detention order would necessarily violate
his due process rights under the Constitution.
The court recommends that Respondents be ORDERED to
provide Ayala with an individualized bond hearing under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a) within seven days of the District Court’s adoption of this
Memorandum 	and 	Recommendation—to 	the 	extent 	that 	it 	is
adopted—or else immediately release Ayala from custody. The
court 	recommends 	that 	Respondents 	be 	PROHIBITED 	from
transferring Ayala outside of the Southern District of Texas until
his bond hearing is held.
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The 	parties 	have 	fourteen 	days 	from 	service 	of 	this
Memorandum and Recommendation to file written objections. 28
U.S.C. 	§ 636(b)(1); 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	72. 	Failure 	to 	timely 	file
objections will preclude appellate review of factual findings or legal
conclusions, except for plain error. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S.
140, 147–49 (1985); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276–77 (5th
Cir. 1988).
Signed at Houston, Texas, on January 20, 2026.
______________________________________
Peter Bray
United States Magistrate Judge
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