Leal Garcia v. Frink et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
MARIA DEL CORAL LEAL
GARCIA,
Petitioner,
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v. 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:25-cv-5387
KRISTI LYNN NOEM, et al.,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court1 is Petitioner Maria del Coral Leal Garcia’s
(“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) (ECF No. 1) as
well 	as 	the 	Government’s 	(“Respondents”) 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	Plaintiff’s
Petition (ECF No. 17). 	Petitioner 	then filed a Reply in Opposition 	to the
Government’s motion (ECF No. 18). Based on a careful review of the Petition,
briefing, arguments, and relevant law, including recent binding precedent
from the Fifth Circuit, the Court RECOMMENDS Petitioner’s Petition (ECF
No. 1) be DENIED AS MOOT, Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 17)
be GRANTED, Respondents’ previously filed Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos.
1 This case was referred to the Undersigned for all purposes pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. (ECF No. 20).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
July 27, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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10, 16) be DENIED AS MOOT, and this case be DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
I. 	Background
According to the Petition, Plaintiff is a citizen of Mexico who has been
residing in the United States since 2000. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 1). On or about June
23, 2025, Respondents’ agents apprehended Petitioner. 	(Id.). As of November
11, 2025, the time of the filing of the Petition, Petitioner was detained at the
Houston 	Contract 	Detention 	Facility 	in 	Houston, 	Texas. 	(Id. 	at 	¶ 	21).
Petitioner sought release from detention or a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a). 	(Id. at ¶¶ 52–55). 	Her Petition also alleges a Fifth Amendment
violation. (Id. at ¶¶ 56–60).
On 	January 	2, 	2026, 	Petitioner 	was 	released 	on 	bond 	from 	the
Department of Homeland Security’s custody. (ECF No. 17 at 2 (citing ECF No.
17-1); see also ECF No. 18 at 2).
II. 	Legal Standard
a. Habeas Corpus
A person in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States can seek relief by writ of habeas corpus. 	P.B. v. Bergami,
No. 3:25-cv-2978, 2025 WL 3632752, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 13, 2025) (citing 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)). 	“[A]bsent suspension, the writ of habeas corpus remains
available to every individual detained within the United States.” 	Hamdi v.
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Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004). 	“The Supreme Court has interpreted
§ 2241 as granting district 	courts with jurisdiction 	to hear habeas corpus
challenges to the legality of the detention of aliens.” Lopez v. Ladwig, No. 6:25-
cv-1884, 2026 WL 19095, at *3 (W.D. La. Jan. 2, 2026) (citing Rasul v. Bush,
542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004)).
b. Motion to Dismiss
Dismissal 	under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 	(“Rule”) 12(b)(1) 	is
proper 	where 	“the 	court 	lacks 	the 	statutory 	or 	constitutional 	power 	to
adjudicate the case.” 	Home Builder’s Ass’n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison,
143 F. 3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 2014). 	The plaintiff bears the burden of proving
that a district court has jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. 	See
Ballew v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 668 F.3d 777, 781 (5th Cir. 2012). 	“[I]f the
defense merely files a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the trial court is required merely
to look to the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint because they are
presumed to be true.” 	Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir.
1981).
III. 	Discussion
Respondents argue this Court lacks subject 	matter 	jurisdiction 	over
Petitioner’s Petition because Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)
released 	Petitioner 	from 	custody 	on January 2, 2026, which 	renders 	her
Petition moot. 	(ECF No. 17 at 5). 	Petitioner acknowledges that she has been
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released 	from 	ICE custody; however, she argues her Petition is not moot
because (1) she is at risk of re-detention at any time and (2) she is “in a digital
cage” due to being required to wear an ankle monitor and comply with the
reporting conditions under ICE’s Intensive Supervision Appearance Program
(“ISAP”). (ECF No. 18 at 3–6).
Federal courts’ jurisdiction is limited by Article III of the Constitution to
actual cases and controversies. 	See Payne v. Progressive Fin. Servs., 748 F.3d
605, 607 (5th Cir. 2014). 	An action is rendered moot “when the court cannot
grant the relief requested by the moving party.” 	Salgado v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, 220 F. App’x 256, 257 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Bailey v. Southerland,
821 F.2d 277, 278 (5th Cir. 1987)). 	“A moot case presents no Article III case or
controversy, and a court has no constitutional jurisdiction to resolve the issues
it presents.” 	Goldin v. Bartholow, 166 F.3d 710, 717 (5th Cir. 1999).
“Generally, 	release 	from 	custody 	renders 	a 	habeas petition 	moot.” 2
Rocha v. Mayorkas, 579 F. Supp. 3d 923, 929 (S.D. Tex. 2022) (citing Lane v.
Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 631 (1982)); see also Lemons v. Swann, 412 F. App’x
672, 673 (5th Cir. 2011) (“In the context of habeas petitions . . . this court has
2 An exception applies in the criminal context if the petitioner continues to suffer
“collateral consequences” as a result of the challenged conviction or detention. See Bacilio-
Sabastian v. Barr, 980 F.3d 480, 482 (5th Cir. 2020). Petitioner does not argue this exception
applies here.
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dismissed 	a petitioner’s appeal as moot upon the petitioner’s 	release from
custody . . . .”).
Petitioner’s arguments regarding the risk of re-detention, the use of an
ankle monitor, and compliance with ICE’s ISAP are unsupported and, thus,
without merit. 	Because Petitioner has been granted the relief she sought in
her Petition, the Petition is now moot. 	See Salazar v. Gillis, No. 5:19-cv-142,
2020 WL 3087012, at *1 (S.D. Miss. June 10, 2020) (collecting cases); see also
Branchi v. Acuna, No. 6:25-cv-1943, 2025 WL 4037165, at *1 (W.D. La. Dec.
27, 2025), report and recommendation 	adopted, No. 6:25-cv-1943, 2026 WL
96462 (W.D. La. Jan. 13, 2026); Mendoza v. Tate, No. 26-cv-4249, 2026 WL
2091719, at *1 (S.D. Tex. July 20, 2026).
IV. 	Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court RECOMMENDS Petitioner’s Petition
(ECF No. 1) be DENIED AS MOOT, Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF
No. 17) be GRANTED, Respondents’ previously filed Motions to Dismiss (ECF
Nos. 	10, 	16) 	be 	DENIED 	AS 	MOOT, 	and 	this 	case 	be 	DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
The Clerk shall send copies of this Memorandum and Recommendation
to the respective parties who have fourteen days from the receipt thereof to file
written objections thereto pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)
and General Order 2002-13. 	Failure to file written objections within the time
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period mentioned 	shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking the factual
findings and legal conclusions on appeal.
SIGNED in Houston, Texas on July 27, 2026.
______________________________
Richard W. Bennett
United States Magistrate Judge
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