Espinoza Andres v. Noem et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
FIDENCIO ESPINOZA ANDRES, 	§
§
§
§
Petitioner,
vs.
KRISTI NOEM, et al.,
Respondents.
§ 	CIVIL ACTION NO. H-25-5128
§
§
§
§
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Through counsel, noncitizen Fidencio Espinoza-Andres filed a petition for
writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, seeking his immediate release from
immigration detention. 	(Dkt. 1). The Court ordered an expedited answer from the
respondents. 	(Dkt. 7). 	The respondents answered with a motion for summary
judgment. 	(Dkt. 14). Espinoza filed a response to the motion. 	(Dkt. 18). Having
reviewed the petition, the motion and response, the pleadings, and the law, the Court
denies the respondents' motion for summary judgment, grants Espinoza's petition
in part, and orders the respondents to hold a bond hearing within seven (7) days from
the date of this Order or release Espinoza.
I. 	BACKGROUND
The parties do not dispute the basic facts of this case. Espinoza is a Mexican
national who entered the United States without inspection in 1999. 	(Dkt. 1, p. 2).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
December 02, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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He had no contact with immigration officials until October· 2025, when he was
arrested and served with a Notice to Appear. 	(Id. at 13). 	He was charged with
inadmissibility, and he has been detained since then while removal proceedings
continue. (Id.).
In his petition, Espinoza contends that his detention should be governed by
the discretionary detention provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1226 rather than the mandatory
detention provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1225. 	(Id. at 6-13). 	He contends that both the
plain language of the statutes and longstanding precedent hold that§ 1225 governs
only noncitizens who are detained when they cross the border, while§ 1226 governs
noncitizens who are apprehended while already present in the country. 	(Id.). 	He
argues that while the Department of Homeland Security has recently changed its
interpretation of the two statutes, the new interpretation conflicts with both the plain
language of the statutes and Congressional intent. 	(Id.). 	He asks the Court to find
that the new interpretation of the statutes violates federal law and the Constitution,
order that his removal proceedings be converted to ones under § 1226, and order that
he either be immediately released or given a bond hearing within seven days. (Id. at
14-16).
The respondents answered the petition and moved for summary judgment.
(Dkt. 14). The respondents contend that because Espinoza entered the United States
without inspection, he is subject to mandatory detention under§ 1225(b)(2). (Id. at
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2, 7-14). 	They contend that this result is supported by the plain language of the
applicable statutes, the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision in Matter of Yajure
Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216, 221-27 (BIA 2025), and persuasive decisions from
other district courts. 	(Id. at 7-14). Espinoza filed a timely response to the motion.
(Dkt. 18).
II. 	DISCUSSION
This case is one of a flood of lawsuits filed across the country in the last
several months challenging the federal government's authority to require mandatory
detention for certain noncitizens while their removal proceedings are in progress. At
issue in these cases is the proper interpretation and application of § 1225(b) and
§ 1226(a). 	Espinoza 	contends 	that 	the 	plain 	language 	of the 	statutes 	and
longstanding precedent show that he 	falls 	within the 	discretionary 	detention
provision of§ 1226(a). 	The respondents contend that the plain language of the
statutes shows that Espinoza is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b).
Section 1225, entitled "Inspection by immigration officers; expedited removal
of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing," provides,
Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of alien who is an
applicant 	for 	admission, 	if 	the 	examining 	immigration 	officer
determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a
doubt 	entitled to 	be 	admitted, 	the 	alien 	shall 	be 	detained for 	a
proceeding under [8 U.S.C. § 1229a].
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) (emphasis added).
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In contrast,§ 1226, entitled "Apprehension and detention of aliens," provides,
in pertinent part:
On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested
and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed
from the United States. 	Except as provided in subsection (c) and
pending such decision, the Attorney General-
( I) 	may continue to detain the arrested alien; and
(2) 	may release the alien on -
(A) 	bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by,
and containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General; or
(B) 	conditional parole; but
(3) 	may 	not 	provide 	the 	alien 	with 	work 	authorization
(including 	an 	"employment 	authorized" 	endorsement 	or 	other
appropriate work permit) unless the alien is lawfully admitted for
permanent resident or otherwise would (without regard to removal
proceedings) be provided such authorization.
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
For decades, the Department of Homeland Security has applied§ 1226, rather
than§ 1225, to noncitizens who are apprehended while already present in the United
States without having been admitted or paroled. 	See, e.g., Savane v. Francis, No.
I :25-cv-6666-GHW, 2025 WL 2774452, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2025) (citation
omitted). 	The Department's own regulations concerning asylum procedures adopt
this interpretation of§ 1225 and§ 1226. 	See Inspection & Expedited Removal of
Aliens; Detention and Removal 	of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings;
Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (proposed Mar. 6, 1997) ("Despite
being applicants for admission, aliens who are present without having been admitted
or paroled (formerly referred to as aliens who entered without inspection) will be
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eligible for bond and bond redetermination."). 	Likewise, the Supreme Court has
stated that the government is authorized to detain "aliens seeking admission into the
country" under §§ 1225(b) while detaining "aliens already in the country" under
§ 1226. 	See Jennings 	v. 	Rodriguez, 	583 	U.S. 	281, 	300 	(2018). 	Under this
longstanding precedent, Espinoza would be subject to discretionary detention under
§ 1226(a) and so would be entitled to a bond hearing.
However, the respondents have recently "revisited [their] legal position on
detention and release authorities" under § 1225 and § 1226. 	ICE Memo: Interim
Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applications for Admission, available
at https://perma.cc/4Q6X-GAZC (last visited Dec. 1, 2025). This Interim Guidance
states that the Department of Homeland Security has now "determined that [§ 1225]
of the [INA], rather than[§ 1226], is the applicable immigration detention authority
for all applicants for admission." Id. 	The Interim Guidance goes on to explain this
newly adopted position:
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An "applicant for admission" is an alien present in the United States
who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States, whether
or not at a designated port of arrival. 	Effective immediately, it the
position of DHS that such aliens are subject to detention under
[§ 1225(b)(2)(A)] and may not be released from ICE custody except
by [§ 1182] parole . ... 	For custody purposes, these aliens are now
treated in the same manner that "arriving aliens" have historically been
treated. 	The only aliens eligible for a custody determination and
release 	on 	recognizance, 	bond, 	or 	other 	conditions 	under
[§ 1226(a)] during removal proceedings are aliens admitted to the
United States ... with the exception of those subject to mandatory
detention under[§ 1226(c)].
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Id. (emphasis in original).
Espinoza 	contends 	that 	because 	he 	entered 	the 	United 	States 	without
authorization, was not inspected or detained when he arrived, and was apprehended
miles from the border more than twenty-five years after he arrived, he is neither an
"arriving alien" nor is he "seeking admission," and so he is not subject to§ 1225. In
contrast, the respondents contend that Espinoza falls squarely within § 1225 	(Dkt.
14, p. 8). The respondents assert that "[r]ead properly, a person 'seeking admission'
is just another way of describing a person applying for admission, meaning he is an
applicant for admission, which includes both those individuals arriving in the United
States and those already present without admission." 	(Id. at 8-9). Recognizing the
different phrases used in § 1225, the respondents nevertheless contend that the terms
"applicant for admission" and "seeking admission" are "plainly synonymous" and
plainly apply to Espinoza. The Court disagrees for several reasons.
First, a basic canon of statutory construction is that "differences in language
... convey differences in meaning." 	Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo v. Texas, 596 U.S. 685,
698 (2022) (quoting Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 582 U.S. 79, 86
(2017)); see also Padron Covarrubias v. 	Vergara, No. 5:25-CV-112, 2025 WL
2950097, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 2025) ("[w]hen two different phrases are used in
a statute, a variation in terms suggests a variation in meaning" (citing A. Scalia & B.
Gamer, Reading Law: 	The Interpretation of Legal Texts 	170 (2012))). 	The
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respondents' argument that the Court should treat the different phrases within the
statute as synonymous contradicts this maxim.
Second, well-established principles of statutory construction require courts to
give meaning to each phrase in a statute rather than construing it in a way that renders
parts of it superfluous. See, e.g., TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) ("It
is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon the whole,
to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be
superfluous, void, or insignificant") (cleaned up); United States, ex rel. Polansky v.
Exec. Health Res., Inc., 599 U.S. 419, 432 (2023) ("every clause and word of a
statute should have meaning") (cleaned up). 	But the respondents' interpretation of
§ 1225(b) would make certain portions of it superfluous. As one court has recently
explained:
If, as Respondents argue, § 1225(b)(2)(A) were intended to apply to all
"applicant[s] for admission," there would be no need to include the
phrase "seeking admission" in the statute. 	That is, rather than stating
that mandatory detention is required for any "applicant for admission,
if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted,"
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added), the statute would instead provide
for 	mandatory detention for 	any "applicant for 	admission, 	if the
examining immigration officer determines that [the] 	alien seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted."
Lopez Benitez v. 	Francis, No. 25-CIV-5937(DEH), 2025 WL 2371588, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. 	Aug. 	13, 	2025) 	(emphasis 	and 	strike-through 	in 	original). 	The
respondents' proffered reading of the statute requires the Court to violate this well-
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established principle.
Third, courts may consider the titles of statutes when interpreting their
provisions. See, e.g., Fla. Dep 't of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S.
33, 47 (2008) ("[S]tatutory titles and section headings are tools available for the
resolution of a doubt about the meaning of a statute." (quoting Porter v. Nuss le, 534
U.S. 516, 528 (2002))); see also United States v. Moore, 71 F.4th 392, 397 (5th Cir.
2023). 	Here, the title of§ 1225 states that it applies to the "expedited removal of
inadmissible arriving aliens." In contrast, the title of§ 1226 states that it applies to
the "apprehension" of noncitizens who are already present in the country. 	These
titles contradict the respondents' current argument that§ 1225 applies to noncitizens
who have been present in the country for years and instead support the government's
longstanding interpretation that § 1225 applies to noncitizens intercepted at the
border while § 1226 applies to noncitizens apprehended away from the border years
after they entered.
Based on these three principles of statutory construction, the Court is not
persuaded by the respondents' argument that their current interpretation of the
statutes is guided by their plain language. 	The respondents are not entitled to
summary judgment in their favor on the basis of the plain language of the statutes.
In the alternative, the respondents contend that this Court should defer to the
BIA's recent decision in Matter ofYajure Hurtado, 291. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025),
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but the Court need not do so. 	The Administrative Procedures Act "specifies that
courts, not agencies, will decide 'all relevant questions of laws' arising on review of
agency action . . . and set aside any such action inconsistent with the law as they
interpret it." Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 392 (2024) (quoting
5 U.S.C. § 706) (emphasis in original). The Court finds thatHurtado's interpretation
of§ 1225 and§ 1226 is inconsistent with the language of the statutes themselves, as
well 	as 	with 	the 	Department 	of 	Homeland 	Security's 	own 	longstanding
interpretation and application of those statutes. 1 	Because the Hurtado decision
utterly ignores the Department's U-tum on the proper interpretation and application
of§ 1225 and§ 1226, the Court finds that decision to be unpersuasive.
Finally, the respondents argue that the Court should consider "persuasive
decisions from other district courts." 	(Dkt. 14, p. 13). 	However, the respondents
recognize that district courts are divided on the issue. 	(Id. 	at 	13-14). 	The
1
The Department issued its Interim Guidance setting forth its new interpretation of
§ 1225 without providing a notice-and-comment period that would in most cases be
required by 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) for agency rulemaking. Nevertheless, the Court recognizes
that "interpretive rules," which are "issued by an agency to advise the public of the
agency's construction of the statutes and rules which it administers" are not subject to the
notice-and-comment requirement. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 575 U.S. 92, 96-97
(2015). 	Such interpretive rules may also be amended without providing a notice-and-
comment period under§ 553(b). Id. at 102. The respondents do not address whether their
new interpretation of§ 1225 constitutes only an interpretive rule. But assuming that to be
the case, the convenience of avoiding the notice-and-comment requirement "comes as a
price: Interpretive rules 'do not have the force and effect of law and are not accorded that
weight in the adjudicatory process."' Id. at 97 (quoting Shala/av. Guernsey Mem 'l Hosp.,
514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995)). 	The Court is therefore not bound by the Department's new
"interpretive rule," assuming it qualifies as such.
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respondents argue that the Court should be guided by the decisions that have found
in its favor. 	(Id. at 14).
This Court has conducted its own independent analysis of the statutes at issue,
the authorities cited by both parties, the legislative history, the longstanding practice
and interpretation of the Department, and the decisions of other district courts from
around the country that have decided the issue in favor of either the petitioner or
respondent. Based on this analysis and the principles set out above, the Court finds
that the question of whether Espinoza's detention should be continued is governed
by§ 1226 rather than§ 1225. Espinoza is not an "arriving alien"; he arrived in this
country more than twenty-five years ago. He therefore does not fall under the plain
language of§ 1225. Instead, he was apprehended while present in the country, and
he is being detained pending a decision on whether he is to be removed. 	As such,
he falls under § 1226.
However, under§ 1226, Espinoza is not entitled to immediate release; instead,
under these circumstances, "[m]any courts have ... found it appropriate to give the
Government a short window in which to complete the bond hearing, or else release
the petitioner." 	Lopez-Arevelo v. Ripa, No. EP-25-CV-337, 2025 WL 2691828, at
*13 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2025) (citing Valasquez Salazar v:.Dedos, No. l:25-cv-
835, 2025 WL 2676729, at *9 (D.N.M. Sept. 17, 2025) (collecting cases)). At that
hearing, the respondents will have the burden to show by clear and convincing
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evidence that Espinoza either presents a danger to the community or is a flight risk.
III. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS as follows:
I. 	The 	respondents' 	motion 	for 	summary 	judgment, 	(Dkt. 	14), 	1s
DENIED.
2. 	Espinoza's petition for writ of habeas corpus, (Dkt. 1), is GRANTED
in part.
3. 	The 	respondents 	are 	ORDERED 	to 	provide 	Espinoza 	with 	an
individualized bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven (7) days of the
date of this Order or else immediately release him from custody.
4. 	Until the bond hearing is held, the respondents are PROHIBITED
from transferring Espinoza outside of the Southern District of Texas.
The Clerk of Court will provide a copy of this Order to the parties.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas on 	~_,,,£C. 	"2-- 	, 2025.
~d~~DAVID HITTNER 	•
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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