Atkinson et al v. Pustilnik

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
YVETTE S. ATKINSON and STEVENS
SANCHEZ,
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Plaintiffs,
VS. 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:25-cv-04923
STEPHEN PUSTILNIK, M.D.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 7). Plaintiffs Yvette
Atkinson and Stevens Sanchez sue Defendant Dr. Stephen Pustilnik, the Medical Examiner for
Fort Bend County, for Due Process violations and defamation. Defendant asserts that the instant
case is precluded by collateral estoppel and res judicata due to an earlier filed case that was
dismissed by Magistrate Judge Andrew Edison. Civil Action No. 4:22-04315 (“Atkinson I”). On
May 19, 2026, the Court held a hearing on this matter and heard arguments of parties.
By way of brief factual background, this case arises out of Dr. Pustilnik’s actions after
Plaintiff Atkinson’s husband died by suicide in June of 2020. The autopsy performed by a
forensic pathologist determined that suicide was the cause of death. One week after the autopsy,
Plaintiff Sanchez, Mrs. Atkinson’s brother, contacted Defendant on Mrs. Atkinson’s behalf to
ask about the delay in issuing a death certificate. Mr. Sanchez and Defendant had a heated
argument. Plaintiffs allege that, in retaliation for the argument, Defendant refused to issue a
death certificate; the delay allegedly prevented Mrs. Atkinson from collecting insurance benefits
from her husband’s death. Defendant later contacted the Head of Community Outreach for the
Fort Bend County Commissioners’ Office about the situation. Defendant allegedly made false
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
June 29, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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and defamatory statements about Plaintiffs, such as asserting that the death was “really
suspicious” and seemingly implying that Plaintiffs had something to do with the death.
Defendant later made similar comments to a Fort Bend County Judge. ECF No. 1 at 2-7.
Plaintiffs assert two claims for relief: 1) a violation of Mrs. Atkinson’s due process rights, and 2)
a state-law defamation claim.
On December 13, 2022, a few years after the death certificate was filed, Ms. Atkinson,
believing Dr. Pustilnik was intentionally delaying Mr. Atkinson's manner-of-death investigation
in retaliation for her brother's speech, filed Atkinson I. On January 19, 2023, Dr. Pustilnik issued
an amended death certificate that lists Mr. Atkinson’s cause of death as a gunshot wound of the
head, and his manner of death as homicide. It took 958 days for Dr. Pustilnik to determine Mr.
Atkinson’s cause and manner of death. Ms. Atkinson amended her complaint to allege the
certificate was falsified in retaliation for the lawsuit.
Judge Edison’s partially granted a Motion to Dismiss in Atkinson I on May 2, 2024. That
order 	dismissed 	all 	but 	one 	claim 	against 	Dr. 	Pustilnik 	in 	Plaintiff’s 	Second 	Amended
Complaint. In the ruling, Judge Edison wrote:
“Ms. 	Atkinson 	does 	not 	have 	a 	property 	interest 	in 	the 	insurance
proceeds. . . . Ms. Atkinson has not identified a liberty or property interest of
which she has been deprived. As a result, Dr. Pustilnik is entitled to qualified
immunity, and Ms. Atkinson’s substantive due process claim fails at the motion to
dismiss stage.”
ECF No. 13 at 31, Supp. Exh. 13 at 19-20.
On 	October 	8, 	2025, 	Magistrate 	Judge 	Andrew 	Edison 	dismissed 	with 	prejudice
Plaintiff’s remaining claims in her Third Amended Complaint in Atkinson I. In that ruling, Judge
Edison wrote:
“I have no trouble concluding that Texas state law vests Ms. Atkinson with a
property 	interest 	in 	Mr. 	Atkinson’s 	physical 	death 	certificate. . . . Yet, 	Ms.
Atkinson has had access to a physical death certificate since June 16, 2020, when
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Dr. McClain issued the initial death certificate. To the extent Ms. Atkinson claims
that she was deprived of her property interest in a physical death certificate, that
claim fails on its face. Beyond the physical death certificate itself, Ms. Atkinson
asserts a property interest in ‘the timely and accurate issuance of a death
certificate.’ Ms. Atkinson does not, however, in the operative pleading or her
response to the motion to dismiss, point me to any state law that creates such a
property interest. . . . But . . . Mr. Atkinson’s death certificate states: ‘On the basis
of examination, and/or investigation, in my opinion, death occurred at the time,
date and place, and due to the cause(s) and manner stated.’ I cannot fathom the
Fifth 	Circuit 	holding 	that 	anyone 	has 	a 	property 	interest 	in 	an
opinion. . . . Because Ms. Atkinson did not establish a constitutionally protected
property interest, she cannot state a due process claim against Defendants.”
ECF No. 7 at 254, Exh. 9 at 17-19 (internal citations omitted).
Atkinson I is now on appeal before the Fifth Circuit. Yvette S. Atkinson v. Stephen
Pustilnik, et al., Case No. 25-20513.
A. Claim I (Due Process Violation) Is Collaterally Estopped and Must Be Dismissed.
Plaintiff’s due process claim is barred by collateral estoppel. It is functionally identical to
the claim fully litigated by Judge Edison. Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing.
First, Plaintiff claims that the parties are different due to 1) the inclusion of Plaintiff
Stevens Sanchez and 2) the elimination of other county officials who were parties to Atkinson I.
However, 	the 	due 	process 	violation 	belongs 	only 	to 	Ms. 	Atkinson, 	not 	Mr. 	Sanchez.
Additionally, in Atkinson I, the due process claim was asserted only against Defendant Pustilnik,
not the other defendants. Therefore, the parties are the same for Claim I. Plaintiffs discuss a First
Amendment claim that Defendant interfered with Plaintiff Sanchez’s First Amendment right to
petition the government for redress of grievances—but that claim is not in the Complaint and is
therefore irrelevant.
Plaintiff next argues that the defamation facts have been added to the due process claim
as a downstream harm, making this a distinct stigma-plus claim. A stigma-plus allows
individuals to seek relief for reputational harm caused by government officials when it is
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accompanied by a tangible loss of a property interest or legal right. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693
(1976). This is a different kind of due process claim than the one in Atkinson I, but it relies on the
question of whether there is a constitutionally protected property interest. Judge Edison has
already ruled that there is not. Therefore, the property interest issue has been previously litigated,
causing the claim as a whole to fail.
Finally, Plaintiff claims that the property interest asserted here is different from the one in
Atkinson I. Here, Plaintiff asserts that the interest is in insurance proceeds, not an accurate death
certificate. This argument fails for two reasons. First, the complaint pleads “a property interest in
obtaining an accurate and timely death certificate for her husband,” not in the insurance
proceeds. ECF No. 1 at 7. Plaintiff has misstated the contents of her Complaint. Second, even if
the Complaint did assert a property interest in the insurance proceeds, Judge Edison previously
held that “Ms. Atkinson does not have a property interest in the insurance proceeds. . . . Ms.
Atkinson has not identified a liberty or property interest of which she has been deprived.” ECF
No. 13 at 31. Therefore, the insurance-proceeds claim is also barred by collateral estoppel—
Judge Edison dismissed that claim early in Atkinson I.
B. The Court Declines to Retain Jurisdiction Over Claim II (State Common Law
Defamation Claim).
Claim I is the basis for federal jurisdiction. With Claim I dismissed, this Court declines to
continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claim in Claim II. 28 U.S. Code
§ 1367(c) provides that a district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a
[supplemental state-law claim] if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction.” This Court finds that the defamation claim would have most appropriately
been asserted in the action before Judge Edison, since it arises from facts obtained during
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discovery in Atkinson I.
Defendant argues that the defamation theory could have been asserted in Atkinson I, and
that by January 25, 2025, Plaintiff acknowledged in her Atkinson I pleadings that she believed
she had a defamation claim. Indeed, in a footnote to an agreed scheduling order entered eight
months before Atkinson I was dismissed, Plaintiff wrote that, “[f]or the avoidance of doubt,
Plaintiff currently believes she has a claim for defamation against Defendant Pustilnik. However,
the factual predicate for this claim may or may not be established during discovery.” ECF No. 13
at 19. Plaintiff never sought leave to amend her complaint to add the defamation claim. Under
these facts, this Court declines to retain jurisdiction over the defamation claim.
For these reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 7) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s
Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this the 29th of June, 2026.
KEITH P. ELLISON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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