Copelin v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services

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Case 4:25-cv-04502 Document14 _ Filed 07/14/26in TXSD Page1of8
United States District Court

Southem District of Texas
ENTERED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT July 14, 2026
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
HOUSTON DIVISION
§
Meagan T. Copelin, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§ Civil Action No. 4:25-cv-04502
V. §
§
Texas Department of Family and §
Protective Services, §
§
Defendant. §

MEMORANDUM, RECOMMENDATION, AND ORDER

In this employment dispute, Defendant Texas Department of Family and
Protective Services (“DFPS”) moved to dismiss Plaintiff Megan T. Copelin’s
complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Dkt. 6. After carefully
considering the motion, the response, Dkt. 10, and the applicable law, it is
recommended that DFPS’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. 6) be granted, but it is
further ordered that Copelin be granted leave to file an amended complaint.

Background

Copelin alleges the following facts, which are taken as true at this stage.
In July 2024, Copelin started working for DFPS as a Child Protective Services
Investigator. Dkt. 1 at 2. During her first child-removal assignment, Copelin
was tasked with transporting a child’s parent, despite contrary DFPS policy.

Id. The parent made death threats against Copelin. Jd. After this event,

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supervisors made “mocking, threatening, and emotionally abusive comments”
to Copelin about the incident. Id.
Following 	that 	incident, 	Copelin 	experienced 	severe 	anxiety, 	sleep
disturbances, and trauma. 	Id. 	She requested mental health leave and
accommodations, but DFPS denied her request “outright,” did not engage in an
interactive process, and refused to modify her duties. Id. She was then “forced”
to resign on August 9, 2024, due to the “intolerable emotional and psychological
impact” of DFPS’s work environment. 	Id. 	Copelin was not offered standard
HR procedures, such as an exit interview, that other resigning employees were
provided. 	Id. 	After her resignation, Copelin’s former supervisor called her to
ask, “Why are you telling people what I said?” Id.
Copelin filed a complaint with the EEOC, see id. at 4, and received a
right-to-sue letter on June 18, 2025, see id. at 28. 	On September 16, 2025,
Copelin sued DFPS, alleging failure-to-accommodate, retaliation, hostile work
environment, constructive discharge, and disparate treatment claims under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”). Id. at 2-3. DFPS moved to dismiss Copelin’s claims, Dkt. 6, to which
Copelin 	responded, 	Dkt. 	10. 	Copelin 	also 	filed 	a 	separate 	“Notice 	of
Opposition” to DFPS’s motion to dismiss. 	Dkt. 11. 	The motion is ripe for
resolution.
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Legal Standard
“Under Rule 12(b)(1), a claim is ‘properly dismissed for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power
to adjudicate’ the claim.” 	In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Liab.
Litig., 668 F.3d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Home Builders Ass’n, Inc. v.
City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998)). “Lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction may be found in the complaint alone, the complaint supplemented
by 	the 	undisputed 	facts 	as 	evidenced 	in 	the 	record, 	or 	the 	complaint
supplemented 	by 	the 	undisputed 	facts 	plus 	the 	court’s 	resolution 	of 	the
disputed facts.” 	Id. at 287. 	The plaintiff bears the burden to establish that
subject-matter jurisdiction exists. Id. at 286.
Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is warranted if a party fails “to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 	Rather,
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“[t]he complaint (1) on its face (2) must contain enough factual matter (taken
as true) (3) to raise a reasonable hope or expectation (4) that discovery will
reveal relevant evidence of each element of a claim.” 	See Lormand v. U.S.
Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 257 (5th Cir. 2009) (analyzing Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555-56). When resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court “accept[s] all well-
pleaded facts as true and view[s] those facts in the light most favorable to the
plaintiffs.” 	Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009) (quotation
omitted).
Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. 	Butler v. S. Porter, 999 F.3d
287, 292 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)
(per curiam)). 	But “regardless of whether the plaintiff is proceeding pro se or
is 	represented 	by 	counsel, 	conclusory 	allegations 	or 	legal 	conclusions
masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to
dismiss.” 	Prescott v. UTMB Galveston Tex., 73 F.4th 315, 318 (5th Cir. 2023)
(quoting Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002)); see
also Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2016) (per
curiam) (“[P]ro se plaintiffs must still plead factual allegations that raise the
right to relief above the speculative level.”).
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Analysis
DFPS is correct that Copelin cannot bring her disability-based claims
under Title VII and that sovereign immunity bars her ADA claims against it.
Those claims should be dismissed. But Copelin’s allegations could be construed
as claims under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 	The Court therefore
grants Copelin leave to amend her pleading to raise such a claim, which will
then give DFPS a chance to address it.
I. 	Copelin’s allegations are not actionable under Title VII.
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating based on race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. 	42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. 	But as DFPS observes,
see Dkt. 6 at 4-5, Copelin’s Title VII claims are based solely on her alleged
disability. 	“Disability … is not a protected category under Title VII.” 	Pena v.
Atascosa Cnty., 2025 WL 1463197, at *1 (W.D. Tex May 21, 2025). Copelin has
not alleged facts indicating that she was discriminated against based on any
Title VII-protected characteristic. Accordingly, her Title VII claims fail.
II. 	Sovereign immunity bars Copelin’s ADA claims.
DFPS is also correct that the ADA claims are barred by sovereign
immunity. 	Dkt. 6 at 2-3. 	“In most cases, Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity bars private suits against nonconsenting states in federal court.”
City of Austin v. Paxton, 943 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 2019). 	That means a
federal court lacks “jurisdiction to hear a suit against the State of Texas or any
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of its agencies, regardless of the relief sought, unless sovereign immunity is
expressly waived.” Soto v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 197 F. Supp.
3d 	930, 	932 	(S.D. 	Tex. 	2016) 	(citing 	Pennhurst 	State 	Sch. 	& 	Hosp. 	v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984)).
Copelin asserts five employment discrimination claims under Title I of
the ADA. 	See Decker v. Univ. of Hou., 970 F. Supp. 575, 577-578 (S.D. Tex.
1997) (“Title I of the ADA … governs employment.”). 	But Title I of the ADA
does not abrogate the state’s sovereign immunity. See Perez v. Region 20 Educ.
Serv. Ctr., 307 F.3d 318, 327 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001)). 	That immunity applies to the DFPS, a
state agency. 	See Soto, 197 F. Supp. 3d at 932. 	As a result, this Court lacks
jurisdiction over the ADA claims against DFPS. 	See Palacios v. Tex. Dep’t of
Fam. & Protective Servs., 2025 WL 2346121, at *2 (S.D. Tex. July 11, 2025)
(same conclusion), adopted by 2025 WL 2337049 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 2025).
III. 	Copelin’s disability-related allegations can be characterized as
Rehabilitation Act claims.
Consistent with its duty to construe Copelin’s allegations liberally,
however, this Court observes that her disability-related discrimination claims
could be couched as violations of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.
§ 794. 	In 	particular, 	Section 	504 	states 	that 	“[n]o 	otherwise 	qualified
individual with a disability … shall, solely by reason of his or her disability, be
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… subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance ….” 	29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Notably, too, public entities that
receive federal funds expressly waive their immunity for Section 504 claims.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1); Pace v. Bogalusa City Sch. Bd., 403 F.3d 272, 280
(5th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
DFPS 	does 	not 	acknowledge 	the 	possibility 	of 	framing 	Copelin’s
allegations as claims under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 	Nor is it
clear whether DFPS qualifies as a public entity that receives federal funds,
such 	that 	Section 	504’s 	sovereign-immunity 	waiver 	applies. 	Given 	the
materiality of this issue—including its impact on subject-matter jurisdiction—
the better course is to grant Copelin leave to amend her pleading to assert a
Rehabilitation Act claim explicitly, if she so chooses, and provide DPFS an
opportunity to address the viability of such a claim.
Recommendation and Order
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED 	that Defendant
Texas Department of Family and Protective Services’s motion to dismiss
(Dkt. 6) be GRANTED as follows:
x 	Plaintiff Meagan T. Copelin’s claims under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE,
and
x 	Copelin’s claims under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities
Act should be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for want of
subject-matter jurisdiction.
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Nevertheless, it is further ORDERED that Copelin be GRANTED leave
to amend her complaint to reframe her allegations as a claim under Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The amended complaint must be filed by July
28, 2026. Failure to meet that deadline may result in dismissal of this suit.

The parties have fourteen days from service of this Report and
Recommendation to file written objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(b). Failure to file timely objections will preclude
appellate review of factual findings and legal conclusions, except for
plain error. Ortiz v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep’t, 806 F.3d 822, 825
(5th Cir. 2015).

Signed on July 14, 2026, at Houston, Texas.

Ve awe

Ytohne Y. Hh

United States Magistrate Judge