Ngandjikomba v. Deputy X. Vargas et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
Cimire Ngandjikomba, 	§
§
Plaintiff, 	§
§
v. 	§ 	Civil Action No. 4:25-cv-4455
§
Harris County Sheriff’s Office and 	§
Deputy X. Vargas, 	§
§
Defendants. 	§
JUDGE PALERMO’S
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This case is about a traffic arrest.1 Defendant Harris County Sheriff’s Office
(“Sheriff’s Office”) moves to dismiss Plaintiff Cimire Ngandjikomba’s amended
complaint. ECF No. 27.2 Defendant Deputy X. Vargas (“Vargas”) also moves to
dismiss. ECF No. 28.3 Having considered the briefs and applicable law, the Court
determines that the Sheriff’s Office’s motion should be granted and Vargas’ motion
should be granted except as to excessive force. In addition, the Court sua sponte
finds that Harris County should be dismissed for lack of service of process.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a Houston METRO bus driver. ECF No. 25. ¶ 4. On July 13, 2025,
1 The district judge referred all pretrial proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 636. Order, ECF No. 17.
2 Plaintiff responded. ECF No. 29. The Sheriff’s Office replied. ECF No. 32.
3 Plaintiff responded. ECF No. 30. Vargas replied. ECF No. 31. Plaintiff sur-replied. ECF No. 34.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
July 10, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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she was driving her assigned route when she encountered Deputy Vargas at the
intersection of San Jacinto and E10. Id. ¶¶ 7–8. Apparently, “[b]oth traffic lights
were green” at the intersection, but Vargas instructed Plaintiff to “Go ahead” and
proceed through. Id. ¶ 9. After she did so, however, Vargas “activated his patrol
lights and began following the bus.” Id. ¶ 10.
Aware she was being followed, Plaintiff pulled over at the next intersection
of “Jensen and Providence” and opened the bus door. Id. ¶ 11.4 Vargas then “pointed
a weapon at her and ordered her to get off the bus and lie on the” ground. Id.5
“Fearing for her life, Plaintiff complied,” and Vargas “handcuffed her right wrist
and forcefully placed her in the back of his patrol car.” Id. ¶ 12.
As a result of the incident, Plaintiff claims her “right wrist was injured,”
requiring a medical brace, “[s]he missed work,” and she “endured significant
trauma,” including “daily panic attacks and fear of law enforcement.” Id. ¶¶ 18, 20.
She felt humiliated and “lost income due to her inability to work” afterwards. Id.
¶ 20.
4 Defendants explain that the intersections are about 1.2 miles apart. ECF No. 27 at 3; ECF No. 28
at 8. Plaintiff does not dispute the distance, and it aligns with measurements from reliable traffic-
mapping services. Accordingly, the Court takes judicial notice that the distance between the San
Jacinto-E10 and Jensen-Providence intersections is about 1.2 miles. FED. R. EVID. 201(b)(2).
5 Plaintiff is not clear about what kind of weapon is involved. Her original complaint alleged it
was a gun or taser. Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 9; Decl., ECF No. 1-2 at 1. Several other filings used the
term weapon. Am. Compl., ECF No. 25 ¶¶ 11, 21; Pl.’s Resp. to Sheriff’s MTD, ECF No. 29 at 2;
Pl.’s Resp. to Vargas’ MTD, ECF No. 30 ¶¶ 11, 15. In her sur-reply, Plaintiff uses the term gun
and firearm. ECF No. 34 at 4-5.
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On September 19, 2025, Plaintiff sued Vargas and the Sheriff’s Office. ECF
No. 1. She later filed an amended complaint, asserting claims against Vargas and
Harris County. ECF No. 25 ¶¶ 21–26.
The Sheriff’s Office and Vargas move to dismiss the amended complaint
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF Nos. 27, 28.
II. 	STANDARD TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 12(B)(6)
Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes courts to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.” To survive a 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff
must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Gaskin v. Univ. of Hous. Police Dep’t, No. CV H-25-1658, 2025 WL 3514356, at
*3 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2025) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). A claim is facially plausible when the factual allegations “allow[] the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (quoting Calogero v. Shows, Cali & Walsh, L.L.P., 970 F.3d 576, 580
(5th Cir. 2020)).
In determining a motion to dismiss, “‘[c]ourts accept ‘all well-pleaded facts
as true’ and ‘view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’” Id. (original
alteration adopted) (quoting Allen v. Walmart Stores, L.L.C., 907 F.3d 170, 177 (5th
Cir. 2018)). At this stage, courts may only consider “(1) the facts in the complaint;
(2) documents attached to the complaint; and (3) matters of which the court may
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take judicial notice.” Id. (citing Walker v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 938 F.3d 724,
735 (5th Cir. 2019)).
III. 	PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS AGAINST THE SHERIFF’S OFFICE AND
HARRIS COUNTY SHOULD BE DISMISSED.
In her amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts one claim against Harris County—
not the Sheriff’s Office—under Monell. ECF No. 25 ¶ 24–27. The Court addresses
the claims against each municipal entity.
A. The Sheriff’s Office Should Be Dismissed Because Plaintiff Asserts
No Claims Against It.
Plaintiff alleges that “Harris County, through the Sheriff’s Office,” is liable
for Vargas’ actions under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658
(1978), because it “failed to properly train, supervise, or discipline deputies
regarding use of force, de-escalation, and constitutional limits.” ECF No. 25 ¶¶ 24–
27. The Sheriff’s Office argues that this claim should be dismissed because, as an
office of Harris County, it cannot be sued directly since “offices within counties are
not legal entities capable of being sued” under Texas law. ECF No. 27 at 6. In
response, Plaintiff maintains that her amended complaint “names Harris County,”
rather than the Sheriff’s Office, “as the municipal entity responsible for policies,
training, and supervision of its law enforcement personnel.” ECF No. 29 at 1.
True enough, Plaintiff named the Sheriff’s Office as a Defendant in her
original complaint but later changed it to Harris County in her amended complaint.
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Compare ECF No. 1, with ECF No. 25. In her response to the Sheriff’s Office’s
motion, she also reiterates that “Harris County failed to adequately train, supervise,
or discipline deputies”—not the Sheriff’s Office. ECF No. 29 at 2 (emphasis added).
Thus, Plaintiff concedes that she no longer asserts claims against the Sheriff’s
Office.
Accordingly, the Sheriff’s Office should be dismissed as a Defendant from
this case.
B. Harris County Should Be Dismissed Because Plaintiff Failed to
Serve Within 90 Days.
Under Rule 4(m), courts “must dismiss the action without prejudice against
[a] defendant or order that service be made within a specified time” if the “defendant
is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed.” FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m). The
Court may grant an extension “if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure” to
serve a defendant within 90 days. Id.
Here, Plaintiff filed her amended complaint—which replaced the Sheriff’s
Office as a Defendant with Harris County—on November 10, 2025. ECF No. 25.
But as the Sheriff’s Office points out, “Harris County has not been served in this
case” nor “made an appearance” over 180 days later. ECF No. 32 at 2 (emphasis
omitted). While Plaintiff served the Sheriff’s Office with the original complaint,
ECF No. 8, that service does not constitute service on Harris County. In her response,
Plaintiff 	argues 	that 	“Harris 	County 	is 	a 	Proper 	Defendant” 	but 	does 	not
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acknowledge that she failed to serve Harris County within 90 days—much less
establish good cause for her failure. ECF No. 29 at 2.
Accordingly, the Court recommends dismissing without prejudice Harris
County as a Defendant under Rule 4(m).
IV. 	VARGAS’ MOTION FOR QUALIFIED IMMUNITY SHOULD BE
DENIED AS TO PLAINTIFF’S EXCESSIVE-FORCE CLAIM AND
GRANTED AS TO ALL OTHER CLAIMS.
Plaintiff next asserts three claims against Vargas in his individual capacity:
one for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, ECF No. 25 ¶ 21; another for
false arrest and unlawful detention under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments,
id. ¶ 22; and the final one for deprivation without due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment, id. ¶ 23. Vargas responds that, among other things, he is entitled to
qualified immunity. ECF No. 28 at 13–14. The Court disagrees as to the excessive
force claim.
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”
Barber v. Rounds, 169 F.4th 577, 581 (5th Cir. 2026) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “[A] plaintiff seeking to overcome qualified immunity
must plead specific facts that both allow the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the harm he has alleged and that defeat a qualified
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immunity defense with equal specificity.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Backe
v. LeBlanc, 691 F.3d 645, 648 (5th Cir. 2012)).
Courts analyze qualified immunity in two steps. First, they “must determine
whether, ‘[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, . . . the
facts alleged show the [government official]’s conduct violated a constitutional
right[.]’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201
(2001), overruled in part on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
236 (2009)). Second, courts “determine ‘whether the right was clearly established.’”
Id. (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201).
A right is “clearly established” when its “contours” are “sufficiently clear that
a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Id.
at 582 (quoting Thompson v. Upshur Cnty., Tex., 245 F.3d 447, 457 (5th Cir. 2001)).
“[E]xisting precedent must have placed the . . . constitutional question beyond
debate.” Id. (ellipsis in original) (quoting Craig v. Martin, 49 F.4th 404, 417 (5th
Cir. 2022)). “The salient question is whether the state of the law gives the official
‘fair warning’ that his or her conduct is unconstitutional.” Ford v. Anderson Cnty.,
Tex., 102 F.4th 292, 307 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741
(2002)).
The Court analyzes each claim against Vargas in turn.
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A. Vargas 	Is 	Not Entitled to 	Qualified Immunity for Plaintiff’s
Excessive-Force Claim.
Plaintiff alleges that “Vargas used objectively unreasonable force, including
pointing a weapon, forcibly handcuffing, and dragging [her] from the bus,” violating
her “rights under the Fourth Amendment.” ECF No. 25 ¶ 21.
“The Fourth Amendment creates a right to be free from excessive force during
a seizure.” Anderson v. Estrada, 140 F.4th 634, 642 (5th Cir. 2025) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Trammell v. Fruge, 868 F.3d 332, 340 (5th Cir.
2017)), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 825 (2025). “To establish a claim of excessive force
under the Fourth Amendment, plaintiffs must demonstrate: (1) injury, (2) which
resulted directly and only from a use of force that was clearly excessive, and (3) the
excessiveness of which was clearly unreasonable.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 167 (5th Cir. 2009) (per
curiam)). To determine “whether the force used was clearly excessive and clearly
unreasonable,” courts pay “careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each
particular case, including [1] the severity of the crime at issue, [2] whether the
suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and [3]
whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id.
(quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)).
Here, the crime at issue, if any, was a minor traffic infraction. Plaintiff drove
through a green light at the intersection of San Jacinto and E10 after Vargas told her
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to “Go ahead.” ECF No. 25 ¶¶ 8-9. When Vargas turned on his lights and began
following her, she continued to drive for a short distance before pulling over to the
first exit, the next intersection. Id. ¶ 11. Even if Plaintiff committed no crime by
driving through the intersection, and even if she “stopped at the first safe and lawful
location . . . consistent with METRO policy, state transportation safety standards,
and basic commercial-vehicle protocols,” ECF No. 34 at 2, Vargas may have
reasonably believed that her failure to stop once he turned on his lights constituted a
misdemeanor. McWashington v. Rodgers, No. 4:24-CV-2153, 2025 WL 1124752,
at *11 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 15, 2025) (explaining that “the Court must assess the facts
and circumstances ‘from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene’”
(quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396)); ECF No. 28 at 15 (explaining that “fail[ing] to
stop for an officer” is a misdemeanor); T EX. T RANSP. CODE § 545.421. Nonetheless,
given the relatively short distance it took Plaintiff to stop and the fact that she
stopped at the next intersection, ECF No. 34 at 2, the Court finds that her failure to
immediately stop was not particularly serious even from Vargas’ perspective.6 Nor
does the Court find that a reasonable officer could have concluded that she was
attempting to flee arrest given that she pulled over and opened the bus door. The first
and third Graham factors—severity of the crime and attempt to flee—therefore favor
6 The Court takes note that at the end of this episode, Vargas did not arrest and charge Plaintiff.
Instead, he released her, further demonstrating the insignificance of any traffic violation. Pl.’s
Resp. Varga’s MTD orig. compl., ECF No. 20 at 3.
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Plaintiff.
The second factor—whether the suspect poses an immediate threat—also
favors Plaintiff. At the time of the incident, Plaintiff was driving a METRO bus with
at least two passengers. ECF No. 25 ¶ 13. From Vargas’ perspective, her failure to
immediately pull over not only concerned Plaintiff’s and his safety but also the
safety of the passengers on board. High speed may have amplified that potential risk,
but the record is devoid of any evidence as to the speed she was travelling. Plaintiff
states that she was making a left turn at an intersection and spoke with Vargas, telling
him that her light was green when he gave her the go ahead to proceed. ECF No. 20
at 2; ECF No. 25 ¶ 9. The fact that she was turning suggests she had to slow down.
Additionally, talking to Vargas, indicating that she had the green light, also suggests
that she had slowed down. After she proceeded through the light, Vargas put on his
lights and followed her until she safely stopped at the next intersection. ECF No. 25
¶ 10. She opened the bus door and Vargas approached with his weapon drawn—a
gun or taser—and ordered off the bus. Id. ¶ 11. He forced her to the ground and
handcuffed her with such force as to cause a wrist injury. Id.
Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true and considering the totality of the
circumstances, it is plausible that Vargas used unreasonable and excessive force in
drawing his weapon as he approached the bus and pointing it at Plaintiff, forcing or
dragging her off the bus, forcing her to the ground, and handcuffing her with force
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enough to injury her. Thus, Plaintiff clears the first qualified-immunity hurdle.
She also satisfies the second hurdle. Plaintiff argues that a “reasonable officer
should have known that pointing a weapon and forcibly handcuffing a compliant bus
driver constitutes a violation of her constitutional rights.” ECF No. 30 at 4. “A right
is clearly established only if existing precedent places the constitutional question
‘beyond debate.’” Barber, 169 F.4th at 583–84 (quoting Martin, 49 F.4th at 417).
Generally, 	this 	requires 	“a 	case 	where 	an 	officer 	acting 	under 	similar
circumstances . . . was held to have violated the Constitution.” Baker v. Coborn, 170
F.4th 988, 994 (5th Cir. 2026) (alteration in original) (quoting Zorn v. Linton, 146
S. Ct. 926, 930 (2026)). The Fifth Circuit explained that “it is not necessary that the
very action in question has previously been held unlawful…so long as the prior
decisions 	gave 	reasonable 	warning 	that 	the 	conduct 	then 	at 	issue 	violated
constitutional rights. Pigott v. Gintz, No. 23-30879, 2024 WL 5087911, at *7 n. 5
(5th Cir. Dec. 12, 2024) (quoting Austin v. City of Pasadena, 74 F.4th 312, 326 (5th
Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Given the weight of authority
holding that an officer may not use force against a compliant, nonthreatening, and
subdued subject,” the Fifth Circuit found law enforcement was on notice that
brandishing a firearm in a threatening manner violated constitutional rights of the
detainee. Id.
In Pigott, for example, the Fifth Circuit has held that pointing a gun at traffic
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detainees “who had committed only a minor traffic offense and were subdued,
compliant, nonthreatening, and not actively resisting” was unreasonable. The court
concluded that the officer used excessive force where he pulled over a driver, “aimed
his gun” at the driver and his children, pointed it between the driver’s “eyes and
press[ed] the barrel against the back of [the driver’s] head, all while he had his finger
on the trigger” and threatened to blow the driver’s “head off.” Id.
Similarly, in Castro v. Kory, officers found a truck driver napping in his
vehicle “on private property behind a strip mall.” No. 23-50268, 2024 WL 1580175,
at *1 (5th Cir. Apr. 11, 2024). After calling out for him to exit the truck, the officers
drew their guns and pointed “toward the truck’s cab.” Id. They then approached the
truck and struggled with the driver to remove him, at various times pointing guns at
his head. Id. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found that “the force used by the officers,
particularly pointing a gun at his head, was clearly disproportionate.” Id. at *4. Thus,
the Fifth Circuit held that they were not entitled to qualified immunity on the driver’s
excessive-force claims.
Here, as Plaintiff alleges, she stopped the bus and opened the door, complying
with Vargas’ attempt to pull her over. ECF No. 20 at 2-3. Nonetheless, despite her
seeming compliance, Vargas pointed his weapon at Plaintiff when he approached
the bus, he shouted and ordered or dragged her off the bus, and she complied, but he
forced her to the ground and handcuffed her with force, causing physical injury. Id.
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He put her in his patrol car. Id.
The Fifth Circuit has recognized that where “an individual stopped for a minor
traffic offense offers, at most, passive resistance and presents no threat or flight risk,
abrupt application of physical force rather than continued verbal negotiating (which
may include threats of force) is clearly unreasonable and excessive.” Holland v.
Otero, No. 4:25-CV-00373, 2026 WL 684124, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2026)
(emphasis added) (quoting Cobbins v. Sollie, No. 22-30692, 2023 WL 4015303,
at *5 (5th Cir. June 14, 2023)). Here, Vargas’ use of force—pointing a weapon—at
a compliant, non-threatening bus driver who stopped after he first waved her through
the intersection but then followed her, and dragged her off the bus, forced her to the
ground, and forcibly handcuffed her, is unreasonable and excessive given the crime
was at best a misdemeanor traffic violation.
As to injury, Plaintiff’s alleges that Vargas forcibly handcuffed her and
injured her wrist, requiring her to wear a brace and miss work. ECF No. 25 ¶¶ 18,
21. While the Fifth Circuit” holds that “[t]ight handcuffing alone, even where a
detainee sustains minor injuries, does not present an excessive force claim,”
Templeton v. Jarmillo, 28 F.4th 618, 622 (5th Cir. 2022), here Plaintiff alleges more
than minor injuries. She claims she missed work because of the wrist injury and she
suffered PTSD, panic attacks, and lost income.
Accordingly, Vargas is not entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s
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excessive-force claim.
B. Plaintiff Fails 	to 	State a Plausible False-Arrest or Unlawful-
Detention Claim.
Next, Plaintiff alleges that Vargas violated her constitutional rights under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments by “detain[ing] and arrest[ing] [her] without
probable cause or legal justification.” ECF No. 25 ¶ 22. In response, Vargas
contends that he had probable cause to detain and arrest her because she failed to
yield to him after he turned on his lights. ECF No. 16–17. Vargas is correct.
“A false arrest occurs, and an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights are
violated, when an officer conducts an arrest without probable cause.” Wood v. Bexar
Cnty., Tex., 147 F.4th 534, 546 (5th Cir. 2025) (quoting Scott v. City of Mandeville,
69 F.4th 249, 255 (5th Cir. 2023)), cert. denied sub nom. Wood v. Bexar Cty., No.
25-1048, 2026 WL 1203374 (U.S. May 4, 2026). “An officer has probable cause if
‘the totality of the facts and circumstances’ within his knowledge ‘at the moment of
arrest are sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect had
committed or was committing an offense.’” Id. (quoting Scott, 69 F.4th at 255). “The
question is whether there is a ‘fair probability’—i.e., ‘more than a bare suspicion’
but not necessarily 50% certainty—that a crime occurred.” Id. (quoting Scott,
69 F.4th at 255).
Under Texas law, “[a] person commits an offense if the person operates a
motor vehicle and wilfully fails or refuses to bring the vehicle to a stop . . . when
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given a visual or audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop.” T EX. T RANSP. CODE
§ 545.421(a); see Perkins v. Davis, No. 18-50675, 2019 WL 11854826, at *1 (5th
Cir. Feb. 27, 2019) (explaining that petitioner was convicted “for fleeing a police
officer in violation of Texas Transportation Code § 545.421”).
Here, Vargas “activated his patrol lights and began following” Plaintiff’s bus
after she drove through the intersection. ECF No. 25 ¶ 10. But she continued driving
to the next intersection before stopping. Id. ¶¶ 11–12. Thus, based on Plaintiff’s own
allegations, 	Vargas 	had 	probable 	cause 	to 	believe 	that 	she 	violated 	Texas
Transportation Code § 545.421 by failing to pull over immediately after he activated
his patrol lights.
Accordingly, her false-arrest claim should be dismissed.
C. Plaintiff Fails to State a Plausible Due Process Claim.
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Vargas’ “conduct deprived [her] of liberty,
dignity, and bodily integrity without due process” under the Fourteenth Amendment.
ECF No. 25 ¶ 23. Neither party briefs this issue further, and it is unclear whether
Plaintiff claims Vargas violated her procedural or substantive due process rights.
Either way, her claim fails.
“To state a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must show ‘a protected
liberty or property interest’ and then show that the state has failed to provide
‘adequate procedures for the vindication of that interest.’” Dunsmore v. Muth,
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154 F.4th 360, 366 (5th Cir. 2025) (quoting Jordan v. Fisher, 823 F.3d 805, 810 (5th
Cir. 2016)).
Plaintiff obviously has a protected liberty interest in her “freedom from bodily
restraint.” Id. However, a “warrantless arrest is reasonable if the officer has probable
cause to believe that a criminal offense has been committed.” McClain v. Delgado,
132 F.4th 362, 365 (5th Cir. 2025) (quoting Loftin v. City of Prentiss, Miss., 33 F.4th
774, 780 (5th Cir. 2022)). Here, as explained above, Vargas had probable cause to
believe that Plaintiff committed a misdemeanor criminal offense by failing to yield
to his patrol lights. His subsequent arrest was therefore procedurally proper. Thus,
Plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed to the extent it relies on procedural due process.
To the extent Plaintiff’s claim relies on substantive due process, it fails for
two independent reasons. “First, although excessive force claims may sometimes be
brought under the substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, they
must 	be 	analyzed 	under 	the 	Fourth 	Amendment 	when 	that 	more 	specific
constitutional provision applies.” Est. of Parker v. Miss. Dep’t of Pub. Safety,
140 F.4th 226, 244 (5th Cir. 2025). In other words, “a [substantive] due process
claim is viable only when the alleged misconduct is ‘not susceptible to proper
analysis’ under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. (quoting Petta v. Rivera, 143 F.3d 895,
901 (5th Cir. 1998)). Here, there is no dispute that Vargas seized Plaintiff when he
arrested 	her. 	Thus, 	the 	Fourth 	Amendment 	analysis 	applies 	and 	“forecloses
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Plaintiff[’s] Fourteenth Amendment claim[].” Id.
Second, even if the Fourteenth Amendment applied, Plaintiff’s substantive
due process claim would still fail. “The Fourteenth Amendment forbids any State
from depriving a person of ‘life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.’”
Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1). “[O]nly the most extreme use of force
violates 	the 	Fourteenth 	Amendment—namely, 	actions 	that 	‘can 	properly 	be
characterized as arbitrary or conscience shocking.’” Id. (cleaned up) (quoting Collins
v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 128 (1992)). This is a demanding
standard. “[O]nly the most egregious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in
the constitutional sense.” Id. (alteration in original and internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998)).
“Conduct shocks the conscience only when it is ‘so brutal and offensive that it did
not comport with traditional ideas of fair play and decency.’” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847). Reckless endangerment alone is
insufficient. Id. at 244–45.
Here, 	nothing 	about 	Vargas’ 	alleged 	conduct 	meets 	the 	Fourteenth
Amendment’s 	demanding 	threshold. 	Although 	the 	Court 	finds 	that 	Plaintiff
sufficiently alleged an excessive force claim, the facts do not involve the “the kind
of arbitrary or conscience-shocking conduct the Constitution forbids.” Id. at 244. For
that reason, too, Plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed to the extent it relies on
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substantive due process.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s due process claim should be dismissed.
D. Plaintiff’s Claims Against Vargas in His Official Capacity, If Any,
Should Be Dismissed.
The caption of Plaintiff’s original complaint listed Vargas as a Defendant
“Individually and in his official capacity.” ECF No. 1 at 1. The amended complaint
drops the “official capacity” language, simply naming Vargas “Individually.” ECF
No. 25 at 1; id. ¶ 5 (explaining that Vargas “is sued in his individual capacity”).
Nonetheless, Vargas argues in his motion that Plaintiff’s claims against him in his
official capacity should be dismissed. ECF No. 28 at 12–13. In her response, Plaintiff
reiterates that she “is suing Deputy Vargas in his individual capacity only” and
“[a]ny claim for official capacity is irrelevant and should be disregarded.” ECF
No. 30 at 4.
“Claims against government officers in their official capacity are ‘another
way 	of 	pleading 	an 	action 	against 	an 	entity 	of 	which 	an 	officer 	is 	an
agent.’” Martinez v. Harris Cnty., Tex., No. 24-20194, 2025 WL 914309, at *6 (5th
Cir. 	Mar. 	26, 	2025) 	(quoting 	Kentucky 	v. 	Graham, 	473 	U.S. 	159, 	165-66
(1985) (cleaned up)). Thus, to the extent any claims linger against Vargas in his
official capacity, they are subsumed within Plaintiff’s claims against Harris County.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Vargas in his official capacity should
be dismissed. See McCoy v. Harris Cnty., Tex., No. 4:25-CV-135, 2026 WL
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1020530, at *14 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2026) (dismissing official-capacity claims “as
duplicative of the municipal liability claims against Harris County”), adopted, No.
4:25-CV-00135, 2026 WL 730816 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2026).
V. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that:
1. the Sheriff’s Office’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 27, be GRANTED and
Plaintiff’s claims against the Sheriff’s Office be DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE;
2. Vargas’ 	motion 	to 	dismiss, 	ECF 	No. 	28, 	be 	GRANTED, 	in 	part,
DISMISSING 	WITH 	PREJUDICE 	all 	claims 	except 	Plaintiff’s
excessive-force claim; and
3. Plaintiff’s claims against Harris County, ECF No. 25, be DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE under Rule 4(m).
The 	Parties 	have 	fourteen 	days 	from 	service 	of 	this 	Report 	and
Recommendation to file written objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); F ED. R.
C IV . P. 72(b). Failure to file timely objections will preclude review of factual
findings or legal conclusions, except for plain error. Quinn v. Guerrero, 863 F.3d
353, 358 (5th Cir. 2017).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed at Houston, Texas, on July 10, 2026.
Dena Hanovice Palermo
United States Magistrate Judge
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