Alexander v. Montgomery County Community Supervision & Corrections Department, et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
MARGARET ALEXANDRA
ALEXANDER,
Plaintiff,
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v. 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:25-cv-4209
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
COMMUNITY SUPERVISION &
CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court1 is Defendants Montgomery County Sheriff’s
Office, Montgomery County District Attorney’s Office, Montgomery County
Community 	Supervision 	& 	Corrections 	Department, 	Montgomery 	County
Attorney’s Office, Brett Ligon, and Laurie Frankenfield (the “Montgomery
County Defendants”) Joint Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 53) and Defendant the
Texas Department of Family and Protective Services’ (“DFPS”) Motion to
Dismiss (ECF No. 54). 	Based on a review of the motions, arguments, and
relevant 	law, 	the 	Court 	RECOMMENDS 	the 	Montgomery 	County
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 53) and DFPS’s Motion to Dismiss
1 This case was referred to the Undersigned for all purposes pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. (ECF No. 55).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
March 24, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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(ECF No. 54) be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint be
DISMISSED 	WITHOUT 	PREJUDICE. 	Should this 	Memorandum and
Recommendation be adopted, the Court RECOMMENDS all other pending
motions (ECF Nos. 11, 13, 14, 20, 24, 26, 41, and 79) be DENIED AS MOOT.
I. 	Background
Plaintiff’s 334-page Second Amended Complaint appears to relate to a
previous 	state 	criminal 	case 	where 	Plaintiff 	pled 	guilty 	to 	a 	felony 	in
connection with the death of one of her children. (See ECF No. 27 at 24–304).
The Second Amended Complaint also involves arguments related to Plaintiff’s
other children who were removed from her custody through state court actions
or voluntary relinquishment. 	(See id.). 	Plaintiff has asserted various claims
against the Montgomery County Defendants and DFPS. (See id. at 304–332).
The Montgomery County Defendants and DFPS have moved to dismiss
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint. (See ECF Nos. 53–54).
II. 	Legal Standard
A motion to dismiss made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
(“Rule”) 12(b)(1) allows a party to challenge the exercise of the Court’s subject
matter jurisdiction. 	FED. R. C IV . P. 12(b)(1). 	Whether a federal court has
jurisdiction must “be established as a threshold matter” and “is inflexible and
without exception.” 	Webb v. Davis, 940 F.3d 892, 896 (5th Cir. 2019). 	The
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party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of proof for a 12(b)(1) motion to
dismiss. 	Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). 	The
Court generally will accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true
and construe those allegations in a light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Kumar
v. Frisco Indep. Sch. Dist., 443 F. Supp. 3d 771, 777-78 (E.D. Tex. 2020). “When
a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the
court should consider the 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing any
attack on the merits.” Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161.
III. 	Discussion
Both the Montgomery County Defendants and DFPS have moved to
dismiss 	Plaintiff’s 	Second 	Amended 	Complaint, 	arguing 	the 	Court 	lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims because the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine prevents state court losers from relitigating their case in federal
district court. (See ECF No. 53 at 5–6; ECF No. 54 at 5–7). Plaintiff responds
that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply in this case. (ECF No. 57 at
29–32; ECF No. 66 at 23–25).
The Court must address the Rooker–Feldman doctrine before other
issues because it raises a jurisdictional question. 	See Truong v. Bank of Am.,
N.A., 717 F.3d 377, 381–82 (5th Cir. 2013). The Court must dismiss an action
if it determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 	FED. R. C IV . P.
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12(b)(1). 	Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal court does not have
jurisdiction to review matters “inextricably intertwined” with a state court
judgment. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486–87 (1983);
Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923) (recognizing that federal
district courts lacked the requisite appellate authority to reverse or modify a
state-court judgment). This doctrine “is confined to . . . cases brought by state-
court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered
before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court
review and rejection of those judgments.” 	Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic
Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
Rooker–Feldman has four elements: “(1) a state-court loser; (2) alleging
harm caused by a state-court judgment; (3) that was rendered before the
district court proceedings began; and (4) the federal suit requests review and
reversal of the state-court judgment.” Burciaga v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co.,
871 F.3d 380, 384 (5th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). 	The doctrine applies to
both final judgments and “claims that are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with a
state court decision.” 	Id.; see also Weaver v. Tex. Capital Bank N.A., 660 F.3d
900, 904 (5th Cir. 2011). 	“One hallmark of the Rooker–Feldman inquiry is
what the federal court is being asked to review and reject.” 	Truong, 717 F.3d
at 382 (citing Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284). 	“The second hallmark of the
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Rooker–Feldman inquiry is the source of the federal plaintiff's alleged injury.”
Id.
While Plaintiff contends that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not
apply in this case, it is clear that the relief Plaintiff seeks is “inextricably
intertwined” with state court decisions:
• 	“Plaintiff requests a judicial declaration that . . . [t]he February 1, 2024
conviction and all related enforcement actions are void ab initio for
want of jurisdiction, fraud on the court, and violation of due process”
(ECF No. 27 at 306 (emphasis in original));
• 	“Plaintiff seeks a declaration that the judgment entered by the 435th
Judicial District Court of Montgomery County, Texas, and all
actions flowing therefrom, violate” the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Supremacy Clause, and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(Id. at 311 (emphasis in original));
• 	“Accordingly, this Court should declare the underlying judgment
constitutionally void and unenforceable as a matter of federal
law, 	and 	further 	declare 	that 	all 	derivative 	proceedings,
probationary conditions, collateral sanctions, or administrative
actions predicated upon that judgment are nullities without
lawful effect” (Id. (emphasis in original));
• 	“Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court enjoin Defendants—
including state judicial officers, probation administrators, and
prosecutors, in their official capacities—from . . . [c]ontinuing to
enforce, rely on, or disseminate the state-court judgment declared
unconstitutional and void under federal law, or any orders, warrants, or
conditions derived therefrom” (Id. at 313 (emphasis in original));
• 	“Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court formally declare that
continued enforcement of the state judgment entered by the
435th 	Judicial District 	Court of 	Montgomery 	County, Texas,
conflicts with and is pre-empted by controlling federal law” (Id. at
316 (emphasis in original)).
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Plaintiff also contends this case falls outside Rooker-Feldman reach due to
“fraud on the court.” (See ECF No. 66 at 24–25; see also ECF No. 64 at 47–48).
The Fifth Circuit has explained that “there is no such thing as a ‘fraud
exception’” to the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. 	Truong, 717 F.3d at 384 n.6.
Instead, “an allegation of fraud must state a claim against the defendants for
damages rather than call upon the federal court to review and reverse a state
court judgment.” 	Houston v. Queen, 8 F. Supp. 3d 815, 824 (W.D. La. 2014),
aff’d sub nom. Houston v. Venneta Queen, 606 F. App’x 725 (5th Cir. 2015)
(collecting cases); see Truong, 717 F.3d at 384 n.6 (“The question is whether
[the fraud] claim is an independent claim.”). 	Here, in her Second Amended
Complaint, Plaintiff alleges multiple instances of fraud on the court concerning
her criminal prosecution, including by: (1) “suppression of material exculpatory
evidence . . . warranting declaratory vacatur and injunctive relief . . .”; (2)
allegedly “knowingly fabricating scientific conclusions to initiate prosecution .
. .”; and (3) “suppressing a live witness . . . .” 	(ECF No. 27 at 50, 63, 99). 	In
addition, she alleges “systemic fraud in custody determinations.” (Id. at 165).
As evidenced by Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, “[a]ny such
relief would be ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the various underlying state
court judgments because it would call on this Court to review the final state
court decisions and conclude that they are void or otherwise inapplicable.”
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Dantzler v. Jorden, No. 24-cv-590, 2025 WL 1983185, at *4 (M.D. La. June 17,
2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. 24-cv-590, 2025 WL 1970262
(M.D. La. July 15, 2025). 	As to the fraud allegations, Plaintiff’s claims go
directly to attacking the state court judgments, complain of injuries resulting
from 	such 	judgments, 	and 	invite 	this 	Court 	to 	review 	and 	reject 	those
judgments. 	Thus, Rooker–Feldman divests the Court of jurisdiction over the
entirety 	of 	Plaintiff’s 	claims, 	including 	any 	requests 	for 	injunctive 	and
declaratory relief. 	See Marshall v. Abbott, No. 4:21-cv-384, 2022 WL 660798,
at *7 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:21-
cv-384, 2022 WL 659180 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 2022) (concluding the court lacked
subject 	matter 	jurisdiction 	under 	Rooker-Feldman 	where 	the 	plaintiff
challenged child custody proceedings).
IV. 	Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court RECOMMENDS the Montgomery
County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 53) and DFPS’s Motion to
Dismiss 	(ECF 	No. 	54) 	be 	GRANTED 	and 	Plaintiff’s 	Second 	Amended
Complaint 	be 	DISMISSED 	WITHOUT 	PREJUDICE. 	Should 	this
Memorandum and Recommendation be adopted, the Court RECOMMENDS
all other pending motions (ECF Nos. 11, 13, 14, 20, 24, 26, 41, and 79) be
DENIED AS MOOT.
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The Clerk shall send copies of this Memorandum and Recommendation
to the respective parties who have fourteen days from the receipt thereof to file
written objections thereto pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)
and General Order 2002-13. Failure to file written objections within the time
period mentioned shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking the factual
findings and legal conclusions on appeal.
SIGNED in Houston, Texas on March 24, 2026.
______________________________
Richard W. Bennett
United States Magistrate Judge
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