Ransom v. Barry et al

'I
I
i	, I
' I
	' I
	I I
: !
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTI
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
A. 	RANSOM,·
INDIVIDUALLY AND, AS NEXT
OF FRIEND OF A.R.,
Plaintiffs,
§
§
§
§
§
§
V. 	§ 	Civil Action No. H-25-4187
§
BRYCE BARRY AND HOUSTON
INDEPENDENT SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
Defendants.
§
§
§
§
§
ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First
Amended Petition Pursuant to Federal Rules 	of Civil Procedure 	12(b)(l) and
12(b)(6) 	(D.ocument 	No. 	10). 	Having 	considered 	the 	Defendants' 	motion,	' 	'
submissions, and applicable law, the Court determines that the Defendants' motion
should be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
This is a case arising from an incident at an elementary school in Houston,
Texas. Plaintiff A. Ransom is the parent of Plaintiff "A.R.," a minor who attended
Barbara Bush Elementary School in the Houston Independent School District
("HISD"). Ransom brings suit against Defendant HISD and J:?efendant Bryce Barry
' I
("Barry"), the principal o~Barbar~ Bush Elementary School, alleging that "[o]n or
' I	
I I
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
December 15, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
Case 4:25-cv-04187 Document 14 Filed on 12/12/25 in TXSD Page 1 of 10

" --,-----·-- ... -- --
l
I
I
i l
: I
i l
about January 2025, ... A.R., age seven years old, was repe~tedly sexually harassed
and assaulted by a fellow 2nd Grade Student at Barbara Bush Elementary." 1 Ransom
further alleges that she reported the assaults to Defendant Barry, who failed to
provide remedy, guidance, or assistance to Plaintiffs. Ransom further alleges that as
a result of Barry's lack of response, her daughter was "forced to attend school in the
same classroom and in close proximity to her attacker each and every day." 2
Based on the foregoing, on May 27, 2025, Ransom filed suit on behalf of her
minor daughter, A.R., in state court, asserting claims against Barry for negligence
and failure to adhere to the Texas Constitution and Texas Education Code. Ransom
also asserts claims against HISD under Section 1983 and Title IX. Ransom seeks
monetary relief in an amount between $1,000,000.00 	and $5,000,000.00. 	On
September 4, 2025, Defendants removed the case to this Court pursuant to the
Court's federal question jurisdiction. On November 3, 2025, Ransom filed her first
amended complaint. On November 17, 2025, Defendants moved to dismiss this case
pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(l) and 12(b)(6). Ransom did not
respond to Defendants' motion to dismiss within either the original response date,
or the date of this Order.
1 Plaintifft' Original Petition, Document No. 1 at Exhibit A-2 at ,r 9.
2 Plaintifft' Original Petition, Document No. 1 at Exhibi~ A-2 at ,r 10.
'I
! I
2 I :
Case 4:25-cv-04187 Document 14 Filed on 12/12/25 in TXSD Page 2 of 10

! ;
- ' I
, I
j
• i
i I	• j
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 	• 1
Rule 12(b)(6) allows dismissal if a plaintiff fails "to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a pleading must
contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although "the pleading standard Rule 8 announces
does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' ... it demands more than ... 'labels
and conclusions."' Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ( quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. 	v. 	Twombly, 	550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). "[A] formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, " [t]he
'court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff."' In re Katrina Canal Breeches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir.
2007) (quotingMartinK. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464,
467 (5th Cir. 2004)). To survive the motion, a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 	550 U.S. at 570.
"Conversely, 'when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a
claim of entitlement to relief, this basic deficiency should ... be exposed at the point
of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.'" Cuvillier
v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558).
3
Case 4:25-cv-04187 Document 14 Filed on 12/12/25 in TXSD Page 3 of 10

III. LAW & ANALYSIS
Defendants move to dismiss Ransom's complaint, contending that Ransom
lacks standing to bring claims against Defendants, and fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. Ransom did not respond to Defendants' motion to
dismiss, failing to rebut or offer evidence to counter Defendants' 	contentions.
Pursuant to Local Rule 7.4, failure to respond is taken as a representation of no
opposition. S.D. Tex. Local R. 7.4.
Ransom brings claims for: (1) negligence against Barry and Defendants Jane
and John Doe, as next friend of the minor Jane Doe; (2) violations of 42 U.S.C. §
1983 by Defendants Barry and HISD; and (3) a violation of Title IX against HISD
solely. Regardless of Ransom's failure to respond to Defendants' motion to dismiss,
the Court will consider, in tum, the merits of Ransom's claim against Defendants.
A. Bryce Barry and Unidentified Doe Defendants
Ransom alleges a common law negligence claim against Barry, contending
that he was "aware of the offensive conduct inflicted on ·Minor Plaintiff ... [and] was
also aware of the child perpetrator predilections for abuse of fellow students." 3
Ransom further alleges that "Defendant Barry had a duty to follow the [School]
3 Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, Document No. 8 at ,r 19. •
4
Case 4:25-cv-04187 Document 14 Filed on 12/12/25 in TXSD Page 4 of 10

'I I
	I I 	.
District's policies and procedures for this type of offensive contact." 4 Ransom also
alleges a violation of Section 1983 against Barry for failing to "adhere to the policies
of the Houston Independent School District" or "fully and properly investigate"
Ransom's concems. 5 In response, Barry contends that he is entitled to both qualified
immunity under federal law and professional immunity under the Texas Education
Code. Ransom offers no rebuttal.
Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that exists to shield government
officials from liability "when their actions could reasonably have been believed to
be legal." Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 370- 31 (5th Cir. 2011). The defense
is available to government officials who perform discretionary functions "insofar as
their conduct does not violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person
would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Turning to
professional immunity, under the Texas Education Code a "professional employee
of a school district is not personally liable for any act that is incident to or within the
scope of the duties of the employee's position of employment, and that involves the
exercise of judgment or discretion on the part of the employee." Tex. Educ. Code§
22.051. The only exception found within the professional immunity standard
4 Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, Document No. 8 at ,r 21. •
5 Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, Document No. 8 at ,r,r31 +32.
5
Case 4:25-cv-04187 Document 14 Filed on 12/12/25 in TXSD Page 5 of 10

. 	. 	: I 	. 	. . 	.
outlined by the Texas Education Code is "in circumstances ih which a professional
employee uses excessive force in the discipline of students or negligence resulting
in bodily injury to students. Id.
Here, Barry contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity because he was
a state government employee acting within the scope of his duties without violating
any clearly established rights of the plaintiff. Barry also contends that he is entitled
to professional immunity under the Texas Education Code based on Ransom's own
complaint. Barry notes Ransom's acknowledgement in her lawsuit that Barry is the
school principal, thus satisfying the "professional employee" element under the
Texas Education Code. Barry further contends that Ransom alleges that Barry "had
been advised" to institute "several remedies" within the school, decisions that
inherently require judgment and discretion within the scope of Barry's employment
with the school district. Ransom offers no rebuttal. An independent review of
Ransom's amended complaint reveals allegations confirming the four elements to
establish professional immunity under the Texas Education Code, that: (1) Barry
was a professional employee of the school district; (2) his challenged conduct was
within the scope of his duties; (3) his duties involved the exercise of discretion; and
(4) his acts did not fall within the stated exceptions.
6
Case 4:25-cv-04187 Document 14 Filed on 12/12/25 in TXSD Page 6 of 10

• I
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Barry is ~ti.titled to both qualified
and professional immunity. Accordingly, the 	Court determines that Ransom's
negligence and Section 1983 claims against Barry should be dismissed.
Ransom also asserts a negligence claim against Defendants "Jane and John
Doe, as next friend of the minor Jane Doe," which Ransom describes as the alleged
perpetrator. 6 The Court notes that Ransom filed this case in state court on May 27,
2025. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), service was required to be
made upon all Defendants ninety days later, by August 25, 2025. A review of the
record in this case reveals that Ransom has failed to serve any of the unidentified
Doe Defendants either by the timeline required under the Federal Rules or by the
date of this Order. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Ransom's claims
against the unidentified Doe Defendants should be dismissed. The Court will now
consider Ransom's claims against the last remaining defendant, HISD.
B. 	Houston Independent School District
Ransom alleges violations 	of Section 	1983 	and Title IX against HISD,
contending that HISD "failed in its codified duties to Plaintiffs" and "acted with
6 Plaintiffe' Amended Complaint, Document No. 8 at ,r 18 ..
7
Case 4:25-cv-04187 Document 14 Filed on 12/12/25 in TXSD Page 7 of 10

I
I I
i
I
II
I
deliberate indifference to reports of Sexual Harassment." 7 1fhe Court will consider
• 	' I
' I
each claim in tum.
First, HISD contends that Ransom's Section 1983 claim is frivolous because
Ransom attempts to use Section 1983 as a vehicle to assert state law claims. HISD
notes Ransom's complaint in which she alleges that HISD "failed to adhere" to the
Texas Constitution and the Texas Education Code in violation of Section 1983.
Ransom offers no rebuttal. Considering the Fifth Circuit's clear guidance that "[i]t
is fundamental to our federal jurisprudence that state tort claims are not actionable
under federal law" and that "a plaintiff under section 1983 must show deprivation of
a federal right," the Court finds that Ransom's Section 1983 claim should be
dismissed. See Nesmith v. Taylor, 715 F.2d 194, 195 (5th Cir. 1983).
Second, HISD contends that Ransom's Title IX claim should be dismissed
because Ransom fails to plead facts plausibly demonstrating the elements of a Title
IX claim as a matter of law. Ransom offers no rebuttal. "A school district that
receives federal funds may be liable for student-on-student harassment if the district:
(1) had actual knowledge of the harassment, (2) the harasser was under the district's
control, (3) the harassment was based on the victim's sex, (4) the harassment was so
severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that· it effectively barred the victim's
7 Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, Document No. 8 at ,r,r 33, 37-39.
8
Case 4:25-cv-04187 Document 14 Filed on 12/12/25 in TXSD Page 8 of 10

: I
I I	, I	
I I
i i	I I
I i
	I I
	I
access to an educational opportunity or benefit, and ( 5) the ;district was deliberately
'
indifferent to the harassment." MK by and through Koepp v. Pearl River Cty. Sch.
Dist., 144 F.4th 801, 806 (5th Cir. 2025) (citations and quotations omitted). The
Supreme Court has also made clear that it is unlikely a single instance of severe one-
on-one peer harassment could be said to have a systemic effect barring the victim's
access to education. See Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. ofEduc., 526 U.S. 629,631 (1999)
(finding it unlikely that a single incident of student-on-student sexual abuse could
constitute systemic harassment under Title IX).
Here, a review of the record reveals that Ransom pleads her minor child A.R.
was subject to abuse by a peer in January of 2025. HISD contends that Ransom fails
to plead any other incidents that occurred with respect to A.R., further arguing that
Ransom fails to allege facts sufficient to show that the harassment was so pervasive
to effectively bar A.R.'s access to education. Based on the Supreme Court's holding
in Davis finding it unlikely that a single incident of student-on-student sexual abuse
could constitute systemic harassment under Title IX, the Court declines to do so here
in the absence of an adequately plead complaint or response. Accordingly, the Court
determines that Ransom's claim under Title IX should be dismissed.
Having considered the pending motion,.submissions, and applicable law, the
Court finds that Ransom states no plausible claim upon whtch relief can be granted
with respect to ariy of the defendants in this case. Accordingly, the Court determines
9
Case 4:25-cv-04187 Document 14 Filed on 12/12/25 in TXSD Page 9 of 10

.l • ,. ' 	"'
that the pending motion should be granted,
defendants in this matter should be dismissed.
I
I I	I I
	I I
I :	, I
i !
and Ransom's claims against all! !
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended
. Petition Pursuant to Federal Rules 	of Civil Procedure 	12(b)(l) and 	12(b)(6)
(Document No. 10) is GRANTED. The Court further
ORDERS that Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants are DISMISSED.
TIDS IS A FINAL JUDGMENT.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this 	/~ day ofDecem_per, 2025.
10
DAVID HITTNER
United States District Judge
Case 4:25-cv-04187 Document 14 Filed on 12/12/25 in TXSD Page 10 of 10