Chapman v. U.S. Bank Trust National Association, not in its Individual Capacity but Solely as Owner Trustee for RCF 2 Acquisition TrustDO NOT DOCKET. CASE HAS BEEN REMANDED.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
Aleta Renee Chapman,
Plaintiff,
v.
U.S. 	Bank 	Trust 	National
Association, 	not 	in 	its 	Individual
Capacity 	but 	Solely 	as 	Owner
Trustee 	for 	RCF 	2 	Acquisition
Trust,
Defendant.
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Civil Action No. 4:25-cv-03758
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Defendant 	U.S. 	Bank 	Trust 	National 	Association, 	despite 	being
confronted with a motion to remand, Dkt. 2, failed to respond to this Court’s
explicit order directing it to substantiate that subject-matter jurisdiction
exists. 	Dkt. 15. 	Plaintiff Aleta Renee Chapman noted U.S. Bank’s failure,
renewed her request for remand, and seeks costs and expenses under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c). 	Dkt. 16. 	Based on the record, it is recommended that Chapman’s
motion to remand be granted and that her request for costs and expenses be
denied. It is further recommended that U.S. Bank’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. 7)
be denied as moot. 	Plaintiff’s motion for a pre-motion conference (Dkt. 3) is
denied.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
November 21, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Background
This case began when Chapman filed a state-court suit against U.S.
Bank, in its capacity as Trustee for RCF 2 Acquisition Trust, to challenge the
foreclosure of her property. See Dkt. 1-1 at 5-7. U.S. Bank timely removed the
case to this Court. Dkt. 1.
The notice of removal invokes diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, as
the only basis for jurisdiction. 	Dkt. 1 at 2. 	U.S. Bank alleged that Chapman
is a Texas citizen, based on her state-court allegation that she resides and has
a homestead in Texas. 	See id. 	As for U.S. Bank’s citizenship, the notice of
removal recites the general principle that the citizenship of the trustee controls
“[i]f a trustee possess ‘customary powers to hold, manage, and dispose of assets
....’” 	Id. (quoting Navarro Sav. Assoc. v. Lee, 466 U.S. 458, 464 (1980))
(emphasis added). 	It then declares that U.S. Bank is a citizen of Delaware,
where its main office is located. Id. at 3.
Chapman 	promptly 	moved 	to 	remand, 	disputing 	that 	diversity
jurisdiction exists and asserting other purported defects in removal. 	Dkt. 2.
U.S. Bank filed a response, and Chapman replied, Dkt. 11. 	Chapman also
sought a “pre motion conference” related to the motion to remand that she had
already filed. 	Dkt. 3. 	In the meantime, U.S. Bank filed a motion to dismiss
her claims on the merits. Dkt. 7, which Chapman opposed, Dkt. 9.
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After reviewing the submissions, this Court entered an order directing
Defendant 	U.S. 	Bank 	to 	provide 	additional 	information 	necessary 	to
demonstrate whether its citizenship is, in fact, diverse from that of Plaintiff
Aleta Renee Chapman. 	See Dkt. 15. 	In particular, U.S. Bank had not shown
that, in addition to its title as trustee, it also possessed real and substantial
control over the assets of the property’s record owner, RCF 2 Acquisition Trust.
See id. at 2 (citing Bynane v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 866 F.3d 351, 357-58 (5th
Cir. 2017)). The Court set a hard deadline of November 10, 2025 for U.S. Bank
to supply the missing information. Id. at 3. d
U.S. Bank did not comply with the October 27, 2025 order. 	This led
Chapman to file a notice flagging U.S. Bank’s non-compliance, renewing her
motion for remand, and seeking costs and expenses under 28 U.S.C. § 1447.
Dkt. 16; Dkt. 17 (affidavit).
Legal standard
A defendant can remove a state-court action if the action could originally
have been filed in federal court. 	28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 	Federal courts, in turn,
are authorized to hear cases that either (1) involve questions of federal law, 28
U.S.C. § 1331, or (2) “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value
of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between ... citizens of different
States,” id. § 1332(a)(1).
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The removal statute must “be strictly construed and any doubt as to the
propriety of removal should be resolved in favor of remand.” 	In re Hot-Hed
Inc., 477 F.3d 320, 323 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). 	“The jurisdictional facts
that support removal must be judged at the time of the removal.” 	Gebbia v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 233 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 2000). 	The party invoking
federal jurisdiction “bears the burden of showing that federal jurisdiction
exists and that removal was proper.” Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins.
Co., 	276 	F.3d 	720, 	723 	(5th 	Cir. 	2002). 	This 	burden 	requires 	proving
jurisdiction exists by a preponderance of the evidence. 	See Vantage Trailers,
Inc. v. Beall Corp., 567 F.3d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 2009). 	Jurisdiction must be
established “by competent proof,” see Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 96-97
(2010), based on “summary judgment type evidence,” St. Paul Reinsurance Co.
v. Greenberg, 134 F.3d 1250, 1253 (5th Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted).
Analysis
I. 	U.S. Bank failed to show that diversity jurisdiction is proper.
The 	only 	asserted 	basis 	for 	jurisdiction 	is 	diversity 	of 	citizenship,
28 U.S.C. § 1332. 	The notice of removal assumes that because U.S. Bank
serves as and is being sued in its capacity the trustee for the property’s record
owner, only its citizenship (Delaware) matters. See Dkt. 1 at 2-3. And because
Chapman is domiciled in Texas, that would make the parties diverse.
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When moving to remand, Chapman argued that U.S. Bank’s citizenship
allegations are incomplete. 	Dkt. 2 at 8. 	As Chapman noted, “[w]here a trust
is not a traditional trust or the trustee lacks full customary powers, the
citizenship of each beneficiary/member may be relevant.” Id. (citing Americold
Realty Tr. v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 577 U.S. 378 (2016)). 	U.S. Bank did not
address this core question, even when responding to Chapman’s motion. 	And
U.S. Bank ignored this Court’s directive to supplement its deficient citizenship
allegations with evidence. Because U.S. Bank failed to prove that jurisdiction
is proper, this case should be remanded.
For diversity purposes, the citizenship of a defendant who is sued in its
capacity as trustee is generally that of the trustee. See Americold Realty Tr. v.
Conagra Foods, Inc., 577 U.S. 378, 382-83 (2016) (citing Navarro Sav. Ass’n v.
Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 462-66 (1980)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1348; Wachovia Bank v.
Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 318 (2006) (holding a national banking association’s
citizenship is that of its main office’s state). 	U.S. Bank adequately disclosed
that information—i.e., as a national banking association, U.S. Bank is a citizen
of Delaware, where its main office is located. See Dkt. 1 at 3 (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1348; Wachovia Bank NA v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 318 (2006)).
But that is not the full inquiry. Instead, binding authority also requires
the Court to determine whether the trustee “possesses the sort of ‘real and
substantial’ control over the trust’s assets” such that only its citizenship should
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matter for diversity purposes. 	See Bynane v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 866 F.3d
351, 357-58 (5th Cir. 2017) (analyzing Navarro 	and Americold); see also
Navarro, 446 U.S. at 464 (trustees have real and substantial control when they
“possess[ ] certain customary powers to hold, manage, and dispose of assets for
the benefit of others,” including the authority “to take legal title to trust assets,
to invest those assets for the benefit of the shareholders, and to sue and be
sued in their capacity as trustees”). 	Unless the trustee exercises that level of
control, then diversity jurisdiction depends on the citizenship of the trust’s
shareholders. See Bynane, 866 F.3d at 357.
U.S. 	Bank 	neither 	alleged 	nor 	proved 	that 	it 	exercises 	real 	and
substantial control over RCF 2 Acquisition Trust’s assets. Its notice of removal
merely asserts that U.S. Bank would be a real party in interest “[i]f” it
“possess[es] customary powers to hold, manage, and dispose of assets ....”
Dkt. 1 at 2 (quotation omitted; emphasis added). 	Nowhere—not even in
response to the motion to remand—does U.S. Bank state that it actually has
those powers. 	See id.; see also Dkt. 10 at 2 (quoting the notice of removal but
providing no facts).
Moreover, the Court explicitly ordered U.S. Bank to supply the missing
information as to whether it has authority over RCF 2’s assets and set a
deadline for doing so. Dkt. 15 at 3 (November 10, 2025 deadline). Weeks have
passed without any response. 	And nothing in the record indicates that the
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parties would be diverse if jurisdiction depends on the citizenship of the trusts’
owners, rather than the citizenship of U.S. Bank alone.
As a result, U.S. Bank has not met its burden to prove that diversity
jurisdiction exists. Plaintiffs’ motion to remand should be granted.
II. 	Chapman has not adequately substantiated any fees or expenses.
After U.S. Bank failed to respond to the Court’s order, Chapman renewed
her request for remand and sought $2,041.00 in various fees and expenses
under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Dkt. 16. “An order remanding the case may require
payment 	of 	just 	costs 	and 	any 	actual 	expenses, 	including 	attorney 	fees,
incurred as a result of the removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 	Such relief is
available only if removal was objectively unreasonable. See Martin v. Franklin
Cap. Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 136 (2005) (requiring objectively unreasonable
removal to award costs and attorneys’ fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)).
U.S. Bank’s failure to engage the settled legal standard for gauging its
citizenship, coupled with its failure to tender any evidence justifying its
citizenship assertion despite being ordered to do so, at least suggests that
removing this case was objectively unreasonable. 	See, e.g., Gromer v. Mack,
799 	F. 	Supp. 	2d 	704, 	712 	(N.D. 	Tex. 	2011) 	(removal 	was 	objectively
unreasonable when “clear precedent” that the defendant failed to engage and
address undermined the asserted bases for federal jurisdiction). 	But even if
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that were true, Chapman has not adequately shown that she incurred any
costs or expenses that can be awarded.
The 	bulk 	of 	Chapman’s 	requested 	expenses 	($1,875.00) 	consist 	of
“[r]esearch and preparation for all motions,” which she purports to bill at
“$75/hr ....” Dkt. 17 at 2. 	But “it is well-settled that pro se litigants ... are not
entitled to fee awards or litigation expenses authorized by fee-shifting statutes
such as section 1447(c).” 	New York v. Bell, 2011 WL 134084, at *2 (D. Conn.
Jan. 14, 2011) (citing Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 435 (1991), and other
decisions). Chapman’s hours spent on this case are not recoverable.
The 	remaining 	items 	lack 	sufficient 	detail. 	Section 	1447(c) 	limits
recovery to “fees and costs incurred in federal court that would not have been
incurred had the case remained in state court.” Avitts v. Amoco Prod. Co., 111
F.3d 30, 32 (5th Cir. 1997). 	Put another way, “ordinary litigation expenses
that would have been incurred had the action remained in state court are not
recoverable 	because 	such 	expenses 	are 	not 	incurred 	‘as 	a 	result 	of 	the
removal.’” 	Id. 	Recoverable “costs” are confined to those specific items in
28 U.S.C. § 1920, of which the only potentially relevant category here includes
“the costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily
obtained for use in the case ....” 	28 U.S.C. § 1920; see also Morguard, LLC v.
Rowe, 2020 WL 1479857, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2020) (agreeing that “costs”
under § 1447(c) are limited to the categories specified in § 1920, citing In re
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N.Y. Life Ins. Co. Agents’ Class Claimants Solicitation Litig., 92 F. Supp. 2d
564, 573 (E.D. La. 1997)).
Chapman’s formulaic recitation that certain costs were “reasonably and
necessarily incurred” because of removal is too conclusory to meet her burden.
Dkt. 17 at 2. 	Chapman’s descriptions also lump too many things together
without providing adequate specifics. 	For example, she requests $72,.00 for
“Travel (gas) and parking for clerk’s office/courthouse visits.” 	Dkt. 17 at 2.
There is no explanation of how much she has allocated for gas, how many miles
of driving she attributes to courthouse filings, nor how many courthouse visits
were involved.
The same problem undermines her request for $54.00 in unspecified
“[c]ertified mail, postage & delivery of filings (to court and opposing counsel)”
and $40.00 in unspecified “[p]rinting, copying, scanning, and PACER access
charges ....” 1 	Dkt. 17 at 2. 	She has not itemized those figures. 	And some of
the 	specific 	items 	are 	problematic 	on 	their 	face. 	As 	an 	example, 	costs
associated with preparing or submitting some of her filings—like her request
for a “pre-motion conference,” Dkt. 3—which she then renewed, Dkt. 13—were
neither warranted nor necessary. To the contrary, Chapman had already filed
1 In addition, there is ample reason to doubt all of Chapman’s figures because they
consist solely of round numbers. 	It is unlikely that costs of these types—certified
mailing, postage, printing, access fees, gas, and the like—when aggregated, would
result in round numbers.
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her 	motion 	to 	remand 	before 	submitting 	the 	motion 	for 	“pre-motion
conference.”
Chapman also has not made the predicate showing to recover PACER
fees. Even decisions that have authorized PACER fees in some instances have
distinguished between “costs incurred performing research (unrecoverable)
and 	those 	sustained 	making 	copies 	of 	documents 	for 	use 	in 	litigation
(recoverable).” Morguard, LLC, 2020 WL 1479857, at *5 (quoting Bear Ranch,
LLC v. HeartBrand Beef, Inc., 2018 WL 3388766, at *2 n.2 (S.D. Tex. July 12,
2018)). 	Yet Chapman does not explain why she had pulled documents via
PACER, nor how much of the $40.00 subtotal consists of PACER fees.
In short, Chapman has not provided sufficient evidence that she incurred
specific costs or expenses that can and should be reimbursed. 	Regardless of
whether removal was objectively reasonable, this Court should deny her
request for costs and expenses under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
Chapman also requests that U.S. Bank be admonished for failing to
comply with this Court’s order to disclose the requested information pertinent
to jurisdiction. See Dkt. 17 at 2. The Court hereby warns both U.S. Bank and
its 	counsel 	that 	disregarding 	a 	court 	order 	directing 	specific 	action 	is
inappropriate. 	But in this instance, the sufficient remedy for U.S. Bank’s
failure to substantiate jurisdiction is to remand the case. No further action is
merited.
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Recommendation and Order
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff Aleta
Renee Chapman’s motion(s) to remand (Dkt. 2; Dkt. 16) be GRANTED, and
that this case be REMANDED to the 400th Judicial District Court of Fort
Bend County, Texas, from whence it was removed.
It is further RECOMMENDED that Chapman’s motion for fees and
expenses (Dkt. 16) under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) be DENIED.
It is further RECOMMENDED that U.S. Bank’s motion to dismiss
(Dkt. 7) be DENIED AS MOOT.
It is ORDERED that Chapman’s motion for pre-motion conference
(Dkt. 3; Dkt. 13) is DENIED.
The parties have fourteen days from service of this Report and
Recommendation to file written objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.
R. 	Civ. 	P. 	72(b). 	Failure 	to 	file 	timely 	objections 	will 	preclude
appellate review of factual findings and legal conclusions, except for
plain error. 	Ortiz v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep’t, 806 F.3d 822, 825
(5th Cir. 2015).
Signed on November 21, 2025, at Houston, Texas.
______________________________
Yvonne Y. Ho
United States Magistrate Judge
_____________________________________
Yvvvooon	n	n	nne Y. Hooo
United States Magistrate Judge
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