Kuuriraya v. Houston Independent School District

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
NKOZI KUURIRAYA,
Plaintiff,
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v. 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:25-cv-3283
HOUSTON INDEPENDENT
SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court1 is Defendant Houston Independent School
District’s (“HISD”) Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 30). 	Based on a review of the
motion, arguments, and relevant law, the Court RECOMMENDS HISD’s
motion (id.) be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (ECF
No. 27) be DISMISSED. Further, the Court RECOMMENDS pro se Plaintiff
Nkozi Kuuriraya’s (“Plaintiff”) Motions for Summary Judgment (ECF Nos. 9–
10) be DENIED AS MOOT.
I. 	Background
Plaintiff filed this case against his employer, HISD, alleging violations
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), the American with
1 This case was referred to the Undersigned for all purposes pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. (ECF No. 15).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
April 24, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (“HIPPA”), the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“DTPA”), 18 U.S.C. §
1346, and 18 U.S.C. § 1001. 	(ECF No. 1 at 2). 	In Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint, he 	also 	mentions “interference with federal 	proceedings” and
“corporate fraud, obstruction, and retaliation” as additional “claims for relief.”
(ECF No. 27 at 7).
On February 27, 2026, HISD moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint. (ECF No. 30).
II. 	Legal Standard
a. Rule 12(b)(1)
A motion to dismiss made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
(“Rule”) 12(b)(1) allows a party to challenge the exercise of the Court’s subject
matter jurisdiction. 	FED. R. C IV . P. 12(b)(1). 	Whether a federal court has
jurisdiction must “be established as a threshold matter” and “is inflexible and
without exception.” 	Webb v. Davis, 940 F.3d 892, 896 (5th Cir. 2019). 	The
party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of proof for a 12(b)(1) motion to
dismiss. 	Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). 	The
Court generally will accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true
and construe those allegations in a light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Kumar
v. Frisco Indep. Sch. Dist., 443 F. Supp. 3d 771, 777–78 (E.D. Tex. 2020).
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“When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12
motions, the court should consider the 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before
addressing any attack on the merits.” Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161.
b. Rule 12(b)(6)
Rule 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal of an action for “failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.” 	FED. R. C IV . P. 12(b)(6). 	When
considering a motion to dismiss, a court should construe the allegations in the
complaint favorably to the pleader and accept as true all well-pleaded facts.
Sullivan v. Leor Energy, LLC, 600 F.3d 542, 546 (5th Cir. 2010). 	In the Fifth
Circuit, motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) are viewed with disfavor and
rarely granted. 	Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir.
2009). 	To survive dismissal, a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009).
However, a court is not bound to accept legal conclusions couched as
factual allegations. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). Although all
reasonable inferences will be resolved in favor of a plaintiff, a plaintiff must
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plead “specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations.” 	Tuchman v. DSC
Commc’ns Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Firefighters’ Ret.
Sys. v. Grant Thornton, L.L.P., 894 F.3d 665, 669 (5th Cir. 2018) (“Although a
complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, the allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .”) (internal
quotations omitted)). “‘Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.’” 	Firefighters’ Ret.
Sys., 894 F.3d at 669 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). 	“The court is not
required to conjure up unpled allegations or construe elaborately arcane
scripts to save a complaint.” Santerre v. Agip Petroleum Co., Inc., 45 F. Supp.
2d 558, 568 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (internal quotations omitted).
To determine whether to grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may only
look to allegations in a complaint to determine their sufficiency. 	Id.; Atwater
Partners of Tex. LLC v. AT & T, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-175, 2011 WL 1004880, at *1
(E.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2011). 	“A court may, however, also consider matters
outside the four corners of a complaint if they are incorporated by reference,
items 	subject 	to 	judicial 	notice, 	matters 	of 	public 	record, 	orders, 	items
appearing in the record of a case, and exhibits attached to a complaint whose
authenticity is unquestioned.” Joubert on Behalf of Joubert v. City of Houston,
No. 4:22-cv-3750, 2024 WL 1560015, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 10, 2024). 	“A
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document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint,
however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” 	Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also FED. R. C IV .
P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice”).
III. 	Discussion
Defendant moves to dismiss each of Plaintiff’s claims. (See ECF No. 30).
Plaintiff filed a response to the motion, but his response mostly argues that
Defendant failed to properly serve the motion to dismiss on Plaintiff. (See ECF
No. 32). 	The Court will first address Plaintiff’s arguments before turning to
Defendant’s motion.
a. Service of the Motion
Plaintiff states he did not receive the motion by mail and that the “only
communications Plaintiff received were automated notices generated by the
Courthouse system.” 	(Id. at 1–2). 	Plaintiff’s response is signed subject to
penalty of perjury. (Id. at 5).
In contrast, Defendant certified that the motion was mailed via first
class mail to Plaintiff. 	(ECF No. 30 at 6). 	The Court notes that Plaintiff has
updated his address multiple times (see ECF Nos. 7, 13, 20, 35) and has
previously had issues receiving filings via mail in this case (see ECF Nos. 17–
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18). 	Per Southern District of Texas Local Rule 83.4, “[a] . . . pro se litigant is
responsible for keeping the clerk advised in writing of the current address.”
Plaintiff’s current address on CM/ECF is listed as “General Delivery,” which is
“a mail service for those without a permanent address, often used as a
temporary mailing address.” 	USPS, https://faq.usps.com/s/article/What-is-
General-Delivery (last visited Apr. 20, 2026).
Importantly, Plaintiff acknowledges that he had notice of the filing via
an email Plaintiff received from CM/ECF. (ECF No. 32 at 5). In fact, Plaintiff’s
response is evidence that Plaintiff had notice of the motion. Plaintiff does not
state, however, that he contacted the Courthouse or Defendant to request a
copy of the motion after receiving notice that a motion was filed. 	Further,
Plaintiff has not requested additional time to respond to the motion. Plaintiff
is clearly aware of Defendant’s motion and has had nearly two months to
attempt to obtain a copy. 	The Court also notes Defendant mailed the motion
to the address provided by Plaintiff at the time of filing (see ECF No. 20). (ECF
No. 30 at 6). 	The Court declines to recommend Defendant’s motion be denied
on the grounds that Plaintiff allegedly did not receive the motion via mail. See
Butler v. Miller, No. 24-cv-410, 2025 WL 105324, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 15, 2025)
(granting a motion to dismiss where a defendant confirmed it was sent via mail
despite the pro se plaintiff stating he never received a copy of a motion,
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requesting additional time to respond due to problems with his mail, and
failing to ultimately file a response to the motion); Thompson v. Stief, No. 4:22-
cv-742, 	2024 	WL 	5278863, 	at 	*2 	(E.D. 	Tex. 	Aug. 	28, 	2024), 	report 	and
recommendation adopted, No. 4:22-cv-742, 2025 WL 28239 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 3,
2025) 	(“It 	is 	well-settled 	that 	a 	Plaintiff 	has 	an 	ongoing 	obligation 	and
responsibility to inform the Court [of] his whereabouts through a current
mailing address.” (internal quotations omitted)).
b. Title VII and ADA
Turning to Defendant’s argument, Defendant first argues that Plaintiff’s
Title VII claim and ADA claim should be dismissed because Plaintiff did not
exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit. (ECF No. 30 at 3–4).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act provides for private causes of action
arising out of employment discrimination and gives federal courts subject
matter jurisdiction to resolve such disputes. 	See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f).
However, before a plaintiff can file a suit in federal court alleging employment
discrimination under Title VII, he must exhaust his administrative remedies.
Davis v. Fort Bend Cnty., 893 F.3d 300, 303 (5th Cir. 2018), aff’d sub nom. Fort
Bend Cnty., Texas v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541 (2019). 	A plaintiff exhausts those
remedies by filing “a timely charge with the EEOC, or with a state or local
agency with authority to grant or seek relief from the alleged unlawful
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employment practice.” Dao v. Auchan Hypermarket, 96 F.3d 787, 789 (5th Cir.
1996) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)). “Exhaustion occurs when [a] plaintiff
files a timely charge with the EEOC and receives a statutory notice of right to
sue.” 	Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378–79 (5th Cir. 2002).
The filing of an EEOC charge “is a precondition to filing suit in district court.”
Id. at 379 (internal quotations omitted). 	Upon receiving a statutory notice of
right to sue, a plaintiff has ninety days to file a civil action pursuant to his
Title VII claims. 	42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The ninety-day limitations period
is strictly construed against all litigants, and pro se litigants are not excused
from abiding by the limitations period. See Taylor, 296 F.3d at 379.
Similarly, the ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against a
“qualified individual on the basis of disability.” 	42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). 	“The
procedural 	requirements 	for 	filing 	an 	ADA 	claim 	incorporate 	Title 	VII’s
administrative procedures and, therefore, an ADA claimant must also exhaust
his or her administrative remedies before filing a claim in federal court.”
Lawson v. Jason Pharms., Inc., No. 3:17-cv-2648, 2019 WL 2448849, at *3
(N.D. Tex. June 12, 2019) (citing Patton v. Jacobs Eng’g Group, Inc., 874 F.3d
437, 443 (5th Cir. 2017)).
Here, 	because 	Plaintiff 	has 	failed 	to 	allege 	that 	he 	has 	met 	the
precondition for filing suit by exhausting his administrative remedies, his Title
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VII and ADA claims should be dismissed without prejudice. 	See Cobb v.
Kendall, No. 3:22-cv-1867, 2023 WL 4534955, at *9 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 2023),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:22-cv-1867, 2023 WL 4533676 (N.D.
Tex. July 13, 2023).
c. 	HIPAA
Defendant also argues Plaintiff’s HIPAA claim should be dismissed
because HIPAA does not provide a private right of action. 	(ECF No. 30 at 4).
The Court agrees with Defendant. The Fifth Circuit has explained that HIPAA
“has 	no 	express 	provision 	creating 	a 	private 	cause 	of 	action” 	and 	that
enforcement of the act is “limited to the Secretary of Health and Human
Services.” Quintana v. Lightner, 818 F. Supp. 2d 964, 972–73 (N.D. Tex. 2011)
(citing Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569, 571 (5th Cir. 2006)). 	Accordingly,
Plaintiff does not have standing to bring a generalized HIPAA claim. 	See
Flanagan v. Walmart Corp., No. 9:24-cv-75, 2024 WL 3297504, at *3 (E.D. Tex.
June 3, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, No. 9:24-cv-75, 2024 WL
3297348 (E.D. Tex. July 3, 2024) (collecting cases). 	Because Plaintiff lacks
standing to bring a claim under HIPAA, any HIPAA claim should be dismissed
without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See id.
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d. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001 and 1346
Defendant also argues Plaintiff’s claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001 and
1346 fail because violations of criminal statutes do not give rise to a private
right of action. (ECF No. 30 at 4–5). Defendant is correct. See Green v. Stubbs,
No. 1:22-cv-5270, 2023 WL 3516210, at *2 (W.D. La. May 3, 2023), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 1:22-cv-5270, 2023 WL 3510881 (W.D. La. May
17, 2023) (“18 U.S.C. § 1001 is a federal criminal statute that does not give rise
to a private right of action and subject matter jurisdiction.” (citing Thomas v.
Abebe, 833 F. App’x 551, 555 (5th Cir. 2020)); Gilchrease v. D.R. Horton, Inc. -
Gulf Coast, No. 24-cv-358, 2024 WL 3221409, at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 29, 2024),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 24-cv-358, 2024 WL 3223918 (E.D.
La. May 16, 2024) (reiterating that criminal statutes do not create private
causes of action that would establish federal question jurisdiction). 	As such,
the Court recommends Plaintiff’s claims under criminal statutes should be
dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. 	See Armbrister v. McFarland, No. 3:18-cv-1211, 2018 WL 6004310,
at *6 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:18-
cv-1211, 2018 WL 5994992 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 15, 2018) (dismissing claims
brought under federal criminal statutes with prejudice for failure to state a
claim).
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e. 	DTPA
Finally, Defendant argues Plaintiff’s DTPA claim should be dismissed
because HISD is entitled to governmental immunity. (ECF No. 30 at 5).
Governmental immunity protects “political subdivisions of the State,
including counties, cities, and school districts” from state law claims unless
such immunity is expressly waived by the legislature. 	Wichita Falls State
Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 694 n.3 (Tex. 2003). 	“Absent legislative
consent, the trial court lacks the subject matter jurisdiction necessary to hear
the suit.” 	Belmonte v. City of Dallas, Texas, No. 3:19-cv-2656, 2021 WL
1903707, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2021), report and recommendation adopted,
No. 3:19-cv-2656, 2021 WL 1895244 (N.D. Tex. May 10, 2021). 	Importantly
here, “[t]he DTPA does not contain the clear and unambiguous language
necessary to waive governmental immunity; the Texas Legislature has not
consented to suit under the act.” Id. (citing Dallas Cnty. v. Rischon Dev. Corp.,
242 S.W.3d 90, 95 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied)).
HISD, a school district, is considered a “political subdivision” of the State
and thus entitled to governmental immunity. 	See King v. Lubbock ISD, No.
5:24-cv-058, 2024 WL 3527965, at *5 (N.D. Tex. July 8, 2024), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 5:24-cv-058, 2024 WL 3528651 (N.D. Tex. July
24, 2024). Because the Texas Legislature has not consented to suits against a
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government entity under the DTPA, the Court does not have the necessary
subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claim. As such, Plaintiff’s DTPA claim
should be dismissed without prejudice. See id. at *6 (collecting cases).
f. 	Remaining Claims for Relief
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint also mentions “interference with federal
proceedings” and “corporate fraud, obstruction, and retaliation” as additional
“claims for relief.” (ECF No. 27 at 7). While pro se pleadings are held to a more
lenient standard, pro se plaintiffs are required to plead factual allegations that
rise above a speculative level, and courts should not create causes of action
where none exist. 	Chhim v. University of Texas at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 469
(5th Cir. 2016). Through the Court’s reading of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint,
it appears that these additional “claims for relief” overlap with Plaintiff’s other
claims, which fail for the reasons discussed above. 	As such, the Court finds
that these additional “claims for relief” should also be dismissed.
IV. 	Leave to Amend
“[D]istrict courts often afford plaintiffs at least one opportunity to cure
pleading deficiencies before dismissing a case, unless it is clear that the defects
are incurable or the plaintiffs advise the court that they are unwilling or
unable to amend in a manner which will avoid dismissal.” Great Plains Tr. Co.
v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 329 (5th Cir. 2002).
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However, Plaintiff has already amended his complaint on one occasion. (ECF
No. 27). 	Further, Plaintiff has “not state[d] what facts they would provide to
address the deficiencies in their . . . Amended Complaint.” 	Garcia v. Harris
Cnty., No. 22-cv-198, 2022 WL 2230469, at *4 (S.D. Tex. June 2, 2022), report
and recommendation adopted, No. 22-cv-198, 2022 WL 2222972 (S.D. Tex.
June 21, 2022). 	Thus, Plaintiff appears “unwilling or unable to amend in a
manner that will avoid dismissal.” Great Plains Tr. Co., 313 F.3d at 329.
Further, as discussed above, “any additional opportunity [to amend]
would be futile given the Court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Griffin
v. Furlow, No. 5:23-cv-016, 2023 WL 3604735, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 2023),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 5:23-cv-016, 2023 WL 3611448 (N.D.
Tex. May 23, 2023) (collecting cases). As such, the Court recommends Plaintiff
not be given leave to amend.
V. 	Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court RECOMMENDS HISD’s motion (ECF
No. 30) be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (ECF No.
27) be DISMISSED. 	Specifically, the Court RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s
claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001 and 1346 be DISMISSED WITH PREJUICE
and Plaintiff’s remaining claims be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
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Further, 	the 	Court 	RECOMMENDS 	Plaintiff’s 	Motions 	for 	Summary
Judgment (ECF Nos. 9–10) be DENIED AS MOOT.2
The Clerk shall send copies of this Memorandum and Recommendation
to the respective parties who have fourteen days from the receipt thereof to file
written objections thereto pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)
and General Order 2002-13. Failure to file written objections within the time
period mentioned shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking the factual
findings and legal conclusions on appeal.
SIGNED in Houston, Texas on April 24, 2026.
______________________________
Richard W. Bennett
United States Magistrate Judge
2 After filing two motions for summary judgment (ECF Nos. 9–10), Plaintiff filed an
amended complaint (ECF No. 27) that rendered his previous filings as moot. 	See Plants
Wholesale, LLC v. Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co., No. 3:25-cv-565, 2026 WL 769892, at *1 (N.D.
Tex. Mar. 18, 2026) (“Courts have recognized that the filing of an amended complaint can
render moot a motion for summary judgment addressed to the original complaint.”).
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