Williams v. Becerra et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
DENETTA R. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
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v. 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:25-cv-2243
CHRISTIAN BECERRA, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM, RECOMMENDATION, AND ORDER
Pending before the Court1 are the following motions: (1) Defendant
Christie Whitbeck’s (“Whitbeck”) Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 36); (2) Christian
Becerra (“Judge Becerra”), Argie Brame (“Judge Brame”), Tiffany Newell
(“Newell”), 	John 	Oldham 	(“Oldham”), 	and 	Beverley 	McGrew-Walker’s
(“McGrew-Walker”) (collectively, the “Fort Bend County Defendants”) Motion
to Dismiss (ECF No. 39); (3) the Fort Bend County Defendants’ Motion to
Recognize Dismissal of Lena Smith and Fort Bend County, Texas (ECF No.
40); (4) Jonathan G. Brush (“Brush”) and Rogers, Morris & Grover, L.L.P.’s
(“RMG”) (collectively, the “RMG Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 41);
(5) Angie Hanan (“Hanan”), Shirley Rose-Gilliam (“Rose-Gilliam”), Judy Dae
(“Dae”), 	Rick 	Garcia 	(“Garcia”), 	Sonya 	Jones 	(“Jones”), 	Kristen 	Malone
1 This case was referred to the Undersigned for all purposes pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. (ECF No. 30).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
January 15, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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(“Malone”), Robert Scamardo (“Scamardo”), and Coby Wilbanks’ (“Wilbanks”)
(collectively, the “FBISD Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 42); (6) the
FBISD Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 45); and (7) the RMG
Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 46).
Based on a review of the motions, arguments, and relevant law, the
Court RECOMMENDS Whitbeck’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 36), the Fort
Bend County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 39), the Fort Bend
County Defendants’ Motion to Recognize Dismissal (ECF No. 40), the RMG
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 41), and the FBISD Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 42) be GRANTED.
The 	Court 	also 	ORDERS 	that 	the 	FBISD 	Defendants’ 	Motion 	for
Sanctions (ECF No. 45) and the RMG Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions (ECF
No. 46) are DENIED.
I. 	Background
This case stems out of Plaintiff’s time as a school board member with the
Fort Bend Independent School District (“FBISD”). 	(See ECF No. 35 at ¶ 21).
Plaintiff alleges she was elected to serve FBISD Position 5 on November 3,
2020. 	(Id.). 	After Plaintiff was sworn in, and over the course of four years,
Plaintiff 	alleges 	the 	“FBISD 	Defendants”2 	surveilled 	Plaintiff 	to 	find
2 Plaintiff does not identify who is included in the term “FBISD Defendants.”
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information that would “force” Plaintiff to resign from her position. (See id. at
¶¶ 23, 25–30).
On June 12, 2021, Plaintiff alleges the “FBISD Defendants” voted to use
$54 million dollars from the general revenue fund to construct an elementary
school. (Id. at ¶ 31). Plaintiff felt the vote would decrease the funds available
to assist students and sought to rescind the item. 	(Id. at ¶ 32). 	On June 19,
2021, Plaintiff alleges the “FBISD Defendants” and the “RMG Defendants”3
encouraged an individual to file a “manufactured and highly defamatory
complaint” against Plaintiff in retaliation for Plaintiff speaking out against the
measure. (Id. at 33).
On June 29, 2021, Plaintiff alleges the FBISD Board President hired an
attorney to investigate Plaintiff. 	(Id. at ¶ 36). 	Plaintiff alleges the “FBISD
Defendants” 	embezzled 	over 	$80,000.00 	of 	taxpayers’ 	funds 	to 	pay 	the
investigator. (Id. at ¶ 39). Plaintiff then alleges the “FBISD Defendants” and
Whitbeck filed a “false claim with liberty mutual insurance claiming an
employee embezzled $77,000.00 from the District in an attempt to recover the
$80,000.00 that the FBISD Defendants embezzled to pay the . . . private
investigator.” (Id. at ¶ 40).
3 Plaintiff does not identify who is included in the term “RMG Defendants.”
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On September 6, 2021, the “FBISD Defendants” voted to hire Whitbeck
as the superintendent of schools. 	(Id. at ¶ 41). 	On September 13, 2021,
Plaintiff claims the “FBISD Defendants” voted to “steer a multi-million-dollar
contract to Dr. Whitbeck’s business associate in which the plaintiff harshly
disagreed with during the public meeting.” 	(Id. at ¶ 45). 	Plaintiff states she
ultimately filed a complaint with the Texas Education agency regarding the
“FBISD Defendants’” contract with Whitbeck’s business associate. 	(Id. at ¶
48).
On October 11, 2021, Plaintiff alleges the board of trustees called a
special meeting where the “FBISD Defendants” requested for Plaintiff to
resign her seat from elected office or else they would release the private
investigator’s report. (Id. at ¶ 50). Plaintiff did not resign, and the report was
released to the public on October 26, 2021. (Id. at ¶¶ 51–52).
On January 23, 2023, Plaintiff alleges the “FBISD Defendants” ordered
a school board election “knowing the plaintiff’s term of office did not expire
until November 2023.” (Id. at ¶ 56). Plaintiff alleges the “FBISD Defendants”
proceeded to embezzle $327,000.00 to bribe . . . Oldham to construct the ultra
vires election.” (Id. at ¶ 57).
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On April 21, 2023, Plaintiff “filed an election lawsuit to stop the ultra
vires election.” 	(Id. at ¶ 58). 	Plaintiff alleges Judges Brame and Becerra
presided over the lawsuit. (Id. at ¶¶ 60–62).
On May 13, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant case. (ECF No. 1). Later, on
July 29, 2025, Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (ECF No.
35). 	Plaintiff’s FAC asserts a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit raising First and Fourth
Amendment 	violations, 	a 	§ 	1983 	conspiracy 	claim, 	a 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1985
conspiracy claim; and a Monell claim. (Id. at ¶¶ 70–88).
II. 	Legal Standards
a. Rule 12(b)(1)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(1) requires that a court
dismiss a claim if the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the
dispute. 	FED. R. C IV . P. 12(b)(1). 	A motion for 	lack 	of subject 	matter
jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) must be considered before any motion on the
merits because subject matter jurisdiction is required to determine the validity
of any claim. 	Moran v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 27 F.3d 169, 172 (5th Cir.
1994). 	“Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be found in any one of three
instances: 	(1) 	the 	complaint 	alone; 	(2) 	the 	complaint 	supplemented 	by
undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by
undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts.” 	Ramming v.
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United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). 	“The burden of proof for a
Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting jurisdiction.” Id.
b. Rule 12(b)(6)
Rule 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal of an action for “failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.” 	FED. R. C IV . P. 12(b)(6). 	When
considering a motion to dismiss, a court should construe the allegations in the
complaint favorably to the pleader and accept as true all well-pleaded facts.
Sullivan v. Leor Energy, LLC, 600 F.3d 542, 546 (5th Cir. 2010). 	In the Fifth
Circuit, motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) are viewed with disfavor and
rarely granted. 	Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir.
2009). 	To survive dismissal, a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009).
However, a court is not bound to accept legal conclusions couched as
factual allegations. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). Although all
reasonable inferences will be resolved in favor of a plaintiff, a plaintiff must
plead “specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations.” 	Tuchman v. DSC
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Commc’ns Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Firefighters’ Ret.
Sys. v. Grant Thornton, L.L.P., 894 F.3d 665, 669 (5th Cir. 2018) (“Although a
complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, the allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .”) (internal
quotations omitted)). “‘Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.’” 	Firefighters’ Ret.
Sys., 894 F.3d at 669 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). 	“The court is not
required to conjure up unpled allegations or construe elaborately arcane
scripts to save a complaint.” Santerre v. Agip Petroleum Co., Inc., 45 F. Supp.
2d 558, 568 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (internal quotations omitted).
To determine whether to grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may only
look to allegations in a complaint to determine their sufficiency. 	Id.; Atwater
Partners of Tex. LLC v. AT & T, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-175-TJW, 2011 WL 1004880,
at *1 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2011). “A court may, however, also consider matters
outside the four corners of a complaint if they are incorporated by reference,
items 	subject 	to 	judicial 	notice, 	matters 	of 	public 	record, 	orders, 	items
appearing in the record of a case, and exhibits attached to a complaint whose
authenticity is unquestioned.” Joubert on Behalf of Joubert v. City of Houston,
No. 4:22-cv-3750, 2024 WL 1560015, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 10, 2024).
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“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se
complaint, 	however 	inartfully 	pleaded, 	must 	be 	held 	to 	less 	stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”4 Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also
F ED. R. C IV . P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice”).
III. 	Discussion
a. The Fort Bend County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No.
39)
The Fort Bend County Defendants argue Plaintiff’s FAC should be
dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on various grounds. 	(ECF No. 39 at 10).
Plaintiff did not file a response. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.4, failure to respond
is taken as a representation of no opposition. 	S.D. TEX . LOCAL R. 7.4. 	The
Court construes all pro se filings liberally. 	See Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94.
Regardless of Plaintiff’s failure to respond to the motion to dismiss, the Court
4 Because Plaintiff has been allowed to proceed in forma pauperis, Plaintiff’s FAC is
subject to screening under § 1915(e)(2). 	Section 1915(e)(2)(B) provides for sua sponte
dismissal of a complaint, or any portion thereof, if the Court finds it is frivolous or malicious,
if it fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief against
a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Section 1915(e)(2)(B)
applies equally to prisoner as well as non-prisoner in forma pauperis cases. See Newsome v.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 301 F.3d 227, 231–33 (5th Cir. 2002) (affirming
dismissal 	of 	nonprisoner 	claims 	for 	frivolity 	and 	failure 	to 	state 	a 	claim 	under 	§
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii)). “Dismissal of an in forma pauperis complaint is appropriate if the
district court determines that it is frivolous, i.e., that ‘it lacks an arguable basis in either law
or fact.’” Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 281–82 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)). A complaint is legally frivolous if it is premised on an “indisputably
meritless legal theory.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.
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will consider the merits of the Fort Bend County Defendants’ motion. 	See
Gonzalez v. Mongo, No. 24-cv-5145, 2025 WL 2174763, at *2 (S.D. Tex. July 31,
2025); Chilton v. Texas S. Univ., No. 4:24-cv-1646, 2024 WL 4282092, at *1
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 2024) (“[W]here a party does not respond to a motion to
dismiss, such failure does not permit the Court to enter a ‘default’ dismissal.”).
i. 	Judge Becerra and Judge Brame
The Fort Bend Defendants argue Judge Becerra and Judge Brame are
entitled to absolute judicial immunity because their alleged acts (1) were
within their judicial capacity and (2) were not taken in the absence of all
jurisdiction. (ECF No. 39 at 16).
Judicial immunity is an absolute immunity from suit, not just from the
ultimate assessment of damages. 	Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991).
Allegations 	of 	bad 	faith, 	malice, 	or 	corruption 	do 	not 	overcome 	judicial
immunity. Id. Judicial immunity is inapplicable only when: (1) a judge takes
an action that is not within her official capacity; or (2) as it concerns judicial
actions “taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” 	Id. 	Courts must
construe jurisdiction broadly for purposes of judicial immunity. See Adams v.
McIlhany, 764 F.2d 294, 299 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435
U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978)).
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Judge Becerra presides over the 434th Judicial District Court in Fort
Bend County, Texas. (See ECF No. 35 at ¶ 5; ECF No. 39 at 11). Judge Brame
serves as associate judge for the same court. (See ECF No. 35 at ¶ 6; ECF No.
39 at 11). Plaintiff’s allegation as to these two judges consists of the following:
• 	“May 2, 2023, Associate Judge . . . Brame presided over the election
matter knowing the laws of the state prohibited District Judges from
presiding over election matters within their District.” (ECF No. 35 at
¶ 60).
• 	“May 5, 2023, Associate Judge . . . Brame, without JURISDICTION
to preside over the election matter.” (Id. at ¶ 61).
• 	“May 8, 2023, Judge . . . Becerra signed off on Judge Brames [sic]
manufactured order, knowing neither of them had JURISDICTION
to preside over an election matter within their District.” (Id. at ¶ 62).
However, simply claiming the actions of these judges were without jurisdiction
does not make it so. 	See Yan v. Tex., No. 4:24-cv-579, 2025 WL 726582, at *7
(N.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:24-cv-
579, 2025 WL 725267 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2025). Further, as noted by the Fort
Bend Defendants, Plaintiff filed her suit regarding the election in Fort Bend
County district court, which invoked the jurisdiction of Judge Becerra and
Judge Brame. (ECF No. 39 at 17 (citing ECF No. 39-1 at 4–21)); see also T EX .
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E LEC . C ODE ANN . § 221.002(a) (“Except as otherwise provided by this section,
the district court has exclusive original jurisdiction of an election contest.”).
Because the alleged conduct by Judge Becerra and Judge Brame was
judicial in nature and was undertaken pursuant to the jurisdiction of the 434th
Judicial District Court in Fort Bend County, Texas, Judge Becerra and Judge
Brame are entitled to absolute judicial immunity. 	See T EX . GOV ’T C ODE A NN .
§ 24.578 (2024) (creating the 434th Judicial District Court in Fort Bend
County, Texas); see also Rodgers v. 323rd Dist. Ct. Tarrant Cnty. Texas, 797 F.
App’x 889 (5th Cir. 2020) (noting an associate judge also has absolute judicial
immunity); Morgan v. City of Fort Worth, Tex., No. 4:13-cv-004, 2013 WL
3196580, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 25, 2013) (same). As discussed above, judicial
immunity is a bar against suit. 	As such, Plaintiff’s claims against Judge
Becerra and Judge Brame should be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). 	See Peters v. Rosenthal, No. 22-cv-312, 2022 WL
508330, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2022).
ii. 	McGrew-Walker
The Fort Bend Defendants argue McGrew-Walker is entitled to absolute
quasi-judicial immunity for acts “integral to the judicial process.” (ECF No. 39
at 18).
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“Clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages for civil
rights violations when they perform tasks integral to the judicial process.”
Evans v. Suter, 260 F. App’x 726, 727 (5th Cir. 2007).
Plaintiff’s 	FAC 	only 	references 	McGrew-Walker 	on 	one 	occasion 	in
identifying her as the District Clerk for Fort Bend County. 	(ECF No. 35 at ¶
9). 	Outside of this reference, Plaintiff’s factual allegations or claims for relief
do not mention McGrew-Walker. 	Thus, it is unclear why Plaintiff has sued
McGrew-Walker. See Kibbey v. Collin Cnty. Det. Facility, No. 4:21-cv-799, 2023
WL 2541465, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 22, 2023), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 4:21-cv-799, 2023 WL 2527858 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2023) (“It is
unclear why Plaintiff has sued District Clerk Finley, other than she was the
District Clerk of Collin County at the time Plaintiff was indicted.”).
To the extent Plaintiff intended to include McGrew-Walker in this
lawsuit due to her involvement with the case Plaintiff filed in Fort Bend
County, 	the 	Court 	finds 	McGrew-Walker 	is 	“entitled 	to 	quasi-judicial
immunity for such acts.” Id. at *2 (collecting cases). As such, Plaintiff’s claims
against McGrew-Walker should be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). See Peters, 2022 WL 508330, at *1.
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iii. 	Newell
The Fort Bend Defendants argue Plaintiff’s claims against Newell should
be dismissed because Plaintiff did not allege facts against Newell. 	(ECF No.
39 at 18–19).
“Defendants are entitled to proper notice of the claims brought against
them.” 	Kibbey, 2023 WL 2541465, at *2; see also Lozano v. Smith, 718 F.2d
756, 768 (5th Cir. 1983). 	Similar to McGrew-Walker, Plaintiff’s FAC only
references Newell on one occasion in identifying her as a certified court
reporter. 	(ECF No. 35 at ¶ 7). 	Outside of this reference, Plaintiff’s factual
allegations or claims for relief do not mention Newell. Thus, it is unclear why
Plaintiff has sued Newell. See Kibbey, 2023 WL 2541465, at *2.
Because there are no details provided by Plaintiff as to how Newell
relates to the underlying case, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim for relief
against Newell. 	Id.; see Greer v. Collier, No. 21-cv3976, 2023 WL 3628272, at
*7 (S.D. Tex. May 23, 2023), appeal dismissed sub nom. Greer v. Thomas, No.
23-20311, 	2023 	WL 	9056070 	(5th 	Cir. 	Sept. 	13, 	2023) 	(“Neither 	Greer’s
amended complaint nor his supplemental amended complaint contain any
allegations 	concerning 	O’Daniel’s 	personal 	involvement 	in 	the 	alleged
constitutional 	violation. 	. 	. 	. 	Without 	plausible 	allegations 	of 	affirmative
personal participation by O’Daniel himself in the acts that allegedly violated
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Greer’s First Amendment rights, Greer has failed to state a claim for individual
liability against O’Daniel.”). As such, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s claims
against Newell be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e).
iv. 	Oldham
As to the remaining Fort Bend Defendant, Oldham, the Fort Bend
Defendants argue Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim against Oldham.
(See ECF No. 39 at 19–29).
Plaintiff’s FAC identifies Oldham as “the election administrator for Fort
Bend County.” (ECF No. 35 at ¶ 8). In her factual allegations, Plaintiff states
“[t]he FBISD Defendants proceeded to embezzle $327,000.00 to bribe . . .
Oldham to conduct the ultra vires election.” (Id. at ¶ 57). Plaintiff’s claims for
relief do not specifically name Oldham; however, Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim
under §§ 1983 and 1985 states “Defendants, each of them, acted as described
herein above, in conspiracy with, and with agreement, permission, ratification,
and approval of each other to violate the Plaintiff’s civil rights afforded under
the United States Constitution.” 	(Id. at ¶ 84). 	Construing Plaintiff’s filings
liberally, as the Court must, the Court concludes Plaintiff asserts a conspiracy
claim under §§ 1983 and 1985 against Oldham.
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To state a § 1983 conspiracy claim, Plaintiff “must not only allege facts
that ‘establish (1) the existence of a conspiracy involving state action, but also
(2) a deprivation of civil rights in furtherance of the conspiracy by a party to
the conspiracy.’” 	Shaw v. Villanueva, 918 F.3d 414, 419 (5th Cir. 2019)
(quoting Pfannstiel v. City of Marion, 918 F.2d 1178, 1187 (5th Cir. 1990),
abrogated on other grounds by Martin v. Thomas, 973 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1992)).
As discussed above, the only mention Plaintiff makes as to a conspiracy
is 	that 	“Defendants, 	each 	of 	them, 	acted 	as 	described 	herein 	above, 	in
conspiracy with, and with agreement, permission, ratification, and approval of
each other to violate the Plaintiff’s civil rights afforded under the United States
Constitution.” 	(ECF No. 35 at ¶ 84). 	However, Plaintiff alleges no specific
facts to support the legal conclusion that Oldham conspired against her. 	As
such, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible § 1983 conspiracy claim against
Oldham. See Wright v. City of Harahan, No. 19-cv-13529, 2020 WL 815240, at
*10 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2020).
Similarly, § 1985 creates a cause of action against anyone who conspires
to deprive another of “equal protection of the laws” or “equal privileges and
immunities under the laws.” 	42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). 	As explained by the Fifth
Circuit, a conspiracy is not actionable under § 1985(3) unless it involves race-
based animus. 	See Lockett v. New Orleans City, 607 F.3d 992, 1002 (5th Cir.
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2010). 	To state a § 1985(3)5 conspiracy claim, Plaintiff must allege that
Oldham “(1) conspired; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or
indirectly, [her] of equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and
immunities under the laws; and (3) took or caused action in furtherance of the
conspiracy; which (4) injured [her] or deprived h[er] of h[er] rights or privileges
as a United States citizen.” Shaw, 918 F.3d at 419.
Plaintiff’s § 1985(3) conspiracy claim fails for the same reason her § 1983
conspiracy claim failed: she alleges no specific facts to support the conclusion
that Oldham conspired against her. 	See Wright, 2020 WL 815240, at *11.
Plaintiff also fail to allege facts establishing that racial animus played any role.
See Cantú v. Moody, 933 F.3d 414, 419 (5th Cir. 2019) (“[I]n this circuit . . . the
only conspiracies actionable under § 1985(3) are those motivated by racial
animus.”) (internal quotations omitted)).
5 Plaintiff’s FAC, liberally construed, does not reflect an intent to state claims under
§ 1985(1) or § 1985(2). To the extent Plaintiff intends to state claims under those provisions,
she fails to do so. Subsection (1) creates a cause of action against anyone who conspires to
(a) prevent a federal officer from discharging their duties or (b) injure a federal officer because
of their lawful discharge of their duties. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(1). Plaintiff has not alleged that
she was a federal officer; so, any § 1985(1) claim fails. Prevailing on a subsection (2) claim
requires proof of race- or class-based animus, Bryant v. Military Dep’t of Miss., 597 F.3d 678,
687 (5th Cir. 2010), and Plaintiff has alleged neither. As such, Plaintiff fails to state any §
1985(2) claims. Wright, 2020 WL 815240, at *11.
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As such, the Court finds Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim for relief
against 	Oldham 	and 	recommends 	Plaintiff’s 	claims 	against 	Oldham 	be
dismissed with prejudice as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
b. The Fort Bend County Defendants’ Motion to Recognize Dismissal
(ECF No. 40)
The Fort Bend Defendants also filed a motion requesting the Court
recognize Lena Smith and Fort Bend County, Texas, are no longer parties to
the instant case. (ECF No. 40 at 1). Plaintiff did not file a response.6
“An amended complaint supersedes the original complaint and renders
it of no legal effect unless the amended complaint specifically refers to and
adopts or incorporates by reference the earlier pleading.” 	King v. Dogan, 31
F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Hicks v. Ashworth, No. 23-cv-2234, 2024
WL 3243474, at *5 (S.D. Tex. June 26, 2024), aff’d, No. 24-20331, 2025 WL
3281407 (5th Cir. Nov. 25, 2025). Thus, “[c]laims and parties not re-alleged in
the amended complaint are no longer before the court — the plaintiff has in
effect dropped those claims and parties.” 	Chay v. Montiel, No. 7:23-cv-206,
6 Pursuant to Local Rule 7.4, failure to respond is taken as a representation of no
opposition. 	S.D. Tex. Local R. 7.4. 	The Court construes all pro se filings liberally. 	See
Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. Regardless of Plaintiff’s failure to respond, the Court will consider
the merits of the motion before the Court. See Gonzalez, 2025 WL 2174763, at *2; Chilton,
2024 WL 4282092, at *1 (“[W]here a party does not respond to a motion to dismiss, such
failure does not permit the Court to enter a ‘default’ dismissal.”).
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2025 WL 972829, at *13 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2025), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 7:23-cv-206, 2025 WL 963591 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2025).
In reviewing Plaintiff’s Original Complaint (ECF No. 1), Plaintiff names
Lena Smith and Fort Bend County, Texas as defendants. 	(See id. at 2, 4, 7).
However, the two are not named in Plaintiff’s FAC. 	(See ECF No. 35 at 3–4).
Further, Plaintiff’s FAC does not specifically refer to and adopt or incorporate
by reference her Original Complaint. 	As such, by removing Lena Smith and
Fort Bend County, Texas as defendants in her FAC, the Court finds this
suggests Plaintiff no longer wishes to assert claims against them. 	See Chay,
2025 WL 972829, at *13.
To the extent Plaintiff asserts claims against Lena Smith or Fort Bend
County, Texas, the Court recommends they be dismissed with prejudice as
frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
c. 	The RMG Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(1)
(ECF No. 41)
The RMG Defendants argue Plaintiff’s claims against them are barred
by the statute of limitations and should be dismissed. (ECF No. 41 at 15–16).
Plaintiff did not file a response.7
7 See supra note 6.
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RMG and Brush served as counsel for FBISD’s board. 	(See ECF No. 35
at ¶¶ 17–18). The only mention Plaintiff’s FAC makes of Brush is that Brush
was “employed by [RMG]” and served “as counsel for the board members.”
(ECF No. 35 at ¶ 18). Brush is not mentioned in Plaintiff’s FAC fact section or
claims for relief. 	(See id. at ¶¶ 21–88). 	As noted previously, Plaintiff often
refers to “RMG Defendants” in her FAC but she never identifies who is
included in that term. 	Liberally construing Plaintiff’s FAC, the Court will
assume Plaintiff is referring to Brush and RMG when she makes allegations
against “RMG Defendants” in her FAC.
As such, Plaintiff alleges the RMG Defendants encouraged “Garrett
Rossier to file a manufactured and highly defamatory complaint against” her
in retaliation for Plaintiff speaking out against the measure. 	(Id. at ¶ 33).
Plaintiff also alleges “[t]he Defendants were aware of Rosenthal’s lack of
authority to act unilaterally with the hiring of their friend, Attorney Phillip
Sharp, to maliciously and unlawfully investigate” Plaintiff.8 	(Id. at ¶ 37).
Similarly, 	Plaintiff 	alleges 	“[t]he 	RMG 	Defendants 	knew 	the 	report 	was
manufactured and the FBISD Defendants were embezzling funds to pay bribe
Attorney Phillip Sharp to author the defamatory report, release the report to
8 Plaintiff identifies Dave Rosenthal as FBISD’s board president. (See ECF No. 35 at
¶ 36).
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the Board of trustees.” 	(Id. at ¶ 47). 	Plaintiff alleges the RMG Defendants’
actions violated her First and Fourth Amendment rights, and they conspired
with others to violate her rights. (See id. at ¶¶ 70–84).
The RMG Defendants argue that all of Plaintiff’s allegations against the
RMG Defendants arise from the period of June 19, 2021 through September
21, 2021. (See ECF No. 41 at 15). Further, the RMG Defendants contend that
the applicable limitations period for Plaintiff’s claims is two years from the
date her claims accrued. 	(Id.). 	Because Plaintiff did not file her Original
Complaint until May 13, 2025, far more than two years after accrual of her
claims, the RMG Defendants maintain Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred. (Id.
at 15–16).
Section 1983 does not prescribe a statute of limitations. Heilman v. City
of Beaumont, 638 F. App’x 363, 366 (5th Cir. 2016). 	Instead, “[t]he statute of
limitations for a suit brought under § 1983 is determined by the general statute
of limitations governing personal injuries in the forum state.” 	Piotrowski v.
City of Hous., 237 F.3d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 2001). Texas has a two-year statute
of limitations for personal injury claims. 	TEX . C IV . PRAC . & R EM. C ODE §
16.003(a); see Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 576. 	In Texas, the limitations period
begins to run when the plaintiff “knows or has reason to know of the injury
which is the basis of the action.” 	Burrell v. Newsome, 883 F.2d 416, 418 (5th
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Cir. 1989) (internal quotations omitted). The plaintiff must know of the injury
and the causal connection between the defendant and the injury. 	Piotrowski,
237 F.3d at 576.
Here, Plaintiff filed her Original Complaint on May 13, 2025. (ECF No.
1). 	To survive the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff must have sufficiently pleaded
facts that suggested liability for injuries that she did not know of until after
May 13, 2023. 	See Heilman, 638 F. App’x at 366. 	However, all of Plaintiff’s
allegations regarding the RMG Defendants occurred in 2021. (See ECF No. 35
at ¶¶ 33, 36–37, 46–47). 	It is evident that Plaintiff believed she had suffered
an injury or had sufficient information to know that she had been injured
because she describes filing complaints during the relevant time period. 	(Id.
at ¶ 53). Plaintiff also filed a lawsuit on April 21, 2023. (Id. at ¶¶ 58, 63).
Based on Plaintiff’s allegations, the Courts agrees her claims against the
RMG Defendants are barred by the statute of limitations and should be
dismissed with prejudice as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
d. The FBISD Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 42)
The FBISD Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC, arguing all of
Plaintiff’s claims against the FBISD Defendants are barred by the statute of
limitations. (ECF No. 42 at 15). Plaintiff did not file a response.9
9 See supra note 6.
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For the purposes of this Memorandum and Recommendation, the FBISD
Defendants 	include 	Hanan, 	Rose-Gilliam, 	Dae, 	Garcia, 	Jones, 	Malone,
Scamardo, and Wilbanks. 	As noted above, Plaintiff’s FAC often refers to “the
FBISD Defendants” but never defines who that term is intended to include.
This is important because Plaintiff does not plead specific facts as to Hanan,
Rose-Gilliam, Dae, Garcia, Jones, Malone, Scamardo, or Wilbanks. 	(See ECF
No. 35 at 	¶¶ 21–69). 	Instead, 	Plaintiff refers 	generally to 	“the 	FBISD
Defendants.” (See id. at ¶¶ 23, 25, 30–31, 33, 39–41, 44–45, 47–48, 50, 56–57).
Plaintiff’s factual allegations as to the FBISD Defendants begin with
allegations that they approved surveillance of Plaintiff in November 2020. (See
id. at ¶ 23). 	The last factual allegation as to the FBISD Defendants states
“[t]he FBISD Defendants proceeded to embezzle $327,000.00 to bribe . . .
Oldham to conduct the ultra vires election.” (Id. at ¶ 57). Plaintiff then alleges
she filed an election lawsuit on April 21, 2023 to stop the “ultra vires election.”
(Id. at ¶ 58).
Plaintiff’s FAC asserts a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit alleging First and Fourth
Amendment 	violations; 	a 	§ 	1983 	conspiracy 	claim; 	a 	42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1985
conspiracy claim; and a Monell claim. 	(Id. at ¶¶ 70–88). 	As explained above,
Plaintiff’s claims have a two-year statute of limitations. 	See Piotrowski, 237
F.3d at 576; TEX . C IV . PRAC . & R EM. C ODE § 16.003(a).
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Based on Plaintiff’s allegations, all of the FBISD Defendants’ alleged
actions that form the basis of Plaintiff’s claims took place between November
2020 and April 2023. (See ECF No. 35 at ¶¶ 22, 58). Plaintiff ultimately filed
her Original Complaint on May 13, 2025. (ECF No. 1). To survive the motion
to 	dismiss, 	Plaintiff 	must 	have 	sufficiently 	pleaded 	facts 	that 	suggested
liability for injuries that she did not know of until after May 13, 2023. 	See
Heilman, 638 F. App’x at 366. Plaintiff has failed to do so.
Based on Plaintiff’s allegations, the Courts agrees her claims against the
FBISD Defendants are barred by the statute of limitations and should be
dismissed with prejudice as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
e. 	Whitbeck’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 36)
Whitbeck argues Plaintiff’s claims against Whitbeck should be dismissed
because the claims occurred outside the relevant statutes of limitations.10
(ECF No. 36 at 11). Plaintiff did not file a response.11
Plaintiff’s FAC ultimately asserts a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit alleging First
and Fourth Amendment violations, a § 1983 conspiracy claim, and a 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985 conspiracy claim against Whitbeck. 	(Id. at ¶¶ 70–84). 	As explained
10 Whitbeck first argues that any official capacity claims against Whitbeck should be
dismissed because they are duplicative of the claims against FBISD. (ECF No. 36 at 10–11).
However, FBISD is not listed as a party in Plaintiff’s FAC. (See ECF No. 35 at ¶¶ 4–20). As
such, the Court will proceed with Whitbeck’s second argument regarding statute of
limitations.
11 See supra note 6.
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above, Plaintiff’s claims have a two-year statute of limitations. See Piotrowski,
237 F.3d at 576; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.003(a).
Based on Plaintiff’s allegations, all of Whitbeck’s alleged actions, forming
the basis of Plaintiff’s claims, took place between 2021 and 2022. (See ECF No.
35 at ¶¶ 40–43, 45, 48, 50, 52, 54). 	Plaintiff ultimately filed her Original
Complaint on May 13, 2025. 	(ECF No. 1). 	To survive the motion to dismiss,
Plaintiff must have sufficiently pleaded facts that suggested liability for
injuries that she did not know of until after May 13, 2023. 	See Heilman, 638
F. App’x at 366. Plaintiff has failed to do so.
Based on Plaintiff’s allegations, the Courts agrees her claims against
Whitbeck are barred by the statute of limitations and should be dismissed with
prejudice as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
f. 	The FBISD Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 45)
The FBISD Defendants move for sanctions against Plaintiff. 	(ECF No.
45 at 7). 	First, the FBISD Defendants argue the Court should sanction
Plaintiff in the form of requiring Plaintiff to seek prior approval from the Chief
Judge before filing any further lawsuits in the Southern District of Texas. (Id.
at 8). 	Second, the FBISD Defendants contend Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis
status should be revoked. 	(Id. at 8–9). 	Third, the FBISD Defendants argue
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the Court should award the FBISD Defendants their reasonable and necessary
attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id. at 9–10).
In her Response, Plaintiff contends she was not properly served with the
FBISD Defendants’ motion. 	(ECF No. 49 at 6). 	Plaintiff also argues that she
has compiled a “massive amount of admissible evidence to prove the elements
of her claim” and describes the evidence in her case. (Id. at 6–28).
“Federal courts have an inherent power to sanction a party or attorney
when necessary to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of their
dockets.” Terra Partners v. Rabo Agrifinance, Inc., 504 F. App’x 288, 290 (5th
Cir. 2012) (internal quotation 	omitted). 	Federal 	courts 	also 	have 	broad
authority “to deter vexatious, abusive, and harassing litigation.” Baum v. Blue
Moon Ventures, LLC, 513 F.3d 181, 187 (5th Cir. 2008).
Here, the Court finds Plaintiff’s actions do not warrant a sanction
requiring Plaintiff to seek prior approval from the Chief Judge before filing any
further lawsuits in the Southern District of Texas. See Azubuko v. Adams, No.
3:05-cv-1633, 2005 WL 2415943, at *1–2 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2005), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 3:05-cv-1633, 2005 WL 2546917 (N.D. Tex. Oct.
11, 2005) (warning plaintiff, who had filed thirty-nine cases in five years, that
sanctions may be imposed if he persisted in filing frivolous lawsuits); Ruston
v. United States, No. 3-04-cv-1522, 2004 WL 2187120, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Sept.
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28, 2004), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3-04-cv-1522, 2004 WL
2339797 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 15, 2004) (warning plaintiff, who had filed twelve
cases in three months, that sanctions may be imposed if he persisted in filing
frivolous lawsuits); Scott v. Stephenson, No. 3:02-cv-0762, 2002 WL 1432373,
at *3 (N.D. Tex. July 1, 2002) (warning plaintiff, who filed twenty-four cases in
one year, that sanctions may be imposed if he persisted in filing frivolous
lawsuits).
Further, the Court denies the FBISD Defendants’ request to revoke
Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status as Plaintiff’s actions in this case do not rise
to the level to warrant such a sanction at this time. 	See Walker v. Hunt, No.
1:19-cv-246, 2022 WL 17484273, at *6 (S.D. Miss. July 12, 2022), report and
recommendation adopted in part, No. 1:19-cv-246, 2022 WL 16921823 (S.D.
Miss. Nov. 14, 2022) (recommending in forma pauperis status be revoked as a
sanction for committing a fraud on the Court).
Finally, the Court 	denies the FBISD 	Defendants’ request for their
attorneys’ fees and costs. 	“[A] court may assess attorney’s fees when a party
has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.”
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45–46 (1991) (internal quotations
omitted); see also Sample v. Miles, 239 F. App’x 14, 21 n. 20 (5th Cir. 2007);
Toon v. Wackenhut Corrs. Corp., 250 F.3d 950, 952–54 (5th Cir. 2001). 	The
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inherent power to impose sanctions, however, must be exercised with restraint
and discretion. See Crowe v. Smith, 151 F.3d 217, 226 (5th Cir. 1998).
Here, the FBISD Defendants specifically argue an award of attorneys’
fees and costs is warranted because Plaintiff’s claims were frivolous. (ECF No.
45 at 9–10). 	However, the Court finds that an award of nearly $40,000 in
attorneys’ fees is not appropriate at this time. 	See Merkle v. Pilgrim REO,
LLC, No. 5-18-cv-588, 2019 WL 4447189, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2019)
(“Viewed through the required lens of ‘restraint and discretion,’ this type of
behavior by pro se litigant Merkle—although frustrating and costly—is alone
here not enough to mandate an award of sanctions, unless and until it
continues beyond a clear warning from the Court like the one included in this
order.”).
Still, Plaintiff is warned that, [a]ll litigants, even those proceeding pro
se, are expected to adhere to the local rules and the governing rules of
procedure, and also to refrain from filing frivolous or vexatious motions or
appeals.” 	Id.; see Celestine v. PNK (Lake Charles), LLC, No. 14-cv-172, 2014
WL 5092025, at *5 (W.D. La. Oct. 9, 2014) (“Accordingly, the undersigned
recommends only nominal sanctions, but plaintiff is cautioned that future
inappropriate filings or other misconduct in this court will not be tolerated.
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The court will feel less inclined toward leniency should plaintiff file another
baseless complaint.”).
As such, the FBISD Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 44) is
denied.
g. The RMG Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 46)
The RMG Defendants also move for sanctions against Plaintiff. 	(ECF
No. 46 at 1). 	The RMG Defendants’ motion is nearly identical to the FBISD
Defendants’ 	Motion 	for 	Sanctions 	(ECF 	No. 	45). 	Similar 	to 	the 	FBISD
Defendants, the RMG Defendants argue (1) the Court should sanction Plaintiff
by requiring Plaintiff to seek prior approval from the Chief Judge before filing
any further lawsuits in the Southern District of Texas; (2) Plaintiff’s in forma
pauperis status should be revoked; (3) the Court should award the RMG
Defendants their reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees and costs. (ECF No.
46 at 7–10). Plaintiff did not file a response.12
As explained above, Court again finds (1) Plaintiff’s actions do not
warrant a sanction requiring Plaintiff to seek prior approval from the Chief
Judge before filing any further lawsuits in the Southern District of Texas; (2)
Plaintiff’s actions in this case do not rise to the level to warrant her in forma
12 See supra note 6.
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pauperis status to be revoked; and (3) an award of nearly $20,000 in attorneys’
fees (id. at 10) is not appropriate at this time.
As such, the RMG Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 46) is
denied.
h. Leave to Amend
Rule 15(a) requires a trial court to grant a party leave to amend a
complaint freely, and the language of the rule “evinces a bias in favor of
granting leave to amend.” 	Marucci Sports, L.L.C. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, 751 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). 	By no means is
leave to amend automatic, but the court must have a “substantial reason” to
deny a party’s request to do so. 	Id. 	In deciding whether to grant or deny a
motion to amend, the court may consider a variety of factors including “undue
delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failures
to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the
opposing party . . . , and futility of the amendment.” 	Id. (quoting Jones v.
Robinson Prop. Grp., LP, 427 F.3d 987, 994 (5th Cir. 2005)). 	Further, denial
of a motion for leave to file an amended complaint is within the Court’s
discretion when the amendment would be futile. See Briggs v. Mississippi, 331
F.3d 499, 508 (5th Cir. 2003). The “futility standard” is “the same standard of
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legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6).” Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co.,
LLC, 234 F.3d 863, 873 (5th Cir. 2000).
Here, while Plaintiff does not request leave to amend, the Court notes,
based on the foregoing, including judicial immunity, quasi-judicial immunity,
and statute of limitations, any potential claims arising out of these facts
against Whitbeck, Judge Becerra, Judge Brame, McGrew-Walker, the RMG
Defendants, and the FBISD Defendants are barred. 	Thus, allowing leave to
amend would be futile. Similarly, the nature of Plaintiff’s allegations against
Newell and Oldham demonstrate that any attempt to amend the claims would
be futile. 	Further, Plaintiff has already amended her complaint on one
occasion (ECF No. 35) and has failed to cure any of these deficiencies.
IV. 	Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court RECOMMENDS Whitbeck’s Motion
to Dismiss (ECF No. 36), the Fort Bend County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
(ECF 	No. 	39), 	the 	Fort 	Bend 	County 	Defendants’ 	Motion 	to 	Recognize
Dismissal (ECF No. 40), the RMG Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No.
41), 	and 	the 	FBISD 	Defendants’ 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	(ECF 	No. 	42) 	be
GRANTED. 	As such, the Court RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s claims against
Whitbeck, the Fort Bend County Defendants, the RMG Defendants, Lena
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Smith, and Fort Bend County, Texas be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as
frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)
The 	Court 	also 	ORDERS 	that 	the 	FBISD 	Defendants’ 	Motion 	for
Sanctions (ECF No. 45) and the RMG Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions (ECF
No. 46) are DENIED.
The Clerk shall send copies of this Memorandum and Recommendation
to the respective parties who have fourteen days from the receipt thereof to file
written objections thereto pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)
and General Order 2002-13. Failure to file written objections within the time
period mentioned shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking the factual
findings and legal conclusions on appeal.
SIGNED in Houston, Texas on January 15, 2026.
______________________________
Richard W. Bennett
United States Magistrate Judge
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