Rylander v. Frazier et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
Yucob Rylander,
Plaintiff,
v.
Mary Elizondo Frazier and
Bradley Arant Boult Cummings
LLP,
Defendants.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
Civil Action H-25-2081
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
This case has been referred to the undersigned magistrate
judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). ECF No. 6. Pending before
the court are: Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 7; Plaintiff’s
Motion to Strike and Request for Sanctions, ECF No. 16; and
Plaintiff’s Request for Sanctions and Criminal Investigation, ECF
No. 18. The court recommends that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,
ECF No. 7, be GRANTED with prejudice as to Plaintiff’s federal
claims and without prejudice as to Plaintiff’s criminal and state
law claims. Plaintiff’s remaining motions, ECF Nos. 16 and 18, are
DENIED. Plaintiff’s request for e-filing access is DENIED.
1. Background
Plaintiff Yucob Rylander, proceeding pro se, alleges multiple
claims 	related 	to 	an 	underlying 	settlement 	agreement 	and
subsequent state court lawsuit. ECF No. 1 at 4–5. Rylander alleges
that he participated in litigation related to the 2019 ITC fire,
which 	ultimately 	settled. 	Id. 	Rylander 	accepted 	a 	“Tier 	5”
settlement of approximately $5,900. Id. at 5. Rylander now alleges
that he qualified for a “Tier 1” settlement award that would have
been worth more than $1,100,000. Id. He alleges that he was
fraudulently 	induced 	to 	accept 	a 	lower 	settlement. 	Id. 	Upon
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
December 29, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
Case 4:25-cv-02081 Document 39 Filed 12/29/25 in TXSD Page 1 of 11

2
discovering the fraudulent inducement, Rylander filed suit in state
court in Harris County against Archer Systems, LLC and Brent
Coon & Associates—apparently the entities that administered the
settlement funds. Id. The instant lawsuit relates to Rylander’s
complaints about the lawyers and judges involved in that state
court action.
Liberally construing Rylander’s allegations in his favor, as
the court must, given his pro se status, Rylander now alleges that
the attorney and law firm for defendant in the state court suit—
Mary Frazier and Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP1 (the law
firm)—committed 	various 	torts 	and 	violated 	Rylander’s
constitutional 	rights 	in 	the 	course 	of 	the 	state 	court 	action.
Rylander’s claims are for: fraud, abuse of process, violation of his
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights via 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), violations of the federal Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and federal and
state criminal violations.
According 	to 	Rylander, 	Frazier 	“had 	a 	longstanding
undisclosed relationship” with the presiding judge in state court,
Judge Davis. 	ECF 	No. 1 at 5. Rylander alleges that 	Frazier
regularly appeared before Judge Davis in court and at one time
made a $1,000 campaign contribution to Judge Davis. Id. Rylander
filed a motion asking Judge Davis to recuse herself, and Rylander
alleges that Judge Davis acted unlawfully in denying the motion
and by fraudulently referring the motion to Judge Brown, the
regional judge who presides over recusal motions. Id. Judge Brown
and Judge Davis allegedly colluded to deny Rylander’s recusal
motion without a hearing. Id. Based on a filing in the state court
1 Rylander states in his responsive briefing that “Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP is not
a defendant but an interested party[.]” ECF No. 8 at 14. Because the law firm is listed as a
defendant in Rylander’s Complaint and because Rylander repeatedly refers to “Defendants”
in his Complaint, the court construes Rylander’s pleadings to include claims against the firm.
Case 4:25-cv-02081 Document 39 Filed 12/29/25 in TXSD Page 2 of 11

3
action, it appears to the court that Judge Davis ultimately recused
herself on May 19, 2025.2 ECF No. 7-7.
Rylander also alleges that Frazier “submitted a fraudulent
Affidavit of Attorney’s Fees” and that Frazier “engaged in ex parte
communications with Judge Brown’s assistant” via email. ECF
No. 1 at 6. Frazier allegedly conspired with the state court judges
“to rig judicial proceedings, falsify judicial orders, and destroy
[Rylander’s] 	constitutional 	right 	to 	a 	neutral 	and 	impartial
tribunal.” ECF No. 1 at 8. Rylander further alleges that the
conspiracy was “motivated by an invidious animus and a desire to
deprive [Rylander] . . . of access to the courts.” Id. at 9.
In his briefing, Rylander states many times that Frazier and
Judge Brown unlawfully conducted “email court,” which Rylander
describes as “an extrajudicial process that involved private email
communications regarding a sanctions motion.” ECF No. 8 at 11–
12. Rylander also repeatedly raises complaints against the state
court 	judges 	in 	his 	briefing, 	even 	though 	the 	judges 	are 	not
defendants in this suit and despite apparently having filed a
separate lawsuit against Judge Brown. Rylander v. Brown, 4:25-
cv-02079, ECF No. 1 (S.D. Tex. May 5, 2025).
Frazier and the law firm (together, Defendants) filed a joint
Motion to Dismiss all of Rylander’s claims under Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). ECF No. 7.
2. Legal Standards
A court may dismiss an action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). To
determine a motion under Rule 12(b)(1), the court may rely on the
complaint alone, the complaint and undisputed facts evidenced in
the record, or the complaint, undisputed facts, and the court’s
2 “[T]he district court may properly take judicial notice of public state court records.” Stiel v.
Heritage Numismatic Auctions, Inc., 816 F. App’x 888, 892 (5th Cir. 2020).
Case 4:25-cv-02081 Document 39 Filed 12/29/25 in TXSD Page 3 of 11

4
resolution of disputed facts. St. Tammany Parish, ex rel. Davis v.
Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 556 F.3d 307, 315 (5th Cir. 2009).
The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the court’s jurisdiction by
a preponderance of the evidence. Vantage Trailers, Inc. v. Beall
Corp., 567 F.3d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 2009).
Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes the court to dismiss a complaint for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” A
complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing 	that 	the 	pleader 	is 	entitled 	to 	relief.” 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ.
P. 8(a)(2). Courts accept “all well-pleaded facts as true” and “view[]
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Allen v. Walmart
Stores, L.L.C., 907 F.3d 170, 177 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Jones v.
Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999)). To survive a motion
to dismiss, the plaintiff must have pleaded “enough facts to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court 	to draw the 	reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Calogero v. Shows, Cali & Walsh, L.L.P., 970 F.3d 576, 580 (5th
Cir. 2020) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “[A]
well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge
that actual proof of those facts is improbable[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 556. However, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Factual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Allen, 907 F.3d
at 177 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
The court liberally construes pro se pleadings. Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). When a plaintiff’s complaint fails
to state a claim, the court should generally give the plaintiff a
chance to amend the complaint under Rule 15(a) before dismissing
Case 4:25-cv-02081 Document 39 Filed 12/29/25 in TXSD Page 4 of 11

5
the action with prejudice, unless doing so would be futile. See Great
Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d
305, 329 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Ayers v. Johnson, 247 F. App’x
534, 	535 	(5th 	Cir. 	2007) 	(“[A] 	district 	court 	acts 	within 	its
discretion when dismissing a motion to amend that is frivolous or
futile.”).
3. Analysis
Rylander 	filed 	a 	motion 	asking 	that 	the 	court 	strike
Defendants’ reply brief in support of their Motion to Dismiss. ECF
No. 16. The Local Rules for the Southern District of Texas allow a
party who has filed an opposed motion to file a reply brief. L.R. 7.4.
In any event, the court’s analysis is not affected by consideration
of Defendants’ reply brief. Rylander’s motion to strike is DENIED.
Defendants argue generally that Rylander does not have
standing to bring his claims because he has not suffered an injury
in fact and because his claims are not redressable. ECF No. 7 at 4–
8. Rylander alleges violations of his constitutional rights, and he
seeks monetary damages in compensation. At this early stage in
the proceedings and as to his civil causes of action, the court does
not find that Rylander wholly lacks standing for all of his claims.
Thus, the court turns to the parties’ remaining arguments.
A. Criminal Claims
Rylander 	alleges 	that 	Defendants 	violated 	a 	number 	of
federal and state criminal statutes. However, private citizens do
not have standing to institute a federal criminal prosecution nor
power to enforce a criminal statute. Gill v. Texas, 153 F. App’x 261,
262 (5th Cir. 2005). To the extent that Rylander attempts to bring
claims related to 18 U.S.C. § 242 and other federal criminal
statutes, he does not have standing to bring those claims because
he 	is 	a 	private 	citizen. 	The 	court 	should 	dismiss 	Rylander’s
criminal 	claims 	without 	prejudice 	for 	lack 	of 	subject 	matter
jurisdiction. Cf. Scott v. Jackson Cnty., Miss., No. 23-60405, 2024
Case 4:25-cv-02081 Document 39 Filed 12/29/25 in TXSD Page 5 of 11

6
WL 1465387, at *2 (5th Cir. Apr. 4, 2024) (“private citizens like
[Plaintiff] do not have a constitutional right to have an individual
criminally prosecuted.”).
B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
To state a claim under § 1983, Rylander must allege a
violation of a right committed by a person acting under color of
state law. Rosborough v. Mgmt. & Training Corp., 350 F.3d 459,
460 (5th Cir. 2003). Private attorneys generally do not act under
color of state law simply by advocating for their client and being
on the winning side of a lawsuit. Glotfelty v. Karas, 512 F. App’x
409, 414 (5th Cir. 2013). A private citizen may be liable under
§ 1983 where the plaintiff alleges that the citizen conspired with
state actors. Id. To successfully allege such a claim, the plaintiff
must allege (1) an agreement between the private and public
defendants to commit an illegal 	act 	and (2) a 	deprivation of
constitutional rights. Id.
According 	to 	the 	Complaint, 	Frazier 	submitted 	a 	false
affidavit for attorney’s fees, emailed Judge Brown’s assistant, and
acted under color of law by “[c]olluding with public officials . . . to
manipulate court outcomes.” ECF No. 1 at 6–7. The actions that
Frazier allegedly engaged in are all within the scope of Frazier’s
legal representation of her client and do not show that Frazier
transformed herself into a state actor merely by representing her
client. Rylander’s allegations that Frazier conspired with state
judges are conclusory and do not suffice to state a claim for relief
under § 1983. Again, the alleged facts include only activities that
attorneys 	regularly 	undertake 	to 	represent 	their 	clients.
Rylander’s § 1983 claim against Frazier should be dismissed with
prejudice for failure to state a claim.
As to the law firm, a private entity acts under color of state
law when the entity performs a traditional government function.
Rosborough v. Mgmt. & Training Corp., 350 F.3d at 460. Rylander
Case 4:25-cv-02081 Document 39 Filed 12/29/25 in TXSD Page 6 of 11

7
has not alleged that the law firm, a private entity, acted under
color of state law. Thus, to the extent that Rylander alleged a
§ 1983 claim against the law firm, that claim should be dismissed
with prejudice for failure to state a claim.
C. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
“[T]he only conspiracies actionable under section 1985(3) are
those motivated by racial animus.” Cantu v. Moody, 933 F.3d 414,
419 (5th Cir. 2019). Rylander alleges that the relevant conspiracy
“was 	motivated 	by 	invidious 	animus 	and 	a 	desire 	to 	deprive
Plaintiff . . . of access to the courts.” ECF No. 1 at 9. Rylander did
not allege that any conspiracy was motivated by racial animus.
Rylander 	states 	in 	his 	responsive 	briefing 	that 	“Defendants
correctly note the omission of racial animus... this action is likely
to be withdrawn because reasonable belief cannot be applied.”3
ECF No. 8 at 17. Rylander’s § 1985 claim should be dismissed with
prejudice for failure to state a claim.
D. RICO
“[A] civil RICO plaintiff must show (1) a violation of § 1962,
(2) an injury to his or her business or property, and (3) that such
injury was proximately caused by a RICO violation.” Lewis v.
Danos, 83 F.4th 948, 956 (5th Cir. 2023). A violation of § 1962
requires (1) a person who engages in (2) a pattern of racketeering
activity (3) connected to the acquisition, establishment, conduct, or
control 	of 	an 	enterprise. 	Word 	of 	Faith 	World 	Outreach 	Ctr.
Church, Inc. v. Sawyer, 90 F.3d 118, 121–22 (5th Cir. 1996); 18
U.S.C. § 1962.
Rylander has not alleged a pattern of racketeering activity.
Rylander’s conclusory allegation that Frazier “engaged in multiple
related acts with the common purpose of defrauding and silencing
3 Rylander confusingly also states that he reserves the right to “move forward with the well
documented race based, intentionally erroneous decision-making process of Harris county
courts against Black men[.]” ECF No. 8 at 17.
Case 4:25-cv-02081 Document 39 Filed 12/29/25 in TXSD Page 7 of 11

8
Plaintiff through illegal judicial influence” is insufficient. ECF
No. 1 at 14. Rylander merely alleges that Frazier operated as part
of an enterprise with Judge Davis and Judge Brown, but he does
not allege any facts tending to support his allegation. All the facts
Rylander alleges include acts that an attorney regularly takes in
representation of their client, such as filing motions and emailing
administrative staff of the court. Rylander’s civil RICO claim
should be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim.
E. State law claims
Because 	the 	court 	recommends 	dismissal 	of 	all 	federal
claims against all defendants, the only remaining claims arise
under state law. See ECF No. 1. The court has “an independent
obligation 	to 	determine 	whether 	subject-matter 	jurisdiction
exists[.]” Soaring Wind Energy, L.L.C. v. Catic USA Inc., 946 F.3d
742, 749 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S.
500, 514 (2006)); see also Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514 (stating that
the court’s obligation persists “even in the absence of a challenge
from any party”). Thus, the court must determine whether it has
subject matter jurisdiction to consider the remaining claims.
“Diversity 	jurisdiction 	requires 	complete 	diversity—no
plaintiff can be a citizen of the same state as any defendant.” The
Lamar Co. v. Miss. Transp. Comm’n, 976 F.3d 524, 530 (5th Cir.
2020). The party invoking federal jurisdiction has the burden to
prove that the court has subject matter jurisdiction. Sentry Ins. v.
Morgan, 101 F.4th 396, 398 (5th Cir. 2024). Rylander does not
allege or argue that the court has diversity jurisdiction. See ECF
No. 1 at 4 (alleging that the court has federal question and
supplemental jurisdiction). There are not any facts before the court
tending to show that the parties are completely diverse. Thus, the
court cannot exercise diversity jurisdiction over the remaining
claims.
Case 4:25-cv-02081 Document 39 Filed 12/29/25 in TXSD Page 8 of 11

9
Federal courts have federal question jurisdiction over all
civil actions “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Federal courts may also have
supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims “that are so related
to claims in the action . . . that they form part of the same case or
controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367. After dismissing federal claims,
this court may choose not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over 	the 	remaining 	state 	law 	claims. 	28 U.S.C. 	§ 	1367(c)(3).
“District courts enjoy wide discretion in determining whether to
retain supplemental jurisdiction over a state claim once all federal
claims are dismissed.” Heggemeier v. Caldwell Cnty., Tex., 826
F.3d 861, 872 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Noble v. White, 996 F.2d 797,
799 (5th Cir. 1993)). The “general rule is that a court should
decline to exercise jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims
when all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, but this
rule is neither mandatory nor absolute.” The Lamar Co. v. Miss.
Transp. 	Comm’n, 976 F.3d 524, 528 	(5th Cir. 2020) (quoting
Brookshire Bros. Holding, Inc. v. Dayco Prods., Inc., 554 F.3d 595,
602 (5th Cir. 2009)). In deciding whether to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction, the court considers the factors set forth in § 1367 and
“the 	common 	law 	factors 	of 	judicial 	economy, 	convenience,
fairness, and comity.” Brookshire Bros. Holding, Inc., 554 F.3d
at 601–02.
The 	court 	should 	decline 	to 	exercise 	supplemental
jurisdiction over Rylander’s remaining state law claims because
this case is in its very early stages, discovery has been stayed, ECF
No. 26, and the factors of judicial economy, convenience, fairness,
and comity weigh 	against exercising 	jurisdiction. Accordingly,
Rylander’s 	remaining 	claims 	should 	be 	dismissed 	without
prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Case 4:25-cv-02081 Document 39 Filed 12/29/25 in TXSD Page 9 of 11

10
F. Amendment and Remaining Motions
“Dismissing an action after giving the plaintiff only one
opportunity to state his case is ordinarily unjustified.” Davoodi v.
Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 755 F.3d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 792 (5th Cir. 1986)). If the
plaintiff seeks leave to amend, he “must give the court at least
some notice of what . . . [the] amendments would be and how those
amendments would cure the initial complaint’s defects.” Scott v.
U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 16 F.4th 1204, 1209 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation
omitted). The court may deny leave “[i]f the plaintiff does not
provide a copy of the amended complaint [or] explain how the
defects could be cured[.]” Id. (citation omitted). The court may also
deny leave to amend when amendment would be futile or when the
plaintiff chooses to stand on her complaint and argues that it
satisfies the pleading requirements. See Khoury v. Thota, No. 20-
20578, 2021 WL 3919248, at *4 (5th Cir. 2021) (affirming the
district court’s denial of leave to amend when the plaintiff chose to
stand on his complaint and argued that it satisfied the pleading
requirements); Wimm v. Jack Eckerd Corp., 3 F.3d 137, 139 (5th
Cir. 1993) (discussing futility of amendment as justification for
denying leave to amend).
Rylander has not requested leave to amend. He argues that
his complaint should survive Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. See
ECF No. 16. In any event, Rylander’s responsive filings do not
show that he would be able to overcome the pleading deficiencies
Defendants have identified. The court is unaware of any facts that
Rylander could state that would support any federal cause of
action against Defendants. Granting leave to amend, therefore,
would be futile and the court declines to do so.
Case 4:25-cv-02081 Document 39 Filed 12/29/25 in TXSD Page 10 of 11

11
Rylander’s remaining requests and motions are frivolous
and 	should 	be 	denied.4 	Rylander 	seeks 	sanctions 	against
Defendants for incorrectly stating the facts of what happened in
state court. ECF No. 16 at 16–17. Rylander also seeks sanctions
against 	Stephen 	Fernelius, 	counsel 	for 	Frazier, 	for 	dating 	a
certificate of service five days prior to the date of the document’s
filing. ECF No. 18 at 2–3. Rylander’s motions, ECF Nos. 16 and 18,
are DENIED.
Because 	the 	court 	recommends 	dismissal 	of 	Rylander’s
claims, 	Rylander’s 	request 	for 	e-filing 	access, 	ECF 	No. 	8, 	is
DENIED as MOOT.
4. Conclusion
The court recommends that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,
ECF No. 7, be GRANTED with prejudice as to Rylander’s federal
claims and without prejudice as to Rylander’s criminal and state
law claims. Rylander’s Motions for Sanctions, ECF Nos. 16 and 18,
are DENIED.
The 	parties 	have 	fourteen 	days 	from 	service 	of 	this
Memorandum and Recommendation to file written objections. 28
U.S.C. 	§ 636(b)(1); 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	72. 	Failure 	to 	timely 	file
objections will preclude appellate review of factual findings or legal
conclusions, 	except 	for 	plain 	error. 	See 	Thomas 	v. 	Arn, 	474
U.S. 140, 147–49 (1985); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276–
77 (5th Cir. 1988).
Signed on December 29, 2025.
______________________________________
Peter Bray
United States Magistrate Judge
4 Rylander filed a Declaration, ECF No. 35. The Declaration does not appear to request any
relief from the court. Thus, the court does not construe it as a motion.
Case 4:25-cv-02081 Document 39 Filed 12/29/25 in TXSD Page 11 of 11