Jones v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
SHAMEEKA L. JONES,
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Plaintiff,
vs. 	Case No. 4:25-cv-1726
SECURITAS SECURITY SERVICES
USA, INC.,
Defendant.
JUDGE PALERMO’S
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 1
This is an employment discrimination dispute. Pending before the Court is
Defendant Securitas Security Services USA, Inc.’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
pro se Plaintiff Shameeka Jones’ claims, ECF No. 2, 2 and Plaintiff’s motion for
sanctions, ECF No. 9. Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed
because she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. ECF No. 2 at 3–4.
Plaintiff seeks sanctions for Defendant’s alleged misrepresentations, meritless and
1 On May 6, 2025, the district judge to whom this case is assigned referred all potentially
dispositive motions to this Court for a report and recommendation in accordance with 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b). Order, ECF No. 7. A remand is dispositive and therefore appropriate for a report and
recommendation. Altus Cmty. Healthcare, LP v. Unitedhealthcare Ins. Co., No. 4:24-CV-3978,
2025 WL 1004371, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2025) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)), adopted
sub nom. Altus Cmty. Healthcare, L.P. v. UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co., No. CV H-24-3978, 2025 WL
1001601 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 3, 2025).
2 Plaintiff filed a response, ECF No. 4. Defendant filed a reply, ECF Nos. 5, 6. Plaintiff also filed
a sur-reply, ECF No. 8.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
February 20, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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misleading arguments, and generally incorrect assertions in its motion to dismiss.
ECF No. 9 at 1–2. 3 Based on a sua sponte review of this Court’s exercise of subject
matter jurisdiction, the Court recommends remanding this case.
I. 	BACKGROUND
The facts are based on the allegations in the complaint. 4 Plaintiff worked for
Defendant for approximately eight years. ECF No. 1-5 at 3. She suffered a work-
related injury and requested to transfer into a position that would accommodate her
limitations, but Defendant ignored that request and did not reasonably accommodate
her. Id. at 4. While pregnant, she also requested a transfer to a less physically
demanding post, which Defendant denied. Id. Defendant informed Plaintiff in
November 2021 that they started her transfer, but the transfer never actually
occurred. Id. Defendant ignored Plaintiff’s follow-up attempts on her transfer and
accommodation requests. 	Id. 	Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment on
November 16, 2023. Id. at 5.
Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination (“Charge”) with the EEOC on
September 4, 2024. ECF No. 4 at 1. In it, she alleged her employer discriminated
against her based on disability and pregnancy. ECF No. 4-1 at 5. Plaintiff then
3 Defendant did not respond to this motion.
4 All well pleaded facts are taken as true, and the complaint is construed in the light most favorable
to the Plaintiff. ADR Int’l Ltd. v. Inst. for Supply Mgmt. Inc., 667 F. Supp. 3d 411, 419 (S.D. Tex.
2023) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009)).
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alleged that she had workplace injury-related restrictions limiting her ability to
perform her job, and she was seven months pregnant when her supervisor informed
her that the transfer process had started. Id. Defendant received an EEOC letter
regarding Plaintiff’s charge, dated September 13, 2024. ECF No. 5-1 at 2. It notified
Defendant that “the EEOC has received sufficient information from [Plaintiff] for
the agency to regard the communication as a Charge of Discrimination,” while also
stating Defendant would receive notification when the EEOC received a perfected
charge. Id. Defendant then received a formal charge notice, which Plaintiff signed
on December 13, 2024. ECF No. 2-1 at 2–3. The formal charge notice alleged
discrimination based on disability and retaliation, noting that Plaintiff’s doctor
cleared her return to work without restrictions around January 2023. Id. at 2. She
stated her belief that she “was discriminated and retaliated against” in violation of
the American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Id.
In March 2025, Plaintiff sued Defendant in Texas state court, expressly
alleging 	disability 	discrimination 	and 	retaliation 	in 	violation 	of 	the 	Texas
Commission on Human Rights Act (“TCHRA”). ECF No. 1-5 at 2, 5–6. Her state
court petition—the operative complaint in this action—references the ADA and the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”), id. at 4, but does not bring claims under
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either statute. Id. at 5–6. 5 Defendant removed the case to federal court, basing subject
matter jurisdiction on both diversity and federal question jurisdiction, ECF No. 1
at 2. Its basis for federal question jurisdiction is Plaintiff’s singular mentions of the
PDA and ADA. Id. at 3. As for diversity, Defendant points out the parties are
completely diverse—Plaintiff is a citizen of Texas, Defendant is incorporated in
Delaware with a principal place of business in California so it is a citizen of
Delaware and California for diversity purposes—and puts forth argument that the
amount in controversy facially appears to exceed $75,000. 	Id. 	at 4–7. After
removing, Defendant filed the instant motion, arguing Plaintiff failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies as to federal and state anti-discrimination law claims, or,
alternatively, her claims here exceed the scope of the charge she brought to the
EEOC. ECF No. 2 at 3–4.
II. 	REMAND 	IS 	APPROPRIATE 	BECAUSE 	THE 	COURT 	LACKS
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION.
The Court is continuously obligated to evaluate its exercise of subject matter
jurisdiction. Sparta v. Gilbert, No. CV H-25-185, 2025 WL 1665183, at *1 (S.D.
Tex. June 11, 2025) (quoting Giannakos v. M/V Bravo Trader, 762 F.2d 1295, 1297
(5th Cir. 1985)). In cases that have been removed from state court, “[i]f at any time
5 The PDA is not an independent statute, but rather an amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act (“Title VII”). Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076, 2076. References
here to the PDA are therefore simultaneously references to Title VII.
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before 	final 	judgment 	it 	appears 	that 	the 	district 	court 	lacks 	subject 	matter
jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). “A district court may
assess subject matter jurisdiction based on ‘(1) the complaint alone; (2) the
complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the
complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed
facts.’” Sparta, 2025 WL 1665183, at *2 (quoting Wolcott v. Sebellius, 635 F.3d 757,
762 (5th Cir. 2011)). All ambiguities must be construed against removal. Le v.
Lloyds, No. 4:25-CV-4208, 2025 WL 4063858, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 19, 2025)
(quoting Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir.
2002)), adopted sub nom. Le v. State Farm Lloyds, No. 4:25-CV-04208, 2026 WL
150295 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 20, 2026).
A. 	The Court Lacks Federal Question Jurisdiction Because Plaintiff Did Not
Plead Federal Law Claims.
“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Plaintiffs are masters of their complaints, so determining that their cause of action
raises a federal question is dependent upon the plaintiff’s well-pled complaint. VW
Credit Inc. v. Abor, No. 4:24-CV-01001-SDJ-AGD, 2025 WL 2701291, at *1 (E.D.
Tex. Aug. 19, 2025), adopted, No. 4:24-CV-01001-SDJ-AGD, 2025 WL 2698125
(E.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2025) (quoting Mega Vape, LLC v. City of San Antonio, 455 F.
Supp. 3d 299, 306 (W.D. Tex. 2020) (quoting Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co., 238 F.3d
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674, 680 (5th Cir. 2001))).
Here, Plaintiff pled causes of action arising under the TCHRA, a state law
clam. ECF No. 1-5 at 5–6. Yet, Defendant removed based on both federal question
and diversity jurisdiction. ECF No. 1 at 2–3. Defendant alleged federal question
jurisdiction based on Plaintiff’s mention of federal statutes, including PDA and the
ADA. Id. However, Plaintiff did not plead federal claims under any federal statutes;
she brings claims for disability discrimination and retaliation only under the
TCHRA. 6 ECF No. 1-5 ¶¶ 8, 11–16.
Plaintiff briefly mentions the ADA and the PDA in her petition. Id. at 4. That
is insufficient to transform her explicit state law claims into federal claims. Collins
v. N. Park Lexus of San Antonio, No. 5:24-CV-01409-JKP, 2025 WL 1749683, at *2
(W.D. Tex. June 24, 2025) (finding that a pro se plaintiff’s “fleeting mention” of
federal statute and the Constitution in a complaint bringing state court causes of
action is insufficient to confer federal question jurisdiction) (citing Mega Vape, LLC,
455 F. Supp. 3d at 307 (citing MSOF Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 295 F.3d 485, 490 (5th
Cir. 2002)). While the Court is required to give her pleading liberal construction, it
6 While TCHRA claims are analyzed under the same analytical framework as ADA and Title VII
claims, they are still distinct theories of liability because as the Fifth Circuit has noted, federal civil
rights laws are not at issue where only claims under the TCHRA are pled. Esparza v. Advanced
Network Mgmt., Inc., No. 24-50024, 2025 WL 764602, at *2 n.4 (5th Cir. Mar. 11, 2025) (“Aside
from serving as persuasive guidance for [Plaintiff]’s TCHRA claims, federal civil-rights laws
aren’t at issue in this case.”); see also Pineda v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 360 F.3d 483, 487, 487
n.1 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting that plaintiff’s claims were brought under the TCHRA and stating “[t]his
is a diversity action, federal civil rights law is not implicated.”)
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is not for the Court to decide for Plaintiff what she may have meant to plead when
she pled under a particular statutory scheme. Id.; VW Credit Inc, 2025 WL 2701291,
at *1 (“Because plaintiffs are masters of their complaints, any ‘determination that a
cause of action presents a federal question depends upon the allegations of the
plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint.’”).
Plaintiff’s 	sole 	reference 	to 	the 	ADA 	comes 	from 	her 	assertion 	of
discrimination due to a workplace injury. ECF No. 1-5 at 4. In whole, she states:
“After sustaining a work-related injury, I requested a transfer to a position that would
accommodate my condition. My request was ignored, and I was subjected to unfair
treatment instead of being provided with reasonable accommodations as required
under the [ADA].” Id. This brief mention is insufficient to raise a claim under the
ADA. See Collins, 2025 WL 1749683, at *2.
As for her PDA reference, Plaintiff states only that “[d]uring and after my
pregnancy, I asked for a transfer to a less physically demanding post to address my
health and safety concerns. However, I faced discriminatory treatment and was
denied this transfer, violating my rights under the [PDA].” ECF No. 1-5 at 4. This
sole reference, again, is insufficient, to raise a federal claim under the PDA. See
Collins, 2025 WL 1749683, at *2.
Plaintiff has not pled claims under either the ADA or PDA, because she only
briefly mentions them in her complaint. See id. Her assertions arise solely under state
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law. Esparza, 2025 WL 764602, at *2 n.4. That is insufficient to confer federal
question jurisdiction. See Collins, 2025 WL 1749683, at *2. Therefore, the Court
does not have federal question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States.”).
B. 	The Court Lacks Diversity Jurisdiction Because Defendant Does Not
Show The Amount In Controversy Is Sufficient.
Defendant also removed based on diversity jurisdiction. ECF No. 1 at 4–7. As
relevant here, diversity jurisdiction confers original jurisdiction on district courts
over “all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between citizens of different states.”
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). 7 Defendant argues the amount in controversy requirement
is facially apparent from Plaintiff’s demand for back pay alone, because she was
compensated at $12.00 per hour and an award of back pay from her last date of
employment would exceed $85,000. ECF No. 1 at 5–6, 6 n.18. Alternatively, it
identifies the categories of damages Plaintiff seeks as evidence of the amount in
7 Diversity jurisdiction requires “complete diversity” between the two sides of a suit—in other
words, all plaintiffs must all be diverse in citizenship from defendants. See JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A. v. Houston, No. 4:25-CV-3245, 2025 WL 3852953, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2025) (noting
the parties were “completely diverse” because the plaintiff was a citizen of Ohio and the defendants
were citizens of Texas and Louisiana), adopted, No. 4:25CV3245, 2026 WL 30844 (S.D. Tex. Jan.
5, 2026). Here, there is complete diversity because Plaintiff is a citizen of Texas and Defendant is
a citizen of both Delaware and California, based on its place of incorporation and principal place
of business, respectively. ECF No. 1 at 4.
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controversy. Id. at 6–7.
In assessing the amount in controversy requirement, courts first look to the
operative complaint as it existed at the time of removal. Aaron v. United States, No.
4:25-CV-4218, 2026 WL 84560, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 12, 2026) (quoting Manguno,
276 F.3d at 723). Where the complaint does not demand a specific sum, “the
defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000.” Guijarro v. Enter. Holdings, Inc., 39 F.4th 309, 314
(5th Cir. 2022) (citing Luckett v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 171 F.3d 295, 298 (5th Cir.
1999). It can do so either by: (1) “establishing that it is ‘facially apparent’ that the
claims are likely to exceed $75,000”; or (2) “setting forth the facts in controversy
that support a finding of the requisite amount.” Id.
Here, Plaintiff’s petition states that she seeks “monetary relief of $250,000 or
less and non-monetary relief.” ECF No. 1-5 at 3. Several Texas courts have found
pleadings with identical language but unspecified amounts of damages insufficient
to confer diversity jurisdiction based on the “facially apparent” standard. See, e.g.,
Le, 2025 WL 4063858, at *3 (noting that the amount in controversy was not “facially
apparent” even where plaintiffs sought statutory interest, exemplary damages, treble
damages, and attorney’s fees because the amounts were unspecified in the operative
petition); Vasquez v. Home Depot USA, No. 7:25-CV-00039-O, 2025 WL 2816785,
at *2 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 2025) (finding the claim for damages of $250,000 or less
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was, without more, insufficient to state a sum certain of damages that would
demonstrate the amount in controversy from the face of the petition), adopted,
No. 7:25-CV-00039-O, 2025 WL 2899890 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 10, 2025); Babalola v.
EAN Holdings, LLC, No. 4:23-CV-00669-BD, 2025 WL 1907475, at *4–5 (E.D.
Tex. July 10, 2025) (holding that because the plaintiff’s petition did not seek a
specific amount and offered limited details on his claimed damages, the court was
unable to find it “facially apparent” that the amount in controversy exceeded
$75,000). The Court reaches the same conclusion here. As ambiguities must be
construed against removal, Plaintiff’s allegation that she seeks no more than
$250,000 in damages without sufficient details related to her requested damages is
insufficient for the Court to find that the amount in controversy does indeed exceed
$75,000. Le, 2025 WL 4063858, at *2; ECF No. 1-5 at 3–7.
In such a situation, a defendant may instead offer “summary judgment-type
evidence showing that the facts in controversy support a finding of damages in
excess of $75,000.” Le, 2025 WL 4063858, at *3–4. Defendant offered no evidence.
See ECF No. 1. It instead relies on a calculation of Plaintiff’s alleged back pay
award—based on an unsubstantiated, unsupported assertion that Plaintiff’s hourly
wage was “approximately $12.00”—and pointing to the list of damages Plaintiff
noted in her petition. Id. at 5–6, 6 n.18. As for the first, this unsubstantiated assertion
is facially ambiguous, using “approximately” language; it must be construed against
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removal. Le, 2025 WL 4063858, at *2. As for Defendant’s second effort to provide
evidence of the amount in controversy, it suffers the same flaw as Defendant’s
attempt to show it is facially apparent: lack of detail for the Court to conclude there
is no ambiguity that the amount in controversy does indeed exceed $75,000 such
that the amount in controversy must be construed against removal. Id.
As the party seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction, Defendant bears the
burden of establishing that it exists. 2013 Houston Sunnyside St. v. Duvernay,
No. 4:24-CV-0687, 2024 WL 3030117, at *1 (S.D. Tex. May 21, 2024) (citing
Manguno, 276 F.3d at 723), adopted, No. 4:24-CV-0687, 2024 WL 3029018 (S.D.
Tex. June 14, 2024). It fails to do so with respect to the amount in controversy
requirement for diversity jurisdiction, because it is not facially apparent from
Plaintiff’s petition nor does Defendant establish the amount in controversy in an
unambiguous manner. Le, 2025 WL 4063858, at *2. Therefore, the Court does not
have diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
Because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case must be
remanded. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“If at any time before final judgment it appears that
the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”). The
Court therefore RECOMMENDS that this case be REMANDED to the District
Court for the 133rd Judicial District of Harris County, Texas.
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III. 	CONCLUSION
The Court RECOMMENDS that the case be REMANDED for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
The 	Parties 	have 	fourteen 	days 	from 	service 	of 	this 	Report 	and
Recommendation to file written objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); F ED. R.
CIV. P. 72(b). Failure to file timely objections will preclude review of factual
findings or legal conclusions, except for plain error. Quinn v. Guerrero, 863 F.3d
353, 358 (5th Cir. 2017).
Signed at Houston, Texas, on February 20, 2026.
_________________________________
Dena Hanovice Palermo
United States Magistrate Judge
y 20, 2026.
_____	__________	_ ___________________
Dena Hanovice Palermo
United States Magistrate Judge
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