Stepp v. Dicky

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
RICHARD B. STEPP,
Petitioner,
versus
WAYNE DICKY,
Respondent.
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CIVIL ACTION NUMBER
4:25-cv-01625
JUDGE CHARLES ESKRIDGE
OPINION AND ORDER ON DISMISSAL
The petition by Petitioner Richard B. Stepp for a
federal writ of habeas corpus under 28 USC §2241 is
dismissed. Dkt 1.
1. Background
Petitioner proceeds here pro se. He filed this petition in
April 2025, when he was detained in the Brazos County
Detention Center on two separate state-court cases.
In the first case, Brazos County Cause Number 06-
3822-CRF-272, Petitioner was indicted in July 2006 on two
counts of manufacture or delivery of controlled substances.
Dkt 15 at 2. In February 2007, he pleaded guilty to both
counts and was sentenced to eighteen years in prison. Ibid.
He was released to parole on October 24, 2011. Dkt 15-1.
As of that date, the “maximum expiration date” of his
sentence was June 7, 2024. Dkt 1 at 12.
In the second case, Brazos County Cause Number
23-03484-CRF-272, Petitioner was arrested on April 29,
2023, for possession of a controlled substance. Id at 25. An
indictment on that charge issued on August 24, 2023. Ibid.
On August 30, 2023, the Texas Board of Pardons and
Paroles issued a “blue warrant” alleging that Petitioner
had violated his parole in Cause Number 06-3822 by
committing the offense charged in Cause Number
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
July 13, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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23-03484. Dkt 15-2. The blue warrant was executed on
September 26, 2023. Dkt 15-3. TBPP held a preliminary
hearing on the alleged violation on October 19, 2023,
although no decision was announced at that time. Dkt 1
at 13. TBPP ultimately issued its preliminary decision on
June 12, 2024, finding probable cause to believe a violation
had occurred and referring the case for a final revocation
hearing. Id at 13–15.
While the revocation proceedings were pending,
Petitioner filed a state application for writ of habeas
corpus, challenging the calculation of certain time credits
and his continued detention on the blue warrant. Id at 19–
20. That application was dismissed by the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals for lack of exhaustion. Id at 28. In
September 2024, Petitioner filed a second habeas
application raising the same grounds, which was denied by
the TCCA on the merits in November 2024. Id at 2–3.
In April 2025, Petitioner filed this federal habeas
corpus action. He doesn’t challenge his underlying
conviction or sentence in Cause Number 06-3822 or his
detention in Cause Number 23-03484. Instead, he
challenges the administration of his sentence in Cause
Number 06-3822, raising three claims:
o Violation of due process rights when TBPP
failed to hold a final revocation hearing within
a reasonable time,
o Illegal confinement past the maximum
expiration date of his sentence, and
o Violation of due process rights in the state
habeas corpus proceedings.
Id at 6.
Since this petition was filed, Petitioner’s parole in
Cause Number 06-3822 was formally revoked. Dkt 23 at 1.
He also pleaded guilty to the charge against him in Cause
Number 23-03484, and he was sentenced to a concurrent
prison term of five years. Dkt 15-4.
Respondent answered the petition and moved for
summary judgment. He contends that the petition should
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be dismissed as moot because Petitioner is no longer a
pretrial detainee. He contends in the alternative that
Petitioner’s claims have no merit because he was properly
held on the facially valid blue warrant. Dkt 15.
Petitioner filed a cross-motion for summary judgment,
contending that the facts recited by Respondent show that
he was detained beyond the maximum expiration date of
his sentence and that he thus was and is illegally detained.
Dkt 16. As relief, he seeks an order declaring that his
sentence in Cause Number 06-3822 has been fully served
and ordering his discharge on that conviction. Dkt 1 at 7.
2. Legal standard
A pro se petition is construed liberally and isn’t held to
the same stringent and rigorous standards as pleadings
filed by lawyers. See Bledsue v Johnson, 188 F3d 250, 255
(5th Cir 1999).
Habeas corpus petitions from state prisoners can be
brought under either 28 USC §2241 or §2254. Section 2241
applies to all “persons in custody regardless of whether
final judgment has been rendered and regardless of the
present status of the case pending against him.” Dickerson
v Louisiana, 816 F2d 220, 224 (5th Cir 1987); see also
Braden v 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 US
484, 488–89 (1973). A prisoner challenging the validity of
his state-court judgments and sentences is also subject to
the more specific provisions of §2254. See Galbraith v
Hooper, 151 F4th 795, 803 (5th Cir 2025).
A petition under §2241 is the proper vehicle for seeking
federal habeas relief from pretrial detention. See Stringer
v Williams, 161 F3d 259, 262 (5th Cir 1998), citing
Dickerson, 816 F2d at 224. It may also be used to challenge
the manner in which a state sentence is being carried out.
See Galbraith, 151 F4th at 802–03. But neither §2241 nor
§2254 afford relief from errors of state constitutional,
statutory, or procedural law. See Estelle v McGuire, 502 US
62, 67-68 (1991): “[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not
lie for errors of state law.” A prisoner seeking relief under
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§2241 must instead allege facts showing a violation of a
federal law or constitutional right. 28 USC §2241(c)(3).
The parties’ motions for summary judgment are
governed by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Clark v Johnson, 202 F3d 760, 764 (5th Cir
2000). Rule 56(a) provides that summary judgment is
appropriate when the pleadings and evidence on file show
that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. See also Trent v Wade, 776 F3d 368, 376 (5th Cir
2015). The Supreme Court holds that “the substantive law
will identify which facts are material.” Anderson v Liberty
Lobby, Inc, 477 US 242, 248 (1986).
3. Analysis
a. Mootness
Respondent first contends that Petitioner’s action
should be dismissed as moot based on his guilty plea in
Cause Number 23-03484. Dkt 15 at 10–11.
A defendant’s guilty plea “bars habeas review of most
non-jurisdictional claims alleging antecedent violations of
constitutional rights.” Matthew v Johnson, 201 F3d 353,
364 (5th Cir 2000), citing Tollett v Henderson, 411 US 258,
267 (1973). But a guilty plea doesn’t waive the defendant’s
right to challenge “the very power of the State to bring the
defendant into court to answer the charge against him.”
Blackledge v Perry, 417 US 21, 30 (1974).
The claims asserted by Petitioner challenge only the
power of the State to detain him for the alleged violation of
his parole in Cause Number 06-3822. His guilty plea in
Cause Number 23-03484 may have waived his right to
challenge any alleged constitutional violations that arose
before entry of the plea in that case. But it didn’t waive his
right to challenge the State’s authority to detain him for
revocation proceedings in Cause Number 06-3822.
Respondent’s argument that the petition should be
dismissed as moot is without merit.
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b. Due process at parole hearing
Petitioner first contends that he was denied due
process when TBPP failed to timely provide him with the
findings from the preliminary hearing and failed to timely
hold a final revocation hearing. Relying on Texas
Government Code §508.283, he asserts that he could be
detained on the blue warrant for no more than 180 days.
He contends that his detention for more than eight months
after the preliminary hearing violated Texas law and thus
his right to due process. Dkt 1 at 9.
Parole revocation proceedings aren’t criminal cases,
and the “full panoply” of rights due a criminal defendant in
a criminal case doesn’t extend to such proceedings.
Morrissey v Brewer, 408 US 471, 480 (1972). Due process
in parole revocation proceedings instead has only minimal
requirements, being (i) written notice of the alleged
violations; (ii) disclosure of the incriminating evidence;
(iii) an opportunity to appear at the hearing and present
witnesses and documentary evidence; (iv) a conditional
right to cross-examine and confront witnesses; (v) a
decision by a neutral decision maker; and (vi) a written
statement of the evidence relied upon and the reasons for
revoking parole. Id. at 489; see also Barnes v Johnson,
184 F3d 451, 454 (5th Cir 1999). Notably absent from this
list is a time period for conducting proceedings or providing
notice of the results.
Petitioner doesn’t allege that he was denied any of the
rights afforded by Morrissey. He asserts only that TBPP
violated Texas law by not timely notifying him of the
outcome of the preliminary hearing and by not conducting
his final revocation hearing within a reasonable time. But
TBPP’s alleged failure to comply with state procedural
rules concerning the timing of proceedings presents a
question only of state law. Such errors being at most
violations of state law, they aren’t cognizable in a federal
habeas proceeding. See Smith v Phillips, 455 US 209, 221
(1982); Estelle, 502 US at 67–68.
The claim that TBPP violated state laws regarding the
timing of parole revocation proceedings will be denied.
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c. Illegal confinement
Petitioner next alleges that he was and is being
illegally incarcerated after the maximum expiration date
of his sentence in violation of due process. Specifically, he
contends that his sentence expired before his parole was
revoked, rendering his continued detention illegal.
Courts have universally held that, so long as the
revocation warrant was issued before the expiration of the
sentence, no constitutional violation occurs even if the
revocation hearing is held after the date the sentence
would otherwise have expired. See Morrison v Johnson,
106 F3d 127, 129 (5th Cir 1997, per curiam) (collecting
cases); see also Cook v United States Attorney General,
488 F2d 667, 670 (5th Cir 1974) (noting that parole
violation warrant must be issued within maximum term of
sentence but needn’t be executed during that period).
The undisputed facts show that Petitioner’s parole was
not revoked until after the maximum expiration date of his
sentence had passed. But the undisputed facts also show
that TBPP issued the blue warrant some ten months before
the expiration date of the sentence, and the warrant was
executed almost nine months before that expiration date.
Petitioner’s constitutional rights weren’t violated under
such circumstances.
The claim of illegal detention after expiration of
sentence will be denied.
d. Due process in state habeas proceedings
Petitioner last contends that state officials failed to
handle his state habeas application in compliance with
Texas state law.
“[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person
in custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the
traditional function of the writ is to secure release from
illegal custody.” Department of Homeland Security v
Thuraissigiam, 591 US 103, 117 (2020), quoting Preiser v
Rodriguez, 411 US 475, 484 (1973). But “an attack on the
state habeas proceeding is an attack on a proceeding
collateral to the detention and not the detention itself.”
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Rudd v Johnson, 256 F3d 317, 320 (5th Cir 2001). As such,
“errors in a state habeas proceeding cannot serve as a basis
for setting aside a valid original conviction.” Nichols v
Scott, 69 F3d 1255, 1275 (5th Cir 1995).
Even if true, Petitioner’s claim challenging the
procedures used by the state habeas court in ruling on his
state petition doesn’t state a claim for federal habeas
corpus relief, as it doesn’t challenge his conviction and
detention. And he isn’t entitled to federal habeas relief
based on procedural irregularities in the state habeas
court.
The claim by Petitioner for alleged due process
violations in his state habeas corpus proceedings will be
denied.
4. Other pending motions
a. Motion to amend
The motion to amend by Petitioner seeks to add claims
concerning the calculation and application of time credits
to his sentence in Cause Number 23-03484. Dkt 21. This
claim arises from separate events in a separate action that
occurred months after the petition was filed in this action.
Any such claims must be raised in a separate petition.
The motion to amend by Petitioner will be denied
without prejudice to him bringing his claims challenging
the time credits in Cause Number 23-03484 in a separate
petition. Dkt 21.
b. Motion for evidentiary hearing
The motion by Petitioner for an evidentiary hearing
seeks either an evidentiary hearing or an order granting
his petition. Dkt 23.
A habeas corpus petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary
hearing only if his claims rely on (i) a new rule of
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral
review by the Supreme Court, or (ii) facts that couldn’t
have been discovered earlier through the exercise of due
diligence. 28 USC §2254(e)(2). If the petitioner makes the
required showing under either of those provisions, he must
also demonstrate that the new facts “would be sufficient to
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establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for
constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have
found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.” Ibid.
But “even if all of these requirements are satisfied, a
federal habeas court still is not required to hold a hearing
or take any evidence.” Shinn v Ramirez, 596 US 366, 381
(2022) (emphasis in original).
Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing doesn’t
satisfy the requirements of §2254(e)(2). His claims don’t
arise from either a new rule of constitutional law or a newly
discovered factual predicate. Even if he did fall into either
of the two limited scenarios in which an evidentiary
hearing might be appropriate, he admits that there aren’t
any factual disputes relating to his petition, which would
render an evidentiary hearing unnecessary. See Coleman v
Vannoy, 963 F3d 429, 435 (5th Cir 2020): “A district court
may refuse an evidentiary hearing where there is not a
factual dispute which, if resolved in the prisoner’s favor,
would entitle him to relief.”
The motion by Petitioner for an evidentiary hearing
will be denied. Dkt 23.
c. Motions for relief or final judgment
Petitioner has filed two motions for relief or final
judgment. Both essentially restate the facts and arguments
from his initial petition and seek a ruling on his petition.
Dkts 26 & 28. As such, each will be rendered moot with the
issuance of this Order.
The motions for relief or final judgment will be denied
as moot. Dkts 26 & 28.
5. Certificate of appealability
Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases
requires a district court to issue or deny a certificate of
appealability when entering a final order that is adverse to
the petitioner. But “a COA is not required to appeal the
denial of a §2241 petition.” Hunter v Tamez, 622 F3d 427,
430 (5th Cir 2010), quoting Pack v Yusuff, 218 F3d 448, 451
n 3 (5th Cir 2000). As such, a certificate of appealability
needn’t be issued.
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6. Conclusion
The motion for summary judgment by Respondent
Wayne Dicky is GRANTED. Dkt 15.
The motion for summary judgment by Petitioner
Richard B. Stepp is DENIED. Dkt 16.
The motion by Petitioner to amend his petition is
DENIED. Dkt 21.
The motion by Petitioner for an evidentiary hearing is
DENIED. Dkt 23.
The motions by Petitioner for relief or final judgment
are DENIED AS MOOT. Dkts 26 & 28.
The petition for writ of habeas corpus by Petitioner
Richard B. Stepp is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Dkt 1.
Any other pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT.
A certificate of appealability is DENIED as unnecessary.
Final judgment will enter separately.
SO ORDERED.
Signed on , at Houston, Texas.
__________________________
Honorable Charles Eskridge
United States District Judge
July 13, 2026
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