Limelight Trading Cards, LLC v. Fye et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
Limelight Trading Cards, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
David Fye, Logan Cox, and
Black Label Breaks LLC,
Defendants.
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Civil Action H-25-1562
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
ON DEFENDANT LOGAN COX’S MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
This case has been referred to the undersigned magistrate
judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). ECF No. 3. Pending before
the court is Defendant Logan Cox’s Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings. ECF No. 44. The court recommends that the motion be
GRANTED. The court will allow Plaintiff one chance to amend the
complaint, however, as discussed in more detail below.
The facts of this case were set forth in detail in the court’s
May 28, 2025 Memorandum and Recommendation and will not be
repeated here. Cox moves for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(c). The court may dismiss a claim under Rule 12(c)
“where the material facts are not in dispute and a judgment on the
merits can be rendered by looking to the substance of the pleadings
and any judicially noticed facts.” Garza v. Escobar, 972 F.3d 721,
727 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Great Plains Tr. Co. v. Morgan Stanley
Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2002)). In analyzing
the complaint, courts apply the same standard as for Rule 12(b)(6).
Id. (quoting Hale v. Metrex Rsch. Corp., 963 F.3d 424, 427 (5th Cir.
2020)).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
June 02, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes the court to dismiss a complaint for
“failure 	to 	state 	a 	claim 	upon 	which 	relief 	can 	be 	granted.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court determines
whether the plaintiff’s complaint contains “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Calogero v. Shows, Cali & Walsh, L.L.P.,
970 F.3d 576, 	580 	(5th 	Cir. 	2020) 	(quoting 	Ashcroft 	v. 	Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “The plausibility standard is not akin to
a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678. Ultimately, the “[f]actual allegations [in the complaint]
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citation omitted).
Courts accept “all well-pleaded facts as true” and “view[]
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Allen v. Walmart
Stores, L.L.C., 907 F.3d 170, 177 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Jones v.
Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999)). “A plaintiff need only
plausibly allege facts going to the ultimate elements of the claim
to survive a motion to dismiss.” Cicalese v. Univ. of Tex. Med.
Branch, 924 F.3d 762, 768 (5th Cir. 2019). However, “[f]actual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level . . . on the assumption that all allegations in
the 	complaint 	are 	true 	(even 	if 	doubtful 	in 	fact).” 	Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555. Only statements of fact are to be taken as true.
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported
by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678. 	Conclusory 	allegations 	are 	“disentitled . . . to 	the
presumption of truth.” Id. at 681. Thus, the court, in reviewing the
plaintiff’s complaint, may neither “accept conclusory allegations”
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nor 	“strain 	to 	find 	inferences 	favorable 	to 	the 	plaintiffs.”
Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Sols., Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 361
(5th Cir. 2004).
Cox argues that Plaintiff Limelight Trading Cards, LLC’s
(Limelight) Complaint fails to state sufficient facts to support any
cause of action against Cox. ECF No. 44 at 4. The court agrees. The
Complaint says little more than that Cox was a customer and
friend of Defendant David Fye, ECF No. 1 at 3 (¶ 9), and that he
encouraged and assisted Fye and his company to commit various
wrongful acts, id. at 16. Limelight’s allegations specific to Cox
are 	entirely 	conclusory. 	They 	amount 	to 	nothing 	more 	than
“threadbare recitals” of the causes of action that Limelight asserts.
Limelight makes no effort to distinguish between Cox’s conduct
and Fye’s. Cox was the customer and Fye the business owner.
Thus, it is not plausible that Cox’s and Fye’s conduct was identical
or that the theory of liability for each is the same. As is discussed
further below, such “group pleading” is not sufficient to survive a
motion to dismiss. The court recommends that the Rule 12(c)
motion be GRANTED.
“Dismissing an action after giving the plaintiff only one
opportunity to state his case is ordinarily unjustified.” Davoodi v.
Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 755 F.3d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Jacquez v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 792 (5th Cir. 1986)). If the
plaintiff seeks leave to amend, they “must give the court at least
some notice of what . . . [their] amendments would be and how
those amendments would cure the initial complaint’s defects.”
Scott v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 16 F.4th 1204, 1209 (5th Cir. 2021)
(citation omitted).
Here, Limelight asks for leave to amend, but does not give
any details about what would be included. The court understands
that Limelight is alleging that Fye and Cox acted in concert and
that Cox committed or encouraged Fye to commit a number of
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wrongful 	acts. 	ECF No. 48 at 3. 	Limelight 	also 	makes 	many
statements of fact in its Response that do not appear anywhere in
the live Complaint. E.g., id. at 4, 7, 12. It appears that Limelight
has other facts at its disposal that could be added to an amended
complaint. Under the circumstances, the court will exercise its
discretion 	to 	allow 	Limelight 	to 	amend 	its 	complaint. 	The
amendment should address all the deficiencies identified in Cox’s
motion. Further leave to address deficiencies already identified
will be denied.
The court notes that, while nothing in Rule 8 prohibits
so-called 	“group” 	pleading, 	Plaintiff 	must 	still 	place 	Cox 	on
notice of what acts and wrongs Plaintiff believes he committed.
Cf. Lasslett v. Tetra Tech Constr., Inc., No. 2:13-CV-072-AM-CW,
2015 WL 13805125, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2015) (collecting and
distinguishing cases); Pastor v. Guardian Transition, Inc., No. H-
19-2406, 2019 WL 7879752, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2019) (“[The
LLC defendant] correctly argues that Plaintiff’s Original Petition
alleges only global and conclusory claims against all Defendants
together, without specifying any particular tortious acts by [the
LLC].”).
The current Complaint alleges many actions for which Fye
is personally responsible but gives no details whatever about any
specific actions for which Cox is personally responsible. Cox is
referred to generally as one of the defendants, without attributing
any specific conduct to him. It is not plausible that Cox, as Fye’s
customer and a non-party to the bankruptcy, engaged in conduct
identical to Fye’s. Nor does it seem plausible, given that Cox and
Fye are not even in business together, that the legal basis for Fye’s
liability would be the same as for Cox. Accordingly, the amended
complaint 	shall 	distinguish 	between 	Cox 	and 	Fye 	whenever
possible and shall specify whether and when both defendants
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committed acts together. Limelight’s amended complaint is
due June 12, 2026.
The 	parties 	have 	fourteen 	days 	from 	service 	of 	this
Memorandum and Recommendation to file written objections. 28
U.S.C. 	§ 636(b)(1); 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	72. 	Failure 	to 	timely 	file
objections will preclude appellate review of factual findings or legal
conclusions, except for plain error. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S.
140, 147–49 (1985); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276–77 (5th
Cir. 1988).
Signed at Houston, Texas, on June 2, 2026.
______________________________________
Peter Bray
United States Magistrate Judge
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