Figueroa v. United States Of America et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
SUZANNE RAYLENE
FIGUEROA,
Plaintiff,
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v. 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:25-cv-1139
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM, RECOMMENDATION, AND ORDER
Pending before the Court1 is Defendant the State of Texas’s (“Texas”)
Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 30), Defendants United States of America, United
States Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship and
Immigration 	Services, 	and 	United 	States 	Immigration 	and 	Customs
Enforcement’s (collectively, “Federal Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss (ECF No.
36), and pro se Plaintiff Suzanne Raylene Figueroa’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for
Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 47). Based on a review of
the motions, arguments, and relevant law, the Court RECOMMENDS Texas’s
Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 30) and the Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
(ECF No. 36) be GRANTED. 	It is also ORDERED that the Court DENIES
1 This case was referred to the Undersigned for all purposes pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. (ECF No. 31).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
December 11, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 47).
The Court FURTHER RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint
(ECF No. 20) be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
I. 	Background2
Plaintiff filed the instant case against Texas and the Federal Defendants
to address “the harm inflicted upon U.S. citizens in mixed-status families.”
(ECF No. 20 at 1). 	Plaintiff alleges she is a United States citizen and the
mother to three children, who are also United States citizens. 	(Id. at 7).
Plaintiff’s husband is “the beneficiary of an approved I-130 petition filed by
Plaintiff and has a pending I-131 Application for Parole in Place, filed to
regularize his presence and prevent family separation.” (Id.).
Plaintiff alleges her “family continues to face existential uncertainty,
coercion, and legal vulnerability caused by government policies that effectively
pressure 	U.S. 	citizen 	families 	to 	‘self-deport,’ 	leaving 	their 	country 	of
citizenship, or endure forced separation.” (Id.). Stated another way, Plaintiff
alleges she and her children “face a credible and ongoing threat of separation
and/or forced, coerced defacto [sic] exile or expatriation as a direct result of
2 The Background section is based on the allegations made in Plaintiff’s First
Amended Complaint. (See ECF No. 20).
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ALL named Defendants’ immigration enforcement policies, particularly those
supported and enforced by the State of Texas.” (Id. at 10).
Plaintiff states that “coordinated immigration enforcement operations”
have occurred in areas located approximately eleven miles from Plaintiff’s
home. 	(Id.). 	Further, Plaintiff adds that public statements from government
officials have “heighten[ed] the Plaintiff’s fear of arrest, removal, or collateral
harm.” 	(Id. at 11). 	Ultimately, Plaintiff brought this action “not to challenge
immigration law itself but to prevent constitutional injury to herself and her
U.S. citizen children.” (Id.).
Plaintiff initially filed her lawsuit on March 11, 2025. 	(ECF No. 1).
Approximately a month later, Plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint.
(ECF No. 20). Plaintiff states she brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief as well as monetary
damages for violations of the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id.
at 11).
II. 	Discussion
a. Texas’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 30)
Texas moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, arguing
Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (ECF No. 30 at 8).
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“Under the Eleventh Amendment, ‘[a]bsent waiver, neither a State nor
agencies acting under its control may be subject to suit in federal court.’” Cox
v. Texas, 354 F. App’x 901, 902 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Puerto Rico Aqueduct
& Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993) (internal
quotations omitted)); Ogrey v. Texas, 207 F. App’x 383, 385 (5th Cir. 2006)
(“The Eleventh Amendment confers immunity upon a state from a suit brought
against it by one of its citizens.”).
In Plaintiff’s Response, she does not argue that Congress has abrogated,
or Texas has waived its immunity. 	(See ECF No. 33 at 1–7); see also Ogrey,
207 F. App’x at 385 (“[Eleventh Amendment] immunity can only be abrogated
if (1) Congress, subject to limitations, expresses in unmistakable statutory
language its intention to allow States to be sued in federal court, . . . or (2) if
the state itself makes a clear declaration that it intends to submit itself to our
jurisdiction.”) (internal quotations omitted); Bonner v. Batiste, No. 22-cv-3502,
2023 WL 5985700, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2023), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 22-cv-3502, 2023 WL 5985241 (S.D. Tex. Sep. 14, 2023) (“Bonner
has failed to respond to the motion to dismiss and has not pointed to evidence
of a waiver of immunity or consent to suit. 	Accordingly, Bonner may not
pursue his claims in federal court against TBPP or the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice Parole Division.”).
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As such, because the claims against Texas are barred by sovereign
immunity, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s claims be dismissed without
prejudice. 	Warnock v. Pecos Cnty., Tex., 88 F.3d 341, 343 (5th Cir. 1996)
(“Because sovereign immunity deprives the court of jurisdiction, the claims
barred by sovereign immunity can be dismissed only under Rule 12(b)(1) and
not with prejudice.”).
b. The Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 36)
The Federal Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended
Complaint, arguing Plaintiff (1) lacks standing; (2) fails to state sufficient facts
to support her claims; and (3) has not brought viable constitutional claims.
(ECF No. 36 at 3–10).
“Article III standing is a jurisdictional prerequisite.” Crenshaw-Logal v.
City of Abilene, Tex., 436 F. App’x 306, 308–09 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Steel Co.
v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998)). At a minimum, Article
III standing requires a plaintiff to show an “injury in fact” that is fairly
traceable to the defendant’s conduct and that is likely to be redressed by the
requested relief. 	Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). An
injury in fact means injury that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” 	Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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Plaintiff alleges her “family continues to face existential uncertainty,
coercion, and legal vulnerability caused by government policies that effectively
pressure 	U.S. 	citizen 	families 	to 	‘self-deport,’ 	leaving 	their 	country 	of
citizenship, or endure forced separation.” 	(ECF No. 20 at 7). 	Plaintiff’s First
Amended 	Complaint 	states 	that 	“coordinated 	immigration 	enforcement
operations” have occurred in areas located approximately eleven miles from
Plaintiff’s home. 	(Id. at 10). 	Further, public statements from government
officials have “heighten[ed] the Plaintiff’s fear of arrest, removal, or collateral
harm.” (Id. at 11).
The Supreme Court has previously rejected this theory of standing,
stating that “an injury in fact does not arise merely from an individual’s
knowledge that the government ‘was engaged in certain activities or from the
individual’s concomitant fear that, armed with the fruits of those activities, the
agency might in the future take some other and additional action detrimental
to that individual.’” 	Crenshaw-Logal, 436 F. App’x at 309 (quoting Laird v.
Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972)).
Here, Plaintiff has alleged nothing more than fear that her husband may
be 	removed, 	which 	would 	affect 	her 	family. 	As 	noted 	by 	the 	Federal
Defendants, “Plaintiff has not made any allegation that her husband is in
removal proceedings or that he will be placed in removal proceedings.” 	(ECF
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No. 36 at 4). 	Plaintiff also acknowledges that she “is not facing literal loss of
citizenship.” (ECF No. 20 at 33). In fact, Plaintiff describes the purpose behind
this case is to “prevent . . . injury to herself and her U.S. citizen children.” (Id.
at 11) (emphasis added).
Plaintiff’s Response to the Federal Defendants’ motion reiterates the
same arguments found in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. (See ECF No.
42). When addressing whether Plaintiff has shown an injury-in-fact, Plaintiff
argues she and her children have suffered emotional harm from “living under
the constant threat of family separation” and will suffer (1) educational harm
“[i]f forced to leave the United States,” (2) financial harm “if forced to relocate,”
(3) loss of family unity if her husband is deported; (4) loss of healthcare if they
depart the country; and (5) destruction of a lawful marriage. (Id. at 11–12).
While 	Plaintiff 	claims 	these 	are 	“not 	hypothetical 	or 	speculative
injuries,” the Court disagrees. (Id. at 12). Plaintiff merely alleges the kinds of
speculative fear that falls short of Constitutional standing. 	See Moore v.
Bryant, 205 F. Supp. 3d 834, 852 (S.D. Miss. 2016), aff’d, 853 F.3d 245 (5th Cir.
2017) 	(“Because 	there 	is 	nothing 	showing 	that 	fear 	of 	racial 	violence 	is
particular to him, Moore lacks standing to make this claim.”); Kirkland v. Cent.
Intel. Agency, No. 25-cv-464, 2025 WL 3167320, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 14, 2025),
report and recommendation adopted as modified, No. 25-cv-464, 2025 WL
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3164486 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 2025) (“This is a ‘subjective fear’ upon which no
injury fairly traceable to the CIA’s alleged surveillance can be based, and it
involves 	only 	speculative 	fears 	of 	future 	surveillance 	with 	‘no 	actual
knowledge’ of the CIA’s targeting practices.” (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l
USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410–14, 418–19 (2013)); see also Crenshaw-Logal, 436 F.
App’x at 309 (“Crenshaw–Logal’s unsupported speculation that the City might
use the communications to her detriment at some point in the future is a far
cry from the imminent threat of particularized harm necessary to establish
constitutional standing.”).
As 	such, 	because 	Plaintiff 	lacks 	standing, 	the 	Court 	recommends
Plaintiff’s 	claims 	against 	the 	Federal 	Defendants 	be 	dismissed 	without
prejudice. 	See Crenshaw-Logal, 436 F. App’x at 310 (“When a complaint is
dismissed 	for 	lack 	of 	jurisdiction 	(including 	lack 	of 	standing), 	dismissal
ordinarily should be without prejudice.”) (collecting cases).
c. 	Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint
(ECF No. 47)
Lastly, 	Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a second amended
complaint. 	(ECF No. 47). 	Both Texas and the Federal Defendants argue
Plaintiff’s proposed amendments are futile. 	(ECF No. 51 at 2; ECF No. 58 at
2–3).
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“[D]istrict courts often afford plaintiffs at least one opportunity to cure
pleading deficiencies before dismissing a case, unless it is clear that the defects
are incurable or the plaintiffs advise the court that they are unwilling or
unable to amend in a manner which will avoid dismissal.” Great Plains Tr. Co.
v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 329 (5th Cir. 2002). 	The
decision to allow amendment of a party’s pleadings is within the sound
discretion of the district court. 	Norman v. Apache Corp., 19 F.3d 1017, 1021
(5th Cir. 1994); Avatar Expl., Inc. v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 933 F.2d 314, 320
(5th Cir. 1991).
“Although leave to amend should not be automatically granted, ‘[a]
district court must possess a substantial reason to deny a request for leave to
amend[.]’” Tucker Energy Servs., USA, Inc. v. Ricoh Americas Corp., No. 4:12-
cv-0417, 2012 WL 2403513, at *1 (S.D. Tex. June 25, 2012) (quoting Jones v.
Robinson Prop. Group, L.P., 427 F.3d 987, 994 (5th Cir. 2005)). 	Under Rule
15(a), “[d]enial of leave to amend may be warranted for undue delay, bad faith
or 	dilatory 	motive 	on 	the 	part 	of 	the 	movant, 	repeated 	failure 	to 	cure
deficiencies, undue prejudice to the opposing party, or futility of a proposed
amendment.” 	U.S. ex rel. Steury v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 625 F.3d 262, 270
(5th Cir. 2010).
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Here, Plaintiff seeks to add “the First Amendment right to freedom of
association and intimate family relationships.” (ECF No. 47 at 2–3). Plaintiff
also seeks to add four new defendants: (1) Kristi Noem; (2) Tom Homan; (3)
Stephen Miller; and (4) Greg Abbott. (Id. at 3). Finally, Plaintiff requests the
Court to compel all Defendants to provide a formal position on how they intend
to protect the rights of all U.S. citizen children, and to affirmatively prohibit
unconstitutional racial profiling in education environments. (Id. at 4).
Considering 	Plaintiff’s 	proposed 	amendments 	in 	the 	context 	of 	her
claims against Texas, the Court agrees with Texas that Plaintiff’s proposed
amendments fail to cure the jurisdictional bar of the Eleventh Amendment.
(See ECF No. 51 at 3); see also Edmiston v. Louisiana Small Bus. Dev. Ctr.,
931 	F.3d 	403, 	408 	(5th 	Cir. 	2019) 	(denying 	leave 	to 	amend 	where 	the
defendants were immune from suit); Hlas v. Texas Dep’t of Pub. Serv., No. 4:23-
cv-514, 	2025 	WL 	2536215, 	at 	*3 	(E.D. 	Tex. 	July 	25, 	2025), 	report 	and
recommendation adopted sub nom. Hlas v. Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety, No. 4:23-
cv-514, 2025 WL 2534342 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 2025) (finding leave to amend
would be futile where claims are barred by sovereign immunity).
Further, 	Plaintiff’s 	proposed 	amendments 	do 	not 	fix 	the 	lack 	of 	a
plausibly 	alleged 	injury-in-fact 	to 	sustain 	claims 	against 	the 	Federal
Defendants. 	See Viera v. Hudman, No. 23-cv-40325, 2024 WL 111353, at *2
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(5th Cir. Jan. 10, 2024) (“But allegations of additional misconduct in 2022 do
nothing to cure the lack of plausible allegations showing injury caused by the
alleged misconduct in 2020. 	Nor does adding a new defendant. 	Thus, the
district court was correct in finding that the proposed amended complaint was
futile.”).
Plaintiff has already amended her complaint on one occasion and filed
the instant motion for leave after reviewing and responding to Texas’s and the
Federal Defendants’ motions to dismiss (ECF Nos. 30, 36). 	At this juncture,
Plaintiff is aware of the insufficiency of her claims and yet “submitted an
equally defective proposed amended complaint.” 	Allen v. Navy Fed. Credit
Union, No. 3:24-cv-949, 2025 WL 1355159, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 2025),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:24-cv-949, 2025 WL 484818 (N.D.
Tex. Feb. 13, 2025), reconsideration denied, No. 3:24-cv-949, 2025 WL 719824
(N.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2025). 	As such, the Court finds Plaintiff has pleaded her
best case and shown that leave to amend would be futile. 	See id.; Martinez v.
Nueces Cnty., Texas, 71 F.4th 385, 391 (5th Cir. 2023) (“If the complaint, as
amended, would be subject to dismissal, then amendment is futile and the
district court was within its discretion to deny leave to amend.”) (internal
quotations omitted). 	Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Second
Amended Complaint (ECF No. 47) is denied.
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III. 	Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court RECOMMENDS Texas’s Motion to
Dismiss (ECF No. 30) and the Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF
No. 36) be GRANTED. 	It is also ORDERED that the Court DENIES
Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 47).
The Court FURTHER RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint
(ECF No. 20) be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
The Clerk shall send copies of this Memorandum and Recommendation
to the respective parties who have fourteen days from the receipt thereof to file
written objections thereto pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)
and General Order 2002-13. Failure to file written objections within the time
period mentioned shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking the factual
findings and legal conclusions on appeal.
SIGNED in Houston, Texas on December 11, 2025.
______________________________
Richard W. Bennett
United States Magistrate Judge
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