Flores v. King

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
RODNEY PAUL F. SR.,
Plaintiff,
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v. 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:25-cv-683
FRANK BISIGNANO,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Rodney Paul F., Sr. (“Plaintiff”) filed this lawsuit against
Defendant Frank Bisignano1 (“Commissioner”) seeking review of the denial of
benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. 	(ECF Nos. 1, 14). 	Pending
before the Court2 are the Parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. (ECF
Nos. 10, 12). Based on a review of the motions, arguments, and relevant law,
the Court RECOMMENDS Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(ECF No. 12) be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(ECF No. 10) be DENIED. 	The Court FURTHER RECOMMENDS the
1 Frank Bisignano was sworn in as the Commissioner of Social Security on May 7,
2025. Bisignano is “automatically substituted” as the defendant in this suit. FED . R. CIV. P.
25(d); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any action instituted in accordance with this subsection
shall survive notwithstanding any change in the person occupying the office of Commissioner
of Social Security or any vacancy in such office.”).
2 On February 24, 2025, this case was referred to the Undersigned for all purposes
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. (ECF
No. 4).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
February 18, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Commissioner’s decision be AFFIRMED and the case be DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
I. 	Background
Plaintiff filed a claim for disability insurance benefits on August 18,
2023, alleging disability starting on August 14, 2023. 	(ECF No. 6-1 at 18).3
Plaintiff’s claims were initially denied by the Social Security Administration
on January 17, 2024, and again on reconsideration on April 4, 2024. (Id.). On
April 8, 2024, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law
Judge. 	(Id.). 	On August 30, 2024, Administrative Law Judge Thomas J.
Helget (the “ALJ”) held a telephonic hearing. (Id.). Plaintiff was represented
by counsel at the hearing. (Id.). Cecile M. Johnson, a vocational expert (“VE”),
appeared and testified at the hearing. (Id.).
On September 18, 2024, the ALJ issued a decision, finding Plaintiff not
disabled at Step Five.4 	(Id. at 27–28). 	At Step One, the ALJ found Plaintiff
had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 14, 2023, the
alleged onset date. 	(Id. at 20). 	At Step Two, the ALJ found Plaintiff has the
3 The Administrative Record in this case can be found at ECF No. 6.
4 In considering a disability claim, an ALJ must conduct a five-step evaluation that
examines: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2)
whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets
or equals the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1;
(4) whether the impairment prevents the claimant from doing past relevant work; and (5)
whether the impairment prevents the claimant from doing any other work. 	Masterson v.
Barnhart, 309 F.3d 267, 271 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520).
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following severe impairments: “morbid obesity; degenerative disc disease,
lumbar spine; osteoarthritis, bilateral knees; diabetes mellitus; sleep apnea;
migraine 	headaches; 	post-traumatic 	stress 	disorder; 	major 	depression;
adjustment disorder; anxiety; alcohol abuse (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).” 	(Id.). 	At
Step 	Three, 	the 	ALJ 	found 	Plaintiff: 	“does 	not 	have 	an 	impairment 	or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one
of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR
404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526).” 	(Id. at 21). 	The ALJ determined that
Plaintiff has the Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) to:
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except:
claimant can stand/walk for 4 hours, in an 8 hour workday;
claimant can sit for 6 hours in an 8 hour workday; occasionally
climb ramps or stairs; never climb ropes, ladders or scaffolding;
occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching or crawling; no
work 	at 	unprotected 	heights, 	dangerous 	moving 	machinery,
hazards, no driving; is able to understand, remember, and carry
out detailed, but not complex instructions, but no work performed
in a production rate environment, such as assembly lime [sic]
work; 	limited 	to 	occasional 	interaction 	with 	supervisors,
coworkers, and the general public.
(Id. at 23). 	At Step Four, the ALJ found Plaintiff “is unable to perform any
past relevant work.” (Id. at 26). At Step Five, the ALJ found there were jobs
that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could
perform—such as a storage facility rental clerk, office helper, photocopy
machine operator—and therefore Plaintiff was not disabled as defined under
the Social Security Act. (Id. at 27–28).
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Plaintiff appealed to the Appeals Council and the Appeals Council denied
Plaintiff’s request for review on December 19, 2024. (Id. at 5). Thus, the ALJ’s
decision represents the Commissioner’s final decision in the case. See Sims v.
Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106–07 (2000).
II. 	Legal Standard
The Court’s review of a final decision of the Commissioner on a Social
Security disability claim is exceedingly deferential. Taylor v. Astrue, 706 F.3d
600, 602 (5th Cir. 2012). “[R]eview of Social Security disability cases ‘is limited
to two inquiries: (1) whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence
on the record as a whole, and (2) whether the Commissioner applied the proper
legal standard.’” Copeland v. Colvin, 771 F.3d 920, 923 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Perez 	v. 	Barnhart, 	415 	F.3d 	457, 	461 	(5th 	Cir. 	2005)). 	When 	the
Commissioner’s decision is reached by applying improper legal standards, the
decision is not supported by substantial evidence. 	Singletary v. Bowen, 798
F.2d 818, 823 (5th Cir. 1986). “Substantial evidence is ‘such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion’ and constitutes
‘more than a mere scintilla’ but ‘less than a preponderance’ of evidence.”
Hardman v. Colvin, 820 F.3d 142, 147 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Newton v. Apfel,
209 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2000)). “‘Any findings of fact by the Commissioner
which are supported by substantial evidence are conclusive.’” 	Heck v. Colvin,
674 F. App’x 411, 413 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Taylor, 706 F.3d at 602).
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Even 	so, 	judicial 	review 	must 	not 	be 	“so 	obsequious 	as 	to 	be
meaningless.” 	Brown v. Apfel, 192 F.3d 492, 496 (5th Cir. 1999) (quotations
omitted). 	The substantial evidence standard is not a rubber stamp for the
Commissioner’s 	decision 	and 	involves 	more 	than 	a 	search 	for 	evidence
supporting the Commissioner’s findings. Singletary, 798 F.2d at 822–23; Cook
v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 391, 393 (5th Cir. 1985). Rather, a reviewing court must
scrutinize the record as a whole, taking into account whatever fairly detracts
from the substantiality of evidence supporting the Commissioner’s findings.
Singletary, 798 F.2d at 823. The court “‘may not reweigh the evidence . . . , nor
try the issues de novo, nor substitute [its] judgment for the [Commissioner’s],
even if the evidence preponderates against the [Commissioner’s] decision.’”
Johnson v. Colvin, 595 F. App’x 443, 444 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Harrell v.
Bowen, 862 F.2d 471, 475 (5th Cir. 1988)).
III. 	Discussion
Plaintiff argues remand is required because (1) the ALJ’s RFC finding
fails to include mental limitations identified in the record or explain why those
limitations were omitted; (2) the ALJ’s evaluation of the medical opinion
evidence is insufficient to permit judicial review; and (3) the ALJ did not
properly provide evidence at step five that Plaintiff could perform a significant
number 	of 	jobs 	in 	the 	national 	economy. 	(ECF 	No. 	10 	at 	1–3). 	The
Commissioner argues that the ALJ did not err in finding Plaintiff was not
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disabled under the Social Security Act. (ECF No. 12 at 4). Plaintiff also filed
a notice of supplemental authority, stating that the court in K.L.J. v. Comm’r,
Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 24-cv-3065, 2025 WL 3170490 (D. Colo. Nov. 7, 2025),
ruled on the same issue—“a legal challenge that the ALJ had found that
Plaintiff suffered from a severe mental impairment but offered an RFC finding
which did not reflect the existence of any severe mental impairment”—and
issued a decision in conformity with Plaintiff’s position here. (ECF No. 14).
A. Mental Limitations
First, Plaintiff argues remand is required because the ALJ failed to
include the mental limitations he identified as credible in the RFC finding or
to explain their omission. (ECF No. 10 at 3– 7). 	Specifically, Plaintiff argues
that 	the 	ALJ 	failed 	to 	incorporate 	into 	the 	RFC 	the 	moderate 	mental
limitations stemming from his severe mental impairments, particularly the
“moderate” limitation in “concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace,” and
that consequently the RFC—allowing for “detailed” instructions instead of
“simple” ones—does not adequately reflect those findings. 	(Id. at 4–6). 	The
Commissioner 	argues 	that 	the 	regulations 	do 	not 	require 	the 	ALJ 	to
incorporate 	verbatim 	the 	assessed 	mental 	limitations 	into 	the 	RFC
determination, and therefore, “the ALJ reasonably accounted for any moderate
limitations in maintaining concentration, persistence or pace by limiting
Plaintiff to performing detailed but not complex tasks and instructions, no
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production rate work, and occasional interaction with supervisors, coworkers,
and the general public.” (ECF No. 12 at 5–6).
Here, the ALJ found the severity of Plaintiff’s mental impairments,
considered singly and in combination, did not meet or medically equal the
criteria of listings 12.04 (“depressive, bipolar and related disorders”) and 12.06
(“anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorders”). (ECF No. 6-1 at 22). The ALJ
evaluated Plaintiff’s mental impairments under the “paragraph B” criteria and
found 	a 	“mild 	limitation” 	in 	understanding, 	remembering, 	or 	applying
information and in adapting or managing oneself; and a “moderate limitation”
in interacting with others and in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining
pace.5 (Id. at 22–23). The ALJ expressly noted that the “limitations identified
in the ‘paragraph B’ criteria are not a residual functional capacity assessment
but are used to rate the severity of mental impairments at steps 2 and 3 of the
sequential evaluation process.” 	(Id. at 23). 	The ALJ then proceeded to
formulate a mental RFC for steps four and five. (Id.).
The RFC limits Plaintiff to understanding, remembering, and carrying
out “detailed, but not complex instructions;” prohibits “work performed in a
production-rate 	environment,” 	such 	as 	assembly-line 	work; 	and 	restricts
5 “To satisfy the paragraph B criteria, [the] mental disorder must result in ‘extreme’
limitation of one, or ‘marked’ limitation of two, of the four areas of mental functioning.”
Saunders v. Comm’r of SSA, No. 1:21-cv-23, 2022 WL 4464373, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Sep. 26,
2022) (quoting 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.00(2)(b)).
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Plaintiff 	to 	“occasional 	interaction 	with 	supervisors, 	coworkers, 	and 	the
general public.” 	(Id.). 	The ALJ stated that “residual functional capacity
assessment reflects the degree of limitation [he] found in the ‘paragraph B’
mental function analysis.” (Id.).
As the ALJ properly recognized, the regulations and social security
rulings provide that the paragraph B criteria are not themselves an RFC
assessment. 	See Miller v. Kijakazi, No. 4:22-cv-03905, 2024 WL 1075485, at
*5 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 2024) (“[C]ourts recognize that Paragraph B findings,
while relevant, ‘do not require the use of any particular language’ when
formulating the RFC.”); T ITLES II & XVI: A SSESSING R ESIDUAL F UNCTIONAL
C APACITY IN INITIAL C LAIMS, SSR 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184, at *4 (providing
limitations identified in the “paragraph B” and “paragraph C” criteria are not
an RFC assessment). 	Rather, the RFC 	determination “requires a 	more
detailed assessment” of work-related functional limitations. SSR 96-8P, 1996
WL 374184, at *4. Courts in this circuit recognize that an ALJ is not required
to incorporate paragraph B findings verbatim into the RFC, so long as the RFC
reasonably accounts for the supported limitations. 	See, e.g., Honaker v.
Kijakazi, No. 2:22-cv-00285, 2023 WL 9503412, at *6 (S.D. Tex. June 12, 2023)
(“The 	ALJ 	is 	not 	required 	to 	incorporate 	the 	‘paragraph 	B’ 	functional
limitations into the RFC assessment ‘word-for-word.’”); Scott v. Comm’r, Soc.
Sec. Admin., No. 4:20-cv-01136, 2022 WL 4240888, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Sep. 14,
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2022) (“[T]he ALJ is not required to incorporate the limitations identified in
the 	Paragraph 	B 	functional 	areas 	as 	such 	limitations 	are 	not 	an 	RFC
assessment 	as 	long 	as 	substantial 	evidence 	supports 	the 	ALJ’s 	RFC
determination.”).
Here, the ALJ reasonably accounted for Plaintiff’s moderate limitations
in concentration, persistence, or pace by restricting him to detailed but not
complex 	work 	and 	by 	eliminating 	production-rate 	work. 	See 	Bonner 	v.
Berryhill, No. 4:17-cv-0641, 2018 WL 3756837, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2018)
(“[T]he 	ALJ’s 	RFC 	determination 	limiting 	[Plaintiff] 	to 	detailed 	but 	not
complex 	work, 	with 	no 	forced 	pace/assembly 	line/production 	rate 	pace,
reasonably incorporates [Plaintiff’s] moderate difficulties in concentration,
persistence, or pace that were discussed throughout the opinion.”). 	The ALJ
further supported his findings with discussion of treatment records reflecting
largely 	“normal 	mental 	status” 	examinations, 	“logical 	and 	goal 	directed”
thought 	processes, 	“intact” 	“intellectual 	functioning,” 	good 	judgment 	and
insight, improvement with cognitive behavioral therapy, and reports that
Plaintiff “tolerated [his] mental health medication regimen well.” (ECF No. 6-
1 at 25).6
6 Plaintiff’s reliance on K.L.J. v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 2025 WL 3170490, a
district court decision from outside this circuit, does not compel a different result. This Court
does not require word-for-word incorporation of paragraph B findings into the RFC. 	The
issue is whether substantial evidence supports the RFC assessed—not whether a different
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After 	reviewing 	the 	record, 	the 	Court 	concludes 	that 	substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s mental RFC determination and that the ALJ
applied the correct legal standards.
B. Medical Opinion Evidence
Second, 	Plaintiff 	argues 	remand 	is 	required 	because 	the 	ALJ’s
evaluation of the medical opinion evidence—specifically the opinion of internal
medicine consultative examiner Dr. Faiyaz Bhojani—is “legally insufficient to
permit meaningful judicial review.” (ECF No. 10 at 7–12). The Commissioner
argues that the ALJ properly considered the opinion of Dr. Bhojani and found
it “somewhat persuasive.” (ECF No. 12 at 7–9).
For claims filed after March 27, 2017, ALJs evaluate medical opinions
under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c. 	Under that regulation, no deference or any
specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, is given to any
medical opinions or prior administrative medical findings, including those
from medical sources. 	Id. at § 404.1520c(a). 	Instead, the ALJ must consider
the persuasiveness of each opinion, focusing primarily on supportability and
consistency. Id.
factfinder might have imposed greater limitations. Glynn v. Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 24-cv-183,
2024 WL 5706063, at *7 (E.D. La. Nov. 22, 2024) (“The decisive issue is whether substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, not whether substantial evidence might support a
different result. Under the substantial evidence standard, whether it might be possible to
evaluate evidence differently and/or possibly reach a different conclusion is immaterial.”
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g))).
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Here, the ALJ found Dr. Bhojani’s opinion “somewhat persuasive.” (ECF
No. 6-1 at 25). 	The ALJ noted that Dr. Bhojani’s diagnostic impressions and
certain findings were supported by his examination and diagnostic studies;
however, the ALJ found that Dr. Bhojani’s limitations regarding sitting,
standing, and walking were not consistent with the totality of the evidence at
the hearing level. 	(Id.). 	In support of that conclusion, the ALJ cited imaging
studies showing only mild degenerative changes in Plaintiff’s lumbar spine and
mild osteoarthritis in his knee, as well as other record evidence. 	(Id.).
Although Plaintiff argues that Dr. Bhojani’s assessed limitations “may have
led a vocational expert to find that [Plaintiff] could only perform sedentary,
rather than light, occupations” (ECF No. 10 at 10), the ALJ was not required
to adopt any medical opinion in full. 	“An ALJ is free to reject any medical
opinion when the evidence supports a contrary conclusion.” Claudio v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., No. 4:23-cv-108, 2023 WL 4748218, at *5 (N.D. Tex. July 25, 2023)
(quoting Harris v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 413, 417 (5th Cir. 2000); Qualls v. Astrue,
339 F. App’x 461, 466 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bradley v. Bowen, 809 F.2d 1054,
1057 (5th Cir. 1987))). 	Moreover, the RFC determination is reserved to the
Commissioner. Joseph v. Astrue, 231 F. App’x 327, 331 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he
determination of any legal conclusions (such as the ability to work) are
reserved to the Commissioner.”).
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The ALJ articulated both supportability and consistency with respect to
Dr. Bhojani’s opinion and cited specific record evidence supporting the decision
to limit Plaintiff to a reduced range of light work rather than sedentary work.
The Court concludes that the ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. Bhojani’s opinion satisfies
the articulation requirements of § 404.1520c and is supported by substantial
evidence.
C. Step 5
Finally, Plaintiff argues remand is required because the ALJ did not
establish that Plaintiff could perform other work at step five of the sequential
evaluation process. 	(ECF No. 10 at 12–16). 	The Commissioner argues that
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s step five finding. 	(ECF No. 12 at 9–
11).
The VE testified that an individual with Plaintiff’s vocational profile and
RFC could perform the representative occupations of storage facility rental
clerk, office helper, and photocopy machine operator, and provided national job
numbers for each. (ECF No. 6-1 at 27). The ALJ stated that the VE’s testimony
was consistent with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) and relied
on that testimony in finding Plaintiff not disabled. (Id.).
However, Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ cited an incorrect DOT code
for the “storage facility rental clerk” position in the written decision, as he cited
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DOT 239.367-026, which refers to a service observer.7 	(ECF No. 10 at 13).
Even so, the record reflects that the VE provided the correct DOT code at the
hearing and the ALJ’s written reference appears to be a typographical error.
(See ECF No. 6-1 at 27, 54). 	The ALJ expressly relied on the VE’s testimony,
and there is no indication that the error affected the substance of the step-five
finding. “Procedural perfection in administrative proceedings is not required.
This court will not vacate a judgment unless the substantial rights of a party
have been affected.” Mays v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1362, 1364 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing
Carter v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 716 F.2d 344, 349 (5th Cir. 1983)). 	In
addition, 	even 	absent 	the 	storage 	clerk 	position, 	the 	VE 	identified 	two
additional occupations with significant national job numbers. (ECF No. 6-1 at
27, 53–54). 	See also Carey v. Apfel, 230 F.3d 131, 145 (5th Cir. 2000)
(acknowledging that the Department of Labor’s Dictionary of Occupational
Titles job descriptions should not be given a role that is exclusive of more
specific vocational expert testimony with respect to the effect of an individual
claimant’s limitations on his or her ability to perform a particular job); id. at
146–47 (“Moreover, claimants should not be permitted to scan the record for
implied or unexplained conflicts between the specific testimony of an expert
7 Compare DICOT 239.367-026, 1991 WL 67228 (Service Observer) with DICOT
295.367-026, 1991 WL 672594 (Storage-Facility Rental Clerk).
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witness and the voluminous provisions of the DOT, and then present that
conflict as reversible error . . . .”).
Plaintiff also contends that the jobs identified would require more than
occasional interaction with supervisors during the training period. 	(ECF No.
10 at 13–14). The transcript reflects that the VE clarified this issue, explaining
that while the training phase may involve more interaction, the jobs as
generally performed require only occasional interaction. 	(ECF No. 6-1 at 56–
58). The ALJ was permitted to rely on that testimony. Carey, 230 F.3d at 146
(“To the extent that there is any implied or indirect conflict between the
vocational expert’s testimony and the DOT in this case, . . . the ALJ may rely
upon the vocational expert’s testimony provided that the record reflects an
adequate basis for doing so.”).
Because the ALJ posed a hypothetical that incorporated the limitations
supported 	by 	the 	record, 	and 	relied 	on 	uncontradicted 	VE 	testimony
identifying jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy,
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s step-five determination.
IV. 	Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court RECOMMENDS Commissioner’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 12) be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 10) be 	DENIED. 	The Court
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FURTHER RECOMMENDS the Commissioner’s decision be AFFIRMED
and the case be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The Clerk shall send copies of this Memorandum and Recommendation
to the respective parties who have fourteen days from the receipt thereof to file
written objections thereto pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)
and General Order 2002-13. Failure to file written objections within the time
period mentioned shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking the factual
findings and legal conclusions on appeal.
SIGNED in Houston, Texas on February 18, 2026.
______________________________
Richard W. Bennett
United States Magistrate Judge
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