GoClips, LLC, et al. v. Along Tools, Inc., et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
GoClips LLC and Z Keepers LLC,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Along 	Tools, 	Inc., 	Rizhao 	Along
Abrasive Tools Co., Ltd. d/b/a Along
Tools Inc.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 4:25-cv-00355
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a patent infringement case. 	After obtaining entry of default,
Dkt. 17, Plaintiffs GoClips LLC and Z Keepers LLC filed a motion for default
judgment against Defendants Along Tools, Inc. (“Along Tools”) and Rizhao
Along Abrasive Tools Co., Ltd. d/b/a Along Tools Inc. (“Rizhao”). Dkt. 22. The
motion also requests a permanent injunction that would bar Defendants from
further 	infringement. 	See 	id. 	After 	carefully 	considering 	Plaintiffs’
submission, 	their 	pleading, 	the 	record, 	and 	the 	applicable 	law, 	it 	is
recommended that their request for default judgment be granted against Along
Tools but denied as to Rizhao.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
January 29, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Background
All well-pleaded facts are taken as true. U.S. Patent No. 9,828,754 (“’754
patent”), issued on November 28, 2017, describes and claims a device and
method for undermounting a sink to a hard surface. See Dkt. 1-1 (patent); Dkt.
1 at 4-5. 	Z Keepers holds the title to and interest in the ’754 patent, while
GoClips has marketing, sale, and distribution rights to the invention. See Dkt.
1 at 5. Together, Plaintiffs manufacture, market, sell, and distribute GoClips®
undermount sink anchors embodying the ’754 patent. See id. at 1, 5.
According to Plaintiffs, Along Tools and Rizhao, acting in concert, have
manufactured, marketed, and distributed “knockoff devices” called “Quick
Clips.” See id. at 8. Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ devices have the same
function and substantially the same form as their patented product. See id. at
9. Whereas Along Tools is a Texas corporation, its alleged affiliate Rizhao is a
Chinese company. See id. at 3; see also Dkt. 22 at 5.
On 	January 	28, 	2025, 	Plaintiffs 	sued 	Defendants 	for 	patent
infringement. 	See Dkt. 1 (complaint). 	Summons were issued on January 30,
2026. Dkt. 4. According to the returns of service, Defendants were served “by
personally delivering and leaving a copy” of the summons and complaint with
“Andy Zhao” at the Mandalay Bay Convention Center in Las Vegas, Nevada.
Dkts. 10, 13. Plaintiffs later elaborated that Zhao was personally served there
while attending a trade show. 	Dkt. 22 at 7; Dkt. 22-1 at 6 (declaration);
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Dkt. 22-9 (affidavits of service). According to Plaintiffs, Zhao is the “managing
agent” for both Defendants. See Dkt. 22 at 7.
Defendants did not answer or otherwise appear to defend this case. That
prompted Plaintiffs to request entry of default, which was granted. 	Dkts. 16,
17. 	Plaintiffs now move for default judgment on their patent infringement
claims, seeking a permanent injunction that would prohibit Defendants from
further infringing the ’754 patent. 	Dkt. 22 at 8-9. 	The motion is ripe for
resolution.
Legal standard
Default proceedings involve three steps: default, entry of default, and
default judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55. A default occurs “when a defendant
has failed to plead or otherwise respond to the complaint within the time
required by the Federal Rules.” 	N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 141
(5th Cir. 1996). 	“An entry of default is what the clerk enters when a plaintiff
establishes the default by affidavit or otherwise pursuant to Rule 55(a).”
Axcess Glob. Scis., LLC v. Ozcan Grp., Inc., 2024 WL 3259700, at *1 (S.D. Tex.
July 1, 2024). A default judgment can then be entered if a plaintiff applies for
such relief under Rule 55(b)(2). See id.
“A default judgment is a judgment on the merits that conclusively
establishes the defendant’s liability.” 	United States ex rel. M-CO Constr. Inc.
v. Shipco Gen., Inc., 814 F.2d 1011, 1014 (5th Cir. 1987). District courts have
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discretion to determine whether entry of default judgment is warranted. 	See
Lewis v. Lynn, 236 F.3d 766, 767 (5th Cir. 2001). But the Fifth Circuit cautions
that “[d]efault judgments are a drastic remedy, not favored by the Federal
Rules and resorted to by courts only in extreme situations.” Sun Bank of Ocala
v. Pelican Homestead & Sav. Ass’n, 874 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 1989) (citations
omitted). A plaintiff “is not entitled to a default judgment as a matter of right,”
even if the defendant “is technically in default.” 	Lewis, 236 F.3d at 767
(quoting Ganther v. Ingle, 75 F.3d 207, 212 (5th Cir. 1996)).
A request for default judgment “must be supported by well-pleaded
allegations and must have a sufficient basis in the pleadings.” 	Wooten v.
McDonald Transit Assocs., Inc., 788 F.3d 490, 498 (5th Cir. 2015) (quotation
omitted). 	“The well-pleaded allegations are assumed to be true, except those
regarding damages.” 	Axcess Glob. Scis., LLC, 2024 WL 3259700, at *2 (citing
Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Hous. Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir.
1975)). 	Any doubts about the appropriateness of a default judgment must be
resolved in favor of the defaulting party. See id.
Analysis
The appropriateness of default judgment depends on “(1) whether the
entry 	of 	default 	judgment 	is 	procedurally 	warranted; 	(2) 	whether 	the
substantive merits of the plaintiff's claim as stated in the complaint provide a
sufficient basis for default judgment; and (3) whether and what relief the
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plaintiff should receive.” Allen & Overy v. Zaziski, 2022 WL 19506, at *1 (S.D.
Tex. Jan. 3, 2022) (citing Neutral Gray Music v. Tri-City Funding & Mgmt.
LLC, 2021 WL 1521592, at *2-3 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2021)). Plaintiffs contend
that their claims meet all requirements. As concluded below, default judgment
is only appropriate as to Along Tools.
I. 	Plaintiffs have shown they properly served Along Tools but not
Rizhao.
The first determination is whether this Court has jurisdiction to grant
default 	judgment. 	See 	Sys. 	Pipe 	& 	Supply, 	Inc. 	v. 	M/V 	VIKTOR
KURNATOVSKIY, 242 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 2001) (describing this as the
court’s “affirmative duty” when addressing a request for default judgment).
For this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, it must be
shown that the defendant was properly served. See Rogers v. Hartford Life &
Acc. Ins. Co., 167 F.3d 933, 940 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Avdeef v. Royal Bank
of Scotland, P.L.C., 616 F. App’x 665, 672 (5th Cir. 2015) (characterizing
“proper service of process” as “a jurisdictional prerequisite to the entry of a
default judgment”); Guillory v. Denny’s, 2025 WL 581456, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Feb.
5, 2025) (default judgment was procedurally improper due to lack of proper
service), adopted by 2025 WL 581042 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2025).
The 	rules 	provide 	two 	avenues 	for 	serving 	business 	entities 	like
Defendants. 	One option is to serve the business under the law of the state
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where the district court is located or where service was made. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 4(h)(1)(A) (incorporating Rule 4(e)(1)). 	The second option is to serve the
summons and complaint on “an officer, a managing or general agent, or any
other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process
and—if the agent is one authorized by statute and the statute so requires—by
also mailing a copy of each to the defendant ....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(B).
Plaintiffs invoke Nevada law, the state where service was made. Under
the pertinent Nevada rule, an entity “may be served by delivering a copy of the
summons and complaint to any officer, director, partner, member, manager,
trustee, or agent identified in Rule 4.2(c)(1) that is located within this state.”
Nev. R. Civ. P. 4.2(c)(2). The reference to subpart (c)(1) incorporates an entity’s
“registered agent” or “managing or general agent” as persons through whom
an entity can be served. See Nev. R. Civ. P. 4.2(c)(1)(A)(i), (ix).
Asserting that the service requirements were met, Plaintiffs rely on the
process server’s personal service of the summons and complaint on Andy Zhao,
Defendants’ alleged managing agent, while he was attending a trade show in
Nevada. 	Dkt. 22 at 7, 12; Dkt. 22-1 at ¶¶ 19-21 (Smith Declaration); Dkt. 22-
9 (affidavits of service). 	As support, they attach the Business Organizations
Inquiry page on the Texas Secretary of State’s website, which lists Zhao as the
“registered agent” for Along Tools. See Dkt. 22-8. This is sufficient to establish
that Zhao was Along Tools’s agent for service. 	See e.g., Banks v. Albertson’s
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Deal & Delivery, 2025 WL 474182, at *2 n.2 (D. Nev. Feb. 11, 2025) (referring
to 	the 	Nevada 	Secretary 	of 	State 	website 	to 	determine 	who 	was 	the
corporation’s agent for service of process); Hockenbergs Equip. & Supply Co. v.
Team Contractors, LLC, 2019 WL 1253576, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2019)
(supporting 	materials, 	including 	screenshot 	of 	the 	company’s 	“Business
Organizations Inquiry,” showed that the individual served was “an officer or
managing agent” for defendant company). Along Tools was validly served.
But Plaintiffs have not shown what role Zhao may (or may not) have at
Rhizao. See Dkt. 22 at 12. They cite a screenshot from Rizhao’s website, which
lists “andy@along-abrasive.com” as the email address for both companies. See
Dkt. 22-1 at 6. Merely pointing to an email address that includes the common
name “Andy” does not show that the email belongs to Zhao. 	And even if that
email were Zhao’s, it would not substantiate that Zhao was Rizhao’s managing
agent or any other agent to whom delivery of the summons and complaint
would comply with Nevada and federal rules for serving Rizhao.
Arguing otherwise, Plaintiffs maintain that “[a] signed return of service
constitutes prima facie evidence of valid service, which can only be overcome
by strong and convincing evidence.” 	Dkt. 22 at 12 (citing People’s United
Equip. Fin. Corp. v. Hartmann, 447 F. App’x 522, 524 (5th Cir. 2011)). 	But
Hartmann’s observation concerned a different question, namely whether the
defendants had adequately contradicted the process server’s declaration that
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the summons and complaint were left with one of defendants at their home.
See 447 Fed. App’x at 524. 	In the default judgment context, however, a court
“need not assume service was proper” if the process server’s affidavit is
“inconsistent or unreliable.” See Roor Int’l BV v. A1 Smoke Shop Inc., 2019 WL
6330543, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 2019) (quotation omitted), adopted by 2019
WL 6330483 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 25, 2019). 	Here, there is ample reason to doubt
the process server’s assertion that Rizhao was properly served via Zhao
because 	Plaintiffs’ 	own 	evidence 	fails 	to 	substantiate 	Zhao’s 	role 	at 	the
company. 	For that reason alone, default judgment against Rizhao should be
denied. 	See Tomasso v. Peddle, 2025 WL 2577141, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 4,
2025) (failure to show that the individual who accepted service was authorized
to do so warranted denying default judgment), adopted by 2025 WL 2687865
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 19, 2025).
II. 	Default 	judgment 	against 	Along 	Tools 	is 	procedurally
warranted.
The 	next 	question 	is 	whether 	default 	judgment 	is 	procedurally
warranted against Along Tools, as the only defendant who Plaintiffs showed
was properly served. 	Six factors inform this inquiry: “[(1)] whether material
issues of fact are at issue, [(2)] whether there has been substantial prejudice,
[(3)] whether the grounds for default are clearly established, [(4)] whether the
default was caused by a good-faith mistake or excusable neglect, [(5)] the
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harshness of a default judgment, and [(6)] whether the court would think itself
obliged to set aside the default on the defendant’s motion.” 	Lindsey v. Prive
Corp., 161 F.3d 886, 893 (5th Cir. 1998) (numeration added). 	These factors
support Plaintiffs’ requested relief.
First, there are no disputed factual issues because no defendant has
responded to this suit. 	Plaintiff’s well-pleaded facts are thus taken as true.
See Nishimatsu, 515 F.2d at 1206 (“The defendant, by his default, admits the
plaintiff's well pleaded allegations of fact”).
Second, Along Tools’s lack of response has prejudiced Plaintiffs by
halting the adversarial process and thwarting their ability to obtain relief.
See Innovative Sports Mgmt., Inc. v. Paisa’s Truck LLC, 2024 WL 625316, at
*3 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2024) (finding prejudice where the defendant’s “failure
to respond threatens to bring the adversary process to a halt”) (quotation
omitted); United States v. $37,603.00 in US Currency, 2021 WL 3013337, at *3
(S.D. Tex. July 16, 2021).
Third, the grounds for default are clearly established. The Clerk of Court
properly entered default after Along Tools failed to answer or otherwise defend.
See Dkt. 17 (entry of default); Fed. R. Civ. P. 55 (failure to appear is grounds
for default). 	Such a failure to defend or appear likewise permits entry of
default judgment. See $37,603.00 in US Currency, 2021 WL 3013337, at *3.
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For the last three factors, nothing in the record indicates that Along
Tools’s default resulted from a “good faith mistake or excusable neglect.”
Neither does anything suggest that default judgment would be unduly harsh
or vulnerable to challenge later. See Sino Star Glob. Ltd. v. Shenzhen Haoqing
Tech. Co., 2025 WL 1668216, at *2 (E.D. Tex. June 12, 2025) (“Defendant’s
ample opportunity to respond after receiving notice of this action contradicts
the idea that a default judgment would be harsh.”); see also Jenkins & Gilchrist
v. Groia & Co., 542 F.3d 114, 119 (5th Cir. 2008) (considerations for setting
aside a default judgment are: “whether the default was willful, whether setting
it aside would prejudice the adversary, and whether a meritorious defense is
presented”) (quotation omitted). 	All factors indicate that default judgment
against Along Tools is procedurally appropriate.
III. 	The complaint provides a sufficient basis for Plaintiffs’ claims.
The next inquiry looks to the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims. There must be
“a 	sufficient 	basis 	in 	the 	pleadings 	for 	the 	judgment 	[to 	be] 	entered.”
Nishimatsu, 515 F.2d at 1206. 	The Court evaluates whether the factual
allegations in the complaint, if taken as true, would state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. See United Cmty. Bank, Inc. v. Loven Bf, Inc., 2020 WL
5045310, at *2 (S.D. Tex. July 22, 2020) (quoting Shaw v. Galo Equip. &
Constr., LLC, 2020 WL 3118928, at *2 (W.D. Tex. June 12, 2020)).
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This is a lower threshold than the standard for surviving a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Wooten, 788 F.3d at 499-500 (allegations need
only provide fair notice of the claim under Rule 8, particularly when the
defaulting defendant chose to forgo moving for dismissal or for a more definite
statement under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(e)). Nevertheless, the allegations must be
more than conclusory. 	See Greene v. Wellsfargo Bank, NA, 2012 WL 968076,
at *5 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 20, 2012) (denying default judgment where allegations
were “vague and conclusory”), aff’d sub nom. McCrimmon v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., 516 F. App’x 372 (5th Cir. 2013).
Plaintiffs have stated a direct infringement claim against Along Tools
under 35 U.S.C. § 271. “An actor is liable for direct infringement when, without
authority, they ‘make[ ], use[ ], offer[ ] to sell, or sell[ ] any patented invention,
within the United States or import[ ] into the United States any patented
invention during the term of the patent ....’” 	Seventh Coast Ventures LLC v.
Xiamen Daysun Indus. Co., LTD, 2025 WL 3488669, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 14,
2025) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)), adopted by 2025 WL 3487706 (S.D. Tex.
Dec. 4, 2025).
According to the complaint, Z Keepers owns “[a]ll right title and interest
in the ’754 patent,” and GoClips “has been granted … rights” to use the
patented method and device. See Dkt. 1 at ¶ 12-13. That would give Plaintiffs
a right to enforce the patent. 	In their complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Along
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Tools 	manufactured, 	exported 	into 	the 	United 	States, 	marketed, 	and
distributed “knockoff devices … which are substantially similar to the patented
GoClips® 	products” 	that 	Plaintiffs 	manufactured, 	marketed, 	sold, 	and
distributed and that “embody the claims” of the ’754 patent. Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 20, 22.
Plaintiffs also allege that Along Tools’s actions were not authorized. 	Dkt. 1
¶ 37. Taking those allegations as true, Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded that
Along Tools directly infringed their patent.
Plaintiffs also bring a willful infringement claim. See Dkt. 22 at 13; Dkt.
1 ¶ 33. 	“To establish willful patent infringement, a plaintiff must show that
the 	defendant 	‘(1) 	knew 	of 	the 	patent-in-suit; 	(2) 	after 	acquiring 	that
knowledge, it infringed the patent; and (3) in doing so, it knew, or should have
known, that its conduct amounted to infringement of the patent.’” See Seventh
Coast, 2025 WL 3488669 at *6 (quoting Eyevac, LLC v. VIP Barber Supply,
Inc., 2024 WL 1556457, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 10, 2024), adopted by 2024 WL
2064074 (W.D. Tex. May 7, 2024)).
Plaintiffs contend that they adequately pleaded willful infringement.
See Dkt. 22 at 13. Their allegation that Along Tools “has willfully, deliberately,
and intentionally infringed” the ’754 patent, however, is conclusory. 	See id.
(citing Dkt. 1 at ¶ 33). The complaint also alleges that Along Tools “is on notice
of Plaintiffs’ GoClips® products” and “continued to infringe” after it was
“placed on notice” about the ’754 patent. See Dkt. 1 at ¶ 36. But Plaintiffs do
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not explain how or when this notice was given. 	Without sufficient factual
allegations that Along Tools knew about the patent before its infringing acts,
Plaintiffs’ willful infringement claim is not colorable. Compare Sino Star, 2025
WL 1668216, at *4 (granting default judgment for willful infringement based
on plausible assertions that defendant received the plaintiff’s notice letter on
a specific date), 	with 	Eyevac, 2024 	WL 1556457, at 	*4 (denying default
judgment on willful infringement where defendants’ asserted knowledge of the
patent hinged on plaintiff’s notification of only one entity that was “no longer
a defendant in this case”); Seventh Coast, 2025 WL 3488669, at *6 (no default
judgment on willful infringement; mere reference to patent notice on plaintiff’s
products and website did not indicate that “Defendants saw [the notice] or
otherwise obtained actual knowledge” of the patent). The only claim on which
Plaintiffs are entitled to default judgment is their direct infringement claim.
IV. 	Along Tools should be enjoined from further infringement.
Lastly, the Court must determine the appropriate relief. 	“A default
judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded
in the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c). Plaintiffs seek a permanent injunction
against Along Tools enjoining further infringement of the ’754 patent. See Dkt.
22 at 16. This relief is warranted.
“A 	court 	may 	issue 	a 	permanent 	injunction 	as 	part 	of 	a 	default
judgment.” Laerdal Med. Corp. v. Basic Med. Supply, LLC, 2016 WL 6436557,
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at *2 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2016) (citing Twist and Shout Music v. Longneck
Xpress, N.P., 441 F. Supp. 2d 782, 785 (E.D. Tex. June 28, 2006)). 	In patent
suits, courts can “grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity
to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the
court deems reasonable.” 35 U.S.C. § 283. To obtain a permanent injunction,
“[a] plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury;
(2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate
to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships
between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and
(4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
First, Plaintiffs claim that Along Tools’s infringement caused them
irreparable harm by “sowing confusion in the United States” and undercutting
their sales, profits, opportunities, and goodwill. 	See Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 25, 38. 	They
also pleaded that Along Tools continues to “damage Plaintiffs by exporting into
the United States, marketing, selling and distributing knockoff products ….”
See Dkt. 1 ¶ 27. 	This is sufficient to establish that the infringement caused
irreparable harm. 	See Seventh Coast, 2025 WL 3488669, at *5 (“continuous
and 	persistent 	infringement 	of 	the 	patent” 	caused 	irreparable 	injury 	to
plaintiff’s 	“reputation 	and 	business 	goodwill”); 	Celsis 	In 	Vitro, 	Inc. 	v.
CellzDirect, Inc., 664 F.3d 922, 930 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Price erosion, loss of
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goodwill, damage to reputation, and loss of business opportunities are all valid
grounds for finding irreparable harm.”).
The continuous nature of Along Tools’s infringement also means that no
remedy 	other 	than 	a 	permanent 	injunction 	would 	be 	adequate. 	Money
damages for past infringement would not compensate Plaintiffs for future
harm. See Golden Hour Data Sys., Inc. v. emsCharts, Inc., 2014 WL 8708239,
at *10 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2014) (citing Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 551 F.3d
1323, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008)); see also Seventh Coast, 2025 WL 3488669, at *5.
The balance of hardships favors a permanent injunction. 	There is no
evidence that prohibiting Along Tools’s sale of infringing products would cause
it cognizable hardship. See i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 863
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (analysis should disregard the infringing parties’ expenses
incurred 	in 	creating 	the 	infringing 	products 	or 	consequences 	of 	its
infringement, such as redesigning the products), aff’d, 564 U.S. 91 (2011).
Lastly, issuing a permanent injunction here would serve the public
interest by “protecting patent rights and enforcing the applicable laws.” MGM
Well Servs., Inc. v. Mega Lift Sys., LLC, 505 F. Supp. 2d 359, 379-80 (S.D. Tex.
2007) (citing Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 452 F.3d 1331, 1348 (Fed.
Cir. 2006)), aff’d, 264 F. App’x 900 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 	All factors support
Plaintiffs’ request that Along Tools be permanently enjoined from further
infringing the ’754 patent.
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Recommendation
For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	it 	is 	RECOMMENDED 	that 	Plaintiffs
GoClips’s and Z Keepers LLC’s motion for default judgment (Dkt. 22) be
GRANTED 	IN 	PART 	and 	DENIED 	IN 	PART. 	Specifically, 	it 	is
RECOMMENDED 	that 	default 	judgment 	be 	entered 	against 	Defendant
Along 	Tools, 	Inc. 	finding 	it 	liable 	for 	direct 	patent 	infringement 	and
permanently enjoining Along Tools, Inc. from further infringing the ’754
patent. 	In all other respects, it is RECOMMENDED that the motion for
default judgment be DENIED.
It is ORDERED that Plaintiffs must file a proposed final judgment by
February 13, 2026 against Along Tools, Inc. that includes specific language
for the permanent injunctive relief.
The parties have fourteen days from service of this Report and
Recommendation to file written objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.
R. 	Civ. 	P. 	72(b). 	Failure 	to 	file 	timely 	objections 	will 	preclude
appellate review of factual findings and legal conclusions, except for
plain error. 	Ortiz v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep’t, 806 F.3d 822, 825
(5th Cir. 2015).
Signed on January 29, 2026, at Houston, Texas.
______________________________
Yvonne Y. Ho
United States Magistrate Judge
Texas.
_____________________________________
onneee Y	Y	Y. Ho
ited	d S	States Magistrate Judge
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