Pruneda v. Dillard et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
ROSALVA PRUNEDA,
Plaintiff,
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v. 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:24-cv-4746
CHARLES E. DILLARD,
WERNER ENTERPRISES, INC.
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending 	before 	the 	Court1 is 	Defendant 	Werner 	Enterprises, 	Inc.’s
(“Werner”) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 17). 	Based on a
review 	of 	the 	motion, 	arguments, 	and 	relevant 	law, 	the 	Court
RECOMMENDS Werner’s motion (id.) be GRANTED.
I. 	Background
This action arises out of a motor vehicle accident occurring on March 11,
2024, between a vehicle operated by Plaintiff Rosalva Pruneda (“Plaintiff”) and
a tractor-trailer owned by Werner and operated by co-Defendant Charles E.
Dillard (“Dillard”). 	(ECF No. 1-2 at 3). 	Plaintiff alleges she was stopped at a
1 On April 10, 2025, this case was referred to the Undersigned to conduct all further
proceedings, including the issuance of a Memorandum and Recommendation on any
dispositive motions. (ECF No. 14).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
March 17, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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red light at the intersection of North Victoria Hwy US 77 and North Alamo St.,
SH 183, in Refugio County, Texas, when Dillard, while traveling southbound
on North Victoria Hwy US 77, merged onto the turning lane to make a left turn
on North Alamo St. SH 183, and subsequently collided his driver’s side rear
tractor-tire with Plaintiff’s car, causing injuries. (Id.). On November 7, 2024,
Plaintiff sued Werner and Dillard (collectively, “Defendants”) in the 135th
Judicial District Court of Refugio County, Texas. 	(ECF No. 1-2 at 1). 	On
December 4, 2024, Werner removed the case to this Court based on diversity
jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1).
In Plaintiff’s original petition, she asserts claims of ordinary negligence
and negligence per se against Defendants, and advances theories of vicarious
liability 	under 	the 	respondeat 	superior doctrine, 	and 	direct 	liability 	for
negligent 	training, 	supervision, 	enforcement 	of 	safety 	policies, 	and
entrustment against Werner. (ECF No. 1-2 at 4–8).
Werner has filed a motion for partial summary judgment, seeking
summary judgment on Plaintiff’s direct liability claims. 	(ECF No. 17 at 1).
Plaintiff filed a response in opposition (ECF No. 21),2 and Werner filed a reply
2 With his response, Plaintiff has also submitted a USB of Werner’s Forward-Facing
Dash Cam Video at the time of accident, which the Court has reviewed. (See ECF No. 21-1).
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(ECF No. 22). 	For the following reasons, the Courts finds that the motion
should be granted.
II. 	Legal Standard
Motions for summary judgment are governed by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (“Rule”) 56. 	Rule 56(a) instructs the Court to grant summary
judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 	See
Nall v. BNSF Ry. Co., 917 F.3d 335, 340 (5th Cir. 2019). “Summary judgment
is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law.’” Talasek v. Nat’l Oilwell Varco, L.P., 16 F.4th
164, 168 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986)). A material fact is one that “might affect the outcome of the suit under
the governing law.” 	Bazan ex rel. v. Hidalgo Cty., 246 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir.
2001) (emphasis omitted); see Aguirre v. City of San Antonio, 995 F.3d 395, 406
(5th Cir. 2021). 	“An issue is ‘genuine’ if it is real and substantial, as opposed
to merely formal, pretended, or a sham.” 	Bazan, 246 F.3d at 489 (emphasis
omitted). 	The Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
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nonmovant. Coleman v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 533 (5th Cir.
1997).
The movant is tasked with the initial burden of informing the Court of
the basis for the motion and pointing to relevant excerpts in evidence that
demonstrate the absence of genuine issues of material fact. See Coastal Agric.
Supply, Inc. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 759 F.3d 498, 505 (5th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323). The movant may also argue that the
nonmovant failed to produce evidence in support of at least one element of a
cause of action for which he bears the burden of proof. 	See Austin v. Kroger
Tex., L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 335 (5th Cir. 2017).
If the movant satisfies the initial burden, it shifts to the nonmovant who
must produce evidence of a genuine factual dispute; he may not merely rest on
the allegations in his pleading. 	See Coastal Agric. Supply, Inc., 759 F.3d at
505. 	The Court should not accept “[u]nsubstantiated assertions, improbable
inferences, 	[or] 	unsupported 	speculation” 	as 	sufficient 	to 	carry 	the
nonmovant’s burden. 	Brown v. City of Houston, Tex., 337 F.3d 539, 541 (5th
Cir. 2003). However, where there is evidence of a genuine factual dispute, such
disputes are 	resolved 	in 	favor of the 	nonmoving 	party 	“when 	an 	actual
controversy exists, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of
contradictory facts.” 	Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston, 185 F.3d 521, 525
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(5th Cir. 1999); McCarty v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., Inc., 864 F.3d 354, 358 (5th
Cir. 2017). 	Further, a genuine issue of material fact exists “if the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Baker v. Coburn, 68
F.4th 240, 244 (5th Cir. 2023), as revised (May 19, 2023).
III. 	Discussion
Werner seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff’s direct liability claims.
(ECF No. 17). 	Werner argues these claims fail because Werner admits the
accident occurred in 	the 	course 	and scope of Dillard’s employment with
Werner, 	and, 	therefore, 	the 	direct 	liability 	claims 	against 	Werner 	are
duplicative of its liability under respondeat superior and thus barred by the
admission rule.3 (Id. at 6–9). The Court agrees.
In the original petition, Plaintiff asserts Werner is vicariously liable for
Dillard’s negligence under the theory of respondeat superior and further
asserts 	a 	direct 	cause 	of 	action 	against 	Werner 	for 	negligent 	training,
supervision, enforcement of safety policies, and entrustment. (ECF No. 1-2 at
3 The “admission rule” provides that if an employer admits or stipulates that an
employee acted within the scope of employment in committing a tort, the employer is not
subject to liability for derivative claims like negligent hiring or supervision. 	See generally
Werner Enters., Inc. v. Blake, 719 S.W.3d 525, 542 (Tex. 2025) (Young, J., concurring) (citing
McHaffie v. Bunch, 891 S.W.2d 822, 827 (Mo. 1995); Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.05)
(writing separately to discuss various analyses of admission rule), reh’g denied (Sep. 26,
2025).
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4–8). 	The substantive law of Texas, which applies in this diversity case,4
recognizes the theory of respondeat superior, under which “an employer may
be vicariously liable for the negligent acts of its employee if the employee’s
actions are within the course and scope of his employment.” 	Sanchez v.
Transportes Internacionales Tamaulipecos S.A de C.V., No. 7:16-cv-354, 2017
WL 3671089, at *2 (S.D. Tex. July 20, 2017) (citing Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 757 (Tex. 2007)). 	“Conversely, direct causes of
action asserting negligent hiring, negligent training, negligent supervision,
and/or negligent entrustment are based on the employer’s own negligent
conduct and not the employee’s negligent conduct.” 	Trinh v. Hunter, No. 20-
cv-00725, 2022 WL 6813293, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 11, 2022) (citing Williams
v. McCollister, 671 F. Supp. 2d 884, 888 (S.D. Tex. 2009)).
“The Texas Supreme Court has held that negligent hiring requires proof
that the employer was negligent in hiring the employee, the employee was
subsequently 	negligent, 	and 	both 	negligent 	acts 	proximately 	caused 	the
plaintiff’s injury.” Cornejo v. EMJB, Inc., No. 19-cv-01265, 2021 WL 4526703,
at *8 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 2021) (citing Endeavor Energy Resources, L.P. v.
Cuevas, 593 S.W.3d 307, 311 (Tex. 2019)). 	“Although the Texas Courts of
4 	See, e.g., Learmonth 	v. 	Sears, 	Roebuck 	& 	Co., 	710 	F.3d 	249, 	258 	(5th 	Cir.
2013) (noting that federal court sitting in diversity applies substantive law of forum state).
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Appeals 	have 	recognized 	claims 	of 	negligent 	supervision, 	training, 	and
retention, the Texas Supreme Court has not ruled definitively on the existence,
elements, and scope of these torts.” 	Id. (citing Sanchez, 2017 WL 3671089, at
*2 (citing Waffle House, Inc. v. Williams, 313 S.W.3d 796, 804 n.27 (Tex.
2010))). 	“Regardless, to the extent that these are viable claims under Texas
law, they are based on an employer’s direct negligence rather than its vicarious
liability.” 	Sanchez, 2017 WL 3671089, at *2 (citations omitted). 	“Texas law
‘instructs that where a plaintiff alleges ordinary (rather than gross) negligence,
and 	the 	employer 	stipulates 	to 	its 	vicarious 	liability 	for 	its 	employee’s
negligence, a respondeat superior claim and the type of direct negligence
claims asserted here are “mutually exclusive” means of recovering from the
employer.’” 	Cornejo, 2021 WL 4526703, at *8 (quoting Sanchez, 2017 WL
3671089, at *2); see also Trinh, 2022 WL 6813293, at *5 (granting summary
judgment as to direct negligence claim where employer stipulated to vicarious
liability); Kuss v. Ulmer, No. 19-cv-629, 2021 WL 1433062, at *5–6 (W.D. Tex.
Mar. 17, 2021) (same); Ochoa v. Mercer Transp. Co., No. 5:17-cv-1005, 2018 WL
7505640, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2018) (same); Fuller v. Werner Enters., Inc.,
No. 3:16-cv-2958, 2018 WL 3548886, at *3, 5 (N.D. Tex. July 24, 2018) (same).5
5 In opposing Werner’s motion for partial summary judgment, Plaintiff does not
address case law cited by Werner, which instructs that where a plaintiff alleges ordinary
(rather than gross) negligence, and the employer stipulates to its vicarious liability for its
employee’s negligence, a respondeat superior claim and the type of direct negligence claims
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Werner does not dispute that Dillard was acting in the course and scope
of his employment with Werner at the time of the accident, and, in doing so,
has stipulated to its vicarious liability for any negligent acts or omissions of
Dillard. 	(ECF No. 17 at 6–7; ECF No. 22 at 1–3). 	Accordingly, if a jury were
to conclude that Dillard was negligent and that his negligence proximately
caused 	Plaintiff’s 	injuries, 	Werner 	would 	bear 	vicarious 	liability 	for 	his
negligence regardless of any inadequacy in its hiring, training, supervision, or
retention of Dillard as an employee. 	Cornejo, 2021 WL 4526703, at *8 (citing
Ochoa, 2018 WL 7505640, at *3). 	Further, if the factfinder determines that
Dillard was not negligent, then any negligence on the part of Werner in its
hiring, supervision, training, or retention of Dillard could not have served as
the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s damages. 	Cornejo, 2021 WL 4526703, at *8
(citing Sanchez, 2017 WL 3671089, at *2). 	Thus, Defendants are entitled to
summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims against Werner for direct negligence.6
asserted here are mutually exclusive means of recovering from the employer. (ECF No. 21).
See Sanchez, 2017 WL 3671089, at *2 (noting plaintiff’s failure to address case law and
rejecting her argument that a jury could find direct negligence on the alleged bases that
employee was “unqualified” to drive an 18-wheeler and that employer was negligent in hiring
him and failing to provide him with adequate training). See also Fuller, 2018 WL 3548886,
at *2 (“[I]f the plaintiff does not allege gross negligence, and the defendant employer admits
vicarious liability, ‘the competence or incompetence of the [employee] and the care which was
exercised in his employment are immaterial issues.’” (citing Sanchez, 2017 WL 3671089, at
*2)). 6 Werner additionally argues that even if such direct liability claims could be asserted,
Plaintiff has not produced evidence to support her claims. (ECF No. 17 at 12–17). Because
Plaintiff has alleged only simple negligence (and not gross negligence) and Werner has
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IV. 	Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court RECOMMENDS Werner’s Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 17) be GRANTED. Further, the Court
RECOMMENDS 	Plaintiff’s 	direct 	liability 	claims 	against 	Werner 	be
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The Clerk shall send copies of this Memorandum and Recommendation
to the respective parties who have fourteen days from the receipt thereof to file
written objections thereto pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)
and General Order 2002-13. Failure to file written objections within the time
period mentioned shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking the factual
findings and legal conclusions on appeal.
SIGNED in Houston, Texas on March 17, 2026.
______________________________
Richard W. Bennett
United States Magistrate Judge
conceded its vicarious liability, such that Plaintiff’s direct liability claims against Werner
must be dismissed, the Court need not reach these alternative arguments.
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