Jones v. Sparrows Offshore, LLC et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
BILLY JOE JONES, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § CIVIL ACTION NO. H-24-4679
§
SPARROWS OFFSHORE, LLC and §
MC OFFSHORE PETROLEUM, LLC, §
§
Defendants. §
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Billy Joe Jones (“Plaintiff”) brought this action in the 61st
Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas, against Sparrows
Offshore, LLC (“Sparrows”) and MC Offshore Petroleum, LLC (“MCOP”)
(collectively referred to as “Defendants”), alleging that his
injuries — suffered on August 9, 2024, during an operation
involving a bridge plug on a well in Louisiana — were caused by
Defendants’ negligence.1 Defendants removed the action to this
court.2 Pending before the court are Defendant Sparrows Offshore,
LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Sparrows’ MSJ”) (Docket Entry
No. 25) and Defendant MC Offshore Petroleum, LLC’s Motion for Final
Traditional Summary Judgment and Incorporated Memorandum of Law
1Plaintiff’s Original Petition and Jury Demand (“Original
Petition”), Exhibit A-1 to Defendants’ Joint Notice of Removal
(“Notice of Removal”), Docket Entry No. 1-1, pp. 1, 4–5. All page
numbers reference the pagination imprinted at the top of the page
by the court’s Electronic Case Filing system.
2Notice of Removal, Docket Entry No. 1, p. 1.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
June 08, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
Case 4:24-cv-04679 Document 35 Filed 06/08/26 in TXSD Page 1 of 25

(“MCOP’s MSJ”) (Docket Entry No. 26). For the reasons explained
below, Sparrows’ MSJ and MCOP’s MSJ will be granted.
I. Background
On November 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed this action against
Sparrows and MCOP in the 61st Judicial District Court of
Harris County, Texas.3 On November 26, 2024, Defendants removed
the action to this court.4
Sparrows and MCOP have each filed a motion for summary
judgment.5 Plaintiff has filed a response and Defendants have
filed replies.6
A. The Platform’s Operations
MCOP owned and operated an offshore platform that was affixed
to the Outer Continental Shelf offshore Louisiana in Green Canyon
Block 184.7 An MCOP representative was in charge of the platform.8
3Original Petition, Exhibit A-1 to Notice of Removal, Docket
Entry No. 1-1, p. 1.
4Notice of Removal, Docket Entry No. 1, p. 1.
5Sparrows’ MSJ, Docket Entry No. 25; MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry
No. 26.
6Plaintiff’s Consolidated Response to Defendants’ Motions for
Summary Judgment (“Plaintiff’s Response”), Docket Entry No. 29;
Defendant MC Offshore Petroleum, LLC’s Reply to Plaintiff’s
Consolidated Response to Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment
(“MCOP’s Reply”), Docket Entry No. 30; Defendant Sparrows Offshore,
LLC’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Consolidated Response to Defendants’
Motions for Summary Judgment (“Sparrows’ Reply”), Docket Entry
No. 32.
7MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry No. 26, pp. 6–7.
8Jarred Henry Deposition (“Henry Depo”), Exhibit 3 to MCOP’s
MSJ, Docket Entry No. 26-3, p. 26 line 12 thru p. 27 line 12.
-2-
Case 4:24-cv-04679 Document 35 Filed 06/08/26 in TXSD Page 2 of 25

MCOP employed Crescent Energy (“Crescent”) and Sparrows as
independent contractors on the platform.9 The MCOP/Crescent Master
Service Contract (“MSC”) stated that (1) “the actual performance
and superintendence of all work . . . shall be by [Crescent],”10
(2) “[Crescent] shall act as and be an Independent Contractor free
and clear of any dominion or control by [MCOP] in the manner in
which said services are to be performed,”11 (3) “[Crescent] is
required to furnish or have his employees, if any, furnish
necessary tools, supplies, or materials to perform the work of
service,”12 and (4) “[Crescent] shall be solely responsible for
compliance with all rules and regulations.”13
At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff was employed
by Crescent.14
B. Plaintiff’s Injury
On August 8 and 9, 2024, Crescent and Sparrows’ employees were
plugging and abandoning various oil and gas wells that tied into
MCOP’s platform.15 Plugging and abandoning the well involved
9MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry No. 26, pp. 6–7; Sparrows’ MSJ,
Docket Entry No. 25, p. 9.
10Master Service Contract – Crescent Energy Services, LLC,
Exhibit 4 to MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry No. 26-4, p. 5 ¶ 4.1.
11Id. ¶ 4.2.
12Id. ¶ 4.2(c).
13Id. ¶ 3.1.
14Deposition of Billy Joe Jones (“Jones Depo”), Exhibit 1 to
MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry No. 26-1, p. 36 lines 13–18.
15Id. at 59 lines 4–16.
-3-
Case 4:24-cv-04679 Document 35 Filed 06/08/26 in TXSD Page 3 of 25

pulling the joints of tubing from the well, preparing the bridge
plug, and running the bridge plug down the well on a wireline to
set it and seal the well.16 The wireline, which is connected to a
crane, moves the plug up and down, while the crane moves the plug
left and right.17
The Crescent day crew spent all of August 8, 2024, pulling
tubing from the well.18 At 6:00 p.m. that day, the Crescent night
crew, which was made up of Plaintiff (rigger), George Peoples
(rigger), Larry Magee (pump operator), and Anthony Blake Sonnier
(wireline operator), took over the platform.19 While on deck, the
crew reported to Magee.20 A crane operator employed by Sparrows was
also a part of the crew.21
Before the night crew began working on the deck they were given
two separate job safety analyses (“JSAs”), one for the crane work
and one for the bridge plug setting operations.22 Jarred Henry, a
16Id.
17Id. at 102 lines 20–23; Anthony Blake Sonnier Deposition
(“Sonnier Depo”), Exhibit 5 to MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry No. 26-5,
p. 43 lines 3–13 and 22-25, p. 53 lines 8–15.
18See Jones Depo, Exhibit 1 to MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry
No. 26-1, p. 59 lines 4–6.
19Id. at 41 line 12 thru p. 43 line 14, p. 44 lines 4–12.
20Id. at 42 lines 11-18.
21Id. at 46 line 21 thru p. 47 line 4, p. 48 line 14 thru p. 49
line 10. Plaintiff alleges that the crane operator on this crew
had been operating the crane in an unsafe manner during previous
night shifts and that “[e]verybody was talking about him.” Id. at
48 lines 14–19, p. 72 lines 10–24.
22Henry Depo, Exhibit 3 to MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry No. 26-3,
p. 24 line 7 thru p. 25 line 1. It is unclear whether the crane
work JSA was Sparrows’ or Crescent’s. Id.
-4-
Case 4:24-cv-04679 Document 35 Filed 06/08/26 in TXSD Page 4 of 25

Crescent employee, conducted a pre-safety meeting for the whole
crew, including the crane operator.23 At the meeting Henry discussed
the JSAs with the crew.24 Henry also discussed the step-by-step
process for plugging the well.25 The parties dispute whether Henry
discussed previous safety issues with the crane operator during the
pre-safety meeting.26 A representative from MCOP was also present
at the meeting.27 He told the crew to “work safe” and that they
needed to “plug the well when [they were] finished pulling the
pipe.”28 However, the MCOP representative was no longer present when
the night crew began their work on the deck.29
At the start of their shift the Crescent night crew finished
pulling the remaining tubing from the well.30 The parties dispute
23Jones Depo, Exhibit 1 to MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry No. 26-1,
p. 51 line 21 thru p. 53 line 22.
24Id. at 65 line 15 thru p. 67 line 24.
25Id.
26Id. at 72 lines 10–14; Henry Depo, Exhibit 3 to MCOP’s MSJ,
Docket Entry No. 26-3, p. 59 lines 17–23; Sonnier Depo, Exhibit 5
to MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry No. 26-5, p. 42 lines 6–9.
27Jones Depo, Exhibit 1 to MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry No. 26-1,
p. 53 line 20 thru p. 54 line 11, p. 64 lines 4–25.
28Id. at 64 lines 18-25. In his deposition Plaintiff gave
conflicting statements about whether the MCOP representative spoke
to the operator of the crane. At one point Plaintiff stated that
the MCOP representative gave the crane operator step-by-step
instructions. Id. at 70 line 5 thru p. 71 line 21. However, when
asked again whether the MCOP representative said anything to the
crane operator, Plaintiff stated that he did not recall. Id. at 71
line 17 thru p. 72 line 2.
29Id. at 100 line 17 thru p. 101 line 5.
30MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry No. 26, p. 9.
-5-
Case 4:24-cv-04679 Document 35 Filed 06/08/26 in TXSD Page 5 of 25

whether the crane operator was operating the crane in an unsafe
manner while pulling the tubing from the well. Plaintiff states
that the crew had multiple discussions about the unsafe manner in
which the crane operator was operating and that Henry pulled the
crane operator to the side during the shift to discuss safety.31
However, Sonnier and Henry state that (1) they do not recall the
crane operator operating in an unsafe manner and (2) they do not
recall discussing the crane operator with other crew members or the
crane operator himself.32
Sometime after midnight on the morning of August 9, 2024, the
crew brought the bridge plug onto the deck to begin the plugging
operations.33 To connect the plug to the wireline unit (which was
connected to the crane), a retainer had to be screwed on to the top
of it.34 When the Crescent crew screwed the retainer on to the
plug, they did so in a cross-threaded fashion.35 Plaintiff saw that
the plug was cross-threaded and asked Magee to complete another
31Jones Depo, Exhibit 1 to MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry No. 26-1,
p. 48 lines 14–19, p. 78 lines 8–17.
32Henry Depo, Exhibit 3 to MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry No. 26-3,
p. 60 lines 2–20; Sonnier Depo, Exhibit 5 to MCOP’s MSJ, Docket
Entry No. 26-5, p. 41 lines 14–24.
33MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry No. 26, pp. 9-10 ¶ 7; Jones Depo,
Exhibit 1 to MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry No. 26-1, p. 65 line 13 thru
p. 66 line 5.
34Jones Depo, Exhibit 1 to MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry No. 26-1,
p. 66 lines 8–23.
35Id. at 103 line 12 thru p. 104 line 2.
-6-
Case 4:24-cv-04679 Document 35 Filed 06/08/26 in TXSD Page 6 of 25

JSA.36 However, Magee ultimately chose not to and instead
instructed the wireline operator to lift the plug.37
After the cross-threaded plug had been lifted off the deck,
the crew decided it needed to be lowered back down.38 The crew
initially decided that they would unscrew the plug from the
retainer after it was set down on the deck.39 However, while the
plug was still suspended in the air, Magee instructed crew members,
including Plaintiff, to unscrew the plug from the retainer.40 While
the crew was unscrewing the plug from the retainer, the plug fell
off, injuring Plaintiff’s hand.41
II. Summary Judgment Standard
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
36Id. at 106 lines 21–24.
37Id. at 106 line 21 thru p. 108 line 5. The parties dispute
whether the crane operator or the wireline operator lifted the
plug. Id. at 108 lines 4–5 (stating the crane operator picked up
the plug); Sonnier Depo, Exhibit 5 to MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry
No. 26-5, p. 44 lines 2–17 (wireline).
38Jones Depo, Exhibit 1 to MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry No. 26-1,
p. 108 lines 9–13.
39Id.; George Peoples’ Deposition (“Peoples Depo”), Exhibit 6
to MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry No. 26-6, p. 40 line 17 thru p. 41
line 10, p. 43 lines 15–19.
40Jones Depo, Exhibit 1 to MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry No. 26-1,
p. 107 lines 1–17; Peoples Depo, Exhibit 6 to MCOP’s MSJ, Docket
Entry No. 26-6, p. 40 lines 17 thru p. 41 line 10, p. 43
lines 15–19.
41Jones Depo, Exhibit 1 to MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry No. 26-1,
p. 107 lines 1–17, p. 114 lines 5–12.
-7-
Case 4:24-cv-04679 Document 35 Filed 06/08/26 in TXSD Page 7 of 25

P. 56(a). A party asserting that a fact is or is not genuinely
disputed must support the assertion by “citing to particular parts
of materials in the record.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). Summary
judgment is proper “after adequate time for discovery and upon
motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986).
“[T]he burden on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing’ —
that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an
absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. at
2554. “The burden shifts to the non-moving party to show, with
competent evidence, the existence of a genuine dispute of material
fact.” Miller v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 98 F.4th 211, 216 (5th
Cir. 2024). “‘The burden on the nonmoving party is not a heavy
one; the nonmoving party simply is required to show specific facts,
as opposed to general allegations, that present a genuine issue
worthy of trial.’” Swope v. Columbian Chemicals Co., 281 F.3d 185,
197 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting 10A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 2727, at 490 (3d ed. 1998)).42 But “‘[a]
mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to present a question
for the jury.’” Rex Real Estate I, L.P. v. Rex Real Estate
Exchange, Inc., 80 F.4th 607, 616 (5th Cir. 2023).
42See also 10A Wright, Miller, & Kane, Federal Practice &
Procedure § 2727.2, at 501 (4th ed. 2016) (same).
-8-
Case 4:24-cv-04679 Document 35 Filed 06/08/26 in TXSD Page 8 of 25

The court “must view all facts and draw all reasonable
inferences in [the nonmovant’s] favor.” Crawford v. Metropolitan
Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee, 129 S. Ct.
846, 851 n.2 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court
“may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.”
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2110
(2000).
III. Applicable Law
The court has jurisdiction pursuant to the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”). See 43 U.S.C. § 1349(b)(1) (granting
jurisdiction over disputes arising out of or in connection with the
exploration, development, or production of minerals on the outer
Continental Shelf). In actions brought under the OCSLA “federal
law governs . . . to the extent that there is applicable federal
law; however, if there is a gap in the federal law, the law of the
adjacent state is used as a gap-filler and becomes surrogate
federal law.” Bartholomew v. CNG Producing Co., 862 F.2d 555, 557
(5th Cir. 1989); see also 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A).
Because the platform is located in Green Canyon Block 184,
which is adjacent to the shore of Louisiana, Louisiana law
governs.43 See Snyder Oil Corp. v. Samedan Oil Corp., 208 F.3d 521,
524 (5th Cir. 2000); Strong v. B.P. Exploration & Production, Inc.,
440 F.3d 665, 668 (5th Cir. 2006).
43MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry No. 26, p. 5; Sparrows’ MSJ, Docket
Entry No. 25, p. 10 ¶ 13; Plaintiff’s Response, Docket Entry
No. 29, p. 6.
-9-
Case 4:24-cv-04679 Document 35 Filed 06/08/26 in TXSD Page 9 of 25

IV. Analysis
Plaintiff asserts claims of ordinary negligence against MCOP
and Sparrows.44
Louisiana’s ordinary negligence scheme is stated in
Article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code. To recover under
Article 2315, Plaintiff must establish: “(1) the defendant[s] had
a duty to conform [their] conduct to a specific standard (the duty
element); (2) the defendant[s’] conduct failed to conform to the
appropriate standard (the breach element); (3) the defendant[s’]
substandard conduct was a cause in fact of the plaintiff’s injuries
(the cause-in-fact element); (4) the defendant[s’] substandard
conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff’s injuries (the scope of
liability or scope of protection element); and (5) the actual
damages (the damages element).” Audler v. CBC Innovis Inc., 519
F.3d 239, 249 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Lemann v. Essen Lane
Daiquiris, 923 So.2d 627, 633 (La. 2006)).
MCOP argues that it is not liable for Plaintiff’s injuries
because it is not vicariously liable and because it did not owe
Plaintiff a duty as a matter of law.45 Sparrows argues that there
are no fact issues as to whether it owed Plaintiff a duty, whether
44Original Petition, Exhibit 1 to Notice of Removal, Docket
Entry No. 1-1, pp. 4–5; Plaintiff’s Response, Docket Entry No. 29,
p. 11.
45MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry No. 26, p. 16 ¶ 17.
-10-
Case 4:24-cv-04679 Document 35 Filed 06/08/26 in TXSD Page 10 of 25

it breached its duty, or whether it caused Plaintiff’s alleged
injuries.46
A. MCOP’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff argues that MCOP is liable for his injuries because
it is vicariously liable for the negligence of its independent
contractors.47 Plaintiff also argues that MCOP is liable for
failing to warn Plaintiff of the hazards on deck.48 MCOP argues
that it is entitled to summary judgment because of its status as a
principal and because it has no duty to warn of an open and obvious
hazard.49
1. Vicarious Liability
Under Louisiana law, “a principal . . . cannot be liable for
injuries resulting from the negligent acts of an independent
contractor . . . unless (1) the liability arises from
ultrahazardous activities performed by the contractor on behalf of
the principal or (2) the principal retains operational control over
the contractor’s acts or expressly or impliedly authorizes those
acts.” Coulter v. Texaco, Inc., 117 F.3d 909, 911–12 (5th Cir.
1997). MCOP argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because
46Sparrows’ MSJ, Docket Entry No. 25, pp. 10–16 ¶¶ 16-30.
47Original Petition, Exhibit 1 to Notice of Removal, Docket
Entry No. 1-1, pp. 4–5 ¶ 1.
48Id. at 5 ¶ 1.p.
49MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry No. 26, p. 5 ¶ II.2., pp. 23-24
¶¶ 26-28.
-11-
Case 4:24-cv-04679 Document 35 Filed 06/08/26 in TXSD Page 11 of 25

there is no fact issue as to whether it retained operational
control over the plug operations or whether the plugging operations
were ultrahazardous.50
a. Operational Control
A principal is liable for injuries resulting from the
negligent acts of an independent contractor when “the principal
retains operational control over the contractor’s acts or expressly
or impliedly authorizes those acts.” Id. at 912. “Testing for
this operational control exception first requires an examination of
whether and to what extent the right to control work has been
contractually reserved by the principal.” Id.
MCOP did not contractually reserve the right to control
Crescent’s work. The MCOP/Crescent MSC contract states that
(1) “the actual performance and superintendence of all work . . .
shall be by [Crescent],”51 (2) “[Crescent] shall act as and be an
Independent Contractor free and clear of any dominion or control by
[MCOP] in the manner in which said services are to be performed,”52
(3) “[Crescent] is required to furnish or have his employees, if
any, furnish necessary tools, supplies, or materials to perform the
work of service,”53 and (4) “[Crescent] shall be solely responsible
50Id. at 5–6.
51Master Service Contract, Exhibit 4 to MCOP’s MSJ, Docket
Entry No. 26, p. 5 ¶ 4.1.
52Id. ¶ 4.2.
53Id. ¶ 4.2(c).
-12-
Case 4:24-cv-04679 Document 35 Filed 06/08/26 in TXSD Page 12 of 25

for compliance with all rules and regulations.”54 The MSC makes
clear that MCOP did not contractually reserve the right to control
Crescent’s work. This weighs heavily in favor of finding that MCOP
did not retain operational control. See Coleman v. BP Exploration &
Production, Inc., 19 F.4th 720, 730 (5th Cir. 2021).
Moreover, MCOP did not expressly or impliedly authorize the
action taken by its independent contractors during the plugging
operations. Operational control exists when the principal retains
such a “right of supervision that the contractor is not entirely
free to do the work in his own way.” LeJeune v. Shell Oil Co., 950
F.2d 267, 270 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting Landry v. Huthnance Drilling
Co., 889 F.2d 1469, 1471 (5th Cir. 1989)). “[A]bsent an express or
implied order to the contractor to engage in an unsafe work
practice leading to an injury, a principal . . . cannot be liable
under the operational control exception.” Coulter, 117 F.3d at
912.
The record establishes that MCOP did not instruct Crescent how
to complete the plug operations. The JSA regarding the plug
operations was created by Sparrows.55 Jarred Henry, a Crescent
employee, discussed the step-by-step process for plugging the well
with the crew at the pre-safety meeting.56 Crescent employees
54Id. ¶ 3.1.
55Henry Depo, Exhibit 3 to MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry No. 26-3,
p. 24 lines 7–25.
56Jones Depo, Exhibit 1 to MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry No. 26-1,
p. 53 lines 14-22, p. 59 lines 17-21, p. 64 lines 4-11.
-13-
Case 4:24-cv-04679 Document 35 Filed 06/08/26 in TXSD Page 13 of 25

screwed the retainer on to the plug.57 Magee, a Crescent employee,
instructed the crew to lift the cross-threaded plug in the air.58
He also instructed the crew to unscrew the plug from the retainer
while it was still suspended in the air.59 There is no evidence
that MCOP gave instructions about the plugging operations. In
fact, nobody from MCOP was present on the deck while the plugging
operations were taking place.60
Plaintiff argues that there is a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether MCOP had operational control over the plugging
operations because MCOP (1) had a person in charge on the platform,
(2) was present at the JSA meeting, and (3) instructed the Crescent
crew to work safely and to plug the well when they were finished
pulling the pipe.61 But these facts to do not create a fact issue
57Id. at 103 line 12 thru p. 104 line 2.
58Id. at 107 lines 1–17, p. 108 lines 1–18; Peoples Depo,
Exhibit 6 to MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry No. 26-6, p. 40 line 17 thru
p. 41 line 10, p. 43 lines 15–19.
59Jones Depo, Exhibit 1 to MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry No. 26-1,
p. 107 lines 1–18, p. 108 lines 1–18; Peoples Depo, Exhibit 6 to
MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry No. 26-6, p. 40 line 17 thru p. 41
line 10, p. 43 lines 6–19.
60Jones Depo, Exhibit 1 to MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry No. 26-1,
p. 100 line 17 thru p. 101 line 5.
61Plaintiff’s Response, Docket Entry No. 29, pp. 8–10.
Plaintiff also argues that an MCOP representative “told the crane
operator everything that needed to be done.” Id. at 9; Jones Depo,
Exhibit 1 to MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry No. 26-1, p. 64 lines 18-25.
However, Plaintiff misrepresents his own testimony. When asked
whether the MCOP representative gave specific instructions to the
crane operator, Plaintiff stated that he did not recall. Jones
Depo, Exhibit 1 to MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry No. 26-1, p. 71 line 16
thru p. 72 line 2.
-14-
Case 4:24-cv-04679 Document 35 Filed 06/08/26 in TXSD Page 14 of 25

as to whether MCOP controlled the step-by-step process of the plug
operation. See Coleman, 19 F.4th at 730–31 (holding that the
principal did not have a duty as a matter of law despite the fact
that the principal gave work priorities, required compliance with
their safety rules, determined the equipment to be used and issued,
and influenced when to begin the work); Parkman v. W&T Offshore,
Inc., 673 F.Supp.3d 811, 821 (M.D. La. 2023) (citing Coleman, 19
F.4th at 731) (“[A]n operator’s approval of a JSA does not
ordinarily subject it to operational control liability.”).
The court concludes that there is no evidence that MCOP
retained operational control over the plugging operations.
b. Ultrahazardous Condition
Plaintiff argues that the plugging operations were
ultrahazardous because they included “a dangerous crane operator.”62
An activity is ultrahazardous when it “‘can cause injury . . .
even when conducted with the greatest prudence and care.’”
62Plaintiff’s Response, Docket Entry No. 29, pp. 7–8. Relying
on Dobbs v. Gulf Oil Co., 759 F.2d 1213, 1219 (5th Cir. 1985),
Plaintiff also argues that evidence of a defective crane precludes
summary judgment. In Dobbs a plaintiff slipped and fell on
hydraulic fluid that had leaked from a crane. Id. at 1215. The
plaintiff filed suit against Gulf, the owner of the platform, under
a strict liability theory. Id. After a jury found for the
plaintiff, Gulf appealed, arguing that the evidence on the issue of
a defect in the crane was insufficient to present a jury question.
Id. at 1215, 1219. The Fifth Circuit held that the testimony on
the condition of the crane was sufficient to present a jury
question on the issue of a defect in the crane. Id. at 1219.
Because Dobbs deals with whether a crane was defective under a
strict liability theory, it has no bearing on whether the plugging
operations were an ultrahazardous condition or whether summary
judgment is appropriate.
-15-
Case 4:24-cv-04679 Document 35 Filed 06/08/26 in TXSD Page 15 of 25

Ainsworth v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 829 F.2d 548, 550 (5th Cir.
1987) (quoting Kent v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 418 So.2d 493,
498 (La. 1982)). In other words, “[t]he ‘ultrahazardous’ label is
thus limited to those activities which present a ‘risk of harm that
cannot be eliminated through the exercise of due care.’” Triplette
v. Exxon Corp., 554 So.2d 1361, 1363 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989)
(quoting O’Neal v. International Paper Co., 715 F.2d 199, 202 (5th
Cir. 1983)). Examples include “pile driving, storage of toxic gas,
blasting with explosives, and crop dusting” with airplanes.
Ainsworth, 829 F.2d at 549.
Although Plaintiff argues that the plugging operations were
conducted negligently because of the alleged unsafe practices of
the crane operator, Plaintiff does not cite to any evidence that
establishes that the plugging operations, even when conducted with
the greatest prudence and care, could cause injury. Instead, the
record establishes that Plaintiff’s injury could have been avoided
had he followed basic safety practice — “i.e, not working under a
suspended load known to be defectively made up and therefore in
danger of breaking free and falling.”63 Ainsworth, 829 F.2d at 550.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to raise an issue of fact
that the plugging operations were ultrahazardous. See Triplette,
554 So.2d at 1363 (holding that although the plaintiff improperly
was using his safety belt while repairing cooling towers, because
the activity “is routinely performed at great heights (in this case
63MCOP’s Reply, Docket Entry No. 30, pp. 3-4.
-16-
Case 4:24-cv-04679 Document 35 Filed 06/08/26 in TXSD Page 16 of 25

fifty feet) with the proper safety equipment and due care, th[e]
activity is one which can be performed safely without great risk of
injury”).
Because there is no fact issue as to whether MCOP retained
operational control over the plugging operations or whether the
plugging operations were ultrahazardous, Plaintiff cannot establish
that MCOP is vicariously liable for his injuries.
2. Ordinary Negligence
MCOP argues that Plaintiff cannot establish that MCOP is
liable for his injuries because the cross-threaded plug was an open
and obvious hazard.64 Plaintiff argues that the court cannot grant
summary judgment even if it or a jury finds that the cross-threaded
plug was an open and obvious hazard because such a finding does not
bar recovery.65
Under Louisiana law, “[a] landowner owes a plaintiff a duty to
discover any unreasonably dangerous condition and to either correct
the condition or warn of its existence.” Bross v. Chevron U.S.A.,
64MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry No. 26, pp. 23–24 ¶¶ 26-28.
65Plaintiff’s Response, Docket Entry No. 29, p. 10. Plaintiff
relies on Farrell v. Circle K Stores, Inc., 359 So.3d 467 (La. 2023)
and Bearden v. K & A of Monroe, LLC, 399 So.3d 515 (La. Ct. App. 2d
Cir. 2024), to argue that summary judgment is precluded here. Id.
However, Plaintiff’s reliance on these cases is misplaced. Farrell
and Bearden do not preclude summary judgment. Farrell reversed the
district court’s decision to deny summary judgment and rendered
judgment in favor of the defendant under an open and obvious theory,
and Bearden affirmed the lower court’s decision to grant summary
judgment in favor of the defendants under an open and obvious
theory. Farrell, 359 So.3d at 479-80; Bearden, 399 So.3d at 525.
-17-
Case 4:24-cv-04679 Document 35 Filed 06/08/26 in TXSD Page 17 of 25

Inc., 649 F.Supp.2d 517, 522 (W.D. La. 2009). However, a defendant
only has a duty to protect against defects that are unreasonably
dangerous, not those that are open and obvious. Simon v.
CenturyLink, Inc., 340 So.3d 88, 91 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2021).
Louisiana courts have developed a “risk-utility balancing test to
determine whether a condition is unreasonably dangerous.” Id.
“The four pertinent factors to be considered in the risk-utility
balancing test are: (1) the utility of the complained-of condition;
(2) the likelihood and magnitude of harm, including the obviousness
and apparentness of the condition; (3) the cost of preventing the
harm; and (4) the nature of the plaintiff’s activities in terms of
social utility or whether the activities are dangerous by nature.”
Id. (citing Bufkin v. Felipe’s Louisiana, LLC, 171 So.3d 851, 856
(La. 2014)).66 “‘In order for a hazard to be considered open and
obvious [under the second prong], the Louisiana Supreme Court has
consistently stated that the hazard should be one that is open and
obvious to all, ie., everyone who may potentially encounter it.’”
George v. ABC Insurance Company, 351 So.3d 447, 454 (La. Ct. App.
4th Cir. 2022) (citing Scarberry v. Entergy Corp., 136 So.3d 194,
204 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2014)). “In deciding a motion for
66Because the record is void of evidence regarding the utility
of the complained of condition, the cost of preventing the harm,
and the nature of plaintiff’s activities in terms of social
utility, the court finds that these factors do not weigh heavily as
a consideration in determining whether the cross-threaded plug was
an unreasonably dangerous condition. See Farrell, 359 So.3d at
474–79.
-18-
Case 4:24-cv-04679 Document 35 Filed 06/08/26 in TXSD Page 18 of 25

summary judgment under Louisiana law, ‘the court can decide that a
condition does not present an unreasonable risk of harm, as a
matter of law.’” Mayet v. Energy XXI Gigs Services, L.L.C., CIVIL
ACTION CASE NO. 17-9568, 2019 WL 4415274, at *7 (E.D. La. Sept. 16,
2019) (quoting Martin v. Boyd Racing, L.L.C., 681 F. App’x 409, 412
(5th Cir. 2017)) (emphasis in original).
The evidence establishes that all of the crew who encountered
the cross-threaded plug understood that it was dangerous. Everyone
could tell that the plug was cross threaded just by looking at it.
Both Plaintiff and Sonnier stated that they knew that the plug was
cross-threaded upon sight.67 Moreover, the evidence establishes
that the entire crew knew that the cross-threaded plug was
dangerous because it could fall at anytime. Plaintiff admits this
in his deposition, and according to Sonnier’s deposition, Sonnier
even attempted to use his stop-work authority when he saw that the
plug was cross-threaded because of the dangers it posed to the crew
who were standing nearby.68 The evidence clearly establishes that
the entire deck crew could see that the plug was cross-threaded
just by looking at it and that they knew the cross-threaded plug
was dangerous because it could fall at anytime.
67Jones Depo, Exhibit 1 to MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry No. 26-1,
p. 106 lines 16-21, p. 185 lines 8–19; Sonnier Depo, Exhibit 5 to
MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry No. 26-5, p. 75 lines 7–12, p. 78
lines 4–16.
68Id.
-19-
Case 4:24-cv-04679 Document 35 Filed 06/08/26 in TXSD Page 19 of 25

Plaintiff offers no evidence that the cross-threaded plug was
not an open and obvious hazard. Instead, Plaintiff argues that the
court cannot grant summary judgment solely on a finding that a
hazard is open and obvious.69 However, the Louisiana Supreme Court
has made clear that there is no limit on summary judgment in cases
involving issues of whether a hazard is open and obvious. Edmison
v. Caesars Entertainment Company, Inc., 177 F.Supp.3d 972, 978
(E.D. La. 2016) (discussing Allen v. Lockwood, 156 So.3d 650, 651
(La. 2015)).
Because MCOP has produced evidence that the cross-threaded
plug was an open and obvious hazard and because Plaintiff has
failed to produce any evidence that rebuts MCOP’s evidence, the
court finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the cross-threaded plug was an open and obvious hazard.
See Allen, 156 So.3d at 653 (holding that summary judgment is
appropriate in cases involving whether a hazard is open and obvious
when the plaintiff fails to offer rebuttal evidence). Accordingly,
Plaintiff cannot establish that MCOP is liable for his injuries.
B. Sparrows’ Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff argues that Sparrows is liable for his injuries
because its crane operator handled the suspended plug in an unsafe
manner and failed to stop the operation once it became unsafe.70
69Plaintiff’s Response, Docket Entry No. 29, p. 10.
70Id. at 13.
-20-
Case 4:24-cv-04679 Document 35 Filed 06/08/26 in TXSD Page 20 of 25

Sparrows argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because
there are no fact issues as to whether it owed a duty to Plaintiff,
breached its duty, or caused Plaintiff’s alleged injuries.71
Sparrows argues that it did not owe Plaintiff a duty because
it did not employ, share a contract, or actually supervise
Plaintiff and because Crescent, not Sparrows, instructed Plaintiff
to unscrew the plug while it was suspended in the air.72 Plaintiff
argues that Sparrows owes him a duty of ordinary care.73
An independent contractor does not owe a special duty to
protect the employee of another independent contractor. McCarroll
v. Wood Group Management Services, Inc., 561 F. App’x 407, 410 (5th
Cir. 2014) (per curiam). Instead, “[o]ne independent contractor
owes another independent contractor at least ‘the duty to refrain
from gross, willful or wanton negligence, and at the most the duty
to refrain from creating an unreasonable risk of harm or a
hazardous condition.’” Id. (citing Lafont v. Chevron, U.S.A., 593
So.2d 416, 420 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991)). The Fifth Circuit “has
also recognized that, in determining whether one independent
contractor owes a duty to another independent contractor’s employee
[under Louisiana law], relevant considerations are whether one
independent contractor employs, shares a contract with, or
71Sparrows’ MSJ, Docket Entry No. 25, pp. 10–16.
72Id. at 12–14 ¶¶ 20–23.
73Plaintiff’s Response, Docket Entry No. 29, pp. 12-13.
-21-
Case 4:24-cv-04679 Document 35 Filed 06/08/26 in TXSD Page 21 of 25

supervises the other’s employee.” Fornah v. Schlumberger
Technology Corporation, 737 F. App’x 677, 681 (5th Cir. 2018) (per
curiam).
Crescent and Sparrows were both independent contractors on the
project.74 There is no evidence that Sparrows employed or had a
contractual agreement with Plaintiff or Crescent. MCOP hired
Sparrows as an independent contractor to perform crane operations;75
it was not Sparrows’ responsibility to supervise the employees of
the co-independent contractor, Crescent.
Moreover, an independent contractor does not have “a duty to
keep other company’s employees from committing unsafe work
practices.” Skinner v. Schlumberger Technology Corp., Civil Action
No. 13-03146, 2015 WL 4253986, at *8 (W.D. La. July 13, 2015)
(citing Joyner v. Ensco Offshore Co., No. CIV. A. 99-3754, 2001
WL 118599, at *4 (E.D. La. Feb. 9, 2001)). In Skinner a crane
operator employed by an independent contractor was reeling in
hydraulic power hoses. 2015 WL 4253986, at *1. During the reeling
process a hose was caught between the gangway and the platform.
Id. However, the crane operator continued to reel the hoses in.
Id. The plaintiff, who was employed by a different independent
contractor, attempted to tell the crane operator to stop. Id.
When the crane operator failed to stop the plaintiff pushed the
74Id. at 5.
75MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry No. 26, p. 9.
-22-
Case 4:24-cv-04679 Document 35 Filed 06/08/26 in TXSD Page 22 of 25

hose over the handrail to dislodge it despite knowing it was unsafe
to do so. Id. at *1, *8. The plaintiff filed suit against the
crane operator’s employer, arguing that the crane operator was
negligent for operating the crane unsafely and for failing to stop
the reeling process. Id. at *7. The court held that the crane
operator’s employer had no duty that “encompassed the risk that
[the plaintiff] would be injured performing an action that [the
plaintiff] himself, an experienced tubing worker, chose to
perform.” Id. at *8. In reaching its decision, the court noted
that (1) the crane operator’s employer had not “assume[d] any role
of authority or supervision over [the plaintiff] . . . when he was
injured,” (2) the plaintiff is the one who made the decision to
push the hose off the gangway, and (3) the plaintiff had
specialized knowledge of the hose. Id. The Fifth Circuit affirmed
the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of
the crane operator’s employer. Skinner v. Schlumberger Technology
Corp., 655 F. App’x 188, 193 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (“We
agree that any duty [the crane operator’s employer] may have owed
to [the plaintiff] did not encompass the risk that [the plaintiff]
would injure himself by performing an admittedly unsafe action that
he voluntarily undertook without any direction to do so from [the
crane operator’s employer]. Thus, summary judgment was
appropriate.”).
Sparrows’ duty does not encompass the risk that Plaintiff
would injure himself by performing an admittedly unsafe action that
-23-
Case 4:24-cv-04679 Document 35 Filed 06/08/26 in TXSD Page 23 of 25

he voluntarily undertook without any direction to do so from
Sparrows. Like the independent contractor in Skinner, Sparrows did
not have authority over Plaintiff. At all relevant times to this
suit, Crescent personnel instructed the crew on the step-by-step
process for plugging the well.76 Like the independent contractor
in Skinner, Sparrows did not instruct Plaintiff or any of the
Crescent crew to unscrew the cross-threaded plug while it was
suspended in the air. It was Magee, a Crescent employee, who made
the decision to do so.77 And like the plaintiff in Skinner, despite
having years of experience plugging and abandoning wells, Plaintiff
here chose to follow Magee’s instructions to unscrew the cross-
threaded plug while it was suspended in the air.78 Plaintiff made
that choice despite understanding that the cross-threaded plug
could have fallen at any moment solely because it was cross-
threaded79 and despite having stop-work authority.80
76Jones Depo, Exhibit 1 to MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry No. 26-1,
p. 65 line 15 thru p. 67 line 21, p. 106 line 21 thru p. 108
line 5; Peoples Depo, Exhibit 6 to MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry
No. 26-6, p. 40 lines 17 thru p. 41 line 10, p. 43 lines 15–19.
77Jones Depo, Exhibit 1 to MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry No. 26-1,
p. 106 line 21 thru p. 108 line 5; Peoples Depo, Exhibit 6 to
MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry No. 26-6, p. 40 line 17 thru p. 41
line 10, p. 43 lines 6–19.
78Jones Depo, Exhibit 1 to MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry No. 26-1,
p. 107 lines 8–17, p. 185 lines 8–19, p. 201 line 23 thru p. 202
line 3; MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry No. 26, p. 23 ¶ 26.
79Jones Depo, Exhibit 1 to MCOP’s MSJ, Docket Entry No. 26-1,
p. 185 lines 8–19. Plaintiff’s testimony establishes that even if
(continued...)
-24-
Case 4:24-cv-04679 Document 35 Filed 06/08/26 in TXSD Page 24 of 25

Because Sparrows did not employ, share a contract with, or
supervise Plaintiff and because Plaintiff chose to place his hands
under a suspended load, Plaintiff cannot establish that Sparrows is
liable for his injuries.
V. Conclusion and Order
For the reasons explained above, Plaintiff's negligence and
gross negligence claims against MCOP and Sparrows fail as a matter
of law. Accordingly, Defendant MC Offshore Petroleum, LLC's Motion
for Final Traditional Summary Judgment and Incorporated Memorandum
of Law (Docket Entry No. 26) and Defendant Sparrows Offshore, LLC's
Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry No. 25) are GRANTED.
The court will enter a final judgment in favor of Defendants.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this the 8th day of June, 2026.
SIM LAKE
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
79Jones Depo, Exhibit 1 to MCOP's MSJ, Docket Entry No. 26-1,
p. 185 lines 8-19. Plaintiff's testimony establishes that even if
the crane was being operated in an unsafe manner, the cross
threaded plug was at risk of falling at any given moment solely
because it was cross-threaded. Id.
80 Id. at 202 lines 18-25.
-25-
Case 4:24-cv-04679 Document 35 Filed 06/08/26 in TXSD Page 25 of 25