Browning v. O'Malley, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
William B.,1
Plaintiff,
v.
Frank J. Bisignano,2
Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration,
Defendant.
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Civil Action H-24-4454
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
William 	B. 	appeals 	the 	Social 	Security 	Administration
Commissioner’s final decision denying his application for Social
Security 	benefits. 	ECF 	No. 	1. 	Pending 	before 	the 	court 	are
William’s 	Motion 	for 	Summary 	Judgment, 	ECF 	No. 12; 	and
the 	Commissioner’s 	Cross 	Motion 	for 	Summary 	Judgment,
ECF No. 14. The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the
undersigned magistrate judge for all purposes, including entry of
final judgment. ECF Nos. 8, 9. William’s Motion for Summary
Judgment is DENIED. The Commissioner’s Motion for Summary
Judgment is GRANTED. The Commissioner’s final decision is
AFFIRMED.
1. Procedural Posture
On 	January 	22, 	2021, 	William 	filed 	an 	application 	for
disability insurance benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Social
1 In light of guidance received from the Committee on Court Administration and Case
Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States, which states that there
are significant privacy concerns in social security cases, the court refers to the Plaintiff
only by their first name and last initial.
2 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Frank J. Bisignano is substituted
as the defendant in this suit.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
March 18, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Security Act. Tr. 318–20. William alleged that his disability began
on July 30, 2019, due to major depressive disorder (MDD), aortic
aneurysm, pre-diabetes, and problems with his lower back and
feet. Tr. 14, 89, 374.
The SSA denied William’s application at the initial level on
July 20, 2021, and upon reconsideration on August 23, 2022.
Tr. 120–23, 	126–29. 	Administrative 	Law 	Judge 	(ALJ) 	Helen
Strong held a hearing on William’s claim by phone on January 19,
2024. Tr. 44–87. William and his counsel were present for the
hearing, along with two medical experts (MEs), and a vocational
expert (VE). Tr. 44–45.
During 	the 	hearing, 	as 	an 	initial 	matter, 	the 	parties
discussed two procedural issues. First, William’s attorney moved
to amend the onset date of disability and to close the period of
disability. Tr. 51. William’s attorney requested to start the period
of disability on May 13, 2020, and end it on January 15, 2022, when
William returned to full-time employment. Id. Second, the ALJ
acknowledged that William had filed a pre-hearing brief. Tr. 52;
see also Prehearing Memorandum, Tr. 461–66. The ALJ explained
that due to time constraints, she would review the brief after the
hearing, with the requested closed period in mind. Tr. 52.
The parties then discussed William’s physical and mental
impairments, as well as his education and work history. As to
education, William testified that he completed four or more years
of college. Tr. 50. As to his impairments, William testified that he
was first diagnosed with aortic valve deterioration in April or May
of 2019. Tr. 54. William’s attorney described William’s medical
condition during the closed period, which included heart and back
problems, a seizure, and infections. Tr. 52–53. She explained that
in 	January 	2022, 	after 	treatment 	for 	his 	medical 	conditions,
William was able to return to work. Tr. 53.
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Because William did not allege any work-related mental
impairments, 	the 	court 	focuses 	its 	discussion 	on 	his 	physical
impairments. See Tr. 65. An ME, Dr. Sanjay Krishnan, testified
about William’s physical impairments based upon his review of
William’s medical record and testimony. Tr. 53–61. Dr. Krishnan
stated that William had severe impairments of aortic stenosis,
status 	post-valve 	replacement, 	aortic 	aneurysm, 	hypertension,
hypolipidemia, and coronary artery disease. Tr. 55. He stated that
William had non-severe impairments of obstructive sleep apnea,
degenerative 	disc 	disease 	of 	the 	lumbar 	spine, 	heel 	ulcers,
and a history of left shoulder rotator cuff surgery. Tr. 55–56.
Dr. Krishnan testified that he considered Listings 4.1, 4.02, 4.04,
and 3.14, and that he did not believe William met or equaled a
Listing. Tr. 57. Dr. Krishnan also testified that William’s medical
history supported a sedentary level of exertion during the closed
period because William experienced heart-related symptoms with
only minimal exertion. Tr. 57–58.
A Vocational Expert (VE) testified about William’s past
work. Tr. 67 (citing William’s Work History Report, Tr. 391–99).
As 	classified 	by 	the 	Dictionary 	of 	Occupational 	Titles 	(DOT),
William’s job as a field supervisor in oil-and-well services is a
skilled (SVP 7), light exertion position. Tr. 67. However, the VE
testified that William performed the job at a medium-exertional
level. Id. William’s prior job as a marketing manager in oil field
services is a skilled (SVP 8) position, generally performed at the
sedentary level, but performed by William at the light exertional
level. Tr. 68. His prior job as a regional manager in oil field services
is a skilled (SVP 8) position, generally performed at the sedentary
level, but performed by William at the medium exertional level. Id.
The VE classified William’s position as a global technical advisor
under the closest DOT title to that occupation, which was as a
consultant. Id. The consultant position is skilled (SVP 6), and it is
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generally 	performed 	at 	the 	light 	exertional 	level, 	but 	it 	was
performed by William at the medium exertional level. Tr. 69.
The ALJ asked the VE a series of hypothetical questions, in
which the VE was to consider a hypothetical claimant, described
as a person of William’s same age, education, and work experience.
The first hypothetical is relevant here. In it, the ALJ instructed
the 	VE 	to 	consider 	a 	hypothetical 	claimant, 	as 	previously
described, who was limited to the sedentary 	exertional 	level.
Tr. 69–70. That is, limited to frequently lifting, carrying, pushing,
or pulling less than ten pounds; occasionally lifting, carrying,
pushing, or pulling ten pounds; standing or walking, with normal
breaks, for about two hours of an eight-hour workday; sitting, with
normal breaks, for about six hours of an eight-hour workday;
occasionally 	climbing 	ramps 	and 	stairs, 	balancing, 	stooping,
kneeling, 	crouching, or crawling; 	and 	never 	climbing 	ladders,
ropes, or scaffolds. Id. The VE testified that such a hypothetical
claimant 	would 	be 	able 	to 	perform 	William’s 	past 	work 	as
marketing manager and as a regional manager, as those jobs are
customarily performed and described in the DOT (as sedentary
positions). Tr. 70. However, the VE stated that William would not
be able to perform those roles as he had actually performed them
(as light exertion positions). Id. The VE testified that William does
not 	have 	any 	skills 	that 	are 	transferrable 	to 	other 	skilled,
sedentary occupations under the standard set in Social Security
Ruling (SSR) 82-41. Tr. 71–72.
On cross-examination, William’s lawyer questioned the VE
about whether the DOT’s “generic job description[s]” accurately
reflected 	William’s 	past 	work 	in 	the 	oil-and-gas 	industry.
Tr. 79–80. The VE testified that both positions, as described in the
DOT, are the closest match to the job responsibilities that William
described performing. Id. The VE also clarified that he testified to
how the position is customarily performed, as well as how William
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actually performed it. Tr. 81–82. Thus, according to the VE, while
William performed his work as a marketing manager and regional
manager at the light exertional level, both positions are classified
as sedentary because the DOT “classifies work at the exertional
level where it is most often performed.” Tr. 82.
After 	William’s 	attorney 	cross-examined 	the 	VE, 	she
questioned William about the nature of his work as a marketing
manager and regional manager. Tr. 83–84. William testified that
as a marketing manager, he stayed in the office “the majority of
the time,” but he also had to assist with setting up for events,
which required him to lift and climb ladders. Tr. 83. William
testified that as a regional manager, he did “everything as far as
operations,” 	which 	included 	travel 	and 	field 	visits. 	Tr. 84.
William’s attorney argued that William’s jobs were “really very
industry specific” and were “really more of a composite job.” Id.
Under agency policy, a “composite job” is one that has “ha[s]
significant elements of two or more occupations and, as such, ha[s]
no counterpart in the DOT.” SSA, Program Operational Manual
System (POMS) DI 25005.020(B).
The ALJ asked the VE whether his testimony had changed
based on William’s testimony and his attorney’s arguments. Tr. 85.
The VE responded, “my role is to explain to you how the claimant
performed his or her occupation and then to tell you based on the
information 	in 	the 	[DOT] 	how 	it 	is 	most 	often 	customarily
performed, and that is what I did.” Id. William’s attorney stated
she had no further questions, but she made a “general objection,”
that William “would not be able to perform a regular marketing
job or a regional sales job and that he had no experience doing
either of those.” Id. After William’s attorney reiterated that she did
not have any more questions, the ALJ closed the hearing and
record. Tr. 86.
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On 	February 	19, 	2024, 	William’s 	counsel 	submitted 	a
twenty-four-page document, entitled “Post-Hearing Memorandum
of Law and Objections to the Vocational Witness’ Testimony,” to
the ALJ. Tr. 475–98. In the brief, William objected to the VE’s
classification of his past work as a marketing manager. Tr. 475–77.
William has acknowledged, in his briefing before this court, “that
many of the duties that [he] described in the work history report
align with the DOT’s description of the [marketing manager]
occupation.” ECF No. 12-1 at 13. However, William argued in his
post-hearing 	brief 	to 	the 	ALJ 	that 	the 	VE’s 	classification 	of
William’s past work “fail[ed] to take into account all the entire
duties the claimant reported to performing at these jobs including
the lifting [weight] duties he had . . . .” Tr. 475. Because of this,
William argued that the VE should have classified the role as a
composite job. Id. He attached to his brief a report completed by a
vocational counselor, Carrie Benchich. Tr. 495–98. Ms. Benchich
classified William’s past work as a “composite job” comprised of
two DOT occupations—marketing manager and clerk. Tr. 497.
The ALJ issued her decision on March 25, 2024. Tr. 11. She
granted William’s request to amend the period of disability to a
closed period—from May 13, 2020, to January 15, 2022. Tr. 14.
The ALJ found that William was not disabled during the closed
period of disability. Tr. 11, 14. The ALJ did not directly address,
nor 	rule 	on, 	William’s 	post-hearing 	objections 	and 	rebuttal
evidence. 	However, 	she 	did 	acknowledge 	the 	existence 	of 	the
document by including it as “Representative Correspondence” in
the decision’s exhibit list. Tr. 30.
William requested review of the ALJ’s decision, which the
Appeals Council denied on September 17, 2024. Tr. 1. William
timely filed a complaint in federal court on November 13, 2024.
ECF No. 1.
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2. Legal Standards
The 	Social 	Security 	Act 	provides 	disability 	insurance
benefits to individuals with physical and mental disabilities who
have 	contributed 	to 	the 	program 	and 	provides 	supplemental
income to individuals with physical and mental disabilities who
have limited income and resources. See 42 U.S.C. § 423. Disability
is defined as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity 	by 	reason 	of 	any 	medically 	determinable 	physical 	or
mental impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last
for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C.
§§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A).
The Commissioner uses a sequential, five-step approach to
determine whether the claimant is disabled. Schofield v. Saul,
950 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 2020); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The
claimant bears the burden of proof on the first four steps, and the
Commissioner bears the burden on the fifth step. Keel v. Saul,
986 F.3d 551, 555 (5th Cir. 2021). A finding that the claimant is
disabled or not disabled at any point in the five-step review
terminates the analysis. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).
This court’s review of the ALJ’s disability determination is
“highly 	deferential.” 	Garcia 	v. 	Berryhill, 	880 	F.3d 	700, 	704
(5th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted). The court “ask[s] only whether
substantial evidence supports the decision and whether the correct
legal standards were employed.” Id. “A decision is supported by
substantial evidence if ‘credible evidentiary choices or medical
findings support the decision.’” Salmond v. Berryhill, 892 F.3d 812,
817 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Whitehead v. Colvin, 820 F.3d 776, 779
(5th 	Cir. 	2016)). 	“Substantial 	evidence 	is 	‘more 	than 	a 	mere
scintilla but less than a preponderance.’” Id. (quoting Williams v.
Admin. Rev. Bd., 376 F.3d 471, 476 (5th Cir. 2004)). “It means—
and means only—‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Biestek v.
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Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. of
N.Y. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The reviewing court must
scrutinize the record to determine whether substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s decision, but it may not reweigh the evidence
or substitute its judgment. Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 457, 461
(5th Cir. 2005).
3. Analysis
A. Step One
At 	step 	one, 	the 	ALJ 	must 	determine 	whether 	the
claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i). 	A 	person 	engaged 	in 	substantial 	gainful
activity is not disabled, regardless of their medical condition, age,
education, or work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b).
The ALJ found that William did not engage in substantial
gainful activity during the closed period of disability, from May 13,
2020, through January 15, 2022. Tr. 17. This finding is not in
dispute.
B. Step Two
At 	step 	two, 	the 	ALJ 	determines 	whether 	any 	of 	the
claimant’s impairments, or any combination thereof, is severe and
has lasted or is expected to last a continuous period of at least
twelve months. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii) (citing 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1509). An impairment is severe if it “significantly limits [the
claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.”
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). An impairment is “not severe only if it is
a slight abnormality [having] such minimal effect on the individual
that it would not be expected to interfere with the individual’s
ability 	to 	work, 	irrespective 	of 	age, 	education[,] 	or 	work
experience.” Keel, 986 F.3d at 555 (quoting Stone v. Heckler, 752
F.2d 1099, 1101 (5th Cir. 1985)). “A person who does not have a
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‘severe impairment’ is not disabled.” Schofield, 950 F.3d at 318
(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)).
The ALJ found that William had severe impairments of
aneurysm of aorta or major branches, ischemic heart disease,
chronic heart failure, and a history of respiratory failure. Tr. 17.
The ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and are
not in dispute.
C. Step Three
At step three, the ALJ determines if any of the claimant’s
severe impairments meets or equals a listed impairment found in
20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (Listings). 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). The Listings describe impairments that the
SSA considers “severe enough to prevent an individual from doing
any 	gainful 	activity, 	regardless 	of . . . age, 	education, 	or 	work
experience.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(a). The claimant will be found
disabled if the claimant’s impairments meet or equal all of the
specified criteria of one of the Listings. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d);
Whitehead, 820 F.3d at 781. The claimant has the burden of
establishing 	that 	their 	impairments 	meet 	the 	criteria 	of 	the
Listing. Whitehead, 820 F.3d at 781.
The ALJ found that William did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the
severity of an impairment in the Listings. Tr. 65–66. In making
this conclusion, the ALJ relied on the objective medical evidence
and ME testimony. Tr. 19–20. One ME, Dr. Krishnan, testified
that 	based 	upon 	his 	review 	of 	William’s 	medical 	records,
Listings 4.10, 	4.04, 	4.02, 	and 	3.14 	were relevant 	to William’s
physical 	impairments. 	Dr. Krishnan 	testified 	that 	William’s
physical 	impairments 	do 	not 	meet 	or 	equal 	the 	severity
requirements of any of the relevant Listings.
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The 	ALJ 	determined 	that 	Dr. Krishnan, 	who 	is 	board
certified in internal medicine, is familiar with the Listings and the
process of evaluating Social Security DIB claims, and that his
opinions were based upon his review of William’s record. Tr. 21.
The ALJ found that Dr. Krishnan’s opinion was consistent with
and supported by the objective medical evidence. Id. The ALJ
therefore found Dr. Krishnan’s opinion as to William’s physical
impairments persuasive. Id.
The 	ALJ’s 	step-three 	determination 	is 	supported 	by
substantial evidence. William does not dispute the step three
findings or point to any evidentiary or legal error in the ALJ’s step
three findings. Having reviewed the record and the briefing, the
court detects no error—legal or factual.
D. Residual Functional Capacity
Before reaching the final two steps, the ALJ must assess the
claimant’s 	residual 	functional 	capacity 	(RFC). 	20 	C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(e) 	(citing 	20 	C.F.R. 	§ 404.1545). 	The 	RFC 	is 	a
determination of the most a claimant can do despite all physical
and mental limitations. Perez, 415 F.3d at 461–62 (citing 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1545(a)(1)). The RFC determination is based on “the medical
evidence in the record, including the testimony of physicians and
the claimant’s medical records.” Webster v. Kijakazi, 19 F.4th 715,
718 (5th Cir. 2021). “An ‘ALJ is responsible for determining an
applicant’s residual functional capacity.’” Id. (quoting Ripley v.
Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 557 (5th Cir. 1995)); see also 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1546(c).
The ALJ determined that William had the RFC to perform a
less-than-sedentary level of exertion, which meant that, during the
closed period, William could:
Lift [] or carry 10 pounds occasionally and less than 10
pounds frequently; stand and or walk with normal
breaks 	for 	a 	total 	of 	two 	hours 	in 	an 	eight 	hour
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workday; sit with normal breaks for a total of about six
hours in an eight hour workday; push and/or pull
within 	those 	stated 	exertional 	limitations. 	[As 	to]
postural limitations, [William] can occasionally climb
ramps 	and 	stairs; 	can 	occasionally 	balance, 	stoop,
kneel, crouch, and crawl; but can never climb ladders,
ropes, and scaffolds.
Tr. 21.
In support of her RFC finding, the ALJ considered the entire
record, including William’s function report and medical records,
and the hearing testimony of William, the two MEs, and the VE.
The 	ALJ 	explained 	that, 	although 	William’s 	medically
determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause
his 	alleged 	symptoms, 	his 	statements 	about 	the 	intensity,
persistence, and limiting effects of his symptoms were not entirely
consistent with the evidence in the record. Tr. 22.
The 	ALJ 	found 	that 	William’s 	statements 	about 	the
intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his symptoms were
not consistent with his reported activities during the period of
disability. Tr. 22. William stated that he was able to independently
perform his daily-living activities during the period of disability.
Id. (citing Tr. 382–90, 410–17; Hearing Testimony, Tr. 44–87).
Those 	activities 	included 	attending 	appointments, 	preparing
meals, 	performing 	household 	chores, 	interacting 	with 	friends,
driving, 	exercising, 	and 	shopping. 	Id. 	In 	April 	2021, 	William
reported to a doctor that he traveled internationally and walked a
lot during the trip. Id. (citing Tr. 1473–76). In June 2021, he
reported to a consultative examiner that he was actively pursuing
employment. Id. (citing Tr. 725–28).
The ALJ considered the initial- and reconsideration-level
opinions of the reviewing state agency consultants. Tr. 23. The
ALJ 	stated 	that 	on 	initial 	review, 	the 	state 	agency 	medical
consultant, Dr. Laurence Ligon, found that William was able to
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perform his past work as it was actually performed. Id. The ALJ
noted that Dr. Ligon determined that William had an RFC for a
light level of exertion, limited by occasional postural activities. Id.
The ALJ concluded that Dr. Ligon’s opinion was not persuasive in
light of hearing testimony, which, according to the ALJ, supported
greater exertional limitations. Id. The ALJ also found the opinion
of the state agency psychological consultant to be persuasive to the
extent that it classified William’s mental impairment as “non-
severe.” Id.
The 	ALJ 	noted 	that 	there 	were 	no 	residual 	functional
capacity 	assessments 	associated 	with 	William’s 	claim 	on
reconsideration. Tr. 24 (citing Tr. 107–13). The ALJ stated that the
state agency medical consultant, Dr. Kavitha Reddy, determined
that there was insufficient evidence to determine William’s claim.
Id. The ALJ observed that Dr. Reddy noted that William had twice
failed 	to 	keep 	his 	appointment 	for 	an 	internal 	medicine
consultative examination. Id. The ALJ concluded that Dr. Reddy’s
opinion was not persuasive because the record supports the finding
that William had severe physical impairments and non-severe
mental impairments during the period of disability. Id.
The RFC was determined according to the appropriate legal
framework and is supported by substantial evidence. The court
finds no error—legal or factual—in the ALJ’s RFC assessment.
William does not contest the RFC determination. ECF No. 12-1 at 5.
E. Step Four
At step four, the ALJ determines whether the claimant can
perform their past work by comparing the RFC with the demands
of the claimant’s past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f); see
also Perez, 415 F.3d at 462. To demonstrate that they are disabled,
the claimant must show that they lack the RFC to perform: (1) “the
actual functional demands and job duties of a particular past
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relevant job;” or (2) “the functional demands and job duties of the
occupation as generally required by employers throughout the
national economy.” SSR 82-61, 1982 WL 31387, at *2 (Jan. 1,
1982).3 If the ALJ determines that the claimant cannot perform
their 	past 	work, 	the 	ALJ 	proceeds 	to 	step 	five.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)(1).
The ALJ posed a hypothetical to the VE during the hearing
that contained all of the limitations in the RFC that the ALJ
ultimately found. Tr. 24. The VE testified that a person of the same
age, education, past work history, and RFC as William, during the
closed period of disability, could perform William’s past work as a
marketing manager as that position is generally performed in the
national economy. Id. Based on that testimony, the ALJ found that
William was not disabled during the closed period of disability.
Tr. 25.
Because 	the 	VE’s 	testimony 	was 	based 	on 	the 	ALJ’s
hypothetical 	question 	that 	incorporated 	all 	the 	limitations
reasonably 	recognized 	by 	the 	ALJ, 	and 	because 	William’s
attorney had the opportunity to cross-examine the VE, the VE’s
testimony is substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s step-four
determination. See Masterson v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 267, 273–74
(5th Cir. 2002) (holding that the ALJ properly relied on the VE’s
testimony because the ALJ “scrupulously incorporated” all the
3 SSR 82-61 was rescinded and replaced by SSR 24-2p in June 2024. SSR 24-2p,
2024 WL 3291790 (June 6, 2024). However, at the time of William’s hearing in
January 2024, the effective Ruling was SSR 82-61, so it applies here. In any event,
regardless of which Ruling applies, the result remains the same. Compare SSR 82-61,
1982 WL 31387, at *2 (as quoted), with SSR 24-2p, 2024 WL 3291790, at *4
(“We determine whether an individual can perform their [past relevant work] by
considering whether the individual retains the RFC to meet the functional demands
of any of their [past relevant work] as they actually performed it or as it is generally
performed in the national economy.”).
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limitations “supported by the evidence and recognized by the ALJ”
and gave an opportunity for cross examination).
William argues that the ALJ erred at step four by failing to
address William’s post-hearing brief, vocational rebuttal evidence,
and objections. ECF No. 12-1 at 10 (citing Tr. 475–98). In his post-
hearing brief, William objected to the VE’s classification of his past
work as a marketing manager, and argued that the VE should
have classified the position as a “composite job.” Tr. 475–77
Agency policy requires ALJs to rule on objections. SSA,
Hearing, 	Appeals 	and 	Litigation 	Law 	Manual 	(HALLEX)
§ I-2- 6- 74(b). The ALJ may do so “during the hearing, in narrative
form as a separate exhibit, or in the body of the decision.” Id. While
HALLEX is merely agency policy, when individual rights “are
affected, an agency must follow its own procedures, even where the
internal procedures are more rigorous than otherwise would be
required.” Morgan v. Colvin, 803 F.3d 773, 777 (5th Cir. 2015).
Several courts have held that an ALJ commits legal error by failing
to address a claimant’s post-hearing objections. See, e.g., Nunley v.
Berryhill, No. 17-0072, 2018 WL 1167700, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 14,
2018) (“The court finds merit in Plaintiff’s argument that ALJ
Dowd committed a legal error by failing to address and rule
on 	Plaintiff’s 	post-hearing 	objections.”); 	Cortez 	v. 	Berryhill,
No. 17-1493, 2018 WL 4103622, at *2 (S.D. Tex. July 23, 2018)
(“The Court concludes that the ALJ violated HALLEX . . . and
therefore committed a legal error.”).
The ALJ did not acknowledge nor rule on William’s post-
hearing objection in her decision or in narrative form as a separate
exhibit. Accordingly, because the ALJ failed to address William’s
objection, the ALJ erred.
However, “courts may not reverse and remand for failure to
comply with these internal procedures without first considering
whether the error was harmless.” Treadaway v. Berryhill, No. 17-
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1093, 2018 WL 3862106, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 2018) (citing
Frank v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 618, 622 (5th Cir. 2003); Newton v.
Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 459 (5th Cir. 2000)). To justify the decision to
vacate the Commissioner’s decision, the court must find that the
claimant’s substantial rights were violated. Morris v. Bowen, 864
F.2d 333, 335 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Mays v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1362,
1364 (5th Cir. 1988). “Procedural improprieties . . . constitute a
basis for remand only if such improprieties would cast into doubt
the 	existence 	of 	substantial 	evidence 	to 	support 	the 	ALJ’s
decision.” Id. Stated differently, a claimant “must show that he
could and would have adduced evidence that might have altered
the result.” Brock v. Chater, 84 F.3d 726, 728–29 (5th Cir. 1996).
William objected to the VE’s classification of his past work
and asserted that the VE should have classified it as a “composite
job.” 	Tr. 	475. 	William 	acknowledged 	that 	while 	the 	DOT’s
marketing-manager description accounted for many of his work
duties, it did not account for all of them. Id.; see also ECF No. 12-
1 at 13. William explained, as an example, “the description does
not include things like setting up for marketing and sales events
by climbing ladders or lifting [twenty] pounds.” ECF No. 12-1
at 13. 	He 	included 	with 	his 	brief 	a 	report 	from 	a 	vocational
counselor, Carrie Benchich. Tr. 495–98. Ms. Benchich concluded
that William’s role as Senior Marketing Manager was a “composite
job” comprised of two DOT occupations—marketing manager and
clerk. Tr. 497.
Again, a “composite job” is one that involves “significant
elements 	of 	two 	or 	more 	occupations 	and, 	as 	such, 	ha[s] 	no
counterpart 	in 	the 	DOT.” 	SSA, 	Program 	Operations 	Manual
System (POMS) DI 25005.020(B). A claimant’s prior job “may be a
composite job if it takes multiple DOT occupations to locate the
main duties of the [prior job] as described by the claimant.” Id.
(emphasis added). “A job may involve duties beyond what the
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[DOT] outlines without being a composite job, such as where a
claimant’s past work ‘may have involved functional demands and
job duties significantly in excess of those generally required for
the job by other employers throughout the national economy.’”
Finch 	v. 	Comm’r, 	Soc. 	Sec. 	Admin., 	No. 	23-13417, 	2024 	WL
2368475, 	at *2 	(11th 	Cir. 	May 	23, 	2024) 	(citing 	SSR 	82-61).
A claimant is “not disabled” at step four if they are capable of
performing a job’s functional demands as that job is generally
performed in the national economy. Id. This is true even if the
claimant is unable to perform the full extent of functional demands
that were required for their past work. Id.
“[T]he DOT is not comprehensive, in that it cannot and does
not purport to include each and every specific skill or qualification
for a particular job.” Carey v. Apfel, 230 F.3d 131, 145 (5th Cir.
2000). Accordingly, the testimony of a VE is valuable because the
VE “is familiar with the specific requirements of a particular
occupation, including working conditions and the attributes and
skills needed.” Id. (citing Fields v. Bowen, 805 F.2d 1168, 1170
(5th Cir. 	1986)). 	The 	VE 	“is 	able 	to 	compare 	all 	the 	unique
requirements of a specified job with the particular ailments a
claimant suffers in order to reach a reasoned conclusion whether
the claimant can perform the specific job.” Id. A VE’s testimony
about a claimant’s ability to perform a job as it is generally
performed in the national economy is a sufficient basis upon which
the ALJ may rely to determine that an appropriate job for the
claimant exists. Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 565 (5th Cir. 1995).
The VE testified based on his review of William’s Work
History 	Report 	and 	his 	familiarity 	with 	jobs 	in 	the 	national
economy. Tr. 66–67; Work History Report, Tr. 392–99. In the Work
History Report, William described his role as Senior Marketing
Manager. He stated that in the role, he “would stand and walk for
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four hours per day, lift ten pounds frequently, and up to [twenty]
pounds.” ECF No. 12-1 at 12 (citing Tr. 397).
Based on William’s description of his work in his Work
History Report, the VE classified the role as “marketing manager,
oil field services . . . DOT number 163.167-018.” Tr. 67–68. The VE
testified that the occupation is sedentary as it is customarily, or
generally, 	performed, 	but 	that 	William 	indicated 	that 	he
performed the role at the light exertion level. Tr. 68. Accordingly,
under the “sedentary” RFC, the VE testified that the hypothetical
claimant would be able to perform the role as it is generally
performed, 	but 	not 	as 	William 	had 	actually 	performed 	it.
Tr. 69–70.
On cross-examination, William’s attorney engaged the VE in
a lengthy discussion concerning his classification of William’s past
work. Tr. 78–83. William’s attorney pressed the VE about whether
the 	DOT’s 	“marketing 	manager” 	description 	aligned 	with
William’s work as an oil-field marketing manager. Id. The VE
repeatedly acknowledged that William performed the role at a
light-exertional level, but that the position, as it is generally
performed in the national economy, is classified as sedentary.
Tr. 79, 	81, 	82. 	At 	one 	point, 	the 	ALJ 	even 	interrupted 	the
questioning to clarify the VE’s testimony:
ALJ: 	[F]or 	hypothetical 	number 	one, 	you 	said
[William] could perform the past relevant work, as I
understand it . . . as [it is] customarily performed. . . .
But 	that 	is 	not 	as 	he 	performed 	it. . . . 	Am 	I
correct . . . ?
VE: I did, Your Honor.
Tr. 81. When William’s attorney pressed the VE about William’s
statement that “he had to lift parts for oil field products,” the VE
told the attorney that William should be the one to testify about
how 	he 	actually 	performed 	the 	job. 	Tr. 80. 	The 	ALJ 	agreed,
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advising the attorney, “If you, you know, disagree with [the VE’s]
testimony and want to elicit clarity through the claimant, you can
certainly do that, counsel.” Tr. 83.
William testified that as a marketing manager, he spent the
“majority of the time” in the office. Tr. 83. But he stated that the
job 	“required 	some 	lifting” 	and 	setting 	up 	for 	events, 	which
involved “climbing ladders and doing some things . . . .” Id. The
ALJ again jumped in to say:
Let 	me 	just 	say 	this 	one 	thing. 	I 	think 	[the 	VE]
did 	indicate 	that 	the 	claimant 	-- 	[the 	VE] 	said
not 	as 	he 	performed 	it, 	but 	as 	customarily
performed. . . . [William], once again, is describing as
he performed it. And so, I am not sure what we are
accomplishing with this line of testimony.
Tr. 84.
To establish that the position was a composite job, William
had to show that it involved significant elements of two or more
occupations. POMS DI 25005.020(B); see also Finch, 2024 WL
2368475, at *3. He did not, and still has not, done so. It is not
sufficient to assert, as William did in his post-hearing objection,
that the DOT description does not reflect all of the duties that he
was tasked with. See Tr. 475. While William has shown that he
had some additional tasks outside of the DOT’s description, he has
not established that they were significant elements of his role. The
fact that William’s past work had duties outside of the DOT
classification does not automatically render it a composite job.
See Finch, 2024 WL 2368475, at *3.
Moreover, 	despite 	the 	ALJ’s 	failure 	to 	directly 	rule 	on
William’s objection, it is clear that she considered the “composite
job” argument. During the hearing, William’s attorney made the
argument that William’s work as a marketing manager was “really
more of a composite job.” Tr. 85. The ALJ clearly considered the
argument, as it prompted the ALJ to ask the VE whether the
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argument, along with William’s testimony, had changed the VE’s
testimony in any way. Id. The VE responded by reaffirming his
testimony, stating, “Your honor, my understanding and my role is
to explain to you how the claimant performed his or her occupation
and then to tell you, based on the information in the [DOT], how it
is most often customarily performed, and that is what I did.” Id.
William’s attorney then made a “general objection” that William
“would not be able to perform a regular marketing job or a regional
sales job and that he had no experience doing either of those.” Id.
At that time, the ALJ noted William’s attorney’s “concern with [the
VE’s] testimony.” Tr. 86. The ALJ heard the testimony, read the
record, considered the argument, and made a decision. That is the
ALJ’s role. The court does not substitute its judgment or weigh the
evidence. The court’s role is to decide whether the ALJ’s decision
is supported by substantial evidence. It is.
The 	ALJ 	also 	made 	William’s 	post-hearing 	brief 	and
objections part of the record by including it as an exhibit to her
report. Tr. 30. She represented that she carefully considered the
entire record in making her decision. Tr. 21. The court has no
reason to doubt this. See e.g., Brunson v. Astrue, 387 F. App’x 459,
461 	(5th 	Cir. 	2010) 	(finding 	no 	reason 	to 	dispute 	the 	ALJ’s
assertion that his decision was based on “careful review of the
evidence”); Robinson v. Saul, No. 19-2695, 2020 WL 4480872, at *4
(S.D. Tex. July 14, 2020) (“As long as the decision is supported by
substantial evidence, the Court accepts the ALJ’s representation
that 	he 	‘carefully 	considered 	the 	evidence 	of 	record 	in 	its
entirety.’”).
Nevertheless, the ALJ ultimately rejected the “composite
job” argument and, instead, adopted the VE’s testimony as the
basis for her step-four decision. She compared William’s RFC with
the physical and mental demands of the marketing manager role
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and concluded that, during the period of disability, William was
able to perform that role as it is generally performed. Tr. 24.
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to not
classify William’s prior role as Senior Marketing Manager as a
composite job. The VE testified about William’s ability to perform
the job as it is generally performed. His testimony provided a
sufficient basis upon which the ALJ could rely in formulating her
decision. 	William, 	himself, 	even 	conceded 	that 	the 	DOT’s
marketing-manager description accounted for “many of the duties”
he had described in his Work History Report. ECF No. 12-1 at 13.
Therefore, the ALJ’s failure to rule on William’s objection to
the VE’s classification does not “cast into doubt the existence of
substantial 	evidence 	to 	support 	the 	ALJ’s 	decision.” 	At 	best,
William’s argument that the ALJ did not consider the vocational
opinion attached to his post-hearing brief raises an evidentiary
conflict. 	The 	Commissioner 	has 	the 	discretion 	to 	resolve 	any
conflicts in the evidence. Carey v. Apfel, 230 F.3d 131, 135 (5th Cir.
2000). The ALJ did not err in according little or no weight to
Ms. Benchich’s 	opinion. 	The 	court 	notes 	that 	the 	opinion 	is
somewhat conclusory and appears to be based on the facts the ALJ
and the VE had already considered. It adds little to the analysis.
The ALJ’s step-four decision is supported by substantial evidence
from the hearing testimony and the record. It is not in error.
F. Step Five
At step five, the ALJ determines whether the claimant can
perform any other work by considering the claimant’s RFC and
other factors, including age, education, and past work experience.
Schofield, 950 F.3d at 318 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v)).
If the claimant can perform other work available in significant
numbers in the national economy, the claimant is not disabled. Id.
(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)).
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The ALJ’s only step-five findings pertained to the period
after 	the 	closed 	period 	of 	disability, 	from 	January 	15, 	2022,
through the date of the hearing. The ALJ did not make step-five
findings for the closed period of disability. Because William was
found to be “not disabled” during the closed period of disability in
step four, the ALJ was not required to proceed to step five. The
ALJ did not err.
4. Conclusion
The 	ALJ’s 	decision 	denying 	social 	security 	benefits 	is
consistent with the law and supported by substantial evidence.
There is no genuine issue of material fact, and summary judgment
is appropriate. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c).
Accordingly, William’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF
No. 12, is DENIED. Commissioner’s Cross Motion for Summary
Judgment, ECF No. 14, is GRANTED, and the Commissioner’s
final decision is AFFIRMED.
A separate final judgment will be entered.
Signed at Houston, Texas, on March 18, 2026.
______________________________________
Peter Bray
United States Magistrate Judge
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