Toomer v. O'Malley

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Case 4:24-cv-04156 Document19 _ Filed 03/06/26 in TXSD Pagelof5
United States District Court

Southem District of Texas
ENTERED
March 09, 2026
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
CHARIKA TOOMER, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:24-CV-04156

§
MARTIN O'MALLEY, §
§
Defendant. §

ORDER

Before the Court are United States Magistrate Judge Richard W. Bennett’s Memorandum
and Recommendation filed on January 23, 2026 (Doc. #17) and Plaintiff Charika Toomer’s
(“PlainGiff’) Objections (Doc. #18). The Magistrate Judge’s findings and conclusions are reviewed
de novo, FED. R. Civ. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); United States v. Wilson, 864 F.2d 1219,
1221 (Sth Cir. 1989), Having reviewed the Memorandum and Recommendation, Plaintiff's
Objections, and applicable legal authority, the Court adopts the Memorandum and
Recommendation as this Court’s Order.

Plaintiff filed this action on October 22, 2024, alleging that former Social Security
Administration Commissioner Martin O’Malley (the “Commissioner”} improperly denied her
application for disability insurance benefits, with a disability onset date of March 23, 2018. Dac.
#1. Plaintiff seeks judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), challenging the Administrative Law
Judge’s (“ALI”) residual functional capacity (“RFC”) determination and evaluation of medical
opinion evidence. Doc. #9. Following administrative proceedings, on February 16, 2024, ALJ

David Gutierrez determined Plaintiff was not disabled at Step Five of the five-step sequential

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION
GPO

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evaluation.’ Doc. #17 at 2. On February 28, 2024, the Appeals Council remanded, directing the
ALJ to “further consider the claimant’s maximum [RFC] and provide appropriate rationale with
specific references to evidence of record in support of the assessed limitations.” /d at 3. On
remand, ALJ Ross Stubblefield held a new hearing and again determined Plaintiff was not disabled
as defined under the Social Security Act. Jd. at 4. The Appeals Council denied review on August
26, 2024, rendering the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision. Doc. #17 at 4—5. In
his Memorandum and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Bennett recommends the Court affirm
the Commissioner’s decision. Doc. #17.

Judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to two inquiries: (1) whether the
decision is supported by substantial evidence, and (2) whether the Commissioner applied proper
legal standards. Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 457, 461 (Sth Cir, 2005); Taylor v. Astrue, 706 F.3d
600, 602 (Sth Cir, 2012). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept to support a conclusion”—more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance. Perez,
415 F.3d at 461. The Court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the
Commissioner. Taylor, 706 F.3d at 602 (“Any findings of fact by the Commissioner which are
supported by substantial evidence are conclusive.”).

In her first objection, Plaintiff argues the ALJ improperly formulated the RFC without

relying on a functional medical opinion following the rejection of treating psychiatrist Dr. Dan

' The five-step evaluation process of a disability claim consists of: (1) whether the claimant is
currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment;
(3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals the severity of an impairment listed in 20
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (4) whether the impairment prevents the claimant from
doing past relevant work; and (5) whether the impairment prevents the claimant from doing any
other work. Masterson v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 267, 271 (Sth Cir. 2002) (citing 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520).
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Beaudry’s opinion. Doc. #18 at 2-4. An ALJ is not required to adopt or mirror any particular
medical opinion, the RFC must be based on ali relevant medical and non-medical evidence.
Thompson vy. Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 23-30702, 2024 WL 1886757, at *2 (Sth Cir, Apr. 30, 2024);
Masterson v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 267, 272 (Sth Cir, 2002), The ALJ’s decision reflects
consideration of treatment history, clinical findings, Plaintiff’s response to medication, and
evidence of Plaintiff's daily functioning and work activity. Doc. #17 at 8-10. Although Plaintiff
identifies evidence that could support greater limitations, the Court may not reweigh conflicting
evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner when the decision is supported
by substantial evidence. Thomson, 2024 WL 1886757, at *2. Accordingly, this objection is
overruled.

Plaintiff next argues the ALJ improperly rejected Dr, Beaudry’s opinion by speculating
about the need for inpatient treatment and by equating symptom improvement with sustained work
capacity. Doc. #18 at 4-6. An ALJ may discount a medical opinion that conflicts with the record
as a whole, and the RFC determination need not match any particular opinion. See Mendoza v.
Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 5:24-cv-055-BJ, 2025 WL 906225, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 2025)
(“Given that an RFC determination is not required to match or mitror a medical opinion, the ALJ
was permitted to develop an RFC that differed from the medical opinions provided while still being
supported by substantial evidence.”); Bowling v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 4341, 434 (Sth Cir. 1994)
(quoting Harrell v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 471, 475 (Sth Cir. 1988)). The ALJ’s decision identifies
specific inconsistencies between the extreme limitations Dr. Beaudry assessed and
contemporaneous treatment records reflecting medication improvement and functional activity
that was inconsistent with those extreme limitations. Doc. #17 at 8-10, Because the evaluation

of the opinion evidence is supported by substantial evidence, this objection is overruled.

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Plaintiff also argues the ALJ failed to comply with the Appeals Council’s remand directive
and SSR 96-8p’s requirement to include a narrative discussion linking evidence to each assessed
limitation, Doc. #18 at 6-7. SSR 96-8p requires a logical, evidence-based explanation sufficient
to permit meaningful judicial review—it does not mandate reliance on any particular medical
opinion or format. Jenkins v. Saul, No. CV H-19-3831, 2021 WL 3831988, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Mar.
24, 2021). The ALJ’s decision on remand addresses treatment records, opinion evidence, and daily
activities with sufficient specificity to support the assessed non-exertional limitations and to permit
meaningful review. Doc. #17. This objection is overruled.

Plaintiff further contends remand is required under Ripley v. Chater because the RFC was
formulated without a supporting medical opinion. Doc. #18 at 7-8; 67 F.3d 552 (5th Cir. 1995).
Ripley requires remand only where the record lacks medical evidence describing the claimant’s
functional capacity—a narrow circumstance triggered by an evidentiary gap, not a disagreement
over how the ALJ weighed available evidence. 67 F.3d at 557. The record here contained
sufficient medical and functional evidence for the ALJ to evaluate Plaintiff's limitations. See Doc.
#17. Plaintiffs disagreement concerns evidentiary weight, not an absence of evidentiary support.
This objection is overruled.

In her final objection, Plaintiff argues she was prejudiced by the rejection of Dr. Beaudry’s
opinion because, had it been credited, vocational testimony could have supported a disability
finding. Doc. #18 at 8-9. Remand for procedural error is warranted only where the claimant
demonstrates a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome. Avery v. Colvin, 605 F.
App’x 278, 283 (Sth Cir. 2015); Jan v. Astrue, 400 F, App’x 929, 932-33 (Sth Cir. 2010). Because

the RFC determination and evaluation of opinion evidence are supported by substantial evidence,

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Plaintiff cannot show that a different outcome would have resulted. This objection is likewise
overruled.

Finally, to the extent Plaintiff's objections raise new legal theories or causes of action not
previously asserted in her Complaint or in briefing before Judge Bennett, those arguments are not
properly before the Court and will not be considered. See Freeman vy. Cnty. of Bexar, 142 F.3d
848, 851 (Sth Cir. 1998) (noting that “a party who objects to the magistrate judge’s report waives
legal arguments not made in the first instance before the magistrate judge”).

in conclusion, the Court adopts the Memorandum and Recommendation (Doc #17) as its
Order. Accordingly, Defendant Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc, #15) is
GRANTED, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED, and Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.

This is a Final Judgment disposing of all claims of all parties. The Clerk of Court is
DIRECTED to close this case.

Itis so ORDERED,

MAR 06 2026

Date The Honorable Alfred H. Bennett
United States District! Judge