Deblasio v. The United States of America

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
Michael DeBlasio,
Movant,
v.
United States of America,
Respondent.
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Crim. No. 4:19-cr-457-01
Civ. No. 4:24-cv-2175
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending is Defendant-Movant Michael DeBlasio’s motion to vacate,
correct, or modify his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Civ. Dkt. 1; Crim. Dkt.
393.1 Respondent the United States of America (the “Government”) filed a
motion for judgment on the record in opposition to DeBlasio’s request for relief.
Civ. Dkt. 6; Crim. Dkt. 399. 	DeBlasio then filed a “Memorandum and Brief”
supporting his motion. Civ. Dkt. 7; Crim. Dkt. 401. After carefully reviewing
the parties’ submissions, the record, and the applicable law, the undersigned
recommends that the Government’s motion for judgment (Civ. Dkt. 6; Crim.
Dkt. 399) be granted and that DeBlasio’s motion for relief under Section 2255
1 All references to “Crim. Dkt.” are to the documents docketed in United States v. DeBlasio,
No. 4:19-CR-457-01 (S.D. Tex. 2022). 	All references to “Civ. Dkt.” are to documents in the
instant civil case, DeBlasio v. United States, Civil No. 4:24-cv-2175.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
November 19, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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(Civ. Dkt. 1; Crim. Dkt. 393) be denied. 	The Court should decline to hold an
evidentiary hearing and deny a certificate of appealability.
I. 	Background
DeBlasio is serving a 288-month sentence following his convictions for
aiding and abetting kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a) and 2 (Counts Two and
Five), and aiding and abetting interference with commerce by robbery, 18
U.S.C. §§ 1951(a) and 2 (Count Three). 	Crim. Dkt. 349 (Judgment). 	Those
charges were brought against DeBlasio in a Second Superseding Indictment.
Crim. Dkt. 166.
The 	charges 	stemmed 	from 	DeBlasio’s 	participation 	in 	a 	series 	of
robberies where he and his codefendants would meet with a drug dealer under
the ruse of buying drugs. 	Crim. Dkt. 231 at 7-8. 	Once the dealer was in
DeBlasio’s Chrysler 200 sedan with the group of robbers, DeBlasio robbed the
dealer and used the dealer’s phone contacts to find more victims. 	Id. 	One of
the victims, F. Thompson, agreed to take money from his employer, Top Golf,
to satisfy DeBlasio’s demands. Id. at 7. DeBlasio drove Thompson to Top Golf,
and Thompson took envelopes totaling $8,147 in cash from Top Golf and gave
them to the robbers. He then alerted the authorities. Id. H. Cardenas, another
kidnapping victim, identified DeBlasio in a photo array. Id. at 8.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, DeBlasio pleaded guilty to Counts Two
and Five—for kidnapping—and Count Three—for robbery. 	Crim. Dkt. 372 at
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37-38. Under that agreement, DeBlasio also agreed to waive “any right to have
the facts that the law makes essential to the punishment either charged in the
superseding indictment, or proved to a jury or proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Crim. Dkt. 231 at 1. The agreement explained that the statutory range
of punishment was “any term of years up to life” for the kidnapping charges
and “any term of years up to 20 years” for the robbery charge. Id. at 1-2.
In the plea agreement, DeBlasio further waived his right to appeal or
collaterally 	attack 	his 	conviction 	or 	sentence, 	except 	for 	any 	claims 	of
ineffective assistance of counsel either on appeal or through a § 2255 motion.
Crim. 	Dkt. 	231 	at 	1, 	3; 	see 	also 	Crim. 	Dkt. 	372 	at 	8-13 	(DeBlasio’s
representations that he understood these terms). 	The agreement stated that
“Defendant is also aware that any estimate of the possible sentencing range
under the sentencing guidelines that he may have received from his counsel,
the United States or the Probation Office, is a prediction and not a promise,
did not induce his guilty plea, and is not binding on the United States,
Probation Office or the Court.” Crim. Dkt. 231 at 3-4.
In exchange for DeBlasio’s plea, the Government promised: (a) to dismiss
the remaining counts of the Second Superseding Indictment; (b) to move for a
one-level reduction under § 3E1.1(b) of the Sentencing Guidelines, if the
Government determined that DeBlasio qualified for such an adjustment and
his offense level otherwise would exceed level sixteen; and (c) not to oppose
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DeBlasio’s request that his sentence run concurrently with his Harris County
case. Id. at 4.
The Court found DeBlasio fully competent and capable of entering an
informed 	plea 	and 	found 	his 	guilty 	plea 	to 	be 	knowing 	and 	voluntary,
supported by an independent basis in fact containing each of the essential
elements of the charged offense. 	Crim. Dkt. 372 at 38. 	The Court adjudged
DeBlasio guilty of Counts Two, Three, and Five of the Second Superseding
Indictment and ordered the preparation of a presentence report (“PSR”). Id.
On July 11, 2022, after rearraignment and the submission of the PSR,
DeBlasio filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea (Crim. Dkt. 280) and
a pro se motion to terminate his trial counsel, Mr. Darryl Austin (Crim. Dkt.
281). 	Another attorney, Mr. Lance Hamm, was appointed in Austin’s stead.
Crim. Dkt. 288.
Hamm represented DeBlasio at sentencing. 	Hamm objected to the 2-
level enhancement for serious bodily injury and to the 2-point increase in
criminal history points for the 2016 robbery conviction. 	See Crim. Dkt. 338.
Hamm argued that DeBlasio’s total offense level for the kidnappings should be
adjusted down to 33 and his criminal history should be in category III, for a
Guidelines range of 168 to 210 months. Id. at 5.
The Court sustained DeBlasio’s objection to the serious bodily injury
enhancement but applied a 2-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 for
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DeBlasio’s aggravating role as a leader or organizer of a criminal activity
involving five or more participants. 	Crim. Dkt. 376 at 12:18-13:14. 	Hamm
objected to the aggravating role enhancement and to the criminal history
points, but the Court overruled both objections. 	Id. at 6-8, 16:22-24. 	Hamm
argued for a sentence of between 15 and 18 years.
The Court determined that DeBlasio’s total offense level was 35 and his
criminal history category was IV, for a Guideline range of 235-293 months. 2
The Court considered the advisory Guidelines and found that a sentence within
the Guideline range would serve the objectives of section 3553(a) and was
therefore appropriate. 	Crim. Dkt. 376 at 31. 	For the kidnapping counts
(Counts Two and Five), the Court sentenced DeBlasio to 288 months, to be
served consecutively with his 2016 state robbery sentence, followed by 5 years
supervised release and a fine of $2,000. As for the robbery count (Count Three),
the Court sentenced DeBlasio to 240 months imprisonment and 3 years
supervised release, to run concurrently with the federal kidnapping sentence,
2 The Court arrived at the total offense level of 35 by: (1) starting with DeBlasio’s
base offense of 32 for the kidnapping charge, 18 U.S.C. § 1201; U.S.S.G. § 2A4.1(a);
(2) adding two levels for using a dangerous weapon, U.S.S.G. § 2A4.1(b)(3); and (3)
adding two more levels for DeBlasio’s aggravating role as explained above; (4) adding
two further levels for multiple counts; and (5) subtracting three levels for acceptance
of responsibility. 	See Crim. Dkt. 350 (Statement of Reasons) (under seal); see also
PSR (Crim. Dkt. 313 at 18-19) (under seal).
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ordered restitution of $8,147 to Top Golf, and imposed a special assessment of
$300. Id. at 31-34. The Court noted:
If the Court’s determination of -- and calculation of the guideline -
- 	advisory 	guideline 	range 	is 	in 	error, 	then 	under 	those
circumstances the 	Court would impose a variant sentence as
stated. 	The reasons of -- for this particular sentence within the
advisory guideline range or a variance, if the guidelines have been
wrongly calculated, 	is because these 	crimes were particularly
vicious. They affect these victims for the rest of their lives. Many
of them have -- people that are victimized by armed robbers,
threatened with death, held captive, suffer tremendous harm over
their lives in many instances. 	This defendant was the leader of
this group, planning, executing, meeting the people. 	He was the
one common thread, he and his -- and his Chrysler 200 black sedan
that he used for these purposes. 	It was he who was known as
“Kidnap the Sack” (phonetic) and used that title for himself on
websites and things of that type; proud of his role as “Kidnap the
Sack.” 	The Court finds that a sentence within this portion of the
guideline range is, therefore, appropriate.
Id. at 35.
DeBlasio filed a notice of appeal. Crim. Dkt. 352. Appellate counsel filed
a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v.
Flores, 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal as
frivolous, dismissing DeBlasio’s claims for ineffective assistance of counsel
without prejudice to asserting them on collateral review and concurring with
appellate counsel that the appeal presented no nonfrivolous issue for appellate
review. Crim. Dkt. 392.
DeBlasio filed the instant motion to vacate, generally stating that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with his plea; that the
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Court misapplied the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) when calculating his
sentence; and that the Court “entered [the] province of [the] jury ....” Civ. Dkt.
1. 	The Government filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, contending
that DeBlasio made only conclusory allegations and wholly failed to meet his
burden. Civ. Dkt. 6. DeBlasio responded to the Government’s motion by filing
a “Memorandum and Brief in Support” of his request for relief. Civ. Dkt. 7.
II. 	Legal standard
Section 2255 sharply curtails the district court’s authority to vacate,
modify, or correct a sentence. To obtain relief, a movant must show that (1) the
sentence violates the U.S. Constitution or other federal law; (2) the court
lacked jurisdiction to impose the sentence; (3) the sentence exceeded the
statutory maximum; or (4) the sentence “is otherwise subject to collateral
attack ….” 28 U.S.C. § 2255. “Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is reserved for
transgressions of constitutional rights and for a narrow range of injuries that
could not have been raised on direct appeal and would, if condoned, result in a
complete miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Vaughn, 955 F.2d 367, 368
(5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). “Other types of error may not be raised under
section 2255 unless the defendant demonstrates that the error could not have
been raised on direct appeal and, if condoned, would result in a complete
miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Cervantes, 132 F.3d 1106, 1109 (5th
Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).
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Ultimately, the movant bears the burden of establishing his claims of
error by a preponderance of the evidence. 	See Wright v. United States, 624
F.2d 557, 558 (5th Cir. 1980). Pro se filings are “entitled to the benefit of liberal
construction.” Hernandez v. Thaler, 630 F.3d 420, 426 (5th Cir. 2011). Absent
“independent 	indicia” 	that 	the 	movant’s 	claims 	likely 	have 	merit, 	an
evidentiary hearing is not required. 	See United States v. Edwards, 442 F.3d
258, 264 (5th Cir. 2006).
Analysis
As an initial matter, the Government is correct that DeBlasio’s original
motion to vacate contained only conclusory and incomplete allegations that are
not sufficient to meet his burden. 	See Day v. Quarterman, 566 F.3d 527, 540-
41 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that conclusory allegations of ineffectiveness are
insufficient 	to 	show 	deficient 	performance 	or 	actual 	prejudice); 	see 	also
Lincecum v. Collins, 958 F.2d 1271, 1279 (5th Cir. 1992). DeBlasio attempted
to 	rectify 	those 	deficiencies 	by 	submitting 	a 	brief 	in 	response 	to 	the
Government’s motion for judgment. 	But as discussed below, even DeBlasio’s
brief fails to demonstrate that he is entitled to relief.
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I. 	DeBlasio has not shown a basis for relief under Section 2255.
A. 	DeBlasio 	fails 	to 	show 	that 	his 	trial 	counsel 	provided
ineffective assistance.
As his first challenge, DeBlasio claims that one of his lawyers, Mr. Darryl
Austin, 3 induced him “to plead guilty based on false promises, including
assurances of a sentence no greater than 168 months.” 	Civ. Dkt. 7 at 3.
DeBlasio’s 	sworn 	statements 	at 	the 	rearraignment, 	however, 	refute 	the
existence of any such assurance, and DeBlasio offers no competent evidence
overriding his own sworn testimony. DeBlasio also cannot show that he likely
would have received a shorter sentence had he proceeded to trial. 	This Court
should deny DeBlasio’s request for relief.
1. 	Legal standard: Ineffective assistance of counsel
For ineffective assistance of counsel claims, a defendant first must show
that his attorney’s representation was deficient. See Strickland v. Washington,
466 	U.S. 	668, 	687 	(1984). 	“[S]trategic 	choices 	made 	after 	thorough
investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually
unchallengeable; 	and 	strategic 	choices 	made 	after 	less 	than 	complete
investigation 	are 	reasonable 	precisely 	to 	the 	extent 	that 	reasonable
3 As the Government points out, DeBlasio had four lawyers over the course of his
case, yet his original motion does not identify which one allegedly rendered ineffective
assistance. 	Crim. Dkt. 399; Civ. Dkt. 6. 	But DeBlasio’s subsequent memorandum
clarifies that he intended to assert this claim against Mr. Austin, who represented
him in connection with the plea agreement. Compare Civ. Dkt. 1, with Civ. Dkt. 7.
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professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.” 	Hinton v.
Alabama, 571 U.S. 263, 274 (2014) (quotation omitted).
Under the first prong of Strickland’s test, counsel’s performance must be
compared to “an objective standard of reasonableness, mindful of the strong
presumption of adequacy.” 	Green v. Johnson, 116 F.3d 1115, 1122 (5th Cir.
1997). “‘A conscious and informed decision on trial tactics and strategy cannot
be the basis for constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel unless it is so
ill chosen that it permeates the entire [process] with obvious unfairness.’” 	Id.
(quoting Garland v. Maggio, 717 F.2d 199, 206 (5th Cir. 1983)).
The second prong of Strickland requires a showing that the attorney’s
“deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” 466 U.S. at 687. “This requires
showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a
fair trial ....” Id. Unless both deficiency and prejudice are shown, “it cannot be
said that the conviction ... resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process
that renders the result unreliable.” Id.
The two-part Strickland standard applies to ineffective assistance of
counsel claims arising out of a guilty plea. 	United States v. Smith, 915 F.2d
959, 963 (5th Cir. 1990). To establish prejudice in relation to a guilty plea, the
petitioner must demonstrate that there was a “reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted
on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). 	To establish
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prejudice regarding a term of sentencing, a petitioner must demonstrate that
“there was a reasonable probability that, but for [trial counsel]’s actions, [he]
would have received a lesser sentence than he did.” United States v. Grammas,
376 F.3d 433, 438 (5th Cir. 2004).
2. 	DeBlasio 	has 	not 	shown 	that 	counsel 	was
unconstitutionally deficient or prejudiced him.
The record does not support DeBlasio’s contention that Mr. Austin
falsely assured that he would receive a lesser sentence than what the Court
imposed. 	At the rearraignment, DeBlasio testified—under oath—that no one
had induced his guilty plea by making any type of promise:
THE COURT: Has anybody else made any kind of promise to you
or assurance of any kind in order to persuade you or induce you to
plead guilty in this case?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
Crim. Dkt. 372 at 15. The Court explicitly admonished DeBlasio that it would
not be bound by the Government’s sentencing recommendations, that it would
determine the sentence based on the Sentencing Guidelines, and that if it were
to make a mistake regarding the Guidelines, DeBlasio “would have to live with
that” because there would be no right to appeal such issues. Id. at 10:5-6, 12:2-
24, 13:1-6, 18:6-24. 	The Court also explained that the sentence could be
anywhere in the range that was noted in the plea agreement, which stated that
the range of punishment for the kidnapping charges was “any term of years to
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life.” 	Id. at 16:19-24; Crim. Dkt. 231 at 1-2. 	DeBlasio indicated that he
understood all these terms before pleading guilty to the three counts per the
plea agreement. Crim. Dkt. 372 at 16-17, 37.
“To 	be 	constitutionally 	valid, 	a 	guilty 	plea 	must 	be 	knowing 	and
voluntary.” 	Cervantes, 132 F.3d at 1110 (citing Harmason v. Smith, 888 F.2d
1527, 1529 (5th Cir. 1989) (explaining that a guilty plea may be invalid if
induced by defense counsel’s unkept promises)). But “[s]olemn declarations in
open court carry a strong presumption of verity,” forming a “formidable barrier
in any subsequent collateral proceedings.” 	Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63,
74 (1977).
The Fifth Circuit “generally will not allow a defendant to contradict his
testimony given under oath at a plea hearing.” 	United States v. Smith, 945
F.3d 860, 863 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. McDaniels, 907 F.3d
366, 371 (5th Cir. 2018)). 	“[T]here must be independent indicia of the likely
merit of the petitioner’s contentions, and mere contradiction of his statements
at the guilty plea hearing will not carry his burden.” Id. (citation omitted). To
carry this burden, a defendant “may seek habeas relief on the basis of alleged
promises, though inconsistent with representations []he made in open court
when entering [his] guilty plea, by proving (1) the exact terms of the alleged
promise, (2) exactly when, where, and by whom the promise was made, and
(3) the precise identity of an eyewitness to the promise.” 	Cervantes, 132 F.3d
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at 1110 (citing Harmason, 888 F.2d at 1529). This usually requires an affidavit
from a reliable third person. United States v. Fuller, 769 F.2d 1095, 1099 (5th
Cir. 1985).
DeBlasio 	submits 	an 	unsworn 	declaration 	from 	a 	family 	member,
Marcus DeBlasio, stating that he has “personal knowledge” that Mr. Austin
told his mother, father, and sister that DeBlasio would receive 168 months’
imprisonment if he pleaded guilty. 	Civ. Dkt. 7 at 7-8. 	Marcus’s declaration
does not state that he was present when the statement was made or that he
heard Mr. Austin make any promises to the family. 	Thus, the declaration is
inadmissible hearsay. 	See Fed. R. Evid. 801. 	But even in substance, the
declaration does not state that Mr. Austin promised that DeBlasio would
receive a specific sentence—as opposed to proffering a mere prediction. 	Nor
does the declaration explain how, when, or under what circumstances the
information was conveyed. 	In short, the declaration does not constitute
competent evidence of “specific factual allegations” from “a reliable third
person” that would permit DeBlasio to contravene his prior sworn statements
denying that his guilty plea was induced by anyone’s assurance that he would
receive a lower sentence than what 	he ultimately received. 	See Fuller,
769 F.2d at 1099; see also Smith, 945 F.3d at 863-64.
Even if counsel had proffered a prediction about DeBlasio’s sentence that
did not materialize, that would not render counsel’s representation ineffective.
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“Clairvoyance is not a required attribute of effective representation.” 	United
States v. Fields, 565 F.3d 290, 295 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); Sharp v.
Johnson, 107 F.3d 282, 289 n.28 (5th Cir. 1997). DeBlasio does not show that
Mr. Austin’s performance fell below an objectively reasonable standard.
Nor does DeBlasio show actual prejudice. 	DeBlasio does not show that
there was a reasonable probability that he would have received a shorter
sentence if he had proceeded to trial instead of pleading guilty. See Grammas,
376 F.3d at 438. 	But-for pleading guilty, DeBlasio would have been tried on
six counts: four kidnapping counts, one robbery count, and one count for using
or brandishing a firearm during or in relation to a crime of violence under
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). See Crim. Dkt. 166. If DeBlasio were found guilty
on all counts, he would have faced a substantially higher sentence in the range
of 360 months to life, plus a mandatory consecutive 7-year sentence on the
firearms count. 4 	And DeBlasio does not attempt to show a likelihood that he
would have been acquitted on any of those six charges. He has neither shown
4 A conviction on all six counts in the Second Superseding Indictment would have left
DeBlasio facing a total offense level of at least 40 (i.e., with the 2 extra kidnapping
counts leading to a 2-level increase for multiple counts added on the 38 already
acquired for Counts Two and Five, with no reduction for acceptance of responsibility).
Coupled with DeBlasio’s criminal history category of IV, that offense level would have
resulted in a Guidelines range of 360 months to life, instead of 235-293 months for
the kidnapping charges for which he pleaded guilty. 	See U.S.S.G. Ch. 5 Part A
(Sentencing Table). 	In addition, a conviction on Count Four, the firearms charge
under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), would have triggered a consecutive 7-year sentence
on top of the 360-months-to-life range for the four kidnapping charges.
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that counsel’s performance was deficient nor that any claimed deficiency was
prejudicial. DeBlasio’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim should be denied.
B. 	DeBlasio cannot challenge the Court’s application of the
Guidelines.
DeBlasio next argues that the Court misapplied the Guidelines and the
factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) when determining his sentence. 	“A district
court’s 	technical 	application 	of 	the 	Guidelines 	does 	not 	give 	rise 	to 	a
constitutional issue cognizable under § 2255.” United States v. Segler, 37 F.3d
1131, 1134 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Vaughn, 955 F.2d 367, 368
(5th Cir. 1992)); United States v. Williamson, 183 F.3d 458, 462 (5th Cir. 1999)
(holding 	that 	“[m]isapplications 	of 	the 	Sentencing 	Guidelines 	... 	are 	not
cognizable in § 2255 motions”).
DeBlasio’s other complaint about a disparity between his sentence and
the sentences imposed on his codefendants is not a valid claim under section
2255. 	See United States v. Robles-Pantoja, No. 93-8079, 1994 WL 171699, at
*1 (5th Cir. Apr. 28, 1994) (per curiam) (holding that the defendant’s sentence
disparity claim was “not of constitutional dimension” and was not “within the
limited scope of habeas relief under Section 2255”); United States v. Farmer,
Civ. 	No. 	4:22-4307, 	2025 	WL 	1785043, 	at 	*4 	(S.D. 	Tex. 	June 	27, 	2025)
(concluding that a “sentencing-disparity claim” was not cognizable under
Section 2255). DeBlasio’s second claim should be denied.
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C. 	DeBlasio’s 	last 	ground 	is 	not 	cognizable 	and
unsubstantiated.
In his final claim, DeBlasio states that the Court “entered the province
of the jury.” 	Civ. Dkt. 1 at 7. 	DeBlasio does not state facts supporting this
claim. 	His ensuing memorandum, however, characterizes this claim as a
challenge to his sentence. 	According to the memorandum, “the sentencing
court relied on facts not found by a jury or admitted by the defendant, including
the application of a sentence enhancement based on disputed allegations that
were not subject to judicial scrutiny or a jury determination,” violating his
“right to trial by jury” under the Sixth Amendment. 	Civ. Dkt. 7 at 5. 	As
already explained, however, Section 2255 does not provide relief for alleged
misapplications of sentencing enhancements. See Williamson, 183 F.3d at 462;
Segler, 37 F.3d at 1134.
Even if such a claim were cognizable in theory, DeBlasio neither explains
what disputed facts or allegations were wrongly considered or otherwise led
the Court to misapply the Guidelines. 	Conclusory allegations are insufficient
to meet DeBlasio’s burden on collateral review. 	See United States v. Pineda,
988 F.2d 22, 23 (5th Cir. 1993) (“‘[M]ere conclusory allegations on a critical
issue are insufficient to raise a constitutional issue.’”) (quoting United States
v. Woods, 870 F.2d 285, 288 n.3 (5th Cir. 1989)). This claim should be denied.
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II. 	An 	evidentiary 	hearing 	and 	certificate 	of 	appealability 	are
unwarranted.
DeBlasio is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. 	No hearing is
necessary 	when 	the 	record 	“is 	clearly 	adequate 	to 	dispose 	fairly 	of 	the
allegations” that counsel rendered ineffective assistance. See Smith, 915 F.2d
at 	964. 	That 	is 	the 	case 	here 	because 	the 	record 	forecloses 	DeBlasio’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. An evidentiary hearing also would not
change the conclusion that Section 2255 does not provide an avenue for
DeBlasio’s 	challenges 	to 	sentencing 	factors 	and 	Guidelines 	issues.
Accordingly, an evidentiary hearing is unwarranted.
To 	obtain 	a 	certificate 	of 	appealability, 	DeBlasio 	must 	make 	“a
substantial 	showing 	of 	the 	denial 	of 	a 	constitutional 	right.” 	28 	U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2). That, in turn requires him to show “that reasonable jurists would
find [this Court’s] assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.”
Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 276 (2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). 	The result here, however, is not debatable among
reasonable 	jurists. 	A 	certificate 	of 	appealability 	should 	be 	denied.
See Alexander v. Johnson, 211 F.3d 895, 898 (5th Cir. 2000).
Recommendation
For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	it 	is 	RECOMMENDED 	that 	the
Government’s 	motion 	for 	judgment 	(Crim. 	Dkt. 	399, 	Civ. 	Dkt. 	6) 	be
Case 4:24-cv-02175 Document 8 Filed 11/19/25 in TXSD Page 17 of 18

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GRANTED, Michael DeBlasio’s § 2255 motion (Crim. Dkt. 393; Civ. Dkt. 1) be
DENIED, and the related civil action (Civ. No. 4:24-cv-2175) be DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
It 	is 	further 	RECOMMENDED 	that 	an 	evidentiary 	hearing 	be
DENIED and a certificate of appealability be DENIED.
The parties have fourteen days from service of this Report and
Recommendation to file written objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.
R. 	Civ. 	P. 	72(b). 	Failure 	to 	file 	timely 	objections 	will 	preclude
appellate review of factual findings and legal conclusions, except for
plain error. 	Ortiz v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep’t, 806 F.3d 822, 825
(5th Cir. 2015).
Signed on November 19, 2025, at Houston, Texas.
______________________________
Yvonne Y. Ho
United States Magistrate Judge
___________________________________
Yvvvooon	n	nn	ne Y. Ho
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 4:24-cv-02175 Document 8 Filed 11/19/25 in TXSD Page 18 of 18