Davis v. Lumpkin

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
MICHAEL WILLIAM DAVIS, §
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Petitioner,
v. CIVIL ACTION NO. H-24-1514
ERIC GUERRERO,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This case is before the Court on Petitioner Michael William
Davis's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and Respondent Eric
Guerrero's answer. Having carefully considered the petition, the
answer, Davis's response, all the arguments and authorities
submitted by the parties, and the relevant record, the Court is of
the opinion that Davis's petition should be denied.
I. Background
Montgomery County Precinct 5 Constable's Deputy Scott
Hazelwood saw two speeding vehicles, one of which was driven by
Davis. 2 R.R. 104-06. Hazelwood 1 s radar indicated that Davis's
vehicle was going 80 miles-per-hour in a 50 miles-per-hour zone.
2 R.R. 107. Hazelwood activated his lights and siren and followed
Davis, reaching speeds of over 100 miles-per-hour. 2 R.R. 107-08,
112, 139, 140. Davis ran through red lights and intersections, and
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
May 22, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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swerved around several other vehicles, including a few emergency
vehicles responding to an unrelated accident. 2 R.R. 108-09, 111,
112, 113-14. Finally, Davis crashed into a light-box and another
vehicle when he attempted to turn at a too-high rate of speed. 2
R.R. 120,123. The high-speed chase lasted for more than seven
minutes, and covered nine miles through two counties. 2 R.R. 111;
4 R.R. 4.
Davis was convicted by a jury in the 435th District Court of
Montgomery County, Texas, of evading arrest or detention, enhanced
to habitual offender status by two prior convictions for aggravated
assault of a public servant and robbery. The trial court sentenced
him to a 40-year term of imprisonment.
Texas's Ninth Court of Appeals affirmed. Davis v. State,
No. 09 22-00196-CR, 2023 WL 2521901 (Tex. App. - Beaumont Mar. 15,
2023). Davis filed a state habeas corpus application, which was
denied by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. He then filed this
federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which he later
amended.
II. Standard of Review
This federal petition for habeas relief is governed by the
applicable provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act ( 11 AEDPA 11 ). Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 335-36
(1997). Under the AEDPA federal habeas relief based upon claims
that were adjudicated on the merits cannot be granted unless the
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state court's decision (1) "was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or (2) "was
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 11 28 u.s.c.
§ 2254(d); Kitchens v. Johnson, 190 F.3d 698, 700 (5th Cir. 1999).
The AEDPA precludes federal habeas relief on factual issues
unless the state court's adjudication of the merits was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(2); Hill v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2000).
The state court's factual determinations are presumed correct
unless rebutted by "clear and convincing evidence." 28 u.s.c.
§ 2254(e)(1); see also Jackson v. Anderson, 112 F.3d 823, 824-25
(5th Cir. 1997).
III. Analysis
Davis's Amended Petition raises 10 claims for relief,
including subclaims. These are addressed in turn.
A. Unexhausted Claims
Davis did not present in Texas courts his claims of vindictive
prosecution, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, or his
claims that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to argue for
a lesser included offense instruction, failing to obtain jury
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instructions on mens rea and culpable mental states, and failing to
present evidence supporting a theory of the absence of causation.
The AEDPA requires that a prisoner exhaust his available State
remedies before raising a claim in a federal habeas petition.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of
a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state
court shall not be granted unless it appears that (A) the
applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the
courts of the State; or (B) (i) there is an absence of
available State corrective process; or (ii) circumstances
exist that render such process ineffective to protect the
rights of the applicant.
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b) (1). As the Fifth Circuit explained in a
pre-AEDPA case, "federal courts must respect the autonomy of state
courts by requiring that petitioners advance in state court all
grounds for relief, as well as factual allegations supporting those
grounds. 11 Knox v. Butler, 884 F.2d 849, 852 n.7 (5th Cir. 1989).
"[A]bsent special circumstances, a federal habeas petitioner must
exhaust his state remedies by pressing his claims in state court
before he may seek federal habeas relief. 11 Orman v. Cain, 228 F. 3d
616, 619-20 (5th Cir. 2000); see 28 u.s.c. § 2254 (b) (1) ("An
application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be
granted unless it appears that . the applicant has exhausted
the remedies available in the courts of the State. • II ) •
Because Petitioner did not present these claims to the Texas state
courts, he has failed to properly exhaust them, and this Court may
not consider them. Knox, 884 F.2d at 852 n.7.
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Ordinarily, a federal habeas petition that contains
unexhausted claims is dismissed without prejudice, allowing the
petitioner to return to the state forum to present his unexhausted
claims. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). Such a result in this
case, however, would be futile because Petitioner 1 s unexhausted
claims would be procedurally barred as an abuse of the writ under
Texas law. On habeas review, a federal court may not consider a
state inmate 1 s claim if the state court based its rejection of that
claim on an independent and adequate state ground. Martin v.
Maxey, 98 F.3d 844, 847 (5th Cir. 1996). A procedural bar for
federal habeas review also occurs if the court to which a
petitioner must present his claims to satisfy the exhaustion
requirement would now find the unexhausted claims procedurally
barred. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1 (1991).
Texas prohibits successive writs challenging the same
conviction except in narrow circumstances. Tex. Code Crim. Proc.
Ann. art. 11.071 § 5(a). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals will
not consider the merits or grant relief on a subsequent habeas
application unless the application contains sufficient specific
facts establishing the following:
(1) the current claims and issues have not been and could
not have been presented previously in a timely initial
application or in a previously considered application
filed under this article or Article 11.07 because the
factual or legal basis for the claim was unavailable on
the date the applicant filed the previous application;
(2) by a preponderance of the evidence, but for a
violation of the United States Constitution no rational
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juror could have found the applicant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt; or
(3) by clear and convincing evidence, but for a violation
of the United States Constitution no rational juror would
have answered in the state's favor one or more of the
special issues that were submitted to the jury in the
applicant's trial under Article 37.071, 37.0711, or
37.072.
Id. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals applies its abuse of the
writ doctrine regularly and strictly. Fearance v. Scott, 56 F.3d
633, 642 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).
Davis does not claim that he could not have presented the
claims in his direct appeal or his state habeas petition because
the factual basis for the claim did not exist. To the extent that
his claim that he was incapable of forming the requisite mens rea
is a claim that he is actually innocent, it fails. As discussed
below, the expert report that Davis argues should have been
presented does not support his argument. Moreover, the evidence
shows that he led police on a high-speed chase through two counties
that lasted several minutes. These actions clearly evince an
intent to evade arrest, i.e., the requisite mens rea, and negate
any claim of actual innocence.
Davis's unexhausted claims do not f within the exceptions to
the successive writ statute and would be procedurally defaulted in
the Texas courts. 501 U.S. at 735 n.1. That bar
precludes this Court from reviewing the claims absent a showing of
cause for the default and actual prejudice attributable to the
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default, or that this Court's refusal to review the claim will
result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Id. at 750.
"Cause" for a procedural default requires a showing that some
objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts
to comply with the state procedural rule, or a showing of a prior
determination of ineffective assistance of counsel. Murray v.
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214,
222 (1988). Davis does not show any such external cause.
While Davis argues that he was unaware that he could file his
own brief in addition to his counsel's appellate brief, his
ignorance of the law does not constitute cause. See, e.g., Saahir
v. Collins, 956 F.2d 115, 118-19 (5th . 1992). Moreover, Davis
represented himself in his state habeas application and could have
raised these claims there, but did not do so. Because Davis fails
to demonstrate cause for his default, these claims are barred from
review.
B. Compulsory Process
In his second claim for relief, Davis argues that he was
denied his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process when expert
witness Wendy Elliott was not called as a trial -witness. Davis
raised this claim in his state habeas petition and the TCCA found
that it was not cognizable on collateral review.
In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his
federal claims in state court pursuant to an independent
and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review
the claims barred unless the prisoner can
demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as
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a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or
demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will
result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.
Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. In Texas state courts, claims that are
based on the trial record must be raised on direct appeal, not in
collateral proceedings. See, e.g., Ex Parte Dutchover, 779 S.W.2d
76, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); Ex Parte Banks, 769 S.W.2d 539 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1989). Because the State habeas court found that this
claim was procedurally defaulted when it was raised for the first
time in a habeas application, i.e., rejected it on independent and
adequate state grounds, this Court may not review the claim absent
a showing of cause and prejudice. Davis makes no such showing.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
Davis raises three undefaulted claims of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel. He contends that counsel was
ineffective by: (1) Failing to argue or present evidence that
Davis lacked the requisite mental state to be guilty of the charged
crime; (2) Failing to argue that the evidence was insufficient to
support a finding that Davis had the requisite mental state; and
(3) Failing to obtain a jury instruction on a "mistake of fact"
defense.
To prevail on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel,
Petitioner
must show that . . . counsel made errors so serious that
counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed
by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the [petitioner] must
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors
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were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair
trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In order
to prevail on the first prong of the Strickland test, Petitioner
must demonstrate that counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness. at 687-88.
Reasonableness is measured against prevailing professional norms
and must be viewed under the totality of the circumstances. Id. at
688. Review of counsel's performance is deferential. Id. at 689.
In assessing prejudice, "Strickland asks whether it is reasonably
likely the result would have been different," if not for counsel's
deficient performance. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 111
(2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Davis contends that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by
failing to propose or request a jury instruction on the defense of
mistake of fact. Under Texas law,
(a) It is a defense to prosecution that the actor through
mistake formed a reasonable belief about a matter of fact
if his mistaken belief negated the kind of culpability
required for commission of the offense.
(b) Although an actor's mistake of fact may constitute a
defense to the offense charged, he may nevertheless be
convicted of any lesser included offense of which he
would be guilty if the fact were as he believed.
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 8.02 (West).
While he argues that counsel should have proposed or requested
an instruction on mistake of fact, Davis does not identify any
pertinent fact about which he was mistaken. Without any factual
basis supporting the defense, Davis fails to show that counsel
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rendered deficient performance. He is not entitled to relief on
this claim.
D. Due Process
Davis next claims that he was denied due process when the
State did not present testimony by Dr. Elliott who prepared an
expert report concluding, Davis contends, that Davis was incapable
of forming the requisite mens rea.
The state habeas court made several findings that undermine
Davis's claim. That court found that Davis presented Elliott's
report during the punishment phase of his trial, thereby
undercutting any claim that the report was suppressed. The habeas
court also found that, while Dr. Elliott found that Davis had
borderline intellectual functioning and may have suffered brain
trauma, she did not conclude that he was incapable of forming the
requisite mental state to commit the crime with which he was
charged. Moreover, the court found that the report contained
material that was potentially harmful to Davis's case. Docket
Entry No. 44 1 at 88. Davis fails to show that these conclusions
are unreasonable, and therefore fails to show either ineffective
assistance of counsel or a denial of due process resulting from
counsel's failure to present this evidence.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Davis's Amended Petition for a Writ
of Habeas Corpus is DENIED.
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V. Certificate of Appealability
Davis has not requested a certificate of appealability ( 11 COA 11 ), but
this Court may determine whether he is entitled to this relief in
light of the foregoing rulings. See Alexander v. Johnson, 211 F.3d
895, 898 (5th Cir. 2000) ("It is perfectly lawful for district
court's [sic] to deny COA sua sponte. The statute does not require
that a petitioner move for a COA; it merely states that an appeal
may not be taken without a certificate of appealability having been
issued.") A petitioner may obtain a COA either from the district
court or an appellate court, but an appellate court will not
consider a petitioner's request for a COA until the district court
has denied such a request. Whitehead v. Johnson, 157 F. 3d 384,
388 (5th Cir. 1988); see also Hill v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 78, 82 (5th
Cir. 1997) (" [T] he district court should continue to review COA
requests before the court of appeals does."). 11 A plain reading of
the AEDPA compels the conclusion that COAs are granted on an
issue-by-issue basis, thereby limiting appellate review to those
issues alone. "
1997).
Lackey v. Johnson, 116 F.3d 149, 151 (5th Cir.
A COA may issue only if the petitioner has made a II substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S. C.
§ 2253(c) (2); see also United States v. Kimler, 150 F.3d 429, 431
(5th Cir. 1998). A petitioner "makes a substantial showing when he
demonstrates that his application involves issues that are
debatable among jurists of reason, that another court could resolve
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the issues differently, or that the issues are suitable enough to
deserve encouragement to proceed further." Hernandez v. Johnson,
213 F.3d 243, 248 (5th Cir. 2000). The Supreme Court has stated
that:
Where a district court has rejected the constitutional
claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy
§ 2253 (c) is straightforward: The petitioner must
demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the
district court's assessment of the constitutional claims
debatable or wrong. The issue becomes somewhat more
complicated where . . the district court denies a
habeas petition on procedural grounds. We hold as
follows: When the district court denies a habeas
petition on procedural grounds without reaching the
prisoner's underlying constitutional claim, a COA should
issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of
reason would find it debatable whether the petition
states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional
right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable
whether the district court was correct in its procedural
ruling.
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
This Court has carefully considered Davis's amended petition.
The Court finds that reasonable jurists would not find it debatable
that Davis's claims are foreclosed by clear, binding precedent.
Davis thus fails to make a "substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (c) (2). The Court
therefore concludes that Davis is not entitled to a certificate of
appealability.
VI. Order
For the foregoing reasons, the Amended Petition is DENIED and
this action will be dismissed with prejudice. No certificate of
appealability shall issue.
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The Clerk shall notify all parties and provide them with a
true copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this the 22nd day of May, 2026.
7 SIM LAKE
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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