4:24-cv-00871•Kirksey v. National Multiple Sclerosis Society
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION Trenton Kirksey, Plaintiff, v. National Multiple Sclerosis Society, Defendant. § § § § § § § § § § § Civil Action No. 4:24-cv-00871 MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION On April 2, 2026, Plaintiff Trenton Kirksey filed a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (Dkt. 107) to alter or amend this Court’s final judgment (Dkt. 104) dismissing his claims with prejudice, to which Defendant National Multiple Sclerosis Society (the “Society”) responded, Dkt. 109, and Kirksey replied, Dkt. 110. Kirksey also filed a motion asking the Court to stay execution of costs until his Rule 59(e) motion is resolved, and requests that the Society’s costs be denied. Dkt. 108. The Society filed a response to that motion, Dkt. 111, and Kirksey replied, Dkt. 112. As explained below, both motions should be denied. First, as the Society aptly notes, Dkt. 109, Kirksey’s motion for relief under Rule 59(e) merely reprises the same arguments and contentions that this Court considered and rejected when adopting the undersigned’s United States District Court Southern District of Texas ENTERED May 18, 2026 Nathan Ochsner, Clerk Case 4:24-cv-00871 Document 113 Filed 05/18/26 in TXSD Page 1 of 6
2 recommendation to grant the Society’s motion for summary judgment and dismiss Kirksey’s employment discrimination and retaliation claims. But relief under Rule 59(e) is an “extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly.” Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 396 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 2004)). The Rule 59(e) standard “favor[s] denial of motions to alter or amend a judgment.” S. Constructors Grp., Inc. v. Dynalectric Co., 2 F.3d 606, 611 (5th Cir. 1993). To obtain relief, the movant “must clearly establish either a manifest error of law or fact or must present newly discovered evidence.” Simon v. United States, 891 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1990) (quotations omitted). “[S]uch a motion is not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal theories, or arguments that could have been offered or raised before the entry of judgment.” Templet, 367 F.3d at 479. Kirksey’s Rule 59(e) motion fails to satisfy the strict standard for relief. This Court already rejected Kirksey’s contention that he should be allowed to withdraw his deemed admissions, despite never seeking such relief before the undersigned had already issued an opinion recommending that summary judgment be granted. Compare Dkt. 107 at 1-2 (Kirksey rehashing this contention), with Dkt. 103 at 2 (adopting January 15, 2026 Memorandum and Recommendation, Dkt. 97); Dkt. 99 (Kirksey’s January 29, 2026 motion for leave to file motion to withdraw deemed admissions); Dkt. 100 (order denying Case 4:24-cv-00871 Document 113 Filed 05/18/26 in TXSD Page 2 of 6
3 Kirksey’s January 29, 2026 request to withdraw deemed admissions, Dkt. 99, including because his tardy request would prejudice the Society). That ruling was not erroneous, much less manifestly so. There is no basis for relief under Rule 59(e). Second, Kirksey’s motion requesting that the Society be barred from recovering any of its costs is meritless. Contrary to his assertion, see Dkt. 108 at 1; Dkt. 112 at 2, there is no valid basis to believe that final judgment should be vacated. The Society therefore is the prevailing party that “should be allowed” to recover its costs. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). Kirksey does not challenge any specific item of costs. Those costs were ballooned by Kirksey’s own misconduct, which necessitated multiple repeat deposition settings—and attendant court reporter, videographer, and transcript costs totaling $8,565.88. See Dkt. 101 at 3, 10-11. All of those transcripts and recordings were used for either the summary judgment briefing, or to prepare for a potential trial, see Dkt. 106-1 at 3 (counsel’s supporting declaration), making them necessary and taxable under Rule 54(d)(1). See Clouse v. S. Methodist Univ., 170 F.4th 367, 375 (5th Cir. 2026) (affirming taxation of necessary deposition transcripts and video recordings under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2)). The remaining $324.00 is attributed to costs of retrieving Plaintiff’s tax returns and Social Security records. See Dkt. 106-1 at 15. The costs of procuring those records from third parties are equally Case 4:24-cv-00871 Document 113 Filed 05/18/26 in TXSD Page 3 of 6
4 recoverable because they were relevant to Plaintiff’s asserted damages and necessary to the potential trial. See Dkt. 106-1 at 3. Kirksey does not dispute any of those conclusions. Instead, apart from reprising his flawed merits arguments, Kirksey insists that no costs should be awarded because he brought the action in “good faith” and imposing costs would cause him financial hardship. See Dkt. 108 at 1-2. But Rule 54(d)(1) carries a strong presumption that a prevailing party is entitled to recover its costs. See Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 377 (2013); Cheatham v. Allstate Ins. Co., 465 F.3d 578, 586 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). And the Society is correct that Kirksey’s arguments fail to overcome the presumption favoring its recovery of costs. See Dkt. 111 at 2-8. The Fifth Circuit has made clear that “the losing party’s good faith is alone insufficient to justify the denial of costs to the prevailing party.” Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 795 (5th Cir. 2006) (reversing order that denied costs). And the Fifth Circuit has concluded that “[f]inancial hardship, without more, is not a sufficient reason to deny costs.” Hawkins v. City of Lexington, 2022 WL 671452, at *1 (5th Cir. Mar. 7, 2022) (per curiam) (citing Smith v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 909 F.3d 744, 753 (5th Cir. 2018)). Although Kirksey asserts that imposing costs would “chill” or discourage litigants from bringing future claims, that position does little more than highlight the Society’s greater resources compared to his own. Yet the Fifth Case 4:24-cv-00871 Document 113 Filed 05/18/26 in TXSD Page 4 of 6
5 Circuit admonishes that “reducing or eliminating a prevailing party’s cost award based on its wealth—either relative or absolute—is impermissible as a matter of law.” Moore v. CITGO Refin. & Chems. Co., 735 F.3d 309, 320 (5th Cir. 2013). Neither does Plaintiff’s pro se status exempt him from paying the Society’s costs. See, e.g., Ben-David v. City of Pasadena, 2024 WL 5679065, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2024) (shifting costs to a losing pro se plaintiff who proceeded IFP despite the plaintiff’s asserted good faith and financial hardship). And, as noted, the costs are higher precisely because Kirksey failed to show up for one deposition and behaved improperly during another. See Dkt. 101 at 3, 10-11 (detailing Kirksey’s misconduct). He cannot escape the consequences of that conduct. In short, none of Kirksey’s contentions is sufficient to overcome the presumption entitling the Society to recover its costs. This Court should order Kirksey to pay $8,889.88 in taxable costs to the Society. Recommendation For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff Trenton Kirksey’s Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment (Dkt. 107) be DENIED. It is further RECOMMENDED that Kirksey’s motion to review or retax costs (Dkt. 108) be DENIED, and that the Clerk of Court be ordered to tax costs against Kirksey in the amount of $8,889.88. Case 4:24-cv-00871 Document 113 Filed 05/18/26 in TXSD Page 5 of 6
6 The parties have fourteen days from service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Failure to file timely objections will preclude appellate review of factual findings and legal conclusions, except for plain error. Ortiz v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep’t, 806 F.3d 822, 825 (5th Cir. 2015). Signed on May 18, 2026, at Houston, Texas. ______________________________ Yvonne Y. Ho United States Magistrate Judge Texas. _____________________________________ Yvvvooon nne Y. Hoo United States Magistrate Judge Case 4:24-cv-00871 Document 113 Filed 05/18/26 in TXSD Page 6 of 6
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