Walden-Bing et al v. Horne, LLP et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
United 	States 	of 	America 	ex 	rel.
Amy C. Walden-Bing,
Plaintiff,
v.
Horne, LLP, Deloitte, LLP, Cohn
Reznick, and Witt O’Briens,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 4:23-cv-01792
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 1
Plaintiff Amy C. Walden-Bing, as Relator, brought this qui tam suit
under the False Claims Act. Dkt. 1. After Walden-Bing’s qui tam claims were
dismissed, see Dkt. 66 (adopting Dkt. 53), Walden-Bing filed a motion for leave
to amend her complaint to bring three claims in her personal capacity. Dkt. 58.
She also moved to strike Defendants Horne, LLP’s and Deloitte, LLP’s motions
(Dkts. 48 & 50) for extension of time to answer or otherwise respond to her
complaint. 	Dkt. 57. 	After carefully considering the motions, the responses,
1 “[A] motion for leave to amend that does not dispose of an existing cause of action,
counterclaim, or defense is within a magistrate judge’s authority because it is not
exempted under [28 U.S.C.] § 636 and is non-dispositive as defined by Federal Rule
72.” Macias v. Bexar Cnty., 2023 WL 3103829, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2023) (citing
Pyca Indus., Inc. v. Harrison Cnty. Waste Water Mgmt. Dist., 81 F.3d 1412, 1421 (5th
Cir. 1996)).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
July 20, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Dkts. 60, 61, the reply, Dkt. 63, and the applicable law, it is ordered that
(a) Walden-Bing’s motion for leave to amend (Dkt. 58) be granted in part and
denied in part and (b) her motion to strike (Dkt. 57) be denied as moot.
Background
The following facts are taken as true. 	Walden-Bing was employed by
Horne as a Quality Assurance/Quality Control Specialist to help process
applications for rental assistance under the Texas Rent Relief program, which
is 	federally 	funded. 	Dkt. 	58-1 	at 	2. 	During 	2022, 	she 	“observed 	and
documented” what she believed to be “serious compliance, control failures, and
fraud 	risks 	in 	program 	processing,” 	including 	“funded 	applications 	with
irregularities” and “conflicting property or records information.” Id. at 3. She
reported her concerns to management and human resources, including her
concerns “about the volume of funded fraudulent applications and ongoing
failure to investigate irregularities and reconcile conflicting property records.”
Id. Meanwhile, Walden-Bing made reports to the Office of Inspector General,
the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the U.S. Department of Labor.
Id. 	Walden-Bing was terminated around September 2, 2022. 	Id. at 5. 	Two
months 	later, 	she 	“communicated” 	with 	the 	Office 	of 	Inspector 	General
regarding her concerns and termination. Id.
Walden-Bing originally filed this case as a qui tam action under the False
Claims Act (“FCA”), naming four defendants: Horne, Deloitte, Cohn Reznick,
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and Witt O’Briens. 	Dkt. 1 (filed May 8, 2023). 	The United States of America
(“the Government”) declined to intervene, Dkt. 22, and this case was unsealed,
Dkt. 23. 	Thereafter, Walden-Bing’s attorney moved to withdraw as counsel,
Dkt. 27, which this Court granted, Dkt. 31. 	The Court’s order also extended
Walden-Bing’s deadline for effectuating service of process. See Dkt. 31 at 1-2.
On December 8, 2025, Walden-Bing—acting pro se—filed an amended
complaint asserting that Horne and Deloitte violated the False Claims Act, 31
U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B), (a)(1)(G) (Counts I through III) and raising
claims for payment by mistake (Count IV), unjust enrichment (Count V) and
negligence (Count VI). 	Dkt. 42 at 23-26. 	Defendants Cohn Reznick and Witt
O’Briens were dropped from the amended complaint. See id. at 1.
The Government then intervened solely to seek dismissal of the FCA
claims, which a pro se litigant cannot pursue on the Government’s behalf. See
Dkts. 45, 46. This Court agreed, dismissing the FCA claims on that basis but
also dismissing Walden-Bing’s common-law claims for lack of standing. 	Dkt.
66 (adopting Dkt. 53).
The Court also denied, without prejudice, Walden-Bing’s barebones
request for leave to amend, instructing Walden-Bing to file a standalone
motion for leave that included a proposed amended pleading stating her new
claims. 	Dkt. 53 at 11. 	Separately, the Court granted Horne’s and Deloitte’s
motions to extend the deadline to answer or otherwise respond to Walden-
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Bing’s amended complaint. Dkt. 49 (December 29, 2025 order granting Horne’s
motion); Dkt. 53 at 12 (January 6, 2026 order granting Deloitte’s motion).
After this Court granted the extensions, Walden-Bing filed a motion to strike
those requests. Dkt. 57 (filed January 7, 2026).
On January 13, 2026, Walden-Bing moved for leave to file a second
amended 	complaint. 	Dkt. 	58. 	Her 	proposed 	pleading 	(the 	“proposed
complaint”) drops all previous claims and asserts a retaliation claim under the
False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730, a retaliation claim under the National
Defense Authorization Act’s (“NDAA”) whistleblower provision, 41 U.S.C.
§ 4712, and an alternative wrongful discharge claim under Texas law. Dkt. 58-
1 at 6-7. 	Both Horne and Deloitte oppose Walden-Bing’s motion for leave to
amend. Dkt. 60 (Horne’s response); Dkt. 61 (Deloitte’s response). Walden-Bing
replied to Horne’s response. Dkt. 63. The motions are ripe for resolution.
Legal Standard
Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure provides that a party
may amend her pleading once as a matter of course. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1).
Otherwise, a “party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s
consent or the court’s leave,” which the court should freely give “when justice
so requires.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). 	This rule “evinces a bias in favor of
granting leave to amend.” 	Jones v. Robinson Prop. Grp., L.P., 427 F.3d 987,
994 (5th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). 	The relevant factors include “[(1)]
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whether permitting the pleading would cause undue delay in the proceedings
or undue prejudice to the nonmovant, [(2)] the movant is acting in bad faith or
with dilatory motive, [(3)] the movant has previously failed to cure deficiencies
by prior pleadings, or [(4)] the proposed pleading is futile in that it adds
nothing of substance to the original allegations or is not germane to the original
cause of action.” 	Lewis v. Knutson, 	699 F.2d 	230, 239 	(5th Cir. 1983).
Amendment would be futile if a proposed new claim or allegations “could not
survive a motion to dismiss” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Rio Grande Royalty Co. v. Energy Transfer Partners, L.P., 620 F.3d 465, 468
(5th Cir. 2010).
Analysis
As both Horne and Deloitte observe, it is unclear whether Walden-Bing
intends to assert claims against Deloitte in her proposed complaint. 	Because
Walden-Bing’s proposed complaint contains no factual allegations concerning
Deloitte that would state a plausible claim for relief, Walden-Bing’s motion for
leave to amend is denied against Deloitte.
The conclusion differs as to Walden-Bing’s proposed new claims against
Horne. As explained below, the proposed complaint plausibly states FCA and
NDAA retaliation claims, although not a cognizable wrongful discharge claim.
And given this case’s procedural posture, Walden-Bing should be allowed to
raise the FCA and NDAA retaliation claims when doing so would not unduly
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prejudice Horne. 	Walden-Bing’s other pending motion to strike (Dkt. 57) is
denied as moot.
I. 	The proposed complaint does not state a claim against Deloitte.
Walden-Bing’s 	proposed 	complaint 	does 	not 	state 	a 	claim 	against
Deloitte, and Deloitte should be dismissed. 	As both Horne and Deloitte
observe, see Dkt. 60 at 10; Dkt. 61 at 2, the proposed complaint contains mixed
signals about her intent to assert claims against Deloitte. 	The pleading’s
caption lists only Horne as the “Defendant,” yet it states more broadly that
“Plaintiff alleges that additional named Defendants acted in concert or within
the relevant program operations ….” 	Dkt. 58-1 at 2. 	Nevertheless, the only
other mention of Deloitte asserts that “Plaintiff understood that Deloitte was
also engaged on the program as a subcontractor with responsibilities related
to audit and/or oversight functions, and that Deloitte billed the program for
those services.” 	Id. at 3. 	That lone statement comes nowhere close to stating
any plausible claim against Deloitte. Because the proposed complaint’s claims
against Deloitte could not survive a motion to dismiss, those claims are futile.
Walden-Bing is barred from asserting any claim against Deloitte.
II. 	Walden-Bing may amend her complaint to assert only two of her
three proposed claims against Horne.
Horne 	argues 	that 	amendment 	would 	be 	futile 	because 	venue 	is
improper and because Walden-Bing fails to state any of her claims. Horne also
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contends that granting Walden-Bing leave to amend would unduly prejudice
it. The Court agrees that Walden-Bing fails to state a wrongful discharge claim
and therefore denies her request for leave to raise it. 	But Horne’s arguments
against allowing Walden-Bing to raise the FCA and NDAA retaliation claims
are unpersuasive.
A. 	Venue objections do not inform the analysis.
Horne claims amendment would be futile because venue is improper
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3). 	Dkt. 60 at 11-14. 	But as
Walden-Bing observes, see Dkt. 63 at 3, “futility is not dependent upon venue
considerations.” 	See Shoes by Firebug LLC v. Stride Rite Child.’s Grp., LLC,
2017 WL 4682092, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 2017). Rather, futility exists when
the amended complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted” when applying the “same standard of legal sufficiency as applie[d]
under Rule 12(b)(6).” 	Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., LLC, 234 F.3d 863, 873
(5th Cir. 2000). Venue challenges provide no basis for denying leave to amend.
B. 	The FCA retaliation claim is not futile.
Horne contends that Walden-Bing fails to state an FCA retaliation claim
and that such a claim would be time-barred. 	Dkt. 60 at 14-18. 	The Court
disagrees.
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1. 	Walden-Bing has stated an FCA retaliation claim.
The purpose of the FCA is to combat fraud against the government.
Robertson v. Bell Helicopter Textron, 32 F.3d 948, 951 (5th Cir. 1994). “To that
end, the FCA contains a whistleblower provision that protects employees who
take steps to uncover and report an employer’s fraudulent submission of claims
to the government.” Jamison v. Fluor Fed. Sols., LLC, 2019 WL 460304, at *4
(N.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2019) (quotation omitted). 	An FCA retaliation claim has
three elements: “(1) the employee ‘engaged in protected activity,’ (2) the
‘employer, or the entity with which he has contracted or serves as an agent,
knew about the protected activity,’ and (3) ‘retaliat[ed] … because of his
protected activity.” United States ex rel. King v. Solvay Pharms., Inc., 871 F.3d
318, 332 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (quoting United States ex rel. Bias v.
Tangipahoa Par. Sch. Bd., 816 F.3d 315, 323 (5th Cir. 2016)).
Contrary to Horne’s assertions, 	see 	Dkt. 60 at 16-17, 	Walden-Bing
sufficiently alleged that she engaged in protected activity known to Horne. To
satisfy the protected activity requirement, an employee need not have filed a
qui tam action at the time of the alleged retaliation; “[i]t is enough that the
conduct raises a ‘distinct possibility’ of an FCA action or otherwise seeks to
stop fraud against the government.” 	United States ex rel. Gomez v. Koman
Constr., LLC, 796 F. Supp. 3d 353, 383 (W.D. Tex. 2025) (quoting Nichols v.
Baylor Rsch. Inst., 418 F. Supp. 3d 143, 153 (N.D. Tex. 2019)). 	Internal
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complaints 	may 	qualify 	as 	protected 	activity 	if 	they 	“concern 	false 	or
fraudulent claims for payment submitted to the government.” 	United States
ex rel. George v. Boston Sci. Corp., 864 F. Supp. 2d 597, 605 (S.D. Tex. 2012)
(citing United States ex rel. Patton v. Shaw Servs., LLC, 418 F. App’x 366, 372
(5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam)). 	“The touchstone is whether the employee’s
complaint was ‘motivated’ by concern over fraud on the government.” 	Gomez,
796 F. Supp. 3d at 383 (quotation omitted). 	But “[m]ere criticism of an
employer’s practices—without any indication that the relator sought to expose
fraud on the government—does not qualify.” Id. (quotation omitted). And “[a]
successful 	retaliation 	claim 	requires 	Defendant 	to 	have 	known 	Plaintiff
engaged in a protected activity.” 	Guerrero v. Total Renal Care, Inc., 2012 WL
899228, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 2012).
Here, Walden-Bing adequately alleged that she engaged in protected
activity. 	She 	alleges 	that 	she 	“observed 	and 	documented 	… 	serious
compliance, control failures, and fraud risks in program processing … [which]
created a substantial risk that ineligible or unverified applications could be
approved and funded.” 	Dkt. 58-1 at 3. 	She raised those “fraud-indicator
concerns to supervisors and/or management,” recommended that “suspicious
files be escalated, investigated, or removed from production,” and requested
“corrective 	action 	to 	align 	file 	handling 	with 	program 	rules 	and
audit/compliance expectations.” 	Id. at 3-4. 	And she “reported … concerns
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about the volume of funded fraudulent applications and ongoing failures to
investigate irregularities and reconcile conflicting property records.” 	Id. at 4.
Because 	her 	alleged 	complaints 	“concern 	false 	or 	fraudulent 	claims 	for
payment submitted to the government,” Walden-Bing has plausibly alleged the
first element of a retaliation claim. 	See Patton, 418 F. App’x at 372; see also
Guerrero v. Total Renal Care, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 2d 769, 788 (W.D. Tex. 2013)
(“Plaintiff’s explicit reference to ‘Medicare/Medicaid fraud’ was sufficiently
aimed at matters that could reasonably lead to a False Claims Act litigation to
trigger the FCA’s anti-retaliation provisions.”) (quotation omitted).
Walden-Bing also 	sufficiently alleges that Horne had notice of her
protected activity. 	“Courts have found the notice prong satisfied based on
allegations that the employee complained directly to her supervisors.” George,
864 F. Supp. 2d at 608. 	“[I]f an employee wants to impute knowledge to the
employer … [s]he must specifically tell the employer that [s]he is concerned
about possible fraud.” 	Id. 	Here, Walden-Bing allegedly reported her fraud
concerns to Horne’s management and human resources personnel. 	Dkt. 58-1
at 4. She has plausibly alleged the second element of a retaliation claim.
Lastly, Horne argues that Walden-Bing did not adequately plead the
final element of her FCA retaliation claim—that she was discharged for
engaging in protected activity. 	Dkt. 60 at 17-18. 	Walden-Bing’s proposed
complaint 	asserts 	that 	“[t]he 	temporal 	proximity 	and 	surrounding
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circumstances support a plausible inference that Plaintiff’s protected activity”
caused her termination. 	Dkt. 58-1 at 5. 	Horne contends that Walden-Bing
fails to allege when she was allegedly engaged in protected activity and that
temporal proximity alone is insufficient to establish causation. Dkt. 60 at 18.
And it argues that Walden-Bing failed to allege who was involved in her
termination and whether they were aware of her protected activity. Id.
Walden-Bing 	does 	not 	specify 	the 	precise 	dates 	of 	her 	internal
complaints. See Dkt. 58-1 at 4. At the prima facie stage, “a plaintiff can meet
[her] burden of causation simply by showing close enough timing between [her]
protected activity and [her] adverse employment action.” Garcia v. Prof’l Cont.
Servs., Inc., 938 F.3d 236, 243 (5th Cir. 2019). 	While not a rigid inquiry, the
Fifth Circuit has “even suggested that four months is close enough” to show a
causal connection. Id.
Here, Walden-Bing alleges that she complained to both management and
human resources. Dkt. 58-1 at 7. Because she was allegedly transferred to the
Texas Rent Relief program in June 2022 and was terminated on or about
September 2, 2022, those complaints must have less than four months after
she lodged those complaints. Dkt. 58-1 at 2, 5. That timing is close enough, at
this stage, to suggest a causal link between the two events. 	See Garcia, 938
F.3d at 243. 	Moreover, “it is plausible to conclude that those who made the
adverse employment decision were told of [Walden-Bing’s] activity, regardless
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of whether [she] directly reported her concerns to them or not.” See Nichols v.
Baylor Res. Inst., 2020 WL 1158456, at *11 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2020). 	Her
allegations are sufficient to plead a cognizable basis for recovery.
2. 	Walden-Bing’s FCA retaliation claim relates back to her
original complaint.
As an alternative futility argument, Horne contends that Walden-Bing’s
FCA 	retaliation 	claim—which 	complains 	of 	her 	September 	2, 	2022
termination, see Dkt. 58-1 at 7—is untimely and does not relate back to her
May 	8, 	2023 	original 	complaint. 	Dkt. 	60 	at 	15-16; 	see 	also 	31 	U.S.C.
§ 3730(h)(3) (3-year limitations period for FCA retaliation claims). 	Walden-
Bing responds that her claim does relate back because it arises from the same
conduct, transaction, or occurrence detailed in her original complaint. Dkt. 63
at 3. Walden-Bing has the better argument.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) provides, in pertinent part, that
“[a]n amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading
when … the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in the
original pleading ….” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B). To fall within that rule, “the
original and amended petitions [must] state claims that are tied to a common
core of operative facts ….” Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 664 (2005).
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Horne argues that the original complaint did not put it on notice of a
potential FCA retaliation claim because, “although the original complaint
mentioned retaliation in passing, [it] did so while citing the NDAA, not the
retaliation provision in the FCA.” 	Dkt. 60 at 15. 	But whether the relation-
back doctrine applies depends on the factual assertions in Walden-Bing’s
original complaint, and not the legal theory she invoked.
According to the original complaint, Walden-Bing saw Horne funding
“fraudulent applications … that did NOT meet eligibility requirements as
established by the Emergency Rental Assistance program,” she flagged those
applications 	for 	her 	supervisors 	in 	July 	and 	August 	2022, 	and 	Horne
terminated her employment shortly after she emailed human resources on
August 26, 2022, complaining of the “funding of fraudulent applications.” Dkt.
1 at 7, 9-10. 	Walden-Bing’s proposed FCA retaliation claim arises out of the
same set of facts concerning her alleged reporting of the same irregularities
that purportedly led to false or unsupported claims for payment. Compare with
Dkt. 58 at 3-4. 	Because the retaliation claim relates back to her original
complaint, it is timely. Amendment would not be futile.
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C. 	The NDAA retaliation claim is not futile.
Horne contends that Walden-Bing’s proposed NDAA retaliation claim
(Dkt. 58-1 at 7-8) is futile because she has not exhausted her administrative
remedies and her allegations are otherwise inadequate. Dkt. 60 at 18-19. This
Court is not persuaded.
The NDAA “prohibits any recipient of federal dollars from retaliating
against whistleblowers who report an abuse of that money.” Tex. Educ. Agency
v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 992 F.3d 350, 353 (5th Cir. 2021); 41 U.S.C. § 4712(a)(1).
Because “[t]he NDAA is a relatively newer statute with scant interpretative
case law … courts evaluating NDAA retaliation claims often draw upon the
analytical frameworks of other whistleblower provisions.” Beltran v. Lockheed
Martin Corp., 2026 WL 788905, at *1 n.2 (5th Cir. Mar. 20, 2026) (per curiam)
(quotation omitted). 	A prima facie case of NDAA retaliation requires that
“(1) [the employee] made a protected disclosure to a person specified in the
statute; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) the protected
disclosure 	was 	a 	contributing 	factor 	in 	the 	adverse 	employment 	action.”
Beltran v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 2026 WL 788905, at *1 (5th Cir. Mar. 20,
2026) (per curiam) (cleaned up).
First, Horne argues that Walden-Bing’s NDAA retaliation claim is futile
because she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. 	Dkt. 60 at 19; see
also Robertson v. Intratek Computer, Inc., 976 F.3d 575, 580 (5th Cir. 2020)
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(“Section 4712 requires a complainant … to exhaust administrative remedies
before filing suit.”). 	Horne notes that, while Walden-Bing alleges that she
“reported” alleged wrongdoing to the Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”),
she state that she submitted a retaliation complaint to the OIG. Dkt. 60 at 19.
Walden-Bing 	responds 	that 	the 	proposed 	complaint 	plausibly 	alleges
administrative exhaustion by asserting she “communicated” with the OIG that
she had been terminated after reporting the fraudulent applications. 	Dkt. 63
at 4; Dkt. 58-1 at 5.
“[A]dministrative 	exhaustion 	is 	typically 	treated 	as 	an 	affirmative
defense—not a pleading requirement for plaintiffs.” 	Thomas v. Hutson, 2025
WL 903131, at *1 (E.D. La. Mar. 25, 2025) (Section 4712 exhaustion) (collecting
cases). “The failure to exhaust must be ‘clear from the face of the complaint’ to
support Rule 12 dismissal.” 	Id. (quoting Coleman v. Sweetin, 745 F.3d 756,
763 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam)). 	Here, however, it is unclear whether
Walden-Bing’s alleged communication to OIG about her termination qualifies
as a complaint that satisfies exhaustion requirements. As a result, this Court
cannot conclude, based on the pleading alone, that the NDAA claim would be
futile for failure to exhaust it.
Second, Horne argues that Walden-Bing’s NDAA retaliation claim is
“conclusory,” and that she “merely restate[s]” its legal elements. Dkt. 60 at 19.
But the same allegations deemed sufficient in the FCA context also plausibly
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state an NDAA retaliation claim. 	Walden-Bing allegedly reported concerns
about funding fraudulent applications to Horne’s management and human
resources. Dkt. 58-1 at 4; see also 41 U.S.C. § 4712(2)(G) (persons specified in
the 	statute 	includes 	“[a] 	management 	official 	or 	other 	employee 	of 	the
contractor, subcontractor, grantee, subgrantee, or personal services contractor
who has the responsibility to investigate, discover, or address misconduct”).
And she alleges that the temporal proximity of her report and her eventual
termination support a plausible inference that her protected disclosure was a
contributing and motivating factor in her termination. 	Id. at 5. 	Those
allegations are enough to state an NDAA retaliation claim.
D. 	The wrongful discharge claim is futile.
Horne argues that Walden-Bing fails to state a wrongful discharge claim
under Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985).
Dkt. 60 at 20-21. Horne is correct.
To recover on a Texas common-law wrongful discharge claim, a plaintiff
must show that (1) she was required to commit an illegal act that carries
criminal penalties; (2) she refused; (3) she was discharged; and (4) the sole
reason for her discharge was her refusal to commit the unlawful act. White v.
FCI USA, Inc., 319 F.3d 672, 676 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Sabine Pilot, 687
S.W.2d at 735)). 	But as Horne observes, see Dkt. 60 at 20-21, Walden-Bing
fails to allege that she was required to commit an illegal act. While she alleges
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that her work included “reviewing program applications and files in connection
with ERA grant-funded operations” and that, over the course of that work, she
“observed and documented … serious compliance, control failures, and fraud
risks,” nowhere does she allege that she was required to engage in any illegal
act or perpetrate the alleged fraud she observed. Nor does she allege that she
refused to engage in any illegal act, or that her refusal was the sole reason for
her discharge. 	Because the proposed complaint fails to state a wrongful
discharge claim, this Court denies Walden-Bing’s request for leave to raise it.
E. 	Horne will not suffer undue prejudice from amendment.
Horne argues that granting Walden-Bing leave to amend would unduly
prejudice 	it. 	Dkt. 	60 at 21-22. 	Walden-Bing 	disagrees, noting that no
scheduling order has been entered and discovery has yet to begin. 	Dkt. 63 at
4. The posture of this case supports allowing amendment.
“The Fifth Circuit and other courts have found prejudice when the
amendment is asserted after the close of discovery; after dispositive motions
have been filed, briefed, or decided; or on the eve of or in the middle of trial.”
Susca, Inc. v. Burlington Ins. Co., 2025 WL 1283995, at *3 (E.D. La. May 2,
2025) (collecting cases). This case was only unsealed on July 18, 2025. Dkt. 23.
The initial conference has not been set nor has discovery commenced. 	While
Walden-Bing’s new retaliation claims change the case’s focus, permitting them
at this early juncture would not force Horne to “reopen discovery and prepare
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additional theories of the case,” see Smith v. EMC Corp., 393 F.3d 590, 596 (5th
Cir. 2004), or “to re-urge the same arguments presented in previous dispositive
motions,” see Bias, 816 F.3d at 328. 	Horne has not established the type of
prejudice that justifies denying leave to amend. 	Walden-Bing’s motion for
leave to amend is therefore granted, but only with respect to the FCA and
NDAA retaliation claims.
III. 	Walden-Bing’s motion to strike is denied as moot.
On January 9, 2026, Walden-Bing moved to strike Horne’s and Deloitte’s
motions (Dkts. 48 & 50) for extension of time to respond to her first amended
complaint. 	Dkt. 57. 	But the Court had already granted both Horne’s and
Deloitte’s motions. 	See Dkt. 49 (December 29, 2025 order granting Horne’s);
Dkt. 53 at 12 (January 6, 2023 order granting Deloitte’s). 	Walden-Bing’s
motion to strike is denied as moot.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that Amy C. Walden-Bing’s
motion to strike (Dkt. 57) be DENIED as moot.
It is further ORDERED that Walden-Bing’s motion for leave to amend
her complaint (Dkt. 58) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
Walden-Bing is GRANTED leave to amend her complaint to include FCA and
NDAA retaliation claims against Horne, LLP, but is DENIED leave to assert
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any claims against Deloitte, LLP and DENIED leave to assert a Texas
common law wrongful discharge claim.
It is further ORDERED that Walden-Bing must file, by July 27, 2026,
a version of her second amended complaint that eliminates her claims against
Deloitte and her state-law wrongful discharge claim against Horne.
It is further ORDERED that the initial conference is hereby set for
August 18, 2026 at 9:00 a.m., by Zoom. 	Walden-Bing and Horne are
reminded that they must fully confer about and then jointly file the Joint
Discovery Case Management Plan at least 14 days before that conference.
The Clerk of Court is directed to send a copy of this opinion to Plaintiff
by email and regular mail to her record addresses.
Signed on July 20, 2026, at Houston, Texas.
______________________________
Yvonne Y. Ho
United States Magistrate Judge
Texas.
_____________________________________
Yvvooon	nne Y. Ho
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 4:23-cv-01792 Document 68 Filed 07/20/26 in TXSD Page 19 of 19